A Critical Study of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Attributing the Madeness of the Concept of Existent to Sayyid Sanad

The Problem of making is the topic of some philosophical discussions, and there are three famous views regarding its object. Some thinkers, such as Shaykh Ishrāq and his followers, including ‘Allāmah Dawānī, believe that quiddity is made; some others believe in the madeness of attribution, while another group consider existence to be made, Mullā Ṣadrā rejects the madeness of quiddity and attribution but accepts the madeness of existence. Nevertheless, prior to Mullā Ṣadrā, Sayyid Sanad maintained that it is the “concept of existent” which is made. Mullā Ṣadrā holds that Sayyid Sanad’s intention of the “concept of existent” in the problem of making is concept qua concept rather than a real thing. Therefore, he quotes Sayyid Sanad’s view alongside the three main views regarding the made (as a separate idea) and considers it to be close to his own view. In the same vein, Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentators assert that Sayyid Sanad’s intention of the “concept of existent” was concept qua concept. However, a study of Sayyid Sanad’s original works (manuscripts) reveals that this attribution is not consistent with reality and, by the “concept of existent” in the problem of madeness, Sayyid Sanad meant the same true existence and not concept qua concept. Thus Sayyid Sanad and Mullā Ṣadrā hold the same view in this regard.