جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "حقوق طبیعی مدرن" در نشریات گروه "فقه و حقوق"

legal modernity as a value-oriented framework considered the concept of "right" as an abstract and metaphysical concept in the eighteenth century. At the same time, utilitarian theory welcomed the method of empirical observation in legal analysis, and considering the socio-economic functions of right emerged as an independent theory and have challenged how metaphysics interacts with reality. The present study seeks to investigate the relationship between metaphysics and reality and the nature of the concept of right from the perspective of utilitarianism theory. The principle of "achieving the greatest welfare for the greatest number" in utilitarian school of thought can challenge the concept of right drastically. It seems that utilitarianism authorizes sacrificing individuals and their interests (rights derived from the theory of modern natural law) as a necessity for greater happiness and welfare. Further investigation revealed that the theory rejects the subjectivism that exists in modern natural law; in other words, in examining the concept of right, it simply does not reflect the precedence of metaphysics over reality and, therefore, can be consistent with a typical impression of the concept of "right".

The essential function of natural law is to be the criterion of justice. And therefore, the relationship of natural law with the positivist approach to law, if it calls into question the said function, can lead to the passage of the theory of natural law. The doctrinal anguish of the first half of the 20th century resided in the development of a theory of natural law based on the interaction of reality and metaphysics. The pre-eminence of metaphysics over reality as the foundation of natural law debauchery on a natural law that has no relation to social realities. We must leave formal justice and we must not fear that this passage means the transition from justice to equity. The main question is how and to what extent the relationship between natural law and social variables exist. Stammbler's natural law with variable content, seems to question the inherent function of natural law; because it depends on contingency. Renard's natural law with progressive content is not, like Dabin's natural law with variable applications, exact. The anguish of having minimal metaphysics and the necessity of the passage from being to having to be requires the natural right to progressive applications.The author tries to substantiate his hypothesis, "natural rights with evolutionary implementations" by comparing the three models proposed by Dabin, Renard, and Stammler for the relationship between natural Law and the variable matter, and criticizing these three models.