جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « legal systems » در نشریات گروه « فقه و حقوق »

"Conflict of interest" as an independent and well-known concept in modern governance is so important that many important keywords in this field are directly related to the issue of conflict of interest. Gaining public trust and promoting democracy, preventing corruption, promoting health and administrative cohesion, transparency and economic development is impossible without achieving an acceptable level of Conflict of interest management. Conflict of interest is an area of extreme complexity and political and legal sensitivity. Hence, the theoretical controversy over the exact perception of "conflict of interest" has been going on for some time. The main question of the present article is a correct understanding of the concept of conflict of interest, its different types and types of confrontation of legal systems. The authors believe that with a correct and comprehensive understanding of the concept and types of conflict of interest and with a comparative observation of the arrangement of legal systems in the face of this great problem, the literature on conflict of interest in Iran can be enriched until in the shadow of deepening the concept in the minds of researchers and concerned, it will be possible to gradually achieve lofty goals such as gaining public trust, justice and transparency.

In accordance with the developments of the last three decades and the rise of China as a world power, its role in international relations and its trade and economic position in our region, and the actual and potential transactions between Iran and China that also have the legal and contractual aspects, the need to pay attention to Chinese legal studies by law schools has been clarified. The quantity of legal works created in this field shows the lack of sufficient attention of the legal community of the country to this field. Therefore, this study firstly, by considering comparative law attempts to explain the position of the Chinese legal tradition in relation to other legal traditions, and secondly by listing the foundations of the Chinese legal tradition, tries to take the first steps in the field of Chinese legal studies.

In this study, human rights in Islam and the West discussed the legal system and the place of religions from the perspective of human rights be addressed. To overview the objectives and activities related to human rights and the teachings of divine religions and the main message is found. Basically, the teachings of divine religions have been very effective role in promoting human rights. The most important problems and disagreements in connection with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there is the issue of absolute freedom to choose and change religion and promote the full equality of women and men, the requirements of true morality and public order that the Islamic Human Rights and West of religions discussed human rights in a way that is not forced to choose a religion support. Attitude that this article seeks to answer it.

The key problem addressed in the paper is that of the legal pluralism, more specifically the pluralism of legal systems within one state that pursues the accommodation of religious freedom claims. In its controversial Refah decisions the Strasbourg Court held that the prohibition of the Turkish Welfare Party was “necessary in a democratic society” because its plan to set up a plurality of legal systems was not “compatible with fundamental democratic principles”[1]. This paper tries to inquire into the notion of legal pluralism, tries to test normative assumptions made by the Court in its regard and argues that a “no plurality” approach would be overly simplistic and that a liberal approach would require different degrees of pluralization (some of which already exist to accommodate differences and diversity within a society) to be extended to religion, without however endangering constitutional democracy. It is necessary to point out at least two major theoretical contexts in which this problem should be considered. One is undoubtedly the issue of ‘militant’ democracy: once we assume that constitutional democracy and legal pluralism are incompatible, we give a (part of) definition of democracy, which entitles us to reject any changes proposed to it while retaining the claim to be democratic. If we know what is democracy in a substantive sense, which values it is designed to protect (e.g. secularism or fundamental rights) we can legitimately reject any changes to that vision as a measure protective of such values[2]. Another context that is relevant is the issue of universality and cultural relativism. It first appears when we attempt to define democracy as a substantive notion, which necessarily assumes a value judgement. It also becomes relevant if we mind that the rationale of legal pluralism is the necessity to recognize, respect and tolerate different views and visions of ‘happiness’. In its pure form the idea of relativism and legal pluralism is represented in the classical version of state-centered international law system, where states posses equal and unlimited internal sovereignty[3]. However even within the State any kind and instance of legal pluralism is about the respect and tolerance of the different normative values and views. Only straightforward consensus on all the rules and values as universal can justify total rejection of legal pluralism. The paper will start by an attempt to clarify the understandings of legal pluralism in social sciences and law. The second part will try to construe a liberal argument in favor of advancing legal pluralism to a certain degree, basing on the individual right to freedom of religion and conscience. Instead of relying on the ‘collective rights’ argument, it rather believes that individual rights provide a sufficient basis for this claim, as far as religious life and consciousness are deemed an important part of individual personality and self-determination. The third part tries to balance the claims of legal pluralism by considering arguments against such a model of society.

One of the legal tools used by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its jurisdictional system is the preliminary ruling on the basis of Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. According to this rule, the national courts can ask the Court to respond about the interpretation and correct way of applying a European law in a european country, with the aim of removing doubts and perplexities. This process ends with the enactment of a preliminary ruling by the Court. If the request for a preliminary ruling by the lower national courts is a consolidated fact, on the other hand the same can not be said for the requests of the Constitutional Courts, which have not reached a common view on the subject. In this article, in addition to the description of the cases of references for preliminary rulings of the Constitutional Courts of countries such as Italy, France, Spain and Germany before the Court of Justice of the European Union, we will try to understand the events concerning these referrals and mutual approaches held by the courts with particular attention to the approach of national Constitutional Courts.

Legal references provide the reader with the identification of legally binding rules. If the general principles of the law are eliminated in international law of treaties and domestic law, the remaining parts will be introduced as dispute cases. Unilateral exercise is one of the examples of dispute cases. This kind of action had no legal effect due to existing agreement patterns ruling the rights and obligations. Hence, there was not any unilateral intention to incur the obligation. However, developments in the major legal systems indicate that the legal effects of such unilateral exercises have been recognized despite their considerable differences. Accordingly, these exercises can be called legal references in various legal systems all around the world.

The question of codification is a topic that is almost as old as the law itself. Early collections of laws are routinely referred to as codes, even though there is usually little reflection on quite what it is that constitutes a ‘code’ or what codification might mean in this context. In the modern law, codification has tended to be thought of in terms of grand modernizing projects that aim to replace older laws with new, universal and complete statements of law. The academic literature on codification has accordingly been dominated by debates for and against codification. The reformers argue that codes are modern, clear, accessible and consistent, while defenders argue that existing laws are consistent with the culture of the community they regulate and are flexible and adaptable to change. In this paper my aim is to go beyond this debate which, in my view, has become somewhat sterile. I try instead to address two principal questions. The first is to ask what exactly it means to codify the law. The, perhaps slightly surprising, conclusion that I draw here is that all law is necessarily ‘codified’ in the precise sense that laws or rules are necessarily generalizations about conduct and how it should be regulated, and that this very process or abstraction or generalization then creates constraints for the practice of law or dispute settlement: as rules are written down they must be followed, and similar cases decided in the same way. In this way the practice of codification regulates legal practice as well as social life. And as rules become more complex they may be written down in different way - law books or legislation. This then leads to the second question, which is to examine the more limited understanding that we have of codification in modern legal systems. Here I argue that codification is linked to practices of state-building and the practices of legitimacy that are associated with it in modern society. In this way I thus hope to offer new understanding of a concept and a practice that is central to the modern law. Finally I would like to record my gratitude to Bahman Khodadadee and Sara Mirbazel for their works in producing this translation, and to Dr. Abdolreza Javan Jafari for assisting with and overseeing this process.