MullaSadra’s Criticism of Avicenna’s Sidiqin Argument; Whole, Number, and Cause-Effect Chain

There is a shared premise in Avicenna’s Sidiqin Argument (and its formulation in our previously published papers) and one of the arguments against the possibility of regress (Taftazani, 1049). This premise is a metaphysical presupposition: for any contingent existent there is a chain that consists of its possible causes, and the chain, as a whole, is an in-itself contingent existent. In Asfar, MullaSadra quoted Taftazani’s argument and criticized this premise. He argued that the existence of the chain is not consistent with the equivalence of real existence and real oneness. If MullaSadra’s objection were penetrating, it would destroy Avicenna’s Sidiqin Argument (and our formulation). We shall argue that not only MullaSadra, in a sense, begs the question, but also his position in this objection is not consistent with its comments on ash-Shifa under the subject of number and his general view about the relation between a cause and its effect.