جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « اهرم بانکی » در نشریات گروه « اقتصاد »

In this study, the effect of bank size, bank leverage and some capital structure ratios on systematic risk of banks listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange has been investigated. In this study, a sample of 10 companies is selected from the banks listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period 2010 to 2019. This study has a main and a secondary objective, which are, respectively, "investigating the effect of leverage on systematic risk in banks listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange" and "investigating the role of bank asset quality on the relationship between systematic risk and banks' leverage". Econometric methods (pooled data method and estimated generalized least squares method) are used to examine the research questions. This research is an applied research, as its results can be used in the decision makings of managers, investors and analysts. The panel data method and library and documentary studies are used respectively to estimate the mode and gathering the needed information. In this regard, statistical indicators are derived using the financial statements of banks published in the Comprehensive Information System (Kodal). The results show that bank leverage affects the systematic risk of banks. Also, the findings show that adjusting the leverage doesn’t have any role in increasing the positive relationship between bank leverage and systematic risk of these banks by asset quality.

Since moral hazard in behaviors of banking system may jeopardize efficiency of debt mechanisms to fund rising, it is important to examine the empirical and theoretical evidences of moral hazard in the Iranian banking system. Risky behavior of banking system is caused by the asymmetric information problems between creditors and central bank. This paper considers the simultaneous effects between changing risk and leverage that justifies existence of moral hazard in the Iranian banking system. To do so, we use dynamic panel data model for the period 2006-2019 in Iranian banking system. According to the obtained results, there is a significant positive relationship between the level of risk and leverage. This relationship implies the existence of moral hazard that can be caused unsuccessfully performance of central bank in supervision and supporting in the banking system.