جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "بیع متقابل" در نشریات گروه "فقه و حقوق"

Iran's new oil contracts, known as IPC, is a new model of contract to restore relations with the industrial world, which includes all oil operations from exploration and drilling to development and exploitation and increased harvesting. In fact, the purpose of this research is to study these types of contracts For the implementation of upstream projects in the country's oil and gas industry, it is from the perspective of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Constitution, which was written in a descriptive-analytical way, and the findings of the research indicate that the principles of exploitation of oil resources, including the negation of foreign economic domination and economic independence and The observance of public interests and public interests in the provisions of the approved general conditions have been observed and the non-contradiction of this type of contract with the principles and provisions of the Constitution is obvious, and the indicators of foreign financing, security production, technology transfer and maximum use of domestic capacities with the initiative of prolonging the period The contract and tying the contractor's fee to the amount of production from the field or tank, without transferring the sovereignty and ownership of the National Oil Company as the operator of the oil and gas resources, is superior compared to the mutual sale contracts.

The upstream contracts of the oil and gas industry, due to the nature and specific characteristics of this industry, have unique characteristics that distinguish this type of contract from other types of international commercial contracts. Complexity, uncertainties, and instabilities have always existed in the oil and gas industry in the upstream sector, i.e., exploration, development, and production stages. Due to the long term of these contracts, it is always possible for events beyond the will and power and prediction of the parties to occur, which may temporarily or permanently create obstacles or delays during the implementation of these contracts. In this case, the continued existence of the contract requires the parties to determine their rights and obligations in the event of force majeure events. Accordingly, the force majeure condition is one of the most important conditions in oil contracts. Iran, as one of the countries with huge oil and gas resources, needs contracts in which the force majeure condition is considered to manage this industry in the upstream and downstream sectors.In this research, with an analytical view, we have given a description of the developments in the inclusion of the force majeure condition in the legal system governing the upstream industry of Iran's oil and gas industry. In this context, the laws and regulations governing this industry and the concluded upstream contracts from the point of view of the force majeure condition, we have investigated to answer this main question:Therefore, if we want to divide the history of the force majeure condition in the upstream contracts of the oil and gas industry, we must consider the existence of three different periods. The first period was the period of neglect and failure to include the force majeure condition in the contracts, which starts from the beginning of the formation of the oil contractual system in Iran, especially in the concession contracts such as Darcy's and Reuter's concessions, until before the nationalization of Iran's oil and gas industry. The second period is when the force majeure condition appeared in the oil Act of 1957 and as a result, this condition was included in most of the upstream contracts concluded between 1950 and 1978. The third period is of great importance to the condition of force majeure and is the time period after the Islamic revolution. It is well-considered and the condition related to force majeure becomes one of the most extensive conditions of oil contracts in this period. In this course, regarding the formal and substantive conditions of force majeure, the conditions of realization and the requirements for citing it, the examples of force majeure and its constituent elements, the effect of force majeure on the life of the contract, the costs incurred, the rights and obligations of the parties and how suspension or termination of the contract and exemption from contractual liability due to the occurrence of force majeure are precisely and explicitly included in oil contracts.

In the present work, we have tried to find out the result of the combination or aggregation of contracts; therefore, by descriptive and analytical methods in jurisprudence, Iranian law, French law, and UNCITRAL legal guide on international mutual trade transactions, we conducted a comparative study and concluded that, connecting different contracts with each other in the form of contract sets, can lead to “merged contracts" or "comprehensive contracts". The terms, conditions and effects of merged contracts are subject to the mutual will of the contracts and the general rules of them, unless it is a specific contract. However, in comprehensive contracts, individual contracts retain their independence, so the disruption in the implementation or validity of one of the subcontracts has no effect on other contracts subject to the comprehensive contract, except by the will of the parties and the determination of the law. We face a shortcoming in the jurisprudence and law of Iran and France regarding the issue, so it is necessary to consider the future changes in the civil code of Iran and France.

After nearly three decades since the conclusion and implementation of Buyback contracts in the oil and gas industry in Iran, objections to this contract, particularly from the perspective of foreign investors has been revealed. Failure to allocate a share of the produced oil and gas to foreign investors and subsequently discussing possibility of reserve recognition, short terms of Buybacks and non participation of oil companies in production period, non admissibility of Buybacks fiscal system for foreign investors and the Iranian content are among many challenges which have been set forth by contractors. In order to solve such problems and attract expertise and financial resources to the Iranian oil and gas projects, a new petroleum contract has been introduced by Iran, the so-called Iranian Petroleum Contract (IPC). The present article will comparatively analyze Buyback and IPC in three aspects naming ownership, reservoir recognition and fiscal regime and will conclude that under IPC, the same as Buyback, ownership of petroleum in situ and produced oil and gas vest by the government. Also, IPC’s contractor, the same as the contractor under the Buyback, is able to recognize oil and gas reserves in accordance with the PRMS guideline, and its fiscal regime although in some areas has been improved, some objections can be raised.

Petroleum upstream service contracts possess different aspects of legal, contractual, fiscal, economic, technical, technological and environmental nature. In this research, efforts have been made to review one of the aspects of the petroleum upstream contracts which have been far too little considered by the domestic legal community, namely the fiscal system of upstream service contracts. Since every service contract avails of its own independent fiscal system, we tried, using the analytic and comparative approach, to review the fiscal system of Iranian service contracts (buy-back) after taking a close look at the fiscal system service contracts used in Iraq. Since our country is in possession of Joint Petroleum Fields with Iraq, it would be extremely beneficial, from the comparative law perspective, to take into full account the contracts concluded overseas for the same field. thus, in the interest of producing a practical research, benefits have been taken from the details two draft petroleum service contracts of Iran and Iraq.

As the primary means of attracting foreign investment, international oil buybacks are consistent with the Iranian Law. Despite the criticisms available, they have been the financing source of the oil industry in Iran. It has been the legal basis of the interactive relationship between Iran and the oil company investors for almost two decades. The legal structure developed gradually, so today it is being unveiled as its new generation, dubbed as the Iranian petroleum contract. In this way, the Iranian legislature has prescribed both exploration and development meticulously, so that with changes in its content, it can receive benefits at the time when the country needs foreign investment especially in the shared oil fields. It will receive benefit with more use of external resources in order to exploit oil resources, particularly in the field of mutual benefit and the difficulty of financing. This paper is an attempt to examine this subject matter in an analytical way. It is an attempt to show the strengths and weaknesses of the oil buyback contracts in each of their generations and offer an applied research on the rise and appearance of the deformation and development of buyback processes in the context of the Iranian Legislature. Specifically, it wants to explain factors affecting development of the international oil contracts and describe the reasons for the recourses, the application and use of this method of signing contracts.

The creation and development of economic analyses of law over the past halfcentury has drawn public attention to the aspect of efficiency. The analytical approach of this novel idea in the realm of contract law has made it possible to compare the efficiency of two different legal acts with reference to each other and to identify their deficiencies. The main element of evaluation of the efficiency in a contract's structure is paying due attention to three principles: lower transaction costs, greater cooperation and the flexibility of the contract. To apply these principles to buy-back and production sharing oil contracts indicates that the transaction costs of buy-back contracts are greater than for production sharing contracts. Moreover, buy-back contracts fail to properly align the interests of employer and contractor and this factor will amount to a decrease in cooperative profit. As to their flexibility, production sharing contracts are also considered to be better placed because their contractual structure enables both parties to align the content and structure of the contract with their own situations either at the time of conclusion or enforcement of the contract. To identify the deficiencies of buy-back contracts through the application of economic analysis of law will result in modification of the contract, an increase in profits for both parties to the project and a better framework for exploiting the oil resources.

Private sector investment, particularly foreign investment is a major and vital category in exploration and development of oil and gas industry. Since the major oil fields are in undeveloped countries, which most important feature of them is government budget lack and weak domestic private sector financing, attracting foreign investment is important. Absence or lack of them has created some problems. Production sharing agreement is, in the last-mentioned countries, as tools for attracting of foreign investment from overseas. Due to the international popularities of the PSA and discussions on design a new contract patterns, in this paper, the use of PSA in the upstream oil industries of Iran is discussed. In this talk, with the use of descriptive and analytical methods and refer to authentic sources of oil law, have studied by financial & non-financial terms of PSA and then, comparing its efficiency in analogy with buy back, analyzed. Finally, this result was obtained that using of PSA in analogy with buy back, will some benefits to our Countries.

Today, technology and access to it, one of necessities and basic indicators ofeconomic development is and this is why it is one of the major topics tradeInternational trade has become. The successful transfer of technologyrequires an understanding of industry goals, resources, technology,innovation and the transmission, transfer methods, factors affecting, how torecruit and how to develop it. Technology transfer agreements due to thescope and complexity of the topic and the different conditions in suchcontracts is expected, are special features. Technology transfer is necessaryfor the conventional patterns different methods of technology transfercontracts were identified and evaluated. Technology transfer agreements,contracts and diverse, including licensing, buyback contracts, contracts andpartnership agreements covers. The contract is a framework, each contractorpatterns with regard to the characteristics and specific circumstances of theparties, may have advantages over other models.

Temporary marriage has been adopted in Iran Civil Code and it is special to Shiite jurisprudence. It is used from the Quran and Hadith that this type of marriage is permissible and there is no reason for its banning. The reasons that have been advance for its banning by Sunnis are based on a particular view of the second caliph. A first look at the subject suggests that this decree is commanded on the base of necessity in order to reduce committing sin; since promoting this type of marriage has implications that are not good in the case of there is no necessity or is not in its place. In this paper, at first the concept of the temporary marriage and its Quranic-narrative documentations have been studied and then its consequences have been evaluated.

The use of buyback for the development of oil and gas fields is an established mechanism in Iran. Current legislation authorizes the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to use buyback for both exploration and development. The buyback scheme can be defined as a risk service contract, under which the contractor is paid back by being allocated a portion of oil/gas produced as a result of providing services. Buyback is based upon a defined scope of work, a capital cost ceiling, a fixed remuneration fee and a defined cost recovery period. When buyback is used for both exploration and development, the specifications of the field to be developed are unknown at the time of contracting and therefore agreement on the scope of work, duration of development operations, ceiling for capital costs, fixed remuneration fee, and duration of cost recovery need to be deferred to the time when a commercial field is discovered. This article first outlines the introduction of buyback for development of Iran’s oil and gas fields. It then examines the main features of the mechanism. Third, the use of buyback for both exploration and development is explored and related challenges discussed. Finally, the article reviews the new buyback model proposed by NIOC to address these challenges.

As a legal institution, the so called "buy back contract" play a significant role in the field of gas and oil transactions of our country for more than 15 years. Since its practical introduction, there has been a kind of ambiguity and secrecy with this new legal institution. Such an ambiguity and the secrecy seems to be the main obstacle for an appropriate and objective critical analysis of these contracts by academician, as well as other experts. The main task of this article is to offer certain suggestions and solutions to improve of buy back contract in Iran by shedding some lights on their shortcomings.

Buy-back contracts in recent years have been played a significant role in Iran's oil and gas industries. Current restrictions in the Iranian laws which somehow obstruct foreign investment in Iran, display buy-back contracts as a suitable means and a quite safe for the parties of those contracts.