جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « کم سرمایه گذاری » در نشریات گروه « حسابداری »

The present research is aimed at investigating the relationship among managerial overconfidence, internal information quality, and investment efficiency in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). To this end, the financial information of 84 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) during the years 2014-2021 was employed. The research results indicate a positive significant relationship among the internal information quality, investment efficiency, and overinvestment; however, the relationship between the quality of internal information and underinvestment is negative and significant. Further, the results revealed that managerial overconfidence improves the relationship between the internal information quality and investment efficiency, while it weakens the relationship among the earning announcement rate, the accuracy of profit forecast by management, and overinvestment. Nevertheless, the opposite applies concerning the absence of updated financial statements due to significant errors. Moreover, the relationship among the earning announcement rate, the accuracy of profit forecast by management, and underinvestment is not affected by managerial overconfidence; but managerial overconfidence strengthens the relationship between the absence of updated financial statements due to significant mistakes and underinvestment.

The power of profitability and increasing the wealth of shareholders in the enterprise requires the optimal use of resources and efficiency in performance. In this regard, information asymmetry and conflict of interest between managers and shareholders can be an important obstacle; therefore, in this study, we try to influence the quality of accounting information (profit forecasting) on investment performance (efficient investment and more or less investment). Also, in order to resolve the conflict of interest, the quality of the auditor (expertise, tenure and remuneration) who plays the role of moderator in this research is used. Therefore, 138 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period 2011 to 2018 were tested by data panel method. The results showed that the quality of accounting information improves efficiency and reduces investment more or less, and the auditor's expertise increases the impact of accounting information quality on investment efficiency and decrease more or less investment; as a result, optimal use of resources and increase efficiency In enterprises, more is achieved.

Investment efficiency is one important factor affecting a firm's performance. Also, financing decisions affect investment decisions, regarding the effects of the non-optimal capital structure on the rate of capital cost and cash flows of the firm. This study examines the relationship between deviation from optimal capital structure and inefficiency of investment.

This is a descriptive, correlation, and post-event study. The statistical population consists of the companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange, and the sample comprises 142 companies during 2007-2017, accounting for 1562 company-years.

The findings showed that an increase in the deviation from optimal capital structure increases investment inefficiency.  Also, an increase in the positive deviation from optimal capital structure (over-leveraged) has a significant and negative effect on over-investment and a positive effect on under-investment. Besides, an increase in the negative deviation from optimal capital structure (under-leveraged) has a significant and positive effect on over-investment and negative effect on under-investment.

The results imply that the optimal capital structure can affect investment efficiency by moderating the cash flow availability and the expected interest rate.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of Managerial overconfidence the Relationship between internal financing and investment efficiency.The statistical population of the study is Tehran Stock Exchange companies. Sampling method was used for systematic sampling (screening), according to which 87 companies were selected as sample. The present research is an applied and post-event method. The realm of research has been from 2012 to 2017. To investigate the hypotheses of the research, ordinary least squares method has been used in the form of Eviews software. Research findings show that internal financing has a positive and fair effect on investment efficiency. And internal financing does not have a positive relationship with investment. Also, internal financing has a negative and equitable relationship with low investment. The Managerial overconfidence on the relationship between internal financing and investment efficiency is not the same.

The purpose of this study is to test the effectiveness of VAT on the investment efficiency in listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. In this regard, 140 companies (980 observation year-companies) accepted in the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period from 2011 to 2017 have been investigated. In order to test the hypotheses of the research, a multiple linear regression model was used using combined data (integrated method). The results of this research indicate a negative and significant effect of the value added tax on the investment level of the company. Also, the research results showed that value added tax has a positive and significant effect on investment efficiency. In addition, the results of the research showed that the value added tax has a negative and significant effect on overinvestment and underinvestment and increases the investment efficiency. These results point to the importance and effectiveness of value added tax in acquiring an unconnected and efficient investment for the company.

In this research, the effect of financial reporting quality model and timing of liabilities on investment efficiency as well as the effect of timing of obligations on the relationship between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency and inefficiency in listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange is investigated. To testthe impact of 80 companies in the years 2007 to 2017, data was analyzed using Eviews software. In this research, three distinct methods (accruals, accruals, accruals, accruals, and accruals) were used to calculate financial reporting quality and their combined method. The results indicate that financial reporting quality has a positive and significant effect on investment efficiency. The quality of financial reporting does not affect investment and investment. Increasing the ratio of short-term debt to total debt will increase investment efficiency. Increasing the maturity of debt has no effect on investment and more. Other research findings indicate that the maturity of a debt, whether short-term or long-term, does not affect the relationship betweenfinancial reporting quality and investment efficient

Information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between management and shareholders lead to the phenomenon of moral hazard. Moral hazard means that the managers may make some decisions (e.g. investment decisions) that do not meet the interests of shareholders. Inefficient investment decisions include over or under-investment in firms’ labor and utilize the non-optimal number of human resources in business entity. One way to avoid inefficient investment decisions is providing the financial reporting quality; because the higher reporting quality increases the stakeholders’ ability to monitor the managers’ behaviors and decisions such as decisions on determine the number of labor in firms. This study investigates the impact of two measures of financial reporting quality (accruals and disclosure quality) on labor investment inefficiencies (include over and under-investment) in a sample of 107 firms listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2003 - 2014. The research results show that the increase in accruals quality and disclosure quality decreases the labor over and under-investments inefficiencies and eventually, companies employ more optimal levels of human resource.

The goal of this paper is to examine the association between product market competition and corporate investment decisions on particularly, over investment and low investment. The managers have different incentives to keep cash in firms. Product market competition is another powerful mechanism ensuring that management does not waste resources. When competition exists, shareholders can observe performance in other firms and use this information as a benchmark to evaluate managers. The aim of this research is to investigate impact of product market competition and Interactive relationship between product market competition and free cash flow on over- investment and low- investment in free cash flow. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index was used as measures of competitiveness. The sample consisted of 110 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange from 10 different industries over the period 2010 to 2015. Research findings indicate that there is no significant positive relationship between Herfindahl- Hirschman with the low_ investment and over_ investment. The interactive effect of product market competition on a negative free cash flow has significant relationship with low investment.

Over and underinvestment has led to low investment efficiency and increased economic overheating and inflation severely damaging the interests of the shareholders and the sound development of macro economy, and has been a mainstream topic in the field of modern corporate finance research. This paper aims to investigate the interactive effect of accounting information quality and information asymmetry on inefficient investment. The main purpose of this study is to inform managers, investors, professional accounting bodies, standard-settings and stock exchange about the accounting information quality as a key factor to reduce information asymmetries and enhancing the efficiency of investment. Research Hypotheses To achieve the purpose of this study, six research hypotheses are chosen. These hypotheses are as follows: There is a significant and positive relationship between information asymmetry and overinvestment at corporate level. There is a significant and positive relationship between information asymmetry and underinvestment at corporate level. There is a significant and negative relationship between accounting information quality and overinvestment at corporate level. There is a significant and positive relationship between accounting information quality and underinvestment at corporate level. There is a significant and negative relationship between accounting information quality and information asymmetry with overinvestment. There is a significant and positive relationship between accounting information quality and information asymmetry with underinvestment.Research Statistical population of this study consists of the companies accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange. The study period is between the years 2001 to 2012. Research method is exploring and determining the relationship between dependent and independent variables. Post event inquiry researches have been used (using historical information). For statistical analysis and to test hypotheses, descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) and inferential statistics (correlation-test, single and multiple linear regression and analysis of variance) are used. The results reveal that there has been a significant and positive correlation between information asymmetry and underinvestment. There has also been a significant and negative (positive) correlation between accounting information quality and over (under) investment. Another result reveals that there has been a significant and positive correlation between accounting information quality and information asymmetry with underinvestment; but there has not been a significant and negative correlation between accounting information quality and information asymmetry with overinvestment. Discussion and According to the results, we find that the accounting information quality reduces overinvestment and underinvestment in corporate level and information asymmetry is the key factor for underinvestment. Therefore, increasing accounting information quality will result in investment efficiency.

This study investigates whether and how firm investment efficiency is influenced by the accrual-based earnings management. The major purpose of this paper is investigating and analyzing the relationship between proxy of accrual-based earnings management and firm’s excess investments. Prior researches suggest that earnings management leads to increase in excess investments of firms (over-investments or under-investments). In this study, the data from 63 listed companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period of 1378-1388 (1999-2009) was collected. The results indicated that there is a significant relationship between discretionary accruals (as proxy of accrual-based earnings management) and excess investment. This suggests that firm’s investment behavior is influenced by accrual-based earnings management. The results also indicate that there is a significant relationship between discretionary accruals (as independent variable) and firm’s excess investment in the period afterwards

This paper examines how real earnings management activities affect firms’ investment activities. Although there is a large literature on earnings management, there is a dearth of evidence on how it affects firms’ real activities. Healy and Wahlen (1999) point out that earnings management studies have paid only minimal attention to its real economic consequences. Research on the consequences of earnings management has concentrated largely on the external, financial impacts. In contrast, the present study investigates the impact of real earnings management on internal, real decisions firms undertake. One might suppose that if management chooses to paint a rosier view for investors in the numbers they report externally, then they would not allow this to influence internal investment decisions. However, it is possible that investment decision makers within the firm believe the misreported growth trend—because they are either over-optimistic or unaware of the misstatement—and invest accordingly. Alternatively, investment decision makers might understand the true state of the firm but choose to overinvest in a high-risk approach to turn around firm’s performance (McNichols and Stubben, 2008). Kedia and Philippon (2006) suggest that firms engaged with earnings management, manipulate the investment decisions to pool with better performing firms, in order to avoid detection. Regardless of the reason for the overinvestment, truthful reporting might have prevented it. Several parties are typically involved in investment decisions. If financial results are reported truthfully, then other parties could enter in order to control the investment. As a result, firms invest more than they otherwise would have; thus attempts to meet capital market expectations or meet bonus targets, for example, could affect investors, employees, customers, and a broad set of related parties. Research Questions or Hypotheses: This study investigates whether and how a firm’s investment behavior is influenced by real earnings management activities. On the other hand, we try to find out how managers’ reaction to real earnings management activities in the context of their investment decisions. Simply, we attempt to answer the following question: Is there any significant relationship between real earnings management proxies (abnormal operating cash flows, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses) and firms’ excess investment? Given sales levels, firms that manage earnings upwards are likely to have one or all of these: unusually low cash flow from operations, and/or unusually low discretionary expenses, and/or unusually high production costs (Cohen and Zarowin, 2008). So, we can develop our research hypotheses as follows: H1: There is a significant negative relationship between abnormal operating cash flows and excess investment. H2: There is a significant positive relationship between abnormal production costs and excess investment. H3: There is a significant negative relationship between abnormal discretionary expenses and excess investment. We have used data for 63 listed companies on Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 1378-1388 (1999-2009) to test the above hypotheses. We first generated the normal levels of CFO, discretionary expenses and production costs using the model developed by Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) as implemented in Roychowdhury (2006). To answer the research questions, this paper analyzes the relationship between proxies of real earnings management and firm’s excess investment by multiple linear regressions. The results indicate significant relationships between abnormal operating cash flows, abnormal discretionary expenses (as independent variables) and excess investment, suggesting that firm’s investment behavior is influenced by real earnings management. Our results also indicate a significant relationship between abnormal discretionary expenses and firm’s excess investment in the period afterwards. Discussion and Managers do not have a direct preference for investing, but the requirements of signaling compel them to act in a consistent manner. The essential point that emerges is a general one: in any signaling equilibrium investment must be consistent with reported profits. In alternative interpretations, such as managerial optimism or empire building, managers might have a primary desire for investment, but it is the same requirement of consistency that lead them to manipulate earnings. In both cases, earnings manipulation is a necessary condition for overinvestment.

This paper by using adjusted model of biddle et al (2009), conditional relationship between conservatism and accrual quality on investment efficiency has been tested in Tehran stock exchange (TSE) during 2006-2009. Investment efficiency can be defined as identifying, funding and implementing all positive NPV investment projects. Underinvestment is defined as rejecting positive NPV investment projects and undertaking negative NPV investment projects is defined as overinvestment. In this paper we use khan and watts (2009) model of conservatism. AQ is the deferential amount of cash income and accounting income. The research hypothesis’s is tested by multivariable simple regression using OLS estimator on panel data base. The result shows that firms report more conservative, make more efficient investment decisions. But there is no evidence that AQ significantly reduces either under or overinvestment. Our results add to a growing stream of literature suggesting that eliminating conservatism from accounting regulatory frameworks may lead to undesirable economic consequences. And can be benefited to accounting standard sitter and stock exchange market.