""Iran's Foreign Policy in the Second Karabakh War: Factors and Approach"

This article, with a geopolitical-perspective, aims to examine the process of Iran's foreign policy approach in the Second Karabakh War and factors affecting it. By dividing the war into three periods: "Imperceptible Azerbaijan's superiority", "perceptible Azerbaijan's superiority" and "Consolidation Azerbaijan's superiority" the three trends of "negligence", "indecisiveness" and "surprise" can be explained in the process of Iran's foreign policy. According to the research claim, the macro-narrative of "Karabakh is the land of Islam" has affected the overall Iran's approach in the Karabakh crisis. The lack of internal consensus, appeasement to Russia, enmity with Israel, competition with Turkey and confrontation with the international system were among the factors affecting Iran's activism in this war. In this war, Iran neglected the Azerbaijan's power and will, and was unable to create a balance between the two narratives "Long-standing ties and the obligation of the Islamic Republic to support the Shiites" and "Separatist Context in Azeri provinces of Iran", and contented itself with declaring neutrality and verbal activism. After Baku dominated the areas bordering with Iran, with a belated understanding of the will of the Azerbaijan, took action with indecisiveness and due to the lack of clear details of the Innovative plan and the lack of consultation and extensive diplomatic activity, was surprised by clause 9 of the Moscow agreement, which became a pretext for the Zangezur Corridor project. This research was done with the analytical-historical approach and the "process tracing" method, using library resources.