جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "naṣīr al-dīn al-ṭūsī" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Studying the intellectual foundations and the position of philosophy and theology in the conceptualization of God among philosophers and theologians, can clarify their approach regarding the issue of God. How is the issue of God studied in the view of al-Ṭūsī and ʿAllāma Ḥillī- two "Ḥilla" theologians- according to their intellectual and philosophical-theological foundations and the position of philosophy and theology in their conceptualization of God? To what extent is their approach to the issue of God similar or different? In this article, we will study this problem from two aspects of form and method-content. As for the form, we will deal with the arrangement of the contents in their works according to their philosophical and theological foundations and the perception they have of God accordingly, and as for the method and content, we will discuss the method of knowing and proving God and explaining His attributes (both method and content). Al-Ṭūsī believes in a philosophical God and ʿAllāma Ḥillī, with a more inner-religious perspective, speaks of a religious-philosophical God. Regarding the content, in the method of proving the existence of God in the conceptualization of God, their opinions are similar, while in the formal structure and the issue of knowing God, they are different according to their intellectual foundations.

How to see the object and the occurrence of sensational errors is one of the leading questions in any epistemological system, including Tusi's epistemology. The importance of this case in the opinions of Islamic philosophers is due to the fact that the senses and their data initiate the process of realizing certain and true wisdom about objects. Questions around this case just like the other philosophic matters have always been a great worry for Nasir-Aldin Tousi and he's tended and paid attention to them in his works. This article tries to express how sensational errors occur in his opinion by considering differences between emotions and sensational cognition. The negative aspects of Tousi's vision towards things expresses that errors do not occur among feeling that is related to outward attention, because visions are limited to getting placed in the middle of the sight. But the positive aspect of  his opinion expresses that errors are just related to sensational knowledge and the judgments made by the wisdom which is earned under the influence of the imaginary power. In the other words, the stems of errors in the senses and sensational matters are in tangible matching with the outward reality that this action is just placed among the borders of wisdom.

Moral cognitivism is one of the topics of moral philosophy and epistemology of ethics and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī is among the moral cognitivists because: first, he refers to various ways for knowing the reality such as reason, fame, experience, revelation and intuition; second, he deals with the middle term as a criterion for knowledge; third, he accepts the demonstrability of the rational moral statements; and fourth, he adheres to moral absolutist. Since he is a moral cognitivist and given that all moral cognitivists are considered moral monists, Ṭūsī is also considered a moral monist; it seems, however, that Ṭūsī, in explaining the demonstrability of moral statements, has not proved the real relationship between the granting of divine blessings and the necessity of gratitude, and has come to the conclusion by claiming that this relationship can be considered the result of a causal relationship between moral act and its result; that is, every moral act, such as thanksgiving, causes happiness and perfection of human beings, and the obligation of thanking God shows the causal relationship between gratitude and the resulting happiness for the grateful person. Therefore, if it is asked why thanksgiving is obligatory, the answer is that this thanksgiving is obligatory because it can lead to happiness and perfection.

have been traditionally paid attention. Many people believe that celestial circumstances play a decisive role in their life events. Scientifically speaking, this is an irrefutable issue, such as the effect of lunar eclipse and solar eclipse on natural phenomena. Unscientifically, however, this has typically manifested as superstitions in people’s lives. Whether celestial circumstances can, in addition to their natural effects, determine value concepts such as good and bad luck of days has even involved philosophers, one of whom is Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. The main question of this research is that which type of philosophical explanation Nasir al-Din al-Tusi has proposed for good and bad luck of days and what his respective Avicennian fundamentals are. This research investigated the good and bad luck of days and their ascription to celestial circumstances from philosophers’ viewpoint, particularly Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. He believed that given the capability of human spirit to affect and be affected by objects, celestial interactions and motions as well as the shape and arrangement of stars and celestial bodies can cause good and bad luck in human life and influence objects on the Earth.

As a semi-Peripatetist semi-illuminationist philosopher, Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī (1200-1273 AC/ 597-672 AH) was well acquainted with Suhrawardī's philosophical thoughts (hikmah al-ishraq) such as idea of intuition and his illumination science; so that some scholars have called him a pure illuminationist. Nevertheless, the influence of Suhrawardī's theory on the issues of perception and cognition is not seen in his works. In other words, Al-Tūsī does not accept illuminative-based knowledge of presence ('ilm hudurī) emphasizing that the acquired knowledge agent is something other than himself. On the other hand, unlike Avicenna's approach (980-1036 AC / 370-428 AH), and also other peripatetic philosophers, in explaining the theory of Absār, Tūsī considers the theory of "radius departure" (khurūj al-shu'ā'), as an autonomous theory. He also introduces rational perceptions through the process of "Impresion" (Inṭibā') rather than "abstraction" (tajrīd). In this article, by examining the various logical and philosophical works of Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, we try to show that in the matter of knowledge and perception, Tūsī has not been an imitating philosopher, either imitating Peripatetic philosophers, or illuminatist ones. Rather, he has taken a new approach in this field. Therefore, his point of view can be examined from two aspects: First, the negative aspect, in which Tūsī denies the "knowledge of presence (al-'ilm al-huzurī)." The second is the affirmative aspect, which expresses the theory of the impression (intibā') of rational perceptions.

The influence of language and discourse in creating gender inequalities is a significant issue that needs to be considered all the more. Here, the role of thinkers is certainly more influential and perhaps more sensitive. Because in practice, culture, customs and laws are formed, expanded and sustained by inspiring from their ideas. Therefore, it is necessary to refine the ideas by constantly examining them and exposing them to criticism. In this regard, critical discourse analysis methods are effective and practical tools that can help the researcher to obtain a scientific analysis of these texts. By critiquing and analyzing the ideas of Aristotle, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, and Mullā Ṣadrā about women, this article intends to state that our language and the kind of discourse we use are effective in changing the world and shaping the identity of individuals, a discourse that has emerged in the words of some philosophers and has led to many of the gender inequalities in the world.

Among the arguments for God's Existence in the Islamic philosophy and kalam, the proof of the truthful (Burhān-i ṣiddīqīn) due to its merits has a unique position. invented by Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), soon received a noticeable reception from his followers who tried to present new versions of the proof. Among the post-Avicennian Imāmī theologians, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) set forth an important, new version of the proof of the truthful in his theological treatise entitled Fūṣūl, which is known by some of later Imāmī theologians as an innovative version of the proof. The gist of his argument is that since contingent beings are not beings by itself, nor can be by itself the cause for something to exist, there must be a necessary existence among the beings of the universe. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s innovative version of proof of the truthful and its effects and reception in the later theological and philosophical works has not received much attention in the recent researches so far. In the present article, having discussed and analyzed al-Ṭūsī’s innovative version of the proof, point out that some of the Imāmī theologians showed considerable attention to it and set out various versions of the proof in their writings.

The present study seeks to examine the effect of the theological rule of “rational beauty and ugliness” on “moral opinions” in the field of philosophical ethics by exploring the two books “Purification of Belief” and “Nasirean Ethics” written by the famous scientist, Khajeh Nasir al-Din Tusi. This research has been done by content analysis method and its findings show that on the one hand, the theological rule of rational beauty and ugliness revealed in “Purification of Belief” is based on an important part of theological issues related to origin, prophecy and resurrection. On the other hand, many of the moral opinions expressed in “Nasirean Ethics” are based on the same rule. The necessity of explaining this research is that the proof of the rational beauty and ugliness, and that many genuine moral values in individual and social issues are rooted in the understanding of reason and accepted by the wise of the world, provides a fundamental basis for moral virtues that obliges even the deniers of the divine laws to observe many moral principles.

The imami-shi'i philosopher and theologian, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi in his great and influential work, Tajrid al-iʿtiqad, had advanced three arguments for what is commonly called "intellectual moral good and bad" (husn wa qubh 'aqli). Two of these three arguments are what we call respectively: "epistemological argument" and "mutual-reverse argument". Both of the conclusions and premises of the arguments are ambiguous and open to more than one interpretation. This paper separates epistemological and ontological aspects of each argument and after advancing their logical structures assess each one. On authors' opinion none of them can fulfill neither to prove the belief of people of justice ('Adliyya) nor invalidate their opponents' theory.

What we call the "negation argument" is the second of the three arguments that Nasir al-Din al-Tusi advanced in his influential work, Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād, in defense of intellectual moral good and bad(husn wa qubh 'aqli). According to this argument, the negation of revealed moral good and bad (husn wa qubh shar'i) entails the negation of intellectual moral good and bad (husn wa qubh 'aqli). The presence of various semantic, ontological, and epistemological factors make al-Tusi‘s intended conclusion and the premises of his argument open to multiple interpretations. The logical form of the most reasonable reading of this argument, which we call the “skeptical reading”, demonstrates that the end result is the denial of the epistemological revealed moral good and bad. Certain shortcomings of this reading have also made it incapable of denying the epistemological revealed moral good and bad; ambiguity in the concept of possibility employed by the argument, the use of counterintuitive and unwarranted premises, and a confusion between the occurrence of a lie and the possibility of it in deeming the other unreliable in declaring oneself. The purpose of this article is not to defend revealed moral good and bad, neither is it to deny the intellectual moral good and bad; rather, it’s merely a demonstration of the incompleteness of the negation argument with respect to the latter.

The proof of the truthful (Burhān-i ṣiddīqīn) is one of the valid and most prominent arguments to demonstrate the existence of God in the Islamic philosophy and theology. It was invented first by Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) and developed via later philosophers and theologians. The proof due to its own credibility received a noticeable reception of the post-Avicennian Imāmī theologians, who tended to the philosophical views of Avicenna, in medieval period. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and al-ʿAllāma al- Ḥillī, among them, set forth various version of it in their works. Naṣīr al-Dīn kāshī tried to invent a new and unique version of the proof of the truthful (Burhān-i ṣiddīqīn) as well. Kāshī’s argument has not been received much attention so far, although it deserve it. In this article, we try to show the evolution of proof of the truthful (Burhān-i ṣiddīqīn) in the Shiʿite Philosophical theology, from Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī to Naṣīr al-Dīn kāshī. This survey shows that the post-Avicennian Imāmī theologians like Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī have followed an Avicennian method for proving the existence of God and that they tried to benefit from Philosophical teachings of Avicenna for demonstrating the existence of God. This new approach in Shiite theology led to the revolution of arguments for proving God in Imāmī Shiʿite theology in the medieval period.

Studying Nasir al-Din Al-Tusi's point of view about the relationship between soul and body and its influence on ethical training of human is important because he believes that soul and body are contrasted, and the relation between the soul and body is accidental; not substantial. Here in this research paper the authors studied the subject upon a descriptive and analytic method. Nassir al-Din Al-Tusi admits that there is some reciprocating influence of the body on resaving ethical virtues and of the soul on controlling body's faculties. He believes that the influence of soul on body happens through something named "Rohe Bokhari". "Rohe Bokhari" comes from a mixture of four-fold humours in the body. This mixture is the main Source of animalism and truculence of human. He believes that there are two kinds of virtues; one is natural and the other is adventitious. He acknowledges that the manner in which the four humors come to be mixture identifies the kind of virtues within "Rohe Bokhari" through which the basis of obtaining virtues would be prepared. It should be noted that there are several stages for ethical training of human. In the first stage the control on natural morality would be obtained through temperance of the temperament the four humors. In the second stage the soul must pay attention to the purpose and significance of the ethical training. Because the soul would be actualized through whatever it pays attention to. The third stage is the application of the will to control body's faculties. It would be obtained through imagination, recognizing the benefits, creating a strong passion, and the control of soul on the body's faculties. The Fourth stage is the repetition and practice in the acquisition of virtues and vices leave.