جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « ساختار مالکیت » در نشریات گروه « حسابداری »

Stock mispricing is a situation where the stock price in the capital market is different from its intrinsic value. Incorrect stock pricing leads to a sudden drop in prices and eventually the stock market crash. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of stock price synchronization on stock mispricing with an emphasis on the role of ownership structure. The statistical population of the research is all the companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange. Using the considered limitations, 149 companies were selected as the research sample in the period of 2011-2020 and the research hypotheses were tested by multivariate regression method. The findings of the research show that the simultaneity of stock prices has a significant and direct effect on stock mispricing. On the other hand, the evidence suggests that managerial ownership and institutional ownership have a moderating (weakening) effect on the relationship between stock price synchronicity and stock mispricing. Also, family ownership and government ownership do not have a significant effect on the relationship between stock price synchronicity and stock mispricing. The results of the research show that the ratio of institutional owners and managerial ownership as a regulatory lever of the company's ownership structure corrects the adverse effect of stock price synchronicity on incorrect pricing and, in fact, probably moves in the direction of investors' interests.

This study measures the credit risk and capital adequacy according to the size and governance structure of the banks admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange. The data used in this research includes the financial data included in the audited financial statements of 22 banks admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange Organization, which were collected in a panel form and in the period of 2019-2019.In order to investigate the impact of ownership concentration and ownership structure on the credit risk-taking behavior and capital adequacy of banks, the variables of shareholders with shares greater than one percent are used as ownership concentration and the variables of corporate, family and government ownership shareholders are used as ownership structure criteria. has been The results show that the increase in ownership concentration leads to a decrease in credit risk and capital adequacy in the bank. Also, government ownership has a negative effect on credit risk, and family and corporate ownership has a positive effect on banks' risk-taking. Also, all three ownership structure variables have a negative effect on bank capital adequacy. In other words, increasing the concentration in all three variables reduces capital adequacy. These findings show that the appropriate ownership structure can limit the bank's risk-taking activities according to the risk level of each bank.​

The main purpose of this research is to investigate the moderating role of ownership structure on the relationship between the performance of the board of directors and the payment of dividends in Tehran Stock Exchange member companies. This research is applied in terms of purpose, descriptive-correlation in terms of data collection method, quantitative research in terms of data nature, and retrospective research in terms of time. The research population is all the companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange during the years 1395 to 1402, of which 140 companies were selected as a statistical sample through screening. This research was conducted based on the logic of deductive-inductive reasoning and panel data was used to test the hypotheses. The necessary data were collected using the new Rahvard software and sorted through the Excel software. For data analysis, the twelfth version of Evioz software was used. The results of the research hypotheses test showed that there is a significant and positive relationship between the performance of the board of directors and the payment of dividends. Also, the ownership structure has a significant and positive effect on the relationship between the performance of the board of directors and the payment of dividends.

The main purpose of this research is to investigate the impact of tax avoidance on company performance, emphasizing the role of ownership structure. The current research is applied and from the methodological point of view, the correlation is causal type (post-event). The statistical population of the research is all the companies admitted to the Baghdad Stock Exchange and they were investigated in the period between 2017 and 2021. Also, to collect the required data and information, firstly, the library method and document studies were used. The basis, theoretical foundations and literature of the research were collected from specialized Latin books and magazines and explanatory notes of selected companies, compact discs of the image and statistical archive of the Baghdad Stock Exchange Organization. Then, the necessary data to test the research hypotheses were extracted by referring to the financial statements, the stock exchange website and other databases. In order to investigate the relationship between the variables, linear regression and Eviuz Naxe 8 software were used. The results of this research showed that the level of tax avoidance has a negativesitive and significant The effect on stock returns, as well as management ownership, has an inverse and significant relationship on the relationship between tax avoidance and stock returns, on the contrary, institutional ownership has no effect on the relationship of avoidance. There is no tax on stock returns.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of Audit Committee Characteristics on the relationship between ownership structure and Classification shifting. In this study, the effect of the characteristics of the audit committee on the relationship between ownership structure and Classification shifting was investigated.The present sample of the present study includes 105 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period 1394 to 1398. In order to test the research hypotheses, multiple regression method has been used.The results show that there is a negative and significant relationship between institutional shareholders and Classification shifting and the independence of the audit committee weakens this relationship. While the expertise of the audit committee does not affect this relationship. There is also a positive and significant relationship between government owners and Classification shifting. While the expertise of the audit committee weakens this relationship and the independence of the audit committee has no effect on the relationship.These findings also indicate that in the presence of institutional and government stakeholders, the characteristics of the audit committee cannot be a mitigating factor in earnings management by Classification shifting.

A solution must be devised to control the representation of managers in companies, ensure their responsibility and accountability, and protect the rights of shareholders. One of these strategies is compensation to motivate managers to achieve organizational goals. Corporate governance mechanisms are one of the factors affecting the managers' compensation. Therefore, this study investigates the relationship between three essential factors of corporate governance (ownership structure, characteristics of the board and chief executive officer (CEO)) and managers' compensation in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2016. This research is practical in terms of purpose and descriptive in implementation. It is also in the correlation branch in terms of investigating the relationship between variables. Data are collected by literature method (reading books and articles) and referring to databases, that is, through the Rahvard Navin databases, as well as the websites belonging to the Tehran Stock Exchange Organization, the Kodal website, and the notes attached to the financial statements. Multiple linear regression and the least-squares method are used for statistical analysis. The results indicate no significant relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure, board of directors' characteristics, CEO's characteristics) and managers' compensation. Therefore, all three research hypotheses that corporate governance mechanisms have a significant relationship with managers' compensation are not confirmed. These results are consistent with the research results of Jaiswal and Bhattacharya (2016) and Abedini et al. (2015), who stated that there is no evidence of a significant relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and the remuneration of managers. It is also in line with the research results of Hassan et al. (2015), who stated that ownership structure has no significant relationship with managers' compensation. The results of the research are inconsistent with the research of Ahmedpour and Javan (2014), Haiderpour et al. (2016), Abedini et al. (2015), and Jaiswal and Bhattacharya (2016).  Results are not far from expected because, on the one hand, the reluctance of CEOs and members of the board of directors of companies to provide information on managers' bonuses, as well as the lack of a valid law to disclose information related to managers' compensation, has caused a lack of access to accurate and transparent information. On the other hand, the largest percentage of ownership of stock exchange companies belongs to public government institutions or government-affiliated institutions. Unfortunately, in public companies, managers' remuneration is not in reality (the remuneration is not based on managers' performance). In contrast, in private companies, the remuneration is based on performance. In addition, there is no independent committee called the Compensation Committee, which has a specific mechanism for determining compensation in companies listed on the Tehran stock exchange. In general, what is clear in research related to managers' compensation in Iran is the lack of accurate and transparent information about the amount of compensation awarded to managers and board members and the amount of cash and non-cash compensation. These issues indicate a shortcoming in the corporate governance system. This research's most important practical suggestion is to oblige companies to form a compensation committee. Because its lack, which increases transparency and accountability for managers' compensation, is strongly felt. Although managers' compensation is one of the most important corporate governance principles, it has not been taken seriously in Iran for some reasons, and some companies refuse to disclose the total amount of compensation. Therefore, it is necessary to research the non-disclosure of managers' compensation in detail.

Internal controls are a process that provides reasonable assurance about the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements based on policies and procedures in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Therefore, operational inefficiency and quality of financial reporting are as negative consequences due to weak internal controls, which are likely to be due to uncontrolled criteria of accounting quality index. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to provide a model of weak internal controls based on non-control criteria of accounting quality index. To achieve the research goal, data of 87 sample companies were collected over a period of 7 years from 2012 to 2018and were analyzed by descriptive-correlation analysis using logit regression test. The results showed that there is a negative and significant relationship between ownership structure (ownership concentration) and weakness of internal controls. There is a significant negative relationship between mandatory disclosure and the weakness of internal controls.

The present research investigated the relationship between political uncertainty (presidential elections) and asymmetric cost behavior and the moderating effect of ownership type (state versus private). The sample consisted of 325 Iranian companies (1,990 observations) listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and the Iran Over the Counter. Data were analyzed using panel data and OLS multiple regression with robust standard errors. The results showed that the asymmetric behavior of selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs is linear during times of political uncertainty (presidential election years), but sticky in non-election years. In other words, costs decrease less than the increase in non-election years. The results also indicated the sticky cost behavior of state-owned firms and the linear (non-sticky) cost behavior of private-owned firms in election years, with state-owned firms exhibiting greater cost stickiness in election years than in non-election years. Additional tests showed that the cost behavior of goods sold is anti-sticky in both election and non-election years, with a greater degree of anti-stickiness in election years. Moreover, in state-owned and private-owned companies, this behavior was non-sticky in both election and non-election years, and state firms exhibited greater anti-stickiness in election years compared to non-election years and private-owned firms. Finally, the behavior of operating costs in both periods was linear and was not significantly different for state-owned and private-owned firms.

The purpose of this research is to investigate the role of ownership structure in adjusting the relationship between tax avoidance, corporate social responsibility disclosure and company value. Based on the purpose, the current research is of an applied type and from the point of view of the inference method, it is of a descriptive-analytical type. The scope of the research covers the period of 10 years from 1391 to 1400 and the place of research is the Tehran Stock Exchange and the companies admitted to the stock exchange. In order to check the validity of the research hypotheses, multivariate regression based on mixed data with fixed effects and Eviuse 11 software was used. The results of research hypotheses showed that tax avoidance has a significant effect on company value. Disclosure of corporate social responsibility has a significant and positive effect on the value of the company. Institutional ownership and managerial ownership moderate the relationship between tax avoidance and firm value. Institutional ownership moderates the relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure and corporate value, but managerial ownership does not moderate the relationship between corporate social responsibility disclosure and corporate value. Valuing tax avoidance is a function of corporate governance and, more broadly, is consistent with the view that tax avoidance and managerial efforts to divert value from shareholders are intertwined. Companies that adopt the principles of corporate social responsibility are more transparent and have less risk of bribery and corruption. Low earnings will lead to low stock returns, followed by a negative outlook for investors. These conditions affect the decrease in the stock price and ultimately lead to the decrease in the value of the company.

The Effect of Ownership Structure on Earning Management in Companies Listed on the Tehran Stock ExchangeProfit is considered as one of the most basic and important items of financial statements in financial and economic decisions, which is considered by many people. But sometimes managers, due to maximizing their own interests, may report profits in a way that contradicts the goal of providing the general interests of users. earning management refers to the set of actions that managers take in order to decorate information to achieve specific goals. Based on the mentioned materials, the main goal of this research is to investigate the effect of ownership structure on earning management in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. In order to achieve the general goal of the research, three hypotheses were developed and using the systematic elimination method, a sample of 114 companies was selected from among the companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange between 2010 and 2016. Discretionary accruals were considered as a measure for earning management, and Jones' modified model was used to estimate discretionary accruals. The analysis of the collected data has been done using the multivariate regression model using the statistical method of combined data. The results of the research hypotheses test show the negative and significant effect of institutional and managerial ownership on earning management, as well as the positive and significant effect of corporate ownership on earning management.

Due to the nature and importance of the insurance industry, optimal financial information and reporting ‎is very important in this industry. Nevertheless, the investors of insurance companies, the stock exchange ‎organization, central insurance and even the policyholders as the main beneficiaries of insurance companies expect ‎significant improvements in the financial reporting of insurance companies. The clauses of the auditor's report on ‎reserves and non-compliance with Iran's Accounting Standard No. 28 and the Central Insurance Regulations are ‎other noteworthy issues. The International Financial Reporting Standard 4, which will be replaced by IFRS 17 in ‎‎2023, is another important issue that Iran's insurance industry must be able to prepare to accept. Therefore, in the ‎current research, the issues and problems of financial reporting in the insurance industry have been identified from ‎the dimensions of recognition and measurement, reporting and disclosure, and finally systems and processes, which ‎are the three main components in the framework of financial reporting.‎

The method used in the research is a survey and the data collection was done through a questionnaire. ‎Finally, 50 questionnaires from 16 insurance companies were received and analyzed.‎

The research results show that the insurance industry is facing challenges in financial ‎reporting. The identified challenges in the field of recognition and measurement include the lack of accounting ‎standards in the field of life insurance, lack of application of common measurement methods at the international ‎level, lack of insurance measurements at the group level, Contracts and recognition of insurance premium income ‎are based only on historical information and ignoring adjustments including risk adjustment. In the field of ‎reporting and disclosure, there are challenges such as the inability to distinguish between insurance operations and ‎investment operations, the problem of distinguishing whether a group of contracts is profitable or unprofitable, and ‎the nature and amount of risks arising from insurance contracts are not disclosed. . Finally, the lack of sufficient ‎training of employees and the lack of integration of the information technology system and the software used are ‎challenges in the field of systems and processes‎.

The purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of CEO rotation on sustainable dividend policy and the amount of dividend distribution according to the ownership structure. Research in terms of purpose is part of applied research and research method in terms of nature and content is cause and effect. The research was conducted in the framework of deductive-inductive reasoning and panel analysis was used to analyze the hypotheses. The statistical population of the research was all the companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange and using the systematic elimination sampling method, 140 companies were selected as the research sample in The 9-year period between 2012 and 2020 was investigated. The results of the research hypotheses test showed that CEO turnover has a negative and significant effect on the sustainable dividend policy; But the rotation of the CEO does not affect the amount of profit distribution; Institutional ownership has a negative effect on sustainable dividend policy; However, the effect of government ownership and the moderating role of government and institutional ownership on the relationship between CEO turnover and sustainable dividend policy are not significant. State ownership has a positive effect and institutional ownership has a negative effect on sustainable dividend policy; But the moderating role of government and institutional ownership on the relationship between CEO turnover and profit sharing is not significant.

in this research the effect of ownership type on the relationship between tax avoidance and firm value is studied . the ability to identify tax avoidance is an important factor in determining the value of firms from the viewpoint of investors and the type of ownership of shareholders can explain or use it . this study seeks to explain the role of ownership type of different shareholders on the relationship between tax avoidance and firm value . in this research , the difference between the legal rate and the actual tax rate is used to measure tax avoidance . the type of institutional and micro - ownership is measured using the amount of stocks available to shareholders and the firm 's value is measured with the qtobin. this research is a quantitative research and in terms of implementation method is correlational and based on purpose , it is an applied research . the statistical sample of the study consists of 111 companies listed in tehran stock exchange during 1390 to 1398. the results indicate that there is a meaningful and inverse relationship between tax avoidance and firm value , as well as ownership structure affects the relation between tax avoidance and firm value.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of ownership structure, characteristics of board of directors and audit committee on the earnings management of listed companies in the period 2012-2019. Multivariate regression model was used to test the research hypotheses. The empirical findings from the testing of research hypotheses show that institutional ownership, industry expertise, independence, and board effort as well as the independence of the audit committee have an adverse effect on earnings management. In addition, the impact of the Audit Committee's efforts on direct profit management. The results of the present study emphasize the role of institutional owners, board of directors, independent audit committee and its specialty on profit management and reducing opportunistic behaviors of company management. The study outcomes can be useful in accepting companies' role in their impact on society and its individuals by managers and senior decision-makers. This study provides a step towards explaining the findings, enriching the relevant literature, and providing future research options in other countries.

The present study investigates the effect of ownership structure in adjusting relationship between related party transactions and unexpected audit fees in loss-making companies. In this way and order to achieve research objectives; Data of 71 companies were extracted for a ten-year period from the beginning of 2010 to the end of 2019, the research variables were calculated and the necessary statistical tests were performed. The method of this research is descriptive-correlational and its design is experimental using post-event approach. The Results Findings There is a positive and significant relationship between transactions with related parties and unexpected audit fees, and the independence of board of directors and duality of CEO's role have a significant effect on this relationship. On the other hand, the size of the board and CEO stability; They had no significant effect on this relationship. Conclusion say Transactions with related parties increase the unexpected costs of auditing and the independence of the board of directors and the duality of the role of the CEO reduce the relationship between transactions with related parties and unexpected auditing costs.

Previous research on earnings management has focused mostly on accruals earnings management methods and real earnings management. Recently, a third tool called classification shifting for earnings management has been considered. Classification shifting occurs when management intentionally misclassifies parts of recurring operational expenses as income-decreasing special items (McVay, 2006). This can inflate core earnings; for example, by hiding parts of the recurring administrative expenses among none operational items. Income Shifting within the income statement does not change bottom-line income but does increase perceived core earnings, an alternative performance measure often emphasized by financial analysts and investors. results of previous studies like McVay (2006) provide evidence of higher levels of classification shifting when management has incentives to act opportunistically to meet or beat consensus analysts' earnings forecasts. Different studies (MacVay, 2006; Saghafi and Jamalian, 2018) documented evidence of using classification shifting as a method of earnings management by the managers in different markets. Some other studies report that a strong investor protection environment and strong internal corporate governance tend to mitigate classification shifting (Behn, Gotti, Herrmann, & Kang, 2013; Zlata & Roberts, 2016). Also, the role of ownership structure, which is argued to have a significant impact on earnings management, should not be neglected. The value of a strong board and audit committee arises, in part, because they constitute a form of monitoring, curbing opportunistic managerial behavior, and therefore reducing information risk (Zlata & Roberts, 2016). Although there is general agreement that strong boards and audit committees curb accrual-based earnings management. In addition, due to the importance of the supervisory role of the board of directors in the company and its impact on the efficiency of supervisory mechanisms in the present study, some characteristics of the board of directors like board size and proportion of independent directors are also considered. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the effect of board characteristics on the relationship between ownership structure and classification shifting. This study investigated the role of board size and independence in the relationship between ownership structure and classification shifting.

The present sample of the present study includes 105 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from the period 2016 to 2020. In order to test the research hypotheses, multiple regression analyses have been used. Based on theoretical foundations these hypotheses were developed and tested:H1: there is a relationship between intuitional ownership and classification shifting.H2: there is a relationship between state ownership and classification shifting.H3: board size has a significant effect on the strength of the relationship between intuitional ownership and classification shifting.H4: proportion of independent directors has a significant effect on the strength of the relationship between intuitional ownership and classification shifting.H5: board size has a significant effect on the strength of the relationship between state ownership and classification shifting.H6: proportion of independent directors has a significant effect on the strength of the relationship between state ownership and classification shifting.In order to measure classification shifting, residuals from the model developed by McVay (2006) were used. This model measures classification shifting between core expenses (cost of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative expenses) and special items.

The results show that there is a negative and significant relationship between institutional shareholders and classification shifting and the size of the board strengthens this relationship. But the effect of the proportion of independent directors on the relationship was not significant. There is also a positive and significant relationship between state ownership and classification shifting. While the proportion of independent directors weakens this relationship, the size of the board of directors does not affect the relationship.

The results of this study show that the ownership structure of companies affects the rate of application classification shifting as a method of earnings management. Different kinds of ownership structures can change manager motivations to apply classification shifting. Since institutional ownership provides professional monitoring and control of manager behavior, it has been proven to be an effective corporate governance mechanism. In line with this theoretical foundation, we find a negative relationship between institutional shareholders and classification shifting. On the other side, a positive relationship between state ownership and classification shifting was expected as a result of poor monitoring mechanisms applied by the states to control managers’ behavior. Different aspects of corporate governance such as the board size and independence also can affect these relationships. The findings of the present study should be considered in the decisions of investors and stakeholders of the company because it can provide new evidence on how to use the change in classification as a new way of earnings management. This finding also can be used by auditors for audit risk assessment and audit planning. Since the evaluation of the classification shifting as a method of earnings management is widely ignored by researchers, there are many possible avenues for future research. The effect of other mechanisms of corporate governance on the classification shifting can be studied and on the other hand effect of classification shifting on the value relevance of financial statements the and reaction of investors to financial statements can be investigated.

Ownership structure and legal frameworks are one of the main and determining factors of corporate governance system. Useful information is information that has qualitative characteristics, and one of these qualitative characteristics of information is relevance. The degree of relevance of specific information varies among users and depends on the extent to which they need to be specific. Relevant information is information that can be used in forecasting models. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the role of ownership structure in the relevance of the value of accounting information with emphasis on the characteristics of the company. This is a descriptive, correlation and post-event study. For this purpose, the data of 155 companies listed in Tehran stock exchange during 2006-2018 were studied. In this research, with regard to the type of data and the common method of analysis with such data, the pooled data method has been used. The relationship between variables was investigated using multivariate regression. The results indicate that the ownership structure plays a mediating role in the Relevance of the Value of Accounting Information.

In full capital markets, all companies are expected to have easy access to resources outside the company, and investment decisions are based solely on expected future profitability, and access to domestic capital has no effect on decisions. But in the real world, due to the asymmetric information mechanism, the cost of financing using internal and external sources is different, and in these environments, asymmetric information between the lender and the borrower on the company's ability to achieve credit and investment power and activity. Their economy is impressive. Therefore, in the present study, the effect of agency costs on the relationship between ownership structure and investment sensitivity to cash flow in companies member of the Tehran Stock Exchange has been investigated. For this purpose, a sample of 107 companies active in the Tehran Stock Exchange, including a seven-year period based on the financial statements of the companies studied during the years 1392 to 1398 was selected and to test the hypotheses by multivariate linear regression method with Using EVIEWS software version 9, was used. The results indicate that agency costs have a significant and inverse effect on the relationship between managerial and institutional ownership and investment sensitivity to cash flow.

Recent research has shown that costs behave asymmetrically; That is, the rate of decrease in costs when sales decrease is less than the rate of increase in costs when sales increase. This asymmetric cost behavior is known as cost stickiness. therefore; The present study investigates the effect of profit smoothing and ownership structure on cost stickiness in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. In this study, we will first examine the effect of institutional shareholders as ownership structure on cost stickiness and then the interaction effect of profit smoothing and corporate governance with cost stickiness. The statistical population of this research is formed by companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and includes 85 companies active in various industries during the years 2009 to 2021. Multiple regression method has been used to test the research hypotheses. Findings indicate that ownership structure reduces cost stickiness; However, it is not a strong factor in reducing profit smoothing. The results also indicate that there is a significant positive relationship between profit smoothing and cost stickiness.

The relationship between shareholders and managers is fraught with conflicts of interest arising from the separation of ownership and control of management, differences in the goals of shareholders and managers, and their information asymmetry. This conflict of interest is explained by the theory of representation. Because some owners do not have effective control over the portfolios they own, the ownership structure (characteristics of the owners and the extent of their ownership) is a potentially important element in determining the riskiness of companies, especially banks. Ownership structure is one of the important regulatory mechanisms in banks that has a direct and indirect impact on capital adequacy, investment and risk-taking of banks.