جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « علم » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The issue of religious science is one of the most challenging issues in the field of philosophy of science and philosophy of religion. In this field, different views have been formed. Some views are immature and primitive, while others are in the structure and format of a scientific theory. Among the viewpoints that have a theory structure is "Theory of Religious Science" by Professor Ali Akbar Rashad. This theory has been formed with regard to the injuries of common sciences and their criticism, as well as the capacities of the Islamic religion , the mission and the goal of the religion.

The present article, with analytical and philosophical method, intends to criticize and Review Professor Rashad's theory in terms of principles, criteria and pillars of religious science.

In this article, In addition to explaining the theory, pointed out its strengths and weaknesses and reached the following results A) Some strengths of the theory are: relative comprehensiveness, having a theoretical framework, based on reliable and religious foundations and the like. b) Some of the ambiguities and gaps are: the difficulty of writing, ambiguities in the application of some concepts and terms, ambiguities in the definition of religious science, ambiguities in the criteria of religious science and the like.

The importance of recognizing the type of attribution between the knower and the known is determining the position of knowledge in the worldview approach and its epistemological function. The main question of this research is: What is the meaning and function of the type of attribution between the knower and the known with the evolution in the philosophical principles? According to the originality of nature, the type of this attribution is the categorical attribution, assuming the duality of the two sides of the attribution, causes problems such as the validity of knowledge, the distinction between the knower and the known, and the problems of mental existence. According to the originality of the existence of gradational oneness, the type of this attribution is the illuminative attribution. In this type of attribution, the knowledge of knower, in a longitudinal and gradational relationship, becomes the cause of the creation of known, and finally according to the originality of the existence of personal oneness, the unity between the knower and the known can be stated and the type of attribution is qāyúmi attribution. The findings of the research show that according to the three philosophical journeys, by passing from multiplicity to unity, the gradational aspect gives its position to unity between the knower and the known, until in the third journey, the presence and intuition of the knower appears in the mirror of his manifestations.

Studying the progress of epistemology in Islamic philosophy shows that although the issues of epistemology have not been discussed separately and seriously and are usually implicitly discussed under the headings related to ontology, at the same time there are materials that It can be a solution to the problems in epistemology. In such an intellectual environment, the research problem is clearly how to show the epistemological approach in Ibn Sina's philosophy by investigating and extracting some epistemological issues through case studies. Of course, Ibn Sina's ontological views cast a shadow on his epistemological topics such as science, abstractions, imagination, etc.; But considering that the foundations of epistemology in Islamic philosophy are based on the three foundations of sense, reason, or intuition, we can refer to the epistemological system of Islamic philosophers in general, and Hikmat Masha in particular (mainly based on reason and reasoning) and Hikmat. Sinoy realized in particular (based on reason and reasoning with the element of intuition). The importance of the research problem is in the conditions that the history of philosophy is a connected whole, and showing this connection reveals various and sometimes invisible angles of the thinking of philosophers, especially Avicenna and his followers. In fact, based on the detailed analysis of Avicenna's epistemological issues, the current research unveils another Avicenna.

The importance of designation (anecdote, description, implication) in Epistemology and acquired knowledge is clear. In the field of designation, there are various viewpoints and some of them can be combined with each other and some of them are contradictory and cannot be combined. One of the famous opinions of philosophers is that the relationship between the concept and the described object is intrinsic to the concept.Some believe that the intrinsic description view has indefensible flaws. For example, in the article "Intrinsic Designation under Scrutiny",  the view of famous philosophers about "Intrinsic Designation" (Hekait-e dhātī) has been criticized, and more or less the view of the Allameh Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi has been confirmed and strengthened under the title "Potentially Designation" (Hekait-e Shaani; Contingent Designation). In the mentioned article, the authors have made seven objections to the "Intrinsic Designation". In our opinion, all the mentioned objections towards the view of "Intrinsic Designation" have several problems; And on the contrary, "Potentially Designation", as presented in this article, is both wrong in itself and inconsistent with principles of Allameh Mesbah. A detailed treatment of all the objections raised around the "Intrinsic Designation" and all the problems of the, "Potentially Designation", as presented in the mentioned article, requires the writing of a book in the field of the designation. Therefore, inevitably, in this article, we have evaluated the first two objections briefly and left the criticism of other objections to a wider field.
It is necessary to mention:First of all, rejecting the objections raised about "Intrinsic Designation" does not logically require the truth of "Intrinsic Designation" and in order to establish this point of view, we should have a positive discussion about its ontological, anthropological and epistemological foundations, and about its consequences.
Secondly, in this article, our defenses of the "Intrinsic Designation" and our objections to the "Potentially Designation" are based on this common basis between the famous philosophers and Allameh Mesbah that on the one hand, the knowledge of ordinary people about the material world is exclusive to the acquired knowledge, and on the other hand, the mental image has two aspects: from one aspect, it exists in the human soul and itself is known, and it is a presentational knowledge, and from the second aspect, it presents something else and it is acquired knowledge.
Thirdly, our main discussion in this article is, first of all, the defense of the "Intrinsic Designation", not the criticism of the "Potentially Designation".
Our method in this article is analytical and descriptive.
In our opinion, objections made to the theory of "Intrinsic Designation" and affirmations raised in the field of establishing the "Potentially Designation" are debatable. Some of the disputes are as follows:(1) Involving the characteristics of Arabic words in semantic and philosophical analyses; (2) Not paying attention to the difference between conventional understanding and conventional analysis; (3) Confusion between the role of the knower and the specific role of knowledge in the designation process; (4) Inserting the concepts of existence and non-existence into whatness; (5) Confiscation and self-explanatory nature of some claims and arguments; (6) Ignoring the differences between mental images and external forms, or ignoring the differences between what is reasonable in itself and what is reasonable through an intermediary; (7) non-distinction between of designation (hekait, description, implication) and transmission.
At least some of the problems that have entered the theory of "Intrinsic Designation" are due to the lack of correct understanding of this theory, and this theory is more accurate than the theory of "Potentially Designation".

The field of value has a wide spectrum in the world of humanity and has significant applications and effects in philosophy, religion, economics, social sciences, ethics, psychology and even daily choices. One of the most fundamental issues that Allameh Jafari paid attention to in his philosophical opinions is the attention to the nature of "value" with an epistemological approach. According to him, "real values" are attributed to the realities of the world; Although the field of value and propositions related to it may not fall into the grid of contemporary experimental-laboratory weighing; But value propositions are knowable and can be as valid and valid as scientific propositions. According to Allameh Jafari's point of view, the measure of the reality of value is measured by its relationship with human nature, and the greater this relationship is, the more real the value appears. In his opinion, the home of "values" is the rational life of man and its origin is the divine and divine existence, therefore, "value" and "ought" can be deduced from human being. This article, with a descriptive-analytical method, aims at a new exploration of Allameh Jafari's views on value realism, which results in creating a path to confirm the theological-Islamic value propositions in various fields of human sciences.

One of the important topics in Islamic philosophy is the discussion of science, and it has been the focus of philosophers since its inception, and it can be safely said that philosophers have not had a single theory in this regard. Philosophers' opinions are ultimately different. In this research, we tried to use of Mulla Sadra's point of view on divine knowledge and the extent of his influence on Imam Ali's speech in Nahj al-Bala'ah, and to evaluate the commonalities and differences regarding divine knowledge from these two points of view. Mulla Sadra believes science is an existential matter with levels, and he believes God's knowledge of essence and knowledge of Creatures before creation and after creation to be direct and unmediated knowledge. Mulla Sadra pays special attention to verses and Hadiths in the issue of divine knowledge, like many philosophical issues. By evaluating the Effects of Mulla Sadra and precision in Nahj al-Balagha, it can be said that Mulla Sadra was significantly influenced by Nahj al-Balagha, because Imam Ali believes that God has knowledge of His essence and the possibilities before and after their creation.

I examine the characteristics and justifications of rational disagreement in science. It explores the relationship between the justification of rational disagreement in science and the justification of rational disagreement in the epistemology of disagreement, specifically religious disagreement. In this regard, I focus on the views of two famous philosophers of science from the second half of the 20th century, namely Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend. The views of these two philosophers on rational disagreement in science can be seen as significant, concrete, and tangible examples of the main approaches in the epistemology of (religious) disagreement, in which rational religious disagreement is justified. I bring together insights from both epistemology and philosophy of science and show reflection on disagreement in science can improve our intuitive understanding of rational disagreement in epistemology. To better understand the existing approaches in epistemology, I utilize intuitive ideas found in rational disagreement in science.

Mulla Sadra has experienced three philosophical journeys: the originality of nature, the originality of existence of gradational oneness and the originality of existence of personal oneness. These three journeys are the main principles of Transcendent Theosophy, and any kind of evolution in them leads to evolutions in minor issues. Due to the systematic connection of the issues, in the issue of the reality of science and various issues related to it, there should be evolutions that are proportional to the three mentioned journeys. According to the first journey of science, the science is from the category of accident and as a result, it is an essential affair, while according to the requirements of the second and third journey, the science has coexistence with existence. This transformation leads to transformation in many minor issues and creates fundamental differences. The issues of the first journey are more influenced by the non-existential view of the realities related to the subject of science, which is referred to as the foundation of qảvm in pre-Sadrai philosophy. In this article, due to the position and opportunity, we will address and analyze some important preliminary issues, which include: the position of discussion, the essential or existential nature of science, being nature or concept of science, the definition of science, the equivocality of names or commonality of meaning of science, being contiguous or analogous of science and the type of attribution proposed in science based on three philosophical journeys.

In the first half of the 20th century, the ontological approach in explaining philosophical issues was first reduced to an epistemological approach and then to a linguistic approach. The experts of the recent approach claimed that the meaningfulness and truth of propositions can be explained by relying on theories of meaning. As a result, the discussion about being and it’s judgments changed to a discussion about language and its meaning and what it is.In this article, we tried to answer the question of what is the theory of meaning in the Allāma Tabātabāī’s, after defining the theory of meaning and the outline of theories of meaning in the West? And does this theory has the ability to answer the problems of the theory of meaning or not?Allāma Tabātabāī, in discussing the primacy and priority of existence over essence or meaning, basically considers it impossible the realization of any meaning, both verbal and non-verbal,in reality, and on the other hand, he proves that meaning is the same mental form and its place is in the mind. Therefore, it can be concluded that his theory is closely related to the imaginary theory of meaning, but it does not have the problems of the apprehension in mind theory of meaning that is discussed in the West, and through the foundations of Islamic philosophy, such as the discovery and recital of the mental form, it answers them.

The concept of "abstraction" plays a crucial role in shaping perceptions and defining their boundaries and characteristics. This study explores the evolving meaning and function of abstraction within the context of three philosophical frameworks: the essential view, the principiality of being with a gradation unity approach, and the personal unity approach. In the essential view, abstraction entails separating from material aspects, thereby elucidating the emergence of triple perceptions, various forms of rationality, and the negation of perceptual additions. In the principiality of being with a gradation unity approach, perception is seen as existential and inseparable from the soul, progressing towards transcendence. Abstraction, in this context, involves transitioning from one order of existence to another, separating the perceiver from the perceived. Finally, in the personal unity of being, perception transforms into "appearance," and abstraction refers to the separation of this appearance from hidden or inferior appearances. Through these three perspectives, the process of abstraction moves from plurality towards unity and perception, ultimately converging with the perceptive appearance in the third paradigm.

This article seeks to show the changes in issues related to knowledge based on Mullā Sadrā's three philosophical evolutions and graded approaches: the quidditative view, the ontological primacy of the existence in the graded unity framework, and the ontological primacy of the existence in the individual unity framework. The main question is, what changes have happened in the problems related to knowledge according to the three mentioned Sadrian tendencies? In this article, we have examined four such issues: "the truth of abstraction", "the way of subsistence of forms in the soul", "the unification or non-unification of the intellect with the intelligible", and "the knowledge of material beings". The result is that these issues are differently dealt with in each of the three approaches; For example, in the first approach, abstraction is in the form of "losing material accidents" in order for the perception to occur, while according to the second approach, abstraction is manifested as "the soul's journey in its existential degrees" and in the third approach, either it is not raised at all or can be discussed as "the soul's journey in its existential manifestations". The way of subsistence of forms in the soul according to the first approach is a kind of subsistence of inherence, and according to the second and third is subsistence of issuing and subsistence of manifesting respectively. The unification of the intellect with the intelligible has no place in the first Sadrian framework, but it is proved in the second approach as the unification of the knower and the known, and in the third, the unification is promoted to absolute unity. Regarding the knowledge of material entities, in the first approach, material entities do not have knowledge of themselves, nor knowledge of others, nor are they objects of knowledge; while according to the second and third frameworks and with the support of principles such as the concomitance of knowledge and existence, the predication of the "true reality" (ḥaqīqa) and the "intangible reality" (raqīqa), the fact that the divisions of existence are its very gradations, and the principle of simple truth, they both know themselves and others, and are objects of knowledge.

 In this research, considering the types of relationship between science and religion (conflict, contrast, intersection and contact), the opinions of a number of sociologists have been examined. Theorists such as Comte, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, etc. have a conflicting point of view and believe that with the transition of societies from traditional to modern and the dominance of experimental science and the modern way of thinking, the position of religion in the modern era is weakened and science takes its place. Some other sociologists like Spencer believe in interaction and others like Simmel believe in separation (independence) between science and religion. Habermas's strategy is the interaction of science and religion, and he considers the social life of modern societies impossible in the absence of religion and religious ethics. Giddens is also against the reduction of the influence of religion with the progress of modernity in the modern world, but he proposes religious rethinking. The findings show that there is no single point of view in sociology that can adequately cover all the complexities related to the relationship between science and religion. But it can be said that the views of classical sociologists based on conflict are changing towards the views based on the interaction of science and religion in the later theories of sociology, which is a kind of peaceful coexistence between modernity and science on the one hand and religion on the other.

This article aims to defend a conditional proposition, or to be more precise a biconditional, one: if we reject that science is value-free, then we must also reject that values are independent of reality, and vice versa. Therefore, arguments proposed against neutrality or value-freedom of science may also be applied in defending moral realism. Two arguments for this claim will be provided. The first argument is based on conformational holism, and uses the fact that by assuming a holistic structure for the relation of theory and evidence one agrees that every criterion which is potentially useful as evidence for theories be subject to confirmation and disconfirmation by further empirical evidence. The second argument is based on anti-dogmatic nature of science I will then argue that among different forms of moral realism, ethical naturalism is the one that is better vindicated.

The long-term Naturalism-Supernaturalism debate among philosophers has been developed with respect to the question of the existence of supernatural entities. According to philosophical Naturalism, all there is are natural; while supernaturalists postulate supernatural entities like God, soul, etc. in their ontological framework. Recently the most heated debates on this issue are informed by scientific theories and the philosophers of both camps invoke the contemporary scientific achievements in their philosophical arguments. This paper is concerned with the question: is it possible for philosophical Naturalism to be challenged by scientific theories? The importance of this question is due to the dilemma it puts in the foreground of philosophical naturalists. If the philosophical naturalist answers the question negatively, she cannot legitimately appeal to scientific theories as empirical evidence in favor of her position. Because then science by default and regardless of its empirical content would confirm Naturalism. On the other hand, the acceptance of the possibility of challenge would be available just at the expense of discarding methodological Naturalism. Methodological Naturalism as a principle that excludes any supernatural entity or supernaturalistic premise from scientific explanations, guarantees the compatibility of scientific worldview with Naturalism, and eliminates the possibility of challenge. Therefore, if the Naturalist wants to benefit from science in her arguments against supernaturalists in a non-dogmatic manner, she has to give up methodological Naturalism as a necessary principle of scientific inquiry.

Today, the idea of expansioning of religious science is known not only in Iran and the Islamic world, but also in the Western philosophy. The "possibility of religious science" discussion has a history of more than two centuries; and its roots grew from the beginning of the discussion of the separation of science and religion and the confrontation between human science and Christian wisdom in the West, and the result was the marginalization of religion for a century. This ideaology has created sects in the Western and Islamic world in the field of science expansion, which are mainly divided into three standpoints. In the expansion of science, a group has given originality to naqli (narration) knowledge, a group to human knowledge (experimental sciences), and the third group has confirmed two standpoints and considered the way to acquire knowledge to be both intellect (áql) and narration (naql). Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, who is one of the sages in this field, considers the third standpoint valid and has emphasized its validity in his numerous books. This article investigates the principles, nature and possibility of religious science from the standpoint of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli with a descriptive-analytical method along with some criticisms on this. According to Ayatollah Javadi Amoli`s view, if science is science and not pure illusion and hypothesis, it will never become un-Islamic; therefore, the expansion of religious science is not only possible but also necessary.

Gazali’s perspectives on gnosis and knowledge are so important, because he has known much different knowledge in his era. In this paper, the difference between revealed gnosis, as a particular knowledge that belongs to the Prophets and human knowledge specifically the terrestrial world, has been explained. He has divided the sciences based on the object of knowledge, and its method, and aims to show that revelation is the most transcendent one. He believed that the revelation can be called a gnosis. The value of revealed gnosis has two aspects: firstly, it is a piece of certain knowledge, and second, without it achieving felicity can’t be possible. Never the other sciences can replace it but he has not wanted to humiliate the other sciences. He has applied philosophical and mystical notions to explain the revelation, but has explicitly expressed the revealed gnosis can’t be considered the same as another knowledge.

Paul Karl Feyerabend is one of the extremely influential philosophers of science in the second half of the twentieth century that his controversial works and opinions have reduplicated his reputation. This is his provocative works led to a misunderstanding for some academics and experts in philosophy, so that someone called him the Worst Enemy of Science. In this article I'm going to show that this idea isn't true: Feyerabend feels hostile towards neither science, nor any tradition else. He fights only against dogmatic and destructive ideologies. Generally speaking, Feyerabend's ideas express only his hostility to technocracy and chauvinism of science. According to Feyerabend, modern science has a lot in common with the Medieval Church. He would maintain that nowadays science has been turned into a rigid religion whose prophets are scientists, whose miracles scientific discoveries and whose judgements scientific statements. Then it's up to us to put science in its place in order to make room for other traditions and human knowledge.