جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « william james » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The question of religious belief and its rationality has become a serious issue in the philosophy of religion due to the claims of modern philosophers. One of the most controversial positions in this regard is evidentialism, which emphasizes that our beliefs should be accompanied by evidence and reasons. In modern times, Clifford, by introducing the idea of "the ethics of belief," advocated evidentialism in its most extreme form. William James, by emphasizing the role of will and emotions in the formation of belief, criticizes Clifford's theory and tries to defend the rationality of religious belief. This paper attempts to answer the question of how James, based on the same evidentialist principles of the evidentialists, criticizes Clifford. It also examines whether his view can respond to the criticisms raised. The aim is to analyze and evaluate James's approach to evidentialism from a non-fideistic perspective using a library-based research method. Considering James's views, especially in his essay "The Will to Believe," it can be concluded that his position in defending the rationality of religious belief against evidentialism is relatively coherent. According to William James, Clifford's evidentialist position is, contrary to its claim, irrational and dogmatic, and desire and will logically play a necessary role in truth-seeking.

Evidences show that the theory of the unexplained does not include propositions of intuitions in the Islamic mysticism. This paper has been authored in the course of the examination of William James’s argument for the unexplained. His argument owes to al-Ghazali phrases according to which James considers Islamic mysticism under the theory of the unexplained. In the process of his research, the author has come across two points: first that the backgrounds of mystical propositions would be clearer for the truth-seekers; second after discovering those backgrounds such as the opponent’s specific social and political preconditions and linguistic constraints, we may devise a precise method for realizing the truths. The words of Muslim mystics and researchers have been taken into consideration in order to demonstrate that this theory is not valid. The method adopted for this paper is phenomenological and structuralist.

This article is an effort to show that during the history of philosophy – both in the epistemology and ethics domains – evidentialism based on extreme rationalism has tremendously influenced the true mechanism of the formation of faith in God. In the light of a kind of determinism, it has averted attentions from the role of other functions such as emotions, passions, and especially volition in the formation of faith in theists within the common understanding framework. Among the contemporary thinkers, William James and Plantinga have tried to modify this deterministic approach and revive those practical aspects of the formation of faith that are always forgotten. The salient common point in the theories of these two thinkers are the attention to the practical aspects of faith within the common understanding framework and the emphasis on the significant role of volition – in line with reason – in the formation of faith. This way, it can be observed that the opinions of William James and Plantinga about the way the mechanism of faith in God is formed complete each other.

William .K. Clifford, the strong rationalist philosopher, holds that believing anything upon insufficient evidence is imprudent and it is considered epistemologically and morally wrong. William James in a fundamental debate with Clifford, and by reduction the meaning of truth and reality to efficacy and usefulness, maintains that the most definite evidence can be found in the consequences of a belief. Allameh Tabatabei, while sympathetic towards James and for preserving the practical interests, proposes the theory of idrakat itibari (constructional perceptions); however, contrary to James and in agreement with Clifford, he does not regard any truth and representational value for them.  The present study extends the meaning of idrak itibari (constructional concept) to “considering a belief in an acceptance manner” such that the likely consequences of a belief would be applied for that. By considering the theoretical constructional perceptions, abandoning Clifford’s inappropriate and stringent approach, and also staying away from James’ lenient mistake in reduction of the meaning of truth and reality, the present article aims to focus on human basic needs in the realm of theoretical rationality to provide an appropriate answer for them.

In what follows, the authors have dealt with William James on the meaning of life. Their approach is philosophical and their method is descriptive-analytic based on library references. By the meaning of life, they mean the aim of life i.e. happiness and good ending. Findings of the research show that James approach, from among many, is humanistic; namely, in his view, happiness is taken into consideration as a fundamental aim carrying the meaning of life for man. According to the principles of relativity, utility, will to believe, and the right of belief, James goes to hold that meaning and happiness are two things none-concrete, relative, and might be made. Everybody, he says, can define and produce this meaning as per his own will and belief and makes it real in his life. The article ends with the examination of James’s view, the ill-founded principles and lack of logical coherence in his theory of the meaning of life.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the function of religious experience in making sense of life from William James’ point of view along with the description and analysis of the critiques. He considers the religious experience as a necessary and sufficient condition for discovering meaning. He considers religion as something individual. With the evidence he provides for the subjectivity of emotions and the privacy of the mental life, we find out that James' views correspond with the new science and the specificity of religious experience and its meaning. Also, James' empirical explanations are uncertain and he does not see the need to prove it rationally. Empirical explanations such as search for meaning by all human beings and the falsification of meaning and the reduction of meaning to purpose indicate that the search for meaning is the most fundamental driving force in life and the reason for man’s religious sense. James looks more at the sense of meaning than the meaning itself. James' view of religious experience and meaning is influenced by pragmatic thinking about utility.

In this paper, we examine descriptively and analytically William James’ view of the relation between religion and the meaning of life and existential pains. As a result, the article is made of two parts. In part one, we describe James’ view to religion and its relationship with the meaning of life and existential pains; and in part two, we try to analyze and criticize James’ view to religion and its relationship with the meaning of life and existential pains. In James’ view, the essence of religion is in fact the personal experiences which are a kind of emotion, and the religious doctrines and rites are outer structures of religion. In his opinion, the personal relationship with the Divine Act causes mental calmness and the decrease in any fear of death and, in consequence, leads to the meaningfulness of life. To criticize James’ views, we examined his perception of the meaning of life and existential pains and its relation with religion, and we put forth some of its faults.

Sensation and cognizance according to religious and mystical philosophers have always been known as two formative components of religion, mysticism and religious and mystical experience. From among these philosophers, two western religious philosophers: James and Hawking, had a greater role in ccommodating these two factors in religion and mysticism. The topic of this article is the manner of this composition according to these two personalities. According to James, sensation is the deeper source of religion. James considers mystical experiences to be of the category of sensations and emotions, and also considers them to have a cognitive aspect; but according to him the cognizance that is present in experience is a cognizance without the mediation of concepts. Hawking considers the essence of religion to be religious experience and for this experience to be mixed with religious sensations and ideas. These ideas are present in the level of the experience itself and in a more distinct manner, manifest as the result of experience. Experience, oversteps the principleof idea and argument, and in the next level the mind uses these experiences and starts to create concepts, theories and clear arguments in order to give them constancy and a firm place. Therefore Hawking considers religious experience to not only be sensational and cognitional but rather conceptual and almost theoretical, in such a way that concepts and theories are present within it although they are produced in a more complete and clearer form. In such a way, Hawking, in criticizing James, not only gives way to nonconceptual cognizance in religion but rather also sees conceptual cognizance and also deductive cognizance to have roots in religion itself and religious experience.

In the classification of contemporary philosophy into analytic and continental philosophies, pragmatism has a middle place, while its affinity to the former is more than its affinity to the latter. In the first part of the 20th century, the relationship between analytic philosophy and pragmatism can be seen in the impact of the founders of pragmatism (notably William James) on analytic philosophers such as Wittgenstein. Some similarities can be found between James’ words and Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblance. In the second part of 20th century, the connection between the two schools has increased and thanks to this, some of the great analytic philosophers such as Quine, Kripke, Putnam, Rorty and Sellars are all pragmatists; thus the concept of analytic pragmatism has been introduced. This article will first discuss the relationship between the ideas of James and Wittgenstein, and then will assess the ideas of Rorty and Sellars to have an overview of the relationship between the two schools in the second part of the 20th century.

Religious experience is an approach to which Western thinkers are considered pioneers among whom Schleiermacher is the most prominent. "The essentialism of religious experience" is one of the several approaches that have been adopted in the case of religious experience. Accordingly, the religion that has sides and various dimensions has been reduced to a religious experience and the religious experience is introduced as the essence of religion. What is presented in this article is a comparative study of the essence of religious experience from the perspective of William James and Ghazzāli. Although mystical experience has a different structure form the religious experience and Ghazali as well as other Muslim philosophers and mystics paid more attention to the way of mystical experience, in the works of Ghazali there are also a traces of religious experience and hence, they are adaptable to some aspects of religious experience offered by William James. William James defines the religion “as the feelings, acts, and experiences that can occur for every individual in their solitudes and he believes that feeling is the essential pillar of religion and inherently reinforces it”. Religious experience is the essence of religion and it means that-the truth of the faith is the same as feelings and emotions that emerge from rational reflections on concrete reality as such, and other spiritual, transcendental, mystical and psychological actions are the consequences of these experiences. On the other hand, in the Muslim world, Al-Ghazzali believes that: The ultimate and holy aim of religion is the perception and experience of ultimate truth that can be achieved through good deeds, worship, asceticism and piety. This article tries to find similarities and differences in essence of religious experience of the two thinkers, because it is only in the theory of the essentialism of religious experience that the similarities and differences of religious experience and mystical experience can be identified. The article begins with an introduction to the nature of religious experience, perspective and context of the rise of religious experience and goes on to describe the religious experience from the perspectives of Ghazali and William James and will deal with the differences between religious and mystical experiences. The comparative study of the similarities and differences between the views constitutes the last part of this study. This comparative study can be examined from several perspectives: 1. Concurrence of the two thinkers in the fact that religious experience is indefinable: William James and Ghazali both believe that religious experience are neither falsifiable nor unfalsifiable. No adequate conception of mystical experience can be expressed in words. Mystical experience is immediate and direct and cannot be transferred to others. 2. The differences in the origin of mystical experiences: William James believes in the effectiveness of alcoholic drinks in the creation of gnostic status. Then mystical manners can be achieved through this way as well. Unlike al-Ghazali, who believes the apocalyptical condition is only dependent on the grace of God and human attempt plays no role in its occurrence. 3. The vicious circle in the theory of James: The criterion by which William James would test the truth of a Religious Experience is the vision and experience, while the truth of religious propositions depends on and metaphysical and rational statements and not empirical proofs. Therefor their truth must be proven elsewhere. As a result, the only way to prove is the self-dependent criterion which will lead to a vicious circle. 4. Believing in the essentiality of religious experience: In this approach, sides and dimensions of religion are reduced to just one dimension and that is the essentiality of religious experience. From the perspective of William James, religious experience is the essence of religion in the sense that the truth of religion limited to personal emotions in the face of ultimate reality. Actions, beliefs and religious practices of the religion are all outside the truth of religion and enjoy a secondary role. The emotions play the key role, and thus the religious experience is the central. But does al-Ghazali in the same sense consider the religious experience as the essence of religion? To answer this question another reading of the essentialism has been offered. According to this version, the religious experience has again the key role but Ghazali considers Sharia as an integral part of religion. Sharia is the path that leads the seeker to the destination, and seeking also takes place within the confines of the law. The reality of religion and the essence of religion are manifested through actions, customs and religious practices. In fact, al-Ghazali regards them the vehicles by which the seeker travels to the truth and does not merely give them secondary instrumental roles. This sense of the essentialism of religious experience is according to Ghazali's view and Islamic paradigm.

James''s primary interest in religion was directed to practical consequences of religious belief in believer''s real life. His general approach to justify the truth of religious belief is resorting to these same consequences. Due to this background and due to some of James''s own statements regarding his theory of truth according to which he identifies the truth of a belief with its practical utility، some interpreters have interpreted him as a philosopher who attempted to present pragmatism as an alternative to realism in metaphysics، epistemology، and philosophy of religion. In this article، relying on the whole James''s statements concerning his theory of truth and focusing on his views about religious experience، the incorrectness of that interpretation will be shown and it will be proved that James''s theory of truth presupposes mind-independent realities and he doesn''t reduce truth to utility; and his commitment to pragmatism in providing justification for religious belief is not incompatible with his commitment to religious realism، the view that there is some knowable mind-independent object for religious belief.

The main question of the present study is concerned with the quiddity of “truth” from the point of view of two prominent figures of pragmatic philosophy: Charles Peirce and William James. Therefore, in this study first a description and analysis of the issue of truth from the point of view of these two pragmatist philosophers are provided and then its principles and basics are criticized based on the views of two Islamic philosophers: Mulla Sadra and Morteza Motahari. In a nutshell, the main claims of Peirce and James in the field of epistemology are: the pursuit of the pragmatic consequences in the stage of knowledge and authenticating the practical utility instead of adapting the mental concepts to reality (external reality or fact-itself) and determining its truth criterion. They believe that the differences and similarities between the ideas and mental concepts are not determined by the mind, but they are determined by means of tangible and practical experiences. Mulla Sadra and Morteza Motahari criticized and rejected this view and believed that this approach leads to the following problems: 1. The meaninglessness of theoretical concepts. 2. Relativity in knowing and gaining of truth. 3. The elimination of rational good and badness. 4. The necessity of pluralism in doctrinal issues and radical thoughts.

Pragmatic theory of truth is one of the theories of the concept of truth. According to this theory P is a true proposition، if and only if، P is useful in practice. This theory creates an Independent and different attitude in religious study. In this religious study، instead of studying of correspondence or non correspondence of religious teachings to the reality، practical works and objective results of these teachings have evaluating. Truth of religious teachings is depending on their practical outcomes and objective results. This approach is be criticized; because It is incompatible with teachings of revealed religions. Numerous criticisms of this approach are: cognitive relativism، humanism and removing the theism، forgetting «the reality of God» and setting «the concept of God» instead of it، lake of attention to revealed essence of religions، reductionism and reducing the religions to their practical and objective results، propagating a utilitarian and Instrumentalist attitude about religions، lake of attention to death and resurrection، disability to understanding of essence of religion…

One of the demonstrations presented to prove God’s existence and rationality of religious beliefs is known as ‘Pascal’s wager’. William James has reviewed this demonstration and has presented a new account of it. According to his opinion we do not always form and accept our beliefs based on mere rational reasons; rather in many cases our will and feelings determine the direction of our beliefs. He believes that religious beliefs are among these cases as well. Criticizing skepticism and suspension of propositions on religious beliefs, James believes although the questions and problems related to accepting or rejecting religious beliefs might be rationally unanswered and without a final response such that we cannot take a definite rational position about them, but in practice and considering our emotional needs and the demands of our willing and emotive nature, they are among genuine and real choices which are living, unavoidable and momentous and we cannot be indifferent to them; rather we should study them considering the needs of our emotive and willing nature, if they are in accordance with our wills and pleasures we should accept them and otherwise we should reject them. James’ view has been criticized. Some of the most important criticisms of William James’ account of ‘Pascal’s wager’ are as follows: having an instrumental look at truth, accepting cognitive volitionaism, contradiction in ethical objectivism, paying attention to the profit of this world and ambiguity of concepts such as emotion and feelings.

This paper has dealt with the theory of religious experience in an analytico-historical approach. Schleier Macher, the main theorist of this theory, presented and developed it to keep Christianity against fundamental demurs of experimental sciences and epistemology. Upon the theory, religion has an independent identity and its essence consists of an inner sensation toward and a direct dependence upon the Absolute. Soren Kierkegaard, an existentialist philosopher, has denied every intellectual treatment on the problem of faith and we are necessitated to accept it unquestionably. In his view, the only way for supporting Christianity is a leap of faith, that is, believing in it without any reasonable proof. Rudolf Otto has also brought into consideration the intuitional, mental and spiritual aspect of religion. Then William James, a pragmatist philosopher, argued that one should defend religion relying on experience and actual effects. And finally Walter Terence Stace, an analytic philosopher, has emphasized on intuitively perceiving of the Absolute and Max Weber has dealt with the theory in a sociological approach.