جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "philosophical concepts" در نشریات گروه "اخلاق"

The study of atheism as a matter of knowledge in the 21st century has attracted the attention of many thinkers. Motahari and Pasquini are among those who have studied the causes and non-philosophical reasons of atheism and believe that atheism is against the human nature although it has a profound connection with how the image of God is, and that any lack of cognition or impeding the formation of proper knowledge can lead one to atheism. Motahari believes that the inadequacy of religious and ecclesiastical concepts impedes the formation of a correct understanding of God and ultimately a reversion to theism in the Western world, where the inaccurate political and social functioning of the church as a religious authority is also a sufficient of atheism and secularism in Western societies. Pasquini also believes that one's emotional and psychological failures in childhood and adolescence lead to a failure in the process of knowing and understanding God. Therefore, he uses the psychological theory of Professor Vitz "dysfunctional father" to illustrate the non-philosophical causes of atheism in individuals, and in particular in the leaders of the new atheism and intellectuals and thinkers and philosophers.

ne of the issues raised in the philosophy of ethics is the recognition of the verisimilitude of value propositions. Some believe that value concepts are philosophical concepts. Consequently, the propositions derived from these concepts are knowledge-creating and provable. From the perspective of others, the notional concepts of these propositions are considered to be mentally-posited. Using a problem-oriented approach and describing and comparing the works of Martyr Motahari and their intellectual analysis, this research seeks to discover the truth about this issue from the viewpoint of Martyr Motahari. A careful attention to the professor's statements shows that professor Motahhari has the second perspective. But the relativity of value propositions cannot be attributed to him. It seems that the words of the professor are correct in imperative statements, but in the declarative propositions of statement, they are false.

Moral concepts, like well-known philosophical concepts, belong to the category of ideas, not forms, and have an external and non- subjective manifestation; therefore, they have great resemblance to secondary intelligibles. However, firstly, as the external realization of moral concepts is the basis for the voluntary act of man, and secondly, finding their examples is the basis for the doer’s intention, moral concepts are different from famous philosophical concepts. This difference has led Muslim scholars to discuss the philosophical concepts and propositions related to ontological area under the rubric of theoretical philosophy, and to discuss the concepts and propositions related to axiology under the rubric of practical philosophy. In this paper, while investigating the reality of philosophical concepts, we examine the nature of moral concepts and their differences with famous philosophical concepts. The existence of a fundamental distinction between these two categories of concepts has led to interpreting famous philosophical concepts as "secondary ontological intelligibles", and considering moral concepts or any concept related to the voluntary and purposeful actions of man as "secondary axiological intelligibles."

One of the important issues raised in the philosophy of ethics is whether ethical propositions are realistic and provable, or the consistency of these propositions is considered to be mentally-posited and unprovable. Considering the importance of Allameh Tabatabai 's novel perspective, this paper attempts to extract and examine his views on whether the moral propositions are realistic or not, and also on relativity or absoluteness of ethics .The analysis of his thoughts suggests that, although he believes that moral propositions are mentally-posited or relative, first, his ideas are only true with regard to the mentally-posited or relative things (moral obligations), not the provable or real propositions. Second, the unprovability of mentally-posited propositions in the domain of morality is not a reason for moral relativity.