جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « ولی فقیه » در نشریات گروه « فقه و حقوق »

Preservation of privacy in its various dimensions is the right of the citizens of a society. On the other hand, the government needs access to financial information, which is reported based on facts, for policy-making and, more importantly, for the implementation of its economic policies. The present writing was compiled with the aim of examining jurisprudential access to real and legal human property information for the implementation of economic programs and policies and in a descriptive-analytical way. For this purpose, in rejecting the government's permission to access citizens' information, three reasons were raised: "no permission in searching other people's affairs", "no guardianship over another" and "inflicting damage on the market". The first and second implications of prohibiting the access to the information of property of the real and legal person's property were accepted provided that an individual jurisprudential view is taken into consideration; but, by using government jurisprudence, these arguments can be rejected and criticized. In order to prove the permission of the government to access the information of assets, four reasons were presented: "refinement of the basis of a ruling (tanqīḥ manāṭ) of the issue of covert monitoring of government officials", "the principle of no harm (lā ḍarar)", "priority comparison" and "use of the authority of the jurist guardianship", of which the last two reasons were accepted as the possibility of setting aside the reasons for prohibition. "Complete implementation of the comprehensive tax plan", "correct distribution of subsidies", "entrusting government privileges to the target community" and "fight against money laundering" are represented as the results of this research.

The subject investigated in this article is expropriation by the government and its related institutions in the light of modern jurisprudential views. Therefore, we have first analyzed the generalities about the municipality and its possessions, and after that we have examined the issue from a jurisprudential and legal point of view. It seems that from the point of view of jurisprudence, bases such as harmlessness, expediency, and such things allow the municipality to acquire, and on the other hand, these bases are an obstacle to the acquisition of this institution. On the other hand, some principles have been proposed in the laws of western countries, including France, and we have entered and applied them in domestic laws. These foundations, which in their most important aspect are public service, public power, and public benefit, have been analyzed in their place.

The legal framework and governance of a nation are profoundly influenced by its foundational theories and intellectual bases, which are often encapsulated in the nation’s constitution. This is particularly evident in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the concept of the authority of the supreme leader [Velayat-e Faqih] has been a cornerstone of its legal and political system since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The principle, deeply rooted in Islamic law, posits that the governance of Muslims should be under the guidance of a qualified jurist during the era of Imam occultation. This concept was institutionalized through the Iranian Constitution, particularly with the ratification of article 5, marking a significant departure from prior constitutional frameworks. Martyr Dr. Sayyed Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti (1928-1981), a pivotal figure in the revolution and the establishment of the new constitution, played a central role in articulating and implementing this principle. This paper aims to delve into Beheshti's contributions and perspectives on the authority of the supreme leader, examining the evolution of this concept and its practical implications within the framework of the Iranian Constitution.

The primary inquiry of this paper revolves around the conceptualization of the authority of the supreme leader as articulated by Martyr Beheshti. Specifically, it seeks to address whether Beheshti's discourses and writings support the notion of the absolute authority of the supreme leader during the era of Imam occultation. Additionally, it questions how Beheshti justified the necessity of this absolute authority and the extent to which he envisioned the scope of the supreme leader’s powers within society. This exploration is crucial for understanding the theoretical underpinnings of Iran's political system and the constitutional legitimation of the supreme leader’s authority.

It is hypothesized that Martyr Beheshti’s intellectual and juridical endeavors significantly contributed to the conceptualization and institutionalization of the Authority of the supreme leader in the Iranian political and legal systems. Beheshti, leveraging his scholarly background and political activism, posited that the absolute authority of a qualified supreme leader is essential for guiding the Islamic community in the absence of the Imam. This hypothesis further suggests that Beheshti envisioned a broad scope of powers for the supreme leader, aiming to ensure the governance of society aligns with Islamic principles. This study seeks to affirm these hypotheses by examining Beheshti's contributions to the theoretical foundation and practical application of Velayat-e Faqih.

The methodology employed in this research is content analysis, focusing on a systematic examination of Beheshti’s speeches, writings, and the constitutional texts. This method allows for an in-depth analysis of the discourse, enabling the extraction of key concepts and viewpoints without imposing external interpretations. The research utilizes library resources, including primary and secondary sources, to construct a comprehensive understanding of Beheshti’s thoughts and the legal-rational structure of the Authority of the supreme leader in Iran. The framework for analysis involves categorizing and tabulating the data to facilitate a clear, systematic presentation of findings. This approach not only highlights Beheshti’s influence on the development of Iran’s constitution but also provides insights into the dynamic interplay between religious authority and state power in the context of modern Islamic governance.

The research meticulously explores Martyr Beheshti’s profound contributions to the constitutional law of the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly focusing on the authority of the supreme leader [Velayat-e Faqih] and its operational limits within the state’s governance. The findings underscore Beheshti’s pivotal role in articulating a vision where the supreme leader’s authority, grounded in Islamic jurisprudence and the collective will of the Muslim community, serves as the linchpin for the governance of an Islamic society. His interpretations emphasize the balance between divine guidance and the community’s welfare, advocating for a leadership model that, while authoritative, fundamentally differs from autocratic or tyrannical governance.
     Beheshti’s perspective on the supreme leader’s authority elucidates a governance model that is neither democratic in the conventional Western sense nor autocratic. It highlights a unique framework where the supreme leader, meeting stringent qualifications and enjoying broad public support, leads with an authority derived from both divine law and the consent of the governed. This model proposes a symbiotic relationship between the jurist’s leadership and the community's welfare, advocating for decisions that prioritize the collective good over individual interests.
     Further, the analysis reveals that the absolute authority of the supreme leader [Velayat-e Motlaqe-ye Faqih], as envisaged by Beheshti, inherently contains checks against tyranny. Beheshti's distinction between tyranny and the supreme leader’s governance lies in the voluntary acceptance and religious obligation of the community towards the supreme leader's leadership, reinforced by the latter's adherence to Islamic principles and the public interest.
     The constitutional place of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist, as articulated by Beheshti, is central to the Islamic Republic’s governance philosophy. Beheshti champions the necessity of an informed, divinely guided leader to ensure the Islamic character of the state's governance. This principle, he argues, is paramount, forming the constitutional bedrock of the Islamic Republic.
     Beheshti's discussions on the limits of the supreme leader’s authority indicate a nuanced understanding of governance. While the constitution delineates the framework within which the supreme leader operates, Beheshti acknowledges the flexibility required to address the community's needs and the public interest, suggesting that in exceptional circumstances, the supreme leader’s authority can extend beyond constitutional stipulations, as exemplified by Imam Khomeini's actions prior to the 1989 (1368 SH) constitutional amendment.

This study concludes that Martyr Beheshti’s contributions to the conceptual and practical understanding of the authority of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist in Iran's constitutional law are both foundational and transformative. Beheshti's vision delineates a governance model that integrates Islamic jurisprudence with the principles of collective welfare and leadership accountability. His interpretations advocate for a leadership that, while authoritative, is fundamentally anti-tyrannical, grounded in the community's welfare and the principles of Islam.
     Beheshti’s elucidation of the guardianship of the Islamic jurist’s role and authority within the Islamic Republic's constitution provides a critical framework for understanding the balance between divine guidance and the societal contract in Islamic governance. The nuanced portrayal of the supreme leader’s authority, with its inherent limits and responsibilities, offers a unique perspective on the governance of an Islamic society, highlighting the dynamic interplay between religious authority, constitutional law, and the public interest.
     In essence, this research underscores the enduring relevance of Beheshti’s thought in the discourse on Islamic governance, presenting his work as a cornerstone in the development of the Islamic Republic of Iran's constitutional and legal framework. Beheshti’s legacy, as examined through this study, offers invaluable insights into the implementing Islamic principles in the governance of a modern state, reflecting a profound engagement with the challenges of religious authority and political power.

The management of economic affairs is an integral part of any political system, which is entrusted to certain institutions or individuals according to the legal, cultural and managerial conditions in each society. In the Islamic society, this procedure is entrusted to the legal guardian as the highest authority, and in this research, the jurisprudential foundations of the legal guardian in economic affairs will be discussed. 

The method of this article is analytical and descriptive using library tools.Ethical Considerations: In writing this article, the principle of accurate and trustworthy referencing has been taken into account.

There are many jurisprudential foundations such as the management of hasbiya affairs, the management of anfal, khums and zakat, and the organization of economic affairs in Islamic society, which, due to the prevention of chaos and being placed in a certain institution, is considered as the guardian of jurisprudence. Continuity of government in the era of absence of Masum (AS) has been entrusted. 

The jurisprudential foundations of the guardianship of the jurist in economic affairs are due to the need of the Islamic society to entrust matters to an authority that is aware of the rules of religion and to organize economic affairs, which exist in different forms in different societies. But in the Islamic society, it has long been considered among the powers of the jurist.

Expediency plays a fundamental role in the legislation of religious precepts and Religious edicts have been legalized considering expediencies and corruptions. As government orders are directed in providing social expediencies, they are of special status. Expediency has played a valuable role in actuality of the guardianship of Islamic jurist and they are in a close relationship. Various authorities entitled to the sharia ruler facilitated compatibility of Islam with emerging needs. Governing social affairs requires decisions not limited to secondary sharia rules, and the ruler issues orders and precepts different from the original ones of which expediency and corruption are found by the guardian of Islamic jurist who is also the ruler of society. The present research aimed at explaining the status of expediency in the theory of guardianship of Islamic jurist. Through analyzing the role of expediency in the theory of guardianship of Islamic jurist, the present work tried to review the basics and the main foundation of the issued rules by the guardian of Islamic jurist, and the tools for access to social expediencies.

The institution of Velayat-e-Faqih, as one of the manifestations of Islam, has a strategic and decisive role in the criminal policy network of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its orientation. In the theory of political discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Supreme Leader is the ruler of the Islamic society, whose powers and guardianship are present at all levels of legislative, judicial, executive and participatory criminal policy. Legislative criminal policy oversees the enactment and oversight of the country's criminal laws and regulations. Vali-e-Faqih, based on the powers arising from the religious arguments of the province as well as the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has the power to make policy and criminal legislation directly and indirectly. Implementing direct policy and legislation of the authorityThe institution of Velayat-e-Faqih, as one of the manifestations of Islam, has a strategic and decisive role in the criminal policy network of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its orientation. In the theory of political discourse of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Supreme Leader is the ruler of the Islamic society, whose powers and guardianship are present at all levels of legislative, judicial, executive and participatory criminal policy. Legislative criminal policy oversees the enactment and oversight of the country's criminal laws and regulations. Vali-e-Faqih, based on the powers arising from the religious arguments of the province as well as the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has the power to make policy and criminal legislation directly and indirectly.

Accepting that a jurist authority can intervene in issues associated with his boundary of authority on the bases of evidences, the question raised is that how the conflict of Imamiyeh jurisprudence with international legal system for a charged follower (of jurisprudence) can be explained and investigated. Adopting a descriptive-analytic approach, the current research is intended to investigate the relationship between the Imamiyeh jurisprudence and legal international system on one hand and the commandment of the jurist for a charged follower in his boundary of authority on the other. After analyzing the data, it was concluded that the primary duty of a charged follower is to refer to a qualified jurist authority while the duty of the jurist itself is the establishment of an Islamic state. Thus, considering the international rules and regulations, the strategy of the plurality of the jurist’s authority system for a qualified jurist in his own geographical boundary is closest to the correct. In this way, not only the commandment of a jurist authority do not intervene for a dutiful follower but also the conflict between Imamiyeh jurisprudence and international legal system is far from conflict.

This research seeks to determine the limits of the guardianship of God, the Prophet and the Imams, and this discussion is important because of the limits of the guardianship of the Vali Faghih. Because the guardianship of the Jurist is due to the guardianship of the Imam, the Prophet and the Almighty God, and since the guardianship of the mujtahid and the jurist cannot be more than the guardianship of God, the Prophet and the Imam, then its limits must be determined.

This research has been carried out in a library using descriptive-analytical research methods. Ethical Considerations:

 related to writing texts and referring to sources was observed.

The intellect dictates that man should obey someone who has come from God, and the reason for this, in addition to the intellect and the numerous verses of the Qur'an, is that they are benevolent guides. The boundaries of the province are also in all personal and social issues as well as expediency.

The Prophet and the Imams have guardianship by the permission of God and the guardianship of the Prophet and the Imams is inferior to the divine guardianship.

The purpose of this study was to identify the legal-jurisprudential position of the jurist in law. The research is theoretical and has been analyzed by reasoning and deductive method. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, Islam is the core of all laws. These principles and principles are governed by the principle of Article 4 of the Constitution and the principle of the guardianship of the Supreme Leader as a just and truthful Islamist, and the director and leader of the Guardian Council and the embodiment of the Guardian Councilchr('39')s exclusive jurisprudence with the  conditions of poverty, justice and awareness. It is unique in the requirements of the time and the issues of the day and in its competence to examine the origin and conformity of laws and the right to invalidate laws contrary to Islamic law. The Velayat-e Faqih is one of the most important institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which, according to the constitution, plays a vital role in the direct and indirect exercise of law by electing members of the Guardian Council and the Expediency Council.

Structural and evaluational in criminal legislation is the role of Vali-e-Faqih through governmental rules and social and subordinate social Fatwas (orders) which are called in this article as “Ahkam-e-Nezamie” (Nezamie rules). The main subject of this paper is to clarify the status of Nezamie rules of Vali-e-Faqih in the structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially in the Guardian Council. This can significantly contribute to create a single procedure in the operation of institutions and legal authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the Guardian Council in citation to the Nezamie rules of Vali-e-Faqih. The author believes in the absoluteness of obeying the Nezamie rules of Vali-e-Faqih by all persons and institutions (with the duty of legislation or measuring the regulations) including the Guardian Council through a descriptive-analytic method based on reliable jurisprudential sources, and comments and decisions of the Guardian Council. Therefore, while examining the regulations and acts of the parliament in terms of consistency or inconsistency, The Guardian Council with the presence of the Nezamie rules of Vali-e-Faqih shouldn’t refer to their jurisprudential views. The comments and decisions of the Guardian Council in this respect have been in some instances different.

Islamic Azad University of Maymeh, Young and Elite Research Club, Maymeh, Iran Moon is considered a natural calendar for human individuals. Proving the crescent sighting is among the issues that all human beings are somehow in need of. Similarly, the Islamic religious law has subjected some of the important devotional acts upon proving the crescent sighting. This very fundamental function of the moon in the matters pertaining to this world and the Hereafter, has given the issue of proving the crescent sighting a special status in Islamic thinking. The question that the present research would deal with is whether the Islamic judge has authority over proving the crescent sighting or not. In fact, do people have to refer to their supreme legal authority (marja‘ taqlīd) concerning the crescent sighting or is the sighting among the state’s duties? Jurists have expressed various views on this question: a group of renowned majority of the jurists have considered as valid the judgment of the Islamic judge, whether his judgment is documented by evident proof or by his own knowledge. Another group maintain the invalidity of the judgment of the Islamic judge and believe that his judgment is not valid whether it is documented by evident proof, by being much reported (tawātur), by having prevalence (shuyū‘), or by the judge’s own sighting and knowledge. Yet, another group maintain that if the judge’s judgment is documented by evident proof, his judgment is valid and if it is documented by his own knowledge and sighting, it is not valid. To provide an answer to the above question, the present article tries to critically review and evaluate the brought up opinions and evidences of each one of them and conclude that the judgment of the ruling jurisconsult on the proof of the crescent sighting is necessary for, and even obligatory upon all people and that all people, even the legal authorities should follow it, since authority evidences of the judgment of the Islamic judge would include them, too.

Political systems in the contemporary world to ensure political survival and to achieve permanent political acceptance and to prevent the institutionalization of corruption, not only start to organize some Regulatory organization, but also provide Regulatory powers for such organizations as The right to research, question, getting informed and find out the on process things. On the other hand, according to 57th article of the Iranian Constitution, the supreme leader can control the Islamic system. Present research with a jurisprudential method, wants to study such authority in the Islamic Republic of Iran for the supreme leader And it does not consider the justification of the prohibition of espionage and bad opinion, and Necessity of good opinion and justifies it as such.

According to primary rule، receiving property belonging to other without his consent is not permissible unless there is a specific reason for it. Since all the governmental taxes particularly customs lack the consent of individuals، some hold that its levying is not permissible. However، refusing to levy these taxes leads to disturbing the business system of the society. Thus، some have permitted it based on the secondary rule. Most of those justifying collection of taxes through secondary rule، have stated government and its requirements as reasons for it. However، this issue has been controversial among Shiite jurisprudents and many have considered the common arguments inadequate for establishing the permissibility of government. As a result، the concomitants of the issue of government including customs are under question too. The present article seeks to put forward a new method towards permissibility of levying taxes. Hence raising the issue in a way that those not approving the government would sanction this practice.

In this article the author tries to analyse the concepts such as Faqih, Vali-ye Faqih, the difference between the Supreme Authority and Vali-ye Faqih.The paper also wants to prove that "Alamiyat" is one of the conditions of Supereme Authority.Imam Khomeini is one of the jurisconsults who negated "Alamiyat" condition in Vali-ye Faqih. He indicated if someone only knows the jurisprudence sciences, but he cant recognize interest of the society, he wont be a priest.Finally, it can be inferred that "Alamiyat" in Vali-ye Faqih relates to the governmental problesms and not to its idiomatic meaning.

Offensive Jihad as one of the branches of the holy religion of Islam is so significant that one particular chapter is devoted to this issue in jurisprudential sources. Offensive Jihad is a two-fold regulation raising questions in two ways. On the one hand، the question is whether offensive Jihad by the Islamic government at the time of occultation is permitted according to the Shiite thought. This question can be dealt with in the field of public law. On the other hand، from the perspective of human rights، the object of offensive Jihad –calling non Muslims to Islam، according to a large number of jurisprudents- is controversial، since it is in conflict with freedom of thought and belief of human being and is considered an imposition according to many intellectual thinkers. The main hypothesis of the article is that offensive Jihad in contemporary times is allowed based on human rights requirements and religious proofs. Studying the goal and wisdom behind offensive Jihad in Islam، this article discusses the legitimacy of offensive Jihad under the rule of the fully qualified jurisprudent.