نشریه آموزه های فلسفه اسلامی
سال هجدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 32، بهار و تابستان 1402)

The moral threshold is regarded as the limit of true happiness. The aim of this research is to conclude this threshold from the statements of Shahīd Moṭahharī, considering the nature of moral reality through a descriptive-analytical method. He perceives the nature of moral reality as religious and based on conscious worship, which cannot exist without belief in monotheism, that is, the moral threshold. It seems that Shahīd Moṭahharī’s expression in proving the nature of moral reality, which embodies religious ethics, requires a corrective and supplementary explanation regarding its foundations and implications. In this way, according to the special characteristics of human beings, the truth of morality should be considered for rational human beings. Based on the pursuit of perfection, humans place nearness (Arabic: قرب) to absolute perfection as the object of their reasoning, discovering their need in understanding their relationship with the Absolute Perfection. Consequently, in light of this awareness, they engage in behavior that corresponds to that need, which is the expression of that need and gratitude towards the Giver of it, what Shahīd Moṭahharī refers to as conscious worship.

A In a collection of articles titled “Sabziwārī Studies,” published by Iranian Book and Literature Home with the claim of introducing the opinions and works of Ḥakīm Sabziwārī, an article titled “Ḥakīm Sabziwārī’s Interaction with the Legacy of Extravagant Narrative Tendencies” has been published. In addition to the title, which conveys and implies prejudice and clearly displays its contentious nature toward the domain of great figures in Islamic philosophy, the entire writing is filled with accusations, doubts, audacity, and disrespect toward philosophical and mystical thought, as well as the realm of verified philosophers and mystics, particularly Ḥakīm Sabziwārī. The mentioned writing, under the pretext of critique, has become a means for satisfying and promoting the literalism of those whom its author represents. It is evident that philosophical thought itself is the standard-bearer (flagbearer) of critique, with the structure of its discussions and research being composed of scientific and logical critiques of ideas. Scientific and logical criticism has criteria and is far from disrespect. This analysis, with a critical and analytical perspective, examines the claims of that writing, especially the accusation of extremism (Arabic: و ل and ,)غ reevaluates the criteria and boundaries of extremism (Arabic: و ل .(

Undoubtedly, the question of proving the existence and attributes of God has consistently been a central concern for philosophers and theologians. Consequently, numerous arguments, such as the argument of motion (Arabic: حرکه), the argument of creation (Arabic: حدوث, romanized: ḥudūth), the cosmological argument, and the argument of the ontological argument (burhān-i ṣiddiqīn), have been proposed to establish the essence of a necessary being. These arguments can be categorized into two main groups: “cosmological” and “ontological”. They vary in terms of precision and strength (validity) in establishing both God’s essence and His attributes. The comprehensiveness, correctness, and value of any claim or belief depend on the validity and scope of the reasoning provided to support it. Given the variations in the scope of implication and the range of proof offered by each argument, this research undertakes a comparative analysis of the aforementioned arguments and we demonstrate that the argument of the ontological argument (Burhān-i Ṣiddiqīn), while being among the most significant and comprehensive proofs for God’s existence, possesses a broader scope of signification regarding the demonstration of Divine names and attributes compared to cosmological arguments. Thus, this argument uniquely suffices in proving both the existence of God and all His attributes, eliminating the need for additional arguments.

There is no doubt that humans are beings of dignity; however, there is disagreement about what dignity is and what its origin is. Some have referred to individuals’ social status as dignity or its origin, while others have mentioned resembling God or possessing reason (intellect). The concept of dignity based on the Islamic philosophical doctrines is a type of secondary intelligible (Arabic: معقول الثانی, romanized: maʿqūl al-thānī) and its origin of abstraction is the capacities of the rational (reasonable) soul (Arabic: النفس الناطقه). The question is, does the rational soul possess the necessary capacities for the abstraction of dignity, and what are those capacities? We have demonstrated in this paper in an analytical-descriptive manner that the rational soul, from the perspective of Islamic philosophy, possesses extraordinarily complex capacities. In addition to having vegetative and animal capacities, it also possesses other capacities that aid it in the path towards angelic transformation. These capacities have caused Muslim philosophers to describe human beings with dignity and the like in various places of their works. From the perspective of Islamic philosophy, firstly, human beings possess dignity. Furthermore, the source of dignity is the entirety of the capacities of the rational soul. In addition, dignity is an inherent and universal matter. Lastly, dignity is a concept that can be understood in gradation and does not apply equally in all cases. Familiarity with the factors that strengthen human dignity, as well as an understanding of the challenges and obstacles to human dignity, is another outcome of this writing.

Allāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī (Arabic: ی ائ ب اط ب ه ط م ال ع (categorizes philosophy into Divine and non-Divine branches, with Divine philosophy further divided into Islamic philosophy and non-Islamic philosophy. The divine nature of philosophy from his perspective is related to the proof of God’s existence. However, the distinguishing feature of the Divine philosophy of Islam compared to others lies in the concept derived from God’s existence. He posits that if Divine philosophy successfully demonstrates the proof of absolute monotheism (or applied and famous and known for all), acknowledging that God’s existence is pure and unbounded by any limitations, even transcending the notion of absoluteness, it will be categorized as philosophy pertaining to Islam; otherwise, it will not qualify as such. In contrast, ʾĀyatu llāh Jawādī Āmulī (Arabic: لی الله جوادی آم ه (آی perceives the Islamic nature of sciences, including philosophy, in a general sense (broader context). Islam, in this general context, means the pursuit and acceptance of truth. Therefore, one cannot issue a ruling (Arabic: و ت ,ف ی romanized: fatawā, lit.: a legal or Islamic ruling) about the Islamic nature of a philosophy merely based on the philosopher or philosophical text; instead, each philosophical or scientific issue must be examined individually. If it aligns with truth and reality, it is Islamic; if it contradicts truth, it is not. The central focus of this research is to identify instances of Islamic philosophy among recognized existing philosophies. This research employs a documentary approach for gathering material and processes it through analytical and logical writing, addressing the implications of these two perspectives and exploring them further.

The discussion of egoism versus altruism, or benevolence, is a significant topic in contemporary ethical philosophy. Egoism is categorized into psychological egoism and ethical egoism. From the perspective of psychological egoism, as a descriptive theory, humans perform every action to maximize their personal benefits. In contrast, ethical egoism, as a prescriptive theory, posits that humans ought to act to achieve the greatest personal benefits. ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s works contain phrases that could be interpreted as indicative of both psychological and ethical egoism. In this article, we will examine the claims and arguments of egoists while comparing their perspectives with those of ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī (Arabic: علامه طباطبائی). We will demonstrate that, despite certain similarities with psychological and ethical egoism, his views are fundamentally distinct. From his teachings, a different form of egoism can be derived, termed metaphysical egoism. ʿAllāma’s metaphysical egoism presents a defensible theory in response to the main criticisms against ethical egoism, namely the conflict of interests and the logical inconsistency.

Although the essence of will, as one of the most significant existential perfections of the Almighty (Truth, The), is an established and undeniable fact, there are differences of opinion among Muslim philosophers regarding its nature, how it is attributed, and its characteristics, such as whether it is intrinsic or actual. Some philosophers, by attributing “will” to Divine knowledge, regard it as one of the essential attributes, equating it with the knowledge of the most perfect order (system). In contrast, others, referring to transmitted texts, classify “will” as one of the attributes of the actions of the Almighty. Finally, some believe that the “will” has levels and has both essential and actual levels. In the aḥādīth (Arabic: احادیث, singular: ḥadīth, meaning traditions and narrations, Arabic: روایات, romanized: riwayāt), some of the meanings of the “will” have been proven to God and some of its meanings have been denied by the Almighty. The research question is whether a clear and acceptable explanation of the will of the Almighty can be presented by analyzing the voluntary actions of humans, which are among the closest and most significant means of understanding the essence and attributes of God. We have concluded through an analytical approach in response to this question, that some voluntary actions of humans are mediated and indicative of deficiency, and the traditions negating “will” pertain to this type of “will” in relation to God. Conversely, some actions of the soul (self) are unmediated and indicative of perfection. Based on this understanding, we can argue for the intrinsic (essential) will of God as the Divine desire that corresponds to the knowledge of the most perfect order (system), which is the origin of the emanation of the universe. Furthermore, the actual will of God is identical to the objective essence of things, and things, in their very known nature, correspond to the divine intention.

This research, using a descriptive-analytical approach, explains the factors leading to intuitive certainty (Arabic: یقین الحضوری, lit.: certainty by vision) from the perspective of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy and the tafsīrs (Arabic: تفاسیر, romanized: tafāsīr) al-Ṣāfī (Arabic: الصافی) and al-Mīzān (Arabic: المیزان). The aim of this article is to examine the extent to which Ṣadrā’s philosophy aligns with the interpretations of his commentators in the factors leading to intuitive certainty, and the applicability of this perspective in the exegesis of the Qurʾān. Ultimately, it is revealed that the tafāsīr (plural form of tafsīr, Arabic: تفسیر), in analyzing the factors of intuitive certainty, consider three domains: the relationship of intuitive knowledge (Arabic: علم الحضوری, lit.: knowledge by presence or presential knowledge) with the knower and the known, the knower, and the agent of knowledge (Arabic: العلم, romanized: al-ʿilm). Although they use Ṣadrian principles such as the primacy (principle) of existence (Arabic: اصاله الوجود), gradation (Arabic: تشکیک), and substantial motion, this application generally remains at the foundational level. In other words, the tafāsīr content themselves with comprehensive of the relationship of the knower to the known and the moral and behavioral journey of the knower in receiving the investment of intuitive certainty from its origins. They do not address other aspects of the relationship that create certainty in relation to the knower, nor do they delve into the gradation in existence and substantial motion in analyzing (tautologous) the knower, its source, and its relation to the factor of knowledge. Therefore, despite their emphasis on using rational foundations, tafāsīr do not apply these principles in all levels of analyzing intuitive certainty. Thus, the philosophical approach to analyzing intuitive certainty is merely one method among others, without predominance, in these two Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentators’ interpretations.

The truth and nature of beauty, as a secondary intelligible (Arabic: معقول الثانی, romanized: maʿqūl al-thānī), have become a topic of discussion among philosophers. In the present study, employing an analytical-comparative method, the truth of beauty and its relationship with pleasure and goodness from the perspectives of Plotinus and Avicenna (Arabic: إبن سینا, romanized: Ibn Sīnā) are examined. It is demonstrated that the thoughts of these two philosophers, despite foundational differences in their metaphysical bases, have significant similarities in this specific area. Although Plotinus recognizes a specific role for proportion and symmetry in the beauty of sensible things influenced by the Platonic tradition, he does not consider this to be the cause or the main criterion of beauty. Instead, he seeks the criterion of sensible beauty among its intelligible causes, with the absolute Good or goodness at the forefront, and regards sensible beauty as a shadow of intelligible beauty. Although Avicenna does not believe in the theory of exemplarism (exemplary ideas), he believes that the cause and criterion of beauty is the perfection of a being. According to Ibn Sina, both beauty itself and the power to perceive beauty are rooted in the perfection of existence. Therefore, the Intellects (Arabic: عقول, romanized: ʿAqūl), which are above the sensible world (the sensible world), possess a higher degree of beauty, and the Necessarily-Existing (Arabic: واجب الوجود, romanized: Wājib al-Wujūd, lit.: Necessary Being), which is absolute perfection, is at the pinnacle of beauty and grandeur, while at the same time possessing the most complete perception of beauty.

One of the examples of the intuitive knowledge (Arabic: علم الحضوری, lit.: knowledge by presence or presential knowledge) is “self-consciousness”. There are two important epistemological questions regarding this concept: First, do we have a consciousness of a reality called “self”? Second, is this consciousness infallible, accurately reflecting the reality of “self” as it is, or could “consciousness of self” be at odds with the “objective self”? There are two basic innovative points in response to these two issues that are considered in this article. First, Muslim philosophers recognize a hierarchy for the knowledge of the “self,” in which the most basic and fundamental aspect of consciousness regarding the “self” is the “perception of the self.” This approach plays an important role in countering the deniers of the “conscious self.” Second, from this perspective, the only way to discuss the most fundamental level of knowing the “self” (the understanding of the self) is to describe one’s consciousness with the aid of descriptive reason. Within the framework of these two points, it can be said that, first, there is a consciousness of the “perceiving self,” and second, the Muslim philosopher, as a deep foundational thinker, regards this consciousness as a “reality.” Due to the unity of consciousness and reality, he concludes that the “epistemic awareness of the self” cannot deviate from the “objective self.” Moreover, considering the “epistemic awareness of the self” and the “objective self” as one is not merely a matter of convention, but rather relies on the content of “consciousness of self” (the understanding of the self).

Among the aḥādīth (Arabic: احادیث, singular: ḥadīth, meaning traditions and narrations, Arabic: وا یات ر, romanized: riwayāt), there are those attributed to the Prophet ṣallā llāhu ʿalayhī wa-ʾālihī wa-sallam and Ahl al-Bayt (Arabic: ل ه ا ٱ ت ی ب ل (ʿalayhim al-ṣalātu wal-salām that address doctrinal, philosophical, and mystical themes. These narrations have been cited in various forms across jurisprudential, narrative, exegetical, mystical, philosophical, theological, and ethical works. Among these is the narration “I spend the night with my Lord, and He feeds and drinks ت ابی :Arabic” (me عند ربی ی ن م طع ی و ی ق ینی س , romanized: “Abītu ʿinda Rabbī yuṭʿimunī wa yasqīnī”). The research question is: What is meant by the status of “being near” (Arabic: ند ع یه , romanized: ʿindīyya) and passing and spending the night with the Lord (Arabic: ه توت ی ب, romanized: Baytūta), and the relation (object) of “eating and drinking” in the ḥadīth? This article employs a descriptive-analytical method to examine the authenticity, implications, and content of the mentioned ḥadīth. It clarifies that, based on rational and traditional evidence from credible narrations, this ḥadīth is rooted in rational principles and legal foundations, and is aligned with logical and consistent usages without the need for interpretation or hesitation. Although various opinions based on differing juridical interpretations have emerged, it can be concluded, in accordance with the principle of the spirit of meaning and the stipulation (position) of words to general meanings, that the ḥadīth conveys a profound mystical and philosophical understanding: that food and drink possess different material and spiritual levels. Whenever a person frees from worldly attachments and attains the Divine nearness (nearness to God) and “being near” (Arabic: ند ع یه , romanized: ʿindīyya) to the Lord, their food and drink at that level become light and knowledge, rendering them independent of worldly sustenance.

The issues and questions of knowledge (Arabic: العلم, romanized: al-ʿilm) discuss the accidents (Arabic: عوارض) and rulings (aḥkām, Arabic: احکام “rulings”, plural of ḥukm “حکم”) of the subject specific to that knowledge. Among the strengths of knowledge and the presentation of scientific issues in educational texts are the preservation of the subject, the maintenance of discussions within the scope of accidents, and the determination of the appropriate position of each issue in the technical order of the topics. The issue of the existence gradation (Arabic: تشکیک الوجود) in the common didactic texts of philosophy is usually discussed at the beginning of the discussions of the book and among the precepts of existence, and its expression, arguments, and problems are discussed in this position. The question is whether it is possible to propose a more appropriate position for the discussion of the existence gradation. Given the nature and content of skepticism, it appears more beneficial to include the topics of the existence gradation under the issue of unity and diversity. This approach would help establish a proper connection with the subject of philosophy through unity and diversity, which are among the properties and accidents of existence. Additionally, it would secure an appropriate place for the existence gradation within philosophical issues and organize its topics related to unity and diversity in a more logical manner. In this article, we analytically demonstrated that the topics of the existence gradation will achieve better logical order and philosophical articulation (expression) when included within the discussions of unity and diversity.