جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « علم پیشین إلهی » در نشریات گروه « علوم انسانی »

Paul Helm believes that there are good reasons that divine omniscience - which includes the future - with human freedom understood in an incompatibilist sense is logically inconsistent. But this tension should not lead us to a reduced theory of divine foreknowledge, just as it should not negate human freedom and responsibility. Helm has argued that a Christian theist may accept a compatibilist sense of human freedom; first, the Christian doctrine of "God's grace" is compatible only with the compatibilist version of human freedom. Second because God is omniscient, it must be omniscient in a strong sense, and this is the case only if compatibilism is true. We will say that Helm's first argument will lead to the denial of some other accepted doctrines of religions, including Christianity, and his second argument falls into affirming the consequences. But Helm's third reason is that necessarily, if God knows x in advance (which He does), then x will necessarily occur. To avoid problems, he emphasizes that what he means by "necessity" is a historical and not logical necessity. But this argument only works when we accept that God is in time. Therefore, those who consider divine knowledge timeless can claim that all events exist in the divine mind in a necessary way and His knowledge is not necessary because it is in the past. It seems that Helm himself also accepts this problem.

Open theology is a theological movement that emerged from the heart of the evangelical Christian tradition at the end of the 20th century and was concerned with drawing a model of God's action in the world, based on which it could resolve the conflict and inconsistency in traditional theology, that is, between free will/human agency and God's prior and absolute knowledge. This thinking, which is considered a new approach in the field of theology and philosophy of religion, has raised views that have attracted the attention and criticism of many thinkers, both philosophically and theologically. Looking at the precious heritage of Islamic and especially Shiite thought, it can be seen that the doctrine of Bada can be more successful in solving the problem of human free will and divine foreknowledge; because based on open theism, it is necessary to give up the application of divine knowledge, in addition to ascribing attributes such as changeability to God in order to protect human free will, while with the help of Bada's teaching, it is possible to maintain the application of divine knowledge and to consider man as a being with absolute free will. In this research, an attempt was made to explain this superiority.

Views on the relationship between divine foreknowledge and human free will have considerable diversity, ranging from the negation of prior knowledge from God to the negation of free will. Most Islamic philosophers, with different explanations, have tried to prove the compatibility of the two. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to discover Sadra's approach to this issue based on ontological and cosmological principles. The comparison of written parts on this subject focuses on evolution in Mulla Sadra's view. The research findings show that Sadr al-Mut`allihin in different works and in terms of ontological and anthropological principles, has taken three different approaches in explaining the compatibility of human free will and Divine foreknowledge. The final opinion of Sadr al-Mut'allihin is in accordance with his final view on the issue of personal unity of existence and manifestation of the worlds.

In this article, we argue that Muslim scholars have divided divine knowledge into three categories including substantial knowledge, knowledge of the creatures before creation, and knowledge of creatures and objects after creation. In fact, there is disagreement among the Islamic thinkers over the divine knowledge, its quality, and features. The point of controversy revolves around the wide disagreements over the divine knowledge of the creatures and objects both before and after creation. Therefore, divine knowledge over creatures before and after creation has always been the point of ongoing and challenging rational and dialectical discussion and debate. We examine this issue comparatively between the three Islamic thinkers (Mulla Sadra, Shaarani and Assar).

The problem of divine foreknowledge and its conflict with the human free will is one of the oldest issues in Abrahamic religions. Solutions proposed so far for the problem have deployed an absolutist approach to concepts. This paper aims to solve the old problem by drawing on modern sciences, particularly the findings of Einstein’s theory of relativity with its relativistic approach. This research has been carried out with an analytic-critical method after collection of data from available sources. In the theory of relativity, an incident occurring in the future from the perspective of a temporal observer occurs at present from the perspective of an atemporal observer. Given this, we conclude that what is called ‘foreknowledge’ is indeed foreknowledge from the perspective of a human observer, but from the viewpoint of an atemporal observer, it qualifies as knowledge of the present, whether or not the observer is a material essentially temporal being, which has—given the theory of relativity—incidentally been atemporal, or an immaterial essentially atemporal being like God. As a consequence, an atemporal present piece of knowledge does not conflict the human will just because it always knowledge of the present.

The question of the divine foreknowledge and the human freewill (volition) is among the most important and complex philosophical issues within the Abrahamic religions tradition, which has come to be called theological fatalism. In the article at hand, we present the new reading of this issue by Zagzebski and discuss the three traditional solutions by Boethius, William of Ockham, and Molina. According to Boethian solution, God is atemporal. William of Ockham deems God’s knowledge of our freewill as a soft fact rather than a hard one, while Molina denies the premise of the transfer of past necessity. This article shows that the question and its solutions have wrongly deemed the eternity of God within time. That viewpoint is against Anselm’s theology that takes God as atemporal. Finally, we show that atemporality solution agrees with Anselm’s theology and God’s actual knowledge. The human’s agency is in line with God’s agency. That is to say, on the one hand, God’s knowledge is at the top of the causal chain that leads to the realization of an act and is considered as one of the conditions for the realization of the voluntary act. On the other hand, the human knowledge and power is part of the causal chain of that action. Therefore, the consideration of the finite human knowledge as relying on the infinite and atemporal knowledge of God does not contradict the human freewill.

Free will and Determinism has always been one of the most important Anthropological issues among Muslim thinkers. This issue has also been considered in Ibn-Arabichr(chr('39')39chr('39'))s mystical school. Ibn-Arabi in the seventh century AH in the picture of the relationship between Previous Divine Knowledge and Human free will or the negation of determinism, has a different approach to the thought of theologians. His theory named as "secrecy destiny" or "following knowledge from the known". Leading research conducted with a descriptive approach and based on library studies, speaks of the relationship of the thoughts of one of the Shiite commentators of the Holy Quran, namely Abul-Futuh Razi, who died in the sixth century AH, with the thoughts of Ibn-Arabi. The findings of the research, based on the views of this commentator in the discussions of determinism and free will, especially his pictureing of infection and testing of human with the previous divine knowledge, shows that not only is there a comparison between his views on the negation of Determinism from human with the theories put forward in Ibn-Arabichr(chr('39')39chr('39'))s school Rather, it indicates that he preceded Ibn-Arabi in the mystical thought of following knowledge from the known.

Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’ is one of the philosophers who have denied God’s foreknowledge. His view is influenced by his thoughts about Divine Knowledge, changes in Divine Will, and attribution of temporality to Him. Open theism as a new theological school, by proposing the dynamic Omniscience view and attributing the experience of time to God, believes in the openness of the future, and denies Divine foreknowledge. By examining the views of Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi and open theists, it can be seen that the attribution of temporality and passive knowledge to God are among the necessary grounds for rejecting divine foreknowledge by both of them, which led them to accept the causal and epistemic openness of the future. This article surveys analytically and critically the similarities between their views.

In this research, the views of Professor Fayyazi have been analyzed. Sadr-ol-Mote'allehin, according to the rule of indivisible entity and by proving the existential perfections of possible beings in the essence of the Almighty Supreme Being, explaining the knowledge by presence of God (immediate apprehension, intuitive knowledge) in the position of essence. Professor Fayyazi believes that this view has its drawbacks. The basic drawback is that Mulla Sadrā’s interpretation of the systematic ambiguity of existence becomes contradictory and the structural drawback with this, is that, this view is incapable of proving God’s knowledge of the contingent things which annihilated (nonexistent) and the impossibilities capable soul. For each of the two theories, there is evidence in his works. The most important result of accepting the activity of the soul, according to the rule of “the doer (producer) and the giver of the object, that does not lack it”, is the acceptance of the possession of forms by the soul in the rank before issuance (emanation) and activity. Such a conclusion leads us to a similar theory but more accurate in the field of soul perception, which is the mystical theory of soul development (unveiling). On the other hand, talking about the capability of the soul in relation to illusory and sensory forms leads us to have the power (potentiality) of the soul, its departure from the power to actuality in the process of perception consequently, the materiality of the human soul and also the materiality of sensory and illusory perceptions. The results which are inconsistent with some of Ṣadra’s other principles. Therefore, it seems that the first theory in partial perceptions is closer to the correct opinion and has more acceptable philosophical results.

In his book, The God Who Risks, John Sanders tries to reach an adequate resolution to the conflict between divine foreknowledge and human free will. He admits God’s omniscience but denies  His exhaustive definite foreknowledge of future events. Sanders calls this “dynamic omniscience”. According to this view, future events are not knowable and are epistemologically open; So, divine foreknowledge is not logically possible. God knows all there is to know, but omniscience does not require foreknowledge. God may give a forecast of what he thinks will occur based on his exhaustive knowledge of past and present factors, but such predictions are always open to the possibility that God might be mistaken about some points. Just as omnipotence is not denied by saying that God cannot do the logically impossible, so too omniscience is not denied by saying that God cannot foreknow the logically unknowable.  This article is an exposition and critical evaluation of Sanders’s view.

This paper, using the integrative method (rational, narrative) and bibliographic and document and libraryreferences, has examined the comparative study of divine science in the wisdom of Sadra and Ibn Sina and its adaptation to verses and narratives, and seeks to explain and adapt the views of two famous philosophers, Ibn Sina andSadra, about the divine former science. The findings indicate that knowledgein the wisdom of Sadra, is an existential and hierarchal process, and in Islamic philosophy, a sensual enjoyment. In the transcendent wisdom, God's knowledge to the nature and knowledge to the beings, before and after the creation, is a scientific presence, but in Islamic philosophy, the knowledge to nature-nature and knowledge of the forms of the Motagarereh-nature,is a presence knowledge and knowledge of the external, beings before and after creation, is attainable. According to the image that Ibn Sina offers about the preceding knowledge of God, the God, before the creation of the forms of theology, did not have knowledge to the creatures, and this way of ignorance is considered in the essence of God, but in the verses and narratives, the knowledge of God has been known to his essence in any matter that exists, that knowledge also exists, whether there are theological forms or not. Sadra's theory,contrary toIbnSina's command theory, has full coordination with verses and narratives and has been confirmed.

Some precious writings have been produced by scholars on the Divine knowledge. Molla Sadra has elaborately discussed this topic. He has considered the rule of "basit-ol-haqiqah kol al-ahsya' va laisah be kharej menha– the pure simple being is the whole being, and is not out of it" as the main point of this discussion.
Noticing God's knowledge of [his own] essence, Molla Sadra tries to prove God's knowledge of Himself before their creation and after their creation. Although I believe Molla Sadra's view on God's prior knowledge is comprehensive compared with his previous philosophers such as Sohrevardi and Ibn-Sina, but his idea has various problems and needs a more complete expression. Stressing on some introductions, I will try to prove God's prior knowledge of objects is an acquired knowledge; a kind of acquired knowledge that no more complete knowledge may be imagined beyond it.

God's knowledge of everything other than Himself has been the subject of many scientific researches in terms of "pre-creation" and "post-creation" knowledge, in which the attribute of "God's knowledge of multiple creatures before their creation" has been more taken into consideration since it is an attribute of essence while Divine essence is indivisible and completely pure. Such a consideration is because of the fact that the affirmation of God's pre-knowledge of multiple creatures seems paradoxical at first and results in several views in this regard, while His essence is indivisible. Evaluating and criticizing their precedent thinker's view, Mulla Sadra and Ibn Arabi have elaborated on the quality of such Divine knowledge. The present paper takes for granted the "Divine pre-knowledge", in the light of which it tries to explain its quality from the view point of these two thinkers. The findings which are based on the logical analysis of Ibn Arabi and Mulla Sadra's sayings indicate that their views are similar in terms of most principles and conclusions and different in terms of methods of explanation. Like Ibn Arabi, Mulla Sadra believes that God's per-knowledge is united with His essence or rather they are the same and that the justification of multiplicity in indivisibility of essence is contingent upon the explanation of "eternal essences" which is a term used by Ibn Arabi is his discussion of Divine pre-knowledge

to people, the prior knowledge of God besides free will of human beings seems impossible. While it is firmed and possible for God. This can clarifies the difference between Ilm of God with Ilm of human being. This proves human being’s inability to know ilm of God by his own made tools; and needs to suffice to His Being transcendent. But pure transcendence has been criticized by Sadrayiyan, claimed to be against logic. In this article, first, the bases of God Gnosis have been outlined and then the problems have been addressed. Finally, transcendence has been defined by traditions. It should be known that God’s Knowledge of actions of His creations in advance not only is the base of this article but has a significant role in answering some problems. Therefore, this point has been referred to in various parts of this article.

Craig believes that theological fatalistic argument, which aims at mocking human freedom, faces two major problems. On the one hand, in the argument, there is a confusion of necessitas consequentis and necessitas consequentiae in the concept of “within one’s power”. On the other hand, the argument neglects the difference between “changing the past” and “counterfactual effect. Besides critically assessing theological fatalism, Craig suggests a proof for human freedom which can be categorized as a Molinistic argument in virtue of appealing to the notion of middle knowledge. According to Craig, we do not need to make philosophical argument for the middle knowledge. Nevertheless, there are many theological argument in support of the idea. For instance, divine providence and foreknowledge are two theological concepts which can be best explained by appealing to the notion of middle knowledge. It seems, however, that Craig’s appeal to the notion of middle knowledge for proving human freedom faces some problems. Alongside the critiques provided by Thomists regarding the middle knowledge (e.g. the lack of object for this kind of knowledge and passivity of divine knowledge), it seems that Craig’s notion of human freedom is not compatible with middle knowledge.

the author of the present article first reviewed opinions of some philosophers like Farabi, Avecina, Sohrevardi, and Molasadra, and then some Mystics like sayyed Heidar Amoli and molla Hadi Sabzavari and finally the opinions of Mirza Mahdi Isfahani. The key point in the latter opinions, is his classification between Ilm Hozori and Hosouli and its expansion to God’s knowledge. He also does not know Ilm as the reason of creating this world and separated ilm from Iradah.

natural sciences in their essence all are in the need of and dependent to Ma’lom. This point causes some arguments like order of Ilm and Ma’lom and dependence of Ilm to Ma’lom. Philosophers and mystics regards the same feature for Ilm of God. But this Ilm is unable to clarifies actions of others done by their free will. As long as we regard Ilm of God the same as natural sciences, no answer can be given to the claim of Ilm of God causes Jabr. The only solution is to recognize His Ilm independent of ma’lom. But as human beings do not enjoy such Ilm, there is no way to realize Ilm; so attempts of some philosophers to understand God’s Ilm are vain; as the base of these attempts is assimilation of God’s Ilm and Ilm of human beings.

in the opinion of Philosophers and Muslim mystics, detailed and extended knowledge, is regarded as an attribute “ Haghighiyah Zat Ezafah”. Therefore, to reach knowledge, there is no escape unless proving information (Maloomat). Because this opinion regards Zat ezafah included in the essence and truth of knowledge; therefore, basically, deems Knowledge of God be zat ezafah, and proving Knowledge of God without assuming a type of fulfilling for Maloom is rejected. But regarding any type of proving for actions done willingly before its performance means rejecting overcoming of a performer over his action and in fact, rejecting the true free will. Here, the problem of “Jabr raised from Knowledge of God” and then reviewing philosophical- mystic’s solutions to adapt prior knowledge of God with free will, shows incapability of these solutions, and emphasis the only solution is to refute ezafah and scholastic proportions from Knowledge of God.

"prior knowledge of God" and " its relationship with free will of human beings" are subject of the present article. In this regard, the nature and predicting approach in human beings have been scrutinized. It becomes clear that knowledge of other people's deliberate future deeds can not be reached by the usual human being's knowledge. Besides, the reality of free will from one hand and generality of knowledge of God since before creation of humanbeings on the other hand are emphasized and it is claimed thateven some individuals are informed of deliberate deeds of human beings in future . and the truth of their words has been cleared. The result is this that the knowledge of God since before creation of people's free will and avoiding prediction of deliberate human beings deeds of people through human beings sciences prove that knowledge of God is different from human beings knowledge. According to this, all predictions about deliberate deeds of people inevitably has a-non-created-source and merely according to what reached us from God refers to His knowledge.