جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « person » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Human life is self-founded and should not be reduced to a right. Supporting human life in various dimensions is the goal of rights. Since the human embryo has a human nature -which is also accepted by the supporters of the theory of personhood- and has life, only this life must be supported, and the embryo has a chance to survive. What is the fact that the relationship between parents and fetus-child is not a proprietary bond? Being a person is not an inherent characteristic in the definition of human nature, and the support of the existence of a human being should not be reduced to his being a person. Protection of human life is the basis of the criminalization of murder, and abstract characteristics such as personhood do not play a role in the inclusion of this crime.

Philosophers of the mind, based on various approaches to the problem of the mind, have proposed different criteria about human personality, "person" or "I". One of these criteria is having a first-person perspective. One of the proponents of this criteria is Lynne Rudder Baker, a non-reductionist materialist philosopher who considers human personality neither as an immaterial soul nor as reducing it over to physical things. According to her, a robust first-person perspective is sufficient and necessary condition for being a person. A being is a person if and only if it has the capacity for a first-person perspective. The robust first-person perspective is the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself, without the use of any name or description. It is same self-consciousness that distinguishes a person from other beings. In contrast, there is a rudimentary first-person perspective, which is specific to beings who, despite having consciousness, lack the self-consciousness feature. The present article has evaluated and criticized the Baker's point of view on first-person perspective with analytical and critical methodology. Ambiguity in the nature of the first-person perspective and being a person, an absence of argument for some claims and lack adequately clarity on some preconditions and presuppositions are some criticisms that were propounded on the acceptability and coherence of Baker's view.

The present study uses an analytical-descriptive method to explain the relationship between philosophy and religion in Boethius’ Christology. For this purpose, three things are done in the Theological Treatises as a representative of Boethius' theological views: 1. Determining and explaining the theological problem that Boethius sought to answer in Christology. 2. Explain components such as: rational explanation of "Trinity" with the help of the category of relation, precise definition of "person" and "nature" in the issue of "Trinity", Demonstrating the intellectual and narrative weakness of the views of Euthychius and Nestorius, as well as emphasizing the distinction between nature and the person through whom Boethius solves the problem. 3. Boethius' final answer to this theological question. In the Consolation of Philosophy as the representative of Boethius' philosophy, we seek to examine two issues: 1. Does this treatise, as some have claimed, lack any Christian symbolism or teaching? 2. Does Boethius explicitly question Christian teachings in this treatise, or does he not merely explicitly refer to Christianity? Examining these cases, it was concluded that in the Theological Treatises, Boethius saw the Christian faith in a rational explanation in agreement with reason; in the Consolation of Philosophy he saw no need to refer directly to Christian teachings; he seeks the salvation of reason, and this has no conflict with his Christian faith.

Based on Constitution view, Baker claims that human persons neither have an immaterial soul which can exist independently of body (immaterialism), and nor are animals (animalism). Human persons are a part of natural world, albeit a distinguished one. What makes something a person is the first-person perspective. Initially, human infants have consciousness and develop self-consciousness during their growth, and can perceive themselves from the first-person perspective. At the outset, they possess no concept and learning to use a language gradually, acquire concepts, including self-concept, and survive while they have first-person perspective. Persons are not identical to their bodies; a person and his body have different persistence conditions, so personal identity is independent from physical identity. It may change a person's body gradually while first-person perspective and person are remained. Present paper first explains Baker’s constitution view of human persons and then answers criticisms of its account of personal identity. Among the criticisms of this view is that the first-person perspective does not persist over time and is divisible and duplicable; thus, it cannot be a criterion for personal identity. Additionally, some thought experiments indicate that the first-person perspective cannot be a proper criterion for personal identity.

All popular concepts of deity (Theism, Pantheism, and Panentheism) believe in divinity. In Theism, “God” has attributes such as consciousness, will, goodness, and so forth, which can be seen in humans. On the contrary, pantheists argue that: a) the person is equal to the human being; b) embodiment is a prominent feature of the human being; c) having attributes such as consciousness, will, and so forth, requires a body and equates to anthropomorphism. In other words, these attributes are inevitably associated with embodiment and the resulting limitations. Thereby, the pantheistic deity is impersonal. There is a duality of the “personality” and “impersonality” of the deity. The crucial question of this article is, “what is the relationship between divinity and personality?” The relationship of embodiment to personality and the relationship of perfection to the impersonal deity, constitute the sub-questions of it. We show that there is a significant relationship between personality and divinity. In the first section, the term divinity is examined; firstly, it is assumed that, contrary to pantheism, divinity is definable. Otto’s attempting to trace the origins of the “holy” and the historical studying of pantheistic approaches confirms this assumption. Secondly, “Infinity, ” “influence, ” and “transcendence” are three critical terms in defining divinity. Pantheistic argument showed that all critiques of personality are summed up in the fact that personality is a limiting factor. That is, it is inconceivable that the transcendent, infinite, and influential deity can be a person. Therefore, in the second part, the concept of person is examined, and we conclude that: 1) there is a relation between the practical terms in person’s meaning and the terms of divinity; 2) Although the main critique of the deity’s personality is the embodiment, it is not a crucial term in defining the person. That is why Michael Levin is in contradiction when he believes that divine unity doesn’t need to be a person or conscious, it is sufficient to be perfect. The question arises as to what perfection means without consciousness, power, and will? Isn’t a human being more complete due to the pantheistic divine unity? Accordingly, an analysis of perfection without addressing personal attributes puts pantheists in an apparent contradiction. Besides, impersonality faces a severe dilemma; if they do not take the personal attributes, according to Kant, the deity is reduced to an object. Instead, there could be some responses to anthropomorphism; firstly, the basis of the Pantheistic mistake is to generalize the meaning of finite consciousness or will to an infinite being, whereas temporality is an attribute of the deity’s knowledge or will’s objects, not of the deity’s knowledge and will. Secondly, the study shows where personality is interpreted to anthropomorphism, it focuses on the late idea in Christian thought about Jesus, while the history of attributing the deity to consciousness, will, and so forth, is much older. Finally, it is indicated that the critiques of the personality are not strong enough to challenge it. So, according to the “Principle of Simplicity”, believers in the personality of the deity have a more justified view.

Philosophical anthropology with reflection on human nature is one of the special fields of interest of Max Scheler. Influenced by idealism, philosophy of life, and Christianity, his phenomenological approach seeks to provide a comprehensive picture of man. To this end, Scheler pays attention to the real and experiential aspects of man along with his spiritual values ​​and by acknowledging their independence from each other and at the same time their interaction and connection. Influenced by the crisis of his time, Max Scheler, on the one hand, turned his attention to the neglected aspects of man, including emotions and feelings, especially love and hate, and on the other hand, while trying to provide a certain knowledge about man by avoiding essentialism, related matters. Examines human beings from a phenomenological point of view and based on how they are manifested. At the same time, while having philosophical affiliations, he also pays special attention to concrete and real human issues based on sociological concerns. Moreover, Scheler places great value on human diagnosis and of course he argues that man cannot be identified objectively and should only be approached on the basis of a phenomenological approach.

The most striking difference between Christian and Muslim theologies is that while, for Christians, God is a person, Muslims worship an impersonal deity. Despite the importance of this difference for a host of theological issues, it is a difference which has gone largely unnoticed by Christians and Muslims alike. Yet Christians everywhere will affirm that God is a person, while the average Muslim will readily deny this. Several arguments have been presented here. In this article, we analyzed the arguments for and against the claim that God is a person, conclude that, as a whole, the claim that God is not a person is more rational and acceptable than the claim that God is a person.