جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « russell » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents, or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work. This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work. This paper is a reflection on the nature of Meinongian Propositions (MP), within which properties are ascribed to non-existent objects, preserving the possibility of their being true. Ordinary theories of the propositional unity, I demonstrate, provide explanations to the nature of MP, only in pain of misrepresenting their truth value, violating our intuitions about their constituents or doubling our ontological commitments. Cognitive accounts e.g. that of Soames, later Russell or Priest, are to work.

Nowadays modal logic is one of the important areas of logic, but at the beginning of the emergence of modern logic, there was not much attention to this branch of logic, and even the founders of modern logic, including Russell, had an anti-modal position. One of the factors that led Russell to adopt such a position was the belief that logic is truth functional and extensional, and this is something that the introduction of modality destroys.Of course During the long period of his philosophical work, Russell has taken many and varied positions about modal notions. From the beginning, he did not have an anti-modal position. At first, he considered necessity as a description of an implication, and after some time, he introduced it as a primitive, basic and indefinable concept. Then, in some of his works, following Moore, he considered necessity as a kind of logical priority of propositions, but in the end he took an anti-modal position and tried to completely discard the modal notions. He said that these concepts are properties of propositional functions, not properties of propositions. But Russell has used second-order logic for explaining the modal concepts and explaining the difference between possibility and existence (which declares both of them to be properties of propositional functions), but even with this, he is not able to completely remove the modal notions from language and logic.

This research, which is practical in nature, and an analytical-descriptive method of document review (content analysis) was used to conduct it. In this research, along with the introduction of educational literature and a brief reference to its background in Iran, Bertrand Russell is mentioned as a person whose educational views are the criteria of content analysis. To analyze the content of the books, the text of the books, sentence by sentence, in all parts of each lesson (even exercises and explanations) were analyzed based on the available components.In this essay, Russell's educational components in the individual field, which include; Cultivation of intelligence, cultivation of scientific spirit, free thinking, cultivation of wisdom, avoidance of dependence, emphasis on independence of thought, strengthening of active aspect, strengthening of sense of rationality, strengthening of internal discipline and thinking have been manifested.The results of this content analysis were shown in the form of frequency distribution tables, Shannon's entropy technique, bar graphs, and importance coefficients in order to determine the level of attention of educational content designers to Russell's educational components and to determine the most and least used of them in Persian books of the first year of high school. to be In explaining and drawing conclusions from the analyzed information, the opinions of experts have been cited in the field of some components in order to increase the credibility of the researcher's statements.

One of the goals, or perhaps the most important goal of Bertrand Russell’s prominent attempts in his philosophical and logical works was to establish a sort of Ideal or Perfect Language in order to be used to deal with the varieties of complexities, ambiguities, and paradoxes which in one way or another appear in natural languages. Such a project is built on the central notion, or better methodology, of Logical Analysis. Russell by using his logical analysis can distinguish between (genuine proper) names and definite descriptions, which further helps him to cope with three main problems: informativeness of identity claims, negative existentials, and non-existents, that is, those expressions which have no reference whatsoever. In this paper, I will introduce and explain Russell’s view in two parts: The Conceptual Aspect of his analysis, which involves the definition of logical analysis, and the Extensional Aspect, which brings in his famous Theory of Descriptions.

Russell's philosophy can be divided into two distinct periods. In the first period, under the influence of his predecessors, he endeavored to preserve foundationalism and in the second period, he tries to minimize foundationalism. In his early works, he accepts induction because of its inherent intuition and widespread use in life and considers inductive inferences as probable, not certain. But in the second period, by analyzing empirical phenomena, he likes what a pure empiricist would do, infer the postulates that are the bases of empirical sciences. These postulates have a supra-logical nature, and interestingly, induction is not among these postulates. In fact, according to Russell, the science and the ordinary understanding that are resulted by non-demonstrative inference require these postulates. In this paper, we try to understand Russell's notions on induction, therefore, we investigate it in detail in the mentioned two distinct periods. For the first period, Russell's notions and one of the examples of probabilistic proofs presented for it will be presented. And for the second period, his reasons for changing his approach and his new perspective, as well as the supra-logical postulates governing the non-demonstrative, along with some of their properties, are presented. And finally, though briefly, some of the criticisms are discussed.

According to Beall and Restall pluralism, classical logic, relevant logic and intuitionistic logic are all correct. In this type of pluralism, logic is considered to be normative; in the sense that one who accepts the truth of the premises of a valid argument, is bounded to accept the result of that argument. Some philosophers try to show that accepting Beall and Restall pluralism is incompatible by the acceptance of the normativity of logic. However, Blake-Turner and Russell have proposed telic pluralism that is not based on the normativity of logic; claiming that their arguments is not threatened by the collapse argument. In this article, by examining telic pluralism, we have determined that Blake-Turner and Russell’s pluralism lacks strong arguments in defense of non-normativity of logic. On the other hand, we try to present a version of the Priest’s collapse argument that still can be used against telic pluralism.

One of the most basic doctrines in the predicate logic is that existence can never be a predicate; rather, it is the particular quantifier. Here Ill try to explore the views of the founders of Fregean logic on the structure of the proposition, and why it does not take existence as a predicate. Then Ill state their explanation and solution for existential propositions. Finally, Ill investigate the shortcomings of their analysis. Many analytical philosophers, including Moore, Kneale, Wisdon, Ayer, etc, who have denied 'existence' as a predicate, have done so as part of their refutation of the ontological argument for the God's existence. However, here Ill deal only with Frege, Russell, and Quine. The other philosopher's stance can more or less be found in one of these three.

The essay tries to evaluate Wittgenstein's resolution to the riddle of Russell's negative facts. That is, when we say, for example, "Tehran is not the capital of Ireland" is true, what kind of truth–maker should we consider for the negative proposition because of its truth? Surely, a negative truth–maker is so problematic and counter–intuitive. Therefore, Wittgenstein has tried to show how it can be returned to the positive truth–makers. Thus, the paper first analyzes Wittgenstein's general resolutions to the nonexistent. Then it focuses on his special resolution to the negative facts riddle, i.e. Tractatus 2.05: "The totality of existent atomic facts also determines which atomic facts do not exist". Finally, after refuting some philosopher's criticisms, it shows his resolution's positive points and possible lacks.

Focusing on language and attempting to derive the hidden meanings is one of the most important aspects of analytic philosophy to solve or resolve philosophical problems. All of the three founders of analytic philosophy، i. e. Frege، Russell، and Moore، trace this road differently. Ludwig Wittgenstein as the follower of them has his own ideas. In this paper، we will firstly explore theories of those founders briefly and then show that Wittgenstein، in some respects، such as; pitcher theory، logical atomism، and respecting to ordinary language is in agreement with them. However، he، in other respects، has own specific ideas: the meaning of states of affairs، critic of metaphysics and insisting on the ordinary language in a different manner.

In this essay I try to analyze briefly the claim and proofs of Mu‘tazilite’s nonbeing objects (thubūt)، Russell''s earlier view in Principles of Mathematics، and Russell''s later view on negative facts. I، then، indicate that since these claims have been defended and reconstructed even in the recent years، it is necessary to reevaluate such views. Since we should not regard their counter–intuitiveness as sufficient in criticizing them، I attempt to show some of their logical unacceptable consequences: if they are true، they ontologically will result in an infinite regress.