arash reisinezhad

Middle Asia or Central Asia is a vast land with a long history in the heart of the Asian continent. Due to the vast resources available in Central Asia, this region has become a place for global and regional powers to compete. Türkiye is no exception to this rule. This country has made many efforts to expand its presence in the region in the last three decades. In recent years, especially after 2016, this presence was not without a plan and out of excitement, but in a clear frame of mind and with necessary credits, Türkiye has tried to create a stable and effective presence in the region. The presence of regional powers in Central Asia is not limited to Türkiye. Due to many common cultural features with the countries of the region and its special geographical location, Iran has always made a continuous effort to be present in Central Asia. Considering the complex relations and historical rivalry of the two countries, the efforts of each cannot be without influencing the other.

Research question:

 The main question that we intend to answer in this research is what are the consequences of Türkiye’s presence in Central Asia on Iran and what is the mechanism of these consequences?Research hypothesis: Based on this new reading of geopolitics, it is possible to hypothesize that the presence of Türkiye in Central Asia will lead to the removal of Iran from the transit and energy corridors of the region, as well as the threat to the territorial integrity of Iran due to the expansion of Pan-Turkism.

Methodology and theoretical framework: 

The analysis of this article is based on the trend impact analysis method. The process is called regular and continuous transformations of data over time. In this method, the process is affected by a sequence of events, and by events we mean significant events that may play an important role in shaping the future. The theoretical framework of this article is based on the three-level reading of the international system along with geopolitical factors. This new reading of geopolitics is taken from the opinion of Mohiuddin Mesbahi in the article "free and restricted: Iran and the international system". Our question can also be put in this new format and reading.

In this research, we have looked for the consequences of Türkiye's presence in Central Asia on Iran. After raising our question, we reviewed previous research to find an answer. Despite addressing the presence of these countries in the region in some articles, no specific research has been done regarding the consequences of Türkiye's presence in Central Asia on Iran. Therefore, we turned to theories to find our answer, and for this purpose. Then we tried to find the answer to our question by using the "trend research" method. For this purpose, we examined Türkiye's presence in the region in the last three decades.Türkiye's emotional presence in the nineties failed and the efforts of Erdogan's government centered on the opinions of Ahmet Davutoglu's were not very successful, but after the 2016 coup and internal and external changes, a new era emerged in the relations between Turkey and the region.  In the following, we examined Iran's presence in the region and finally addressed our main issue, which is the consequences of Türkiye's presence in the region on Iran. Türkiye's presence in Central Asia at all three domestic, regional and international levels has consequences for Iran in the region in cultural, economic and political-military fields. In the economic field, Türkiye will strengthen its infrastructure by joining “the Belt and Road Initiative” and by bypassing Iran, in addition to using the advantages of the right of transit and by attracting Chinese capital, the country will strengthen its infrastructure, and the capital will flow to Turkish projects instead of Iran. In addition, in the geopolitical or political-military field, bypassing Iran in two directions, east-west and north-south, both in the field of transit and in the field of energy, weakens Iran's strategic position and erodes its geopolitics. On the other hand, with the expansion of annexationist and pan-Turkish ideas in the direction of greater convergence with the region, in addition to threatening Iran's territorial integrity with Turkification of the space, it leaves no room for Iran's presence in the region.

Türkiye's presence in Central Asia at domestic, regional and international levels has consequences for Iran in the region in all three cultural, economic and political-military fields. In the economic field, Türkiye will strengthen its infrastructure by joining the Belt and Road Initiative and by bypassing Iran, in addition to using the advantages of the right of transit and by attracting Chinese capital, the country will strengthen its infrastructure, and the capital will flow to Turkish projects instead of Iran. In addition, in the geopolitical or political-military field, bypassing Iran in two directions, east-west and north-south, both in the field of transit and in the field of energy, weakens Iran's strategic position and erodes its geopolitics. On the other hand, with the expansion of annexationist and pan-Turkish ideas in the direction of greater convergence with the region, in addition to threatening Iran's territorial integrity with Turkification of the space, it leaves no room for Iran's presence in the region.

In hydro hegemony, dams as infrastructure facilities, in addition to political and economic benefits at the national level, are considered hydropolitical tools at the regional level, which have the ability to change the power structure and hydro political relations in a water basin. A government that enjoys this advantage tends to read water resources as power. Due to having hydro-hegemony components, Turkey has the ability to change regional political outputs. These changes have the possibility of affecting Iran's national security in the water basins of Kura-Aras, Tigris and Euphrates. By examining Turkey's water mechanisms and the concept of hydro-hegemony, this article tries to answer the question of how the rise of Turkey's hydro-hegemony in the Tigris, Euphrates and Kora-Ars water basins affects Iran's national security? Relying on the environmental security of Bari Buzan in the form of system exploration method, the authors have come to the conclusion that Turkey's hydro hegemonic rise affects Iran's national security directly and indirectly through; Jeopardizing food security, affect climate changes, demographic changes, the spread of radicalism in the region, and the strengthening of Turkey's political bargaining power against Iran.

The New Silk Road, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative, stands as a powerful manifestation of China's influence extending beyond its borders. This initiative originated as a response to China's need to counter the encirclement resulting from America's pivot to Asia strategy and address internal developmental imbalances by tapping into new markets through its geo-economic prowess. In the context of the evolving global order, the New Silk Road holds immense significance as a determinant of power dynamics. This article explores the fundamental question of how the competition between the United States and China in the Arab Middle East impacts the international power structure. Adopting a process-tracing approach and focusing on the geopolitical dimensions of the initiative, the article examines the strategic shifts towards the West from both American and Chinese perspectives in the establishment of the New Silk Road. Additionally, it delves into the crucial trend of "leaving the belt, putting the road under pressure," providing detailed analysis, and assessing its consequences on the global competition between the two nations. Ultimately, the article concludes that while Beijing's endeavor to launch and advance the New Silk Road may appear as a geo-economic competition on the surface, a deeper examination reveals a geopolitical battle between China and the United States for global dominance in the 21st century.

One of the consequences of global climate change is the water shortage crisis and the resulting disputes among the beneficiary governments. The criticality of the world's climatic situation has led to the emergence of disputes between governments in connection with the division of common waters.  In this article, by utilizing the descriptive-analytical method and collecting data and information by document-library method, we are going to respond to the following question: "Which are the factors influencing the formation and escalation of disputes caused by the division of water in border-rivers between the Islamic Republic of Iran and its neighbors”? The hypothesis presented in response to the question raised above is based on the premise that in addition to the obvious role of the “water scarcity” phenomenon in the occurrence of the disputes above, it is necessary that four other variables; the politics of transboundary powers, management of water resources, ideological gap and instability of states, also be investigated and analyzed by the political elites. The variables mentioned above are divided into two groups: internal (Instability of States and Water Resources Management) and external (Cross-Border Powers’ politics and Ideological Gap). It is necessary to remember that the explanation of the mentioned four variables does not necessarily mean the absence of other factors in the discussed framework. It is possible that in the context of future research in this field, some other new variables will be identified.

The unexpected victory of Trump in November 2016 had a significant impact on the regional and international momentum generated by JCPOA. The JCPOA presented an opportunity for cooperation between Iran and the US-West in the West Asian region, particularly in combating ISIS. However, the US withdrawal from the JCPOA under the Trump administration severely undermined its credibility and reliability. Moreover, this decision resulted in the imposition of severe sanctions on Iran, which found support among some regional countries. Escalating tensions, such as the downing of an American drone by Iranian forces, further heightened the intensity and scope of these conflicts. As the likelihood of Trump's participation in the upcoming US presidential campaign grows and the increasing presence of conservative extremists in the construction of American power, it becomes imperative for Iran to understand his potential strategies. Anticipating and devising a sophisticated response will be crucial. This research explores the foundations and approaches of the American strategy toward Iran during Trump's presidency. It seeks to unveil the strategies chosen by President Trump in dealing with Iran and their implications. Employing a process-tracing approach and relying on analytical descriptions, along with data collected from library sources and the internet, this study sheds light on America's intricate goals and strategies, offering suggestions for effectively engaging with and sustaining them.

On November 29, 2020, Turkiye sent an exploratory ship named "Oruç Reis" to the eastern Mediterranean waters to search for energy sources. Although the activities of this ship provoked protests from many countries in the region, these protests could not prevent the extension of its mission until January 2021. Analysts believe that the "Oruç Reis" mission, like the 2019 agreement between Turkiye and the Libyan government regarding the determination of the exclusive and economic zone of the two countries, is a continuation of Turkiye's new maritime doctrine "Blue Homeland", which has been widely discussed in the media and political circles of Turkiye in recent months. The "Blue Homeland Doctrine" was first proposed in 2006 by retired Turkish Navy General Cem Gordeniz, but it failed to attract much attention. But in recent years, due to the new needs and changes in Turkiye's foreign policy, the "Blue Homeland Doctrine" has been able to take on a more practical aspect.  In the following article, after examining the background of the research and using the Trend Impact Analysis method and a new reading of geopolitics, we have tried to answer our question.

Research Question: 

The question that we will address in this article is what consequences the "Blue Homeland Doctrine" have for Iran considering its history and goals? Especially since the issue of obtaining hydrocarbon energies in the Eastern Mediterranean and the expansion of political and military influence is one of the main issues raised in the "Blue Homeland Doctrine" and at the same time is one of the most important concerns of the Turkish government. Meanwhile, Iran, as Turkiye's neighbor, is one of the countries with large energy reserves.Research Hypothesis: According to the Methodology used for this article, no hypothesis has been considered.

Methodology and Theoretical Framework: 

The analysis of the current article is based on the Trend Impact Analysis method. The trend is called regular and continuous transformations of data over time. In this method, the process is influenced by a sequence of events, and by events we mean important events that may play an important role in shaping the future. The theoretical framework of this article is based on a three-level reading of the international system along with geopolitical factors. This new reading of geopolitics is taken from the opinion of Mohiuddin Mesbahi in the article "free and confined: Iran and the international system". In this article, the emphasis is on geopolitics and geoeconomics, and the field of geoculture is not discussed. Our question can also be put in this new format and reading.

In this article, in response to the question of, "The Consequences of the "Blue Homeland Doctrine" on Iran, we tried to investigate the origins and history of this doctrine and search for its goals. As we said, the "Blue Homeland Doctrine" is rooted in the feeling of greatness of this country due to years of presence in the Mediterranean in the form of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the fear of being encircled in the region following the borders imposed in 1923. Through this doctrine, Turkiye seeks to be able to use the energy resources of the Levant region and become a Mediterranean power, with a powerful military and economic presence and use all its facilities in the Eastern Mediterranean to introduce itself as an energy hub. After examining the origins and goals, we examined the main part of our question, the consequences of the "Blue Homeland Doctrine" on Iran and divided these consequences into two political-military and energy sectors. In the political and military sector, we came to the conclusion that Turkiye's attempt to influence Lebanon in various fields is in line with its goals for a wider presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and may put this country against Lebanon's Hezbollah, which is a non-governmental group with political, military and cultural power and considering the role this group plays in Iran's foreign policy in the region, it can cause tension between the two countries over Lebanon. In addition, the conflict in Lebanon can spread to other centers of conflict between the two countries, i.e., Syria and Iraq, or be affected by them and intensify. In the energy sector, we discussed the consequences that the turning Turkiye into an energy hub could have on Iran.  Iran is the second holder of gas energy reserves in the world but it never uses these resources. Turning Turkiye into an energy hub by the "Blue Homeland Doctrine" can exclude Iran from the future energy corridors, but if the relations with Turkiye improve along with the removal of internal obstacles and international sanctions, the doctrine can be an opportunity to export this country's Gas to Europe.

According to the objectives of the "Blue Homeland Doctrine" the consequences of this doctrine for Iran can be examined in two areas. In the political-military field, increasing Turkiye's presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially in Lebanon, it can increase the tensions between the two countries, which can easily spread to other regions due to the many points of conflict between Turkiye and Iran in the region. In the field of energy, turning Turkiye into an energy hub can be an opportunity to export Iran's gas to Europe and it can also remove Iran from future international corridors.

This article, with a geopolitical-perspective, aims to examine the process of Iran's foreign policy approach in the Second Karabakh War and factors affecting it. By dividing the war into three periods: "Imperceptible Azerbaijan's superiority", "perceptible Azerbaijan's superiority" and "Consolidation Azerbaijan's superiority" the three trends of "negligence", "indecisiveness" and "surprise" can be explained in the process of Iran's foreign policy. According to the research claim, the macro-narrative of "Karabakh is the land of Islam" has affected the overall Iran's approach in the Karabakh crisis. The lack of internal consensus, appeasement to Russia, enmity with Israel, competition with Turkey and confrontation with the international system were among the factors affecting Iran's activism in this war. In this war, Iran neglected the Azerbaijan's power and will, and was unable to create a balance between the two narratives "Long-standing ties and the obligation of the Islamic Republic to support the Shiites" and "Separatist Context in Azeri provinces of Iran", and contented itself with declaring neutrality and verbal activism. After Baku dominated the areas bordering with Iran, with a belated understanding of the will of the Azerbaijan, took action with indecisiveness and due to the lack of clear details of the Innovative plan and the lack of consultation and extensive diplomatic activity, was surprised by clause 9 of the Moscow agreement, which became a pretext for the Zangezur Corridor project. This research was done with the analytical-historical approach and the "process tracing" method, using library resources.

While much ink has been spilled to Iran's regional policy, the majority of these analyses, either intuitively or deliberately, build their explanation on the so-called ‘Persian-Shia offensive intentions’. Conversely, the present paper seeks the roots of Iran's regional policy in its specific geography and history. From this perspective, Iran’s regional policy is inseparable from its geopolitical strategies. To shed light on these strategies, the paper begins with the rise of the Persian Achaemenid until the establishment of the Islamic Republic, focusing on major driving forces behind Iran’s regional policy and strategies. The paper elaborates on a foundational concept of ‘strategic loneliness’, as Iran’s permanent feature, by highlighting the country’s curse of geography and its long- standing historical insecurity. In following, it shows the consequential impact of Iran’s strategic loneliness for the country’s non-state foreign policymaking strategic connections with military non-state actors—in the containment of its regional enemies. The paper ultimately argues that while this policy has kept Iran’s national integrity and security while entrapped the country in a durable ‘geopolitical predicament’ and deepened regional crisis in the Middle East

The present paper engages intimately with Iran’s connections with its proxies through adopting an ‘analytical process-tracing narrative.’ The strength of this narrative lies in its potential to generate a conceptual framework organically and incrementally along the unifying theme. As Alexander George and Andrew Bennett argue, analytical process-tracing is a tool in extrapolating a case study’s “explanation into a generalization.” Process tracing will allow me to capture the dynamics of change and the causal mechanisms behind these changes within the evolution of the subject under study. Put differently, in the analytical process-tracing an otherwise atheoretical narrative presented “in the form of a chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event came about” is embedded into “an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical terms.”

Iran’s specific geography and historical insecurity are integral elements and dimensions of regional policy and strategy. In addition to its geostrategic location and geographical proximity to the threat sources, Iran’s geographical vulnerability and its lack of natural defense impediments have shaped the country’s fate of territorial occupation and military encirclement for more than twenty-five centuries. This fact has nourished and galvanized Iran’s historical insecurity. The final product is Iran’s strategic loneliness. For a country with a deep sense of greatness, Iran’s strategic loneliness pushes the country to take a dynamic geopolitical strategy—namely, non-state foreign policy—to preserve its national security and territorial integrity. Indeed, the very logic of geography and history reveals the fact that Iran’s ultimate deterrence capabilities have been mainly predicated on its ability for the external power projection (Reisinezhad, 2016). Nonetheless, the lack of regional collective security institutions and pact(s) has trembled the credibility of this geopolitical strategy. Although Iran’s non-state foreign policy has been partially effective in keeping the country’s security safe, it has weakened Iran’s financial sources and, more significantly, entrapped the country in a durable offensive-defensive complex. It is Iran’s durable geopolitical predicament. Iran’s specific geography and history have crucially shaped its geopolitical strategy. However, it should be important to disentangle the argument from geographical and historical ‘determinism’. At first glance, putting emphasis on these two factors opens door for fatalism while ignores human agency. Geography and history by no means determine state’s approaches to use military force and regional strategies. In reality, human agency matters since it is men who decide and take action. There are still historical instances wherein men overcame the dictates of geography and unchained historical patterns. Nevertheless, “in the long run, those who are working in harmony with environmental influences will triumph over those who strive against them” (Parker and Mackinder, 1982: 121). Indeed, geography and historical trends limit human choices by constraining or instigating states’ actions. To be more precise, geography and history provides a framework within which geopolitical strategy is formulated and implemented. They set contours on which trajectory and path is achievable and which is not. As Robert D. Kaplan cogently argues, “the more we remain preoccupied with Iran’s specific geography and history have crucially shaped its geopolitical strategy. However, it should be important to disentangle the argument from geographical and historical ‘determinism’. At first glance, putting emphasis on these two factors opens door for fatalism while ignores human agency. Geography and history by no means determine state’s approaches to use military force and regional strategies. In reality, human agency matters since it is men who decide and take action. There are still historical instances wherein men overcame the dictates of geography and unchained historical patterns. Nevertheless, “in the long run, those who are working in harmony with environmental influences will triumph over those who strive against them” (Parker and Mackinder, 1982: 121). Indeed, geography and historical trends limit human choices by constraining or instigating states’ actions. To be more precise, geography and history provides a framework within which geopolitical strategy is formulated and implemented. They set contours on which trajectory and path is achievable and which is not. As Robert D. Kaplan cogently argues, “the more we remain preoccupied with current events, the more that individuals and their choices matter; but the more we look out over the span of the centuries, the more that geography plays a role (Kaplan, 2012: 28). Therefore, a balance between geography and history, on the one side, and the decisions and actions of men, on the other side, matter for a deeper analysis of Iran’s regional policy. In short, geography and history imprison Iranian leaders and delimit, rather than determine, their choices and opportunities for regional maneuver. The ideas emerge and vanish, the leaders are born and then die; but what remains durably is Iran’s geography and history!

For more than half century, Iran’s connections with its proxies have been the country’s pivotal geopolitical strategy crafted to contain regional and global threats. In contrast to the mainstream view, this strategy is rooted less in Iran’s revolutionary ideology rather than its specific geography and history. The paper shows that Iran’s strategic loneliness is a very historical product of its specific geography and history. It also argued how Iran’s geopolitical strategy has intensified its geopolitical predicament and entrapped the country in the offensive-defensive complex. Within this situation, regional cooperation in several domains, particularly the conflict resolution processes, is vital and necessary for Iran’s regional policy. The establishment of a path-dependent bilateral or multilateral security institution(s) with regional states would be crucial for the stability of the Middle East. As the regional tensions spiraling out of control, building comprehensive collective security with tripartite power centers of Tehran-Ankara-Riyadh would deescalate geopolitical competition in the Middle East.While it is a major driving force for the country’s power projection beyond its borders, strategic loneliness sets Iran’s center of gravity within its internal territory. Relying on the inside shows that Iran’s center of gravity has predicated on ‘state-society relation’; rather than on strategic alliance with whether the Great Powers or non-state actors. In other words, Iran’s strategic loneliness shows intrinsic and independent foundations of Iran’s national security. Within this context, popular support and legitimacy are the most crucial and vital assets for a country whose borders have been historically bloody frontier zone. It was this very fact ignored by the last Shah of Iran.

The New Silk Road as the most ambitious macro-project in the current time is the sign and symbol of China’s power projection beyond its borders. Two lanes of the six lanes of the land belt of the New Silk Road go through the Russian territory. Also, Europe will be the main terminal of the land and sea routes of this grand project. Furthermore, China’s relations with Russia and Europe will involve potential tensions with huge consequences for the balance of power and global economy. From this perspective, the main issue is some sort of divergence and convergence of these three big powers along the Silk Road’s Eurasian land route. What are the divergence and convergence factors in China’s relations with Russia and Europe along the New Silk Road? The thesis is premised on the fact that the Polar Silk Road lays the ground for convergence, and the one going through Central Asia diverges Moscow and Beijing, and on the other side, China’s projects in the Balkans cause convergence in East Europe, while bringing divergence of relations with Central and Western Europe powers. This writing shows in detail the branches and the consequences of the Icy (Polar) Silk Road. Also, it enumerates the challenges and opportunities between China and Russia, especially in Central Asia; then, it shows China’s policy-line for infiltrating into East Europe and the Balkans. The paper explores the extent and expanse of China’s tense relations with West Europe countries. The theoretical framework of the paper is progressive based on a tri-faceted and tri-spherical reading of geopolitics. Such a framework of connection of these three structures with geographical factors shows that the roots and consequences of this macro-project can be traced back to the spheres of Geopolitics, Geo-culture,   and Geo-economy as well as to the three “International”, “Regional”, and “Internal” levels.

Regionalism has been introduced as a conventional model of interaction in international relations and it is also a different model of exercising power in international arena which is based on values such as cooperation, unity and peace. Regionalism has undergone a transformation since the Cold War. The classical model of regionalism was the European model and some developing countries tried to copy the European regionalism model and implement it in their regions. But the European regionalism model was based on the goals and needs of European countries and was not suitable for other regions so developing countries have designed and implemented new models of regionalism. Modern regionalism does not have the elements of the European-oriented model. Organizations such as NAFTA, ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are examples of new and different models of regionalism that have broken the monopoly of the European model of regionalism and have launched their own model of regionalism. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is one of the important regional organizations that offers a new model of regionalism, and the Islamic Republic of Iran is also a member. In this article, we examined the interaction pattern of the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the mechanisms of convergence and the challenges and perspectives of the regionalism of this organization.Research Question: The main question of this research is what is the regionalism model of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization? What are the interactive patterns and mechanisms for convergence in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?Research Hypothesis: Considering that in this research we have used the systematic exploration strategy and historical review technique, we have not presented a hypothesis for this research because the main question of this article is about the regionalism model of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the answer to this question is related to the issues objectives and existing mechanisms in the structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Therefore, the answer to such a question requires examining the structure of this organization, documents, reports and historical events related to the convergence of this organization, so in this research we did not pay attention to the hypothesis or its possible answer.

To answer the main question in this research, the systematic exploration strategy and historical review technique have been used. In this strategy, the author does not provide any hypothesis for the main question and instead of checking the validity of the hypothesis, he directly refers to the evidence. Documents, reports, historical events, books and articles are the sources that are examined to answer the main question. Therefore, based on the historical study technique, we examined a historical period from 2001 until now, that is, since the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization until now and we examined the sources available in this historical period and we were able to identify the patterns of internal interaction, the mechanism to identify the convergences, challenges and perspectives of the regionalism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The findings show that since the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, two different models of regionalism have been formed in this organization. The first model was common since the establishment of the organization until 2017, we call this model "guided", in fact, the structure of this regionalism model was "2 + 4". Two countries, Russia and China, were leading four other Central Asian countries towards regionalism. Russia and China provided financial support to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and provided practical ideas and plans to strengthen regionalism. But after the two nuclear countries India and Pakistan joined this organization in 2017, the second model of regionalism began. In fact, the "guided" model was changed to the "pervasive" model. In this model, the "2 + 4" pattern has been changed and different branches have been created in the organization. The leadership role of Russia and China has decreased and each country is trying to independently use the regionalism capacities of this organization. Based on this pervasive model, Iran's permanent membership has been accepted and Turkey's permanent membership is also being considered. With the increase in the number of members and the diversity of their interests, the fields of activity of the organization have expanded and various mechanisms have been launched to strengthen convergence. These mechanisms work in different fields including security, economic and cultural. These mechanisms are the most important factors for the deepening of convergence in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization because they provide the conditions for mutual trust between the member countries of the organization and facilitate cooperation and participation.

The conclusion of this research is that the concept of convergence has been continuously enriched and developed since the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Convergence mechanisms have become more efficient and advanced and various fields of cooperation have expanded, so the possibility of cooperation in this organization has been facilitated and the motivation for the effective participation of the Shanghai Organization in global governance has increased. The organization now has the capacity to act as a driving force for the reconstruction of the new world order, but it should not be forgotten that the organization lacks a "strong collective identity", and there are many internal conflicts among members. The different religions, languages, cultures and histories of each of the member countries prevent the formation of a common identity and the conflicts between India and China, India and Pakistan, as well as Russia and China are so deep that we cannot easily ignore them. Therefore, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization does not have a sufficient condition (strong collective identity) to achieve complete convergence, but in general, the organization has been able to maintain mutual trust among members with agreements and annual meetings of the heads of member states and joint projects. Therefore, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has the necessary condition (mutual trust) for regionalism.

In the early 16th century, Shah Ismail I (1501–1524) established the Safavid Empire (1501–1736 BC) and reunited Iran for the first time after the collapse of the Sassanid Empire of the 7th century. He ruled a vast territory from Euphrates and Transcaucasia to Hindukush and Oxus. More significantly, he reconstructed Iran’s national identity by combining the Twelver Shia Islam with the Iranian plateau. It was his crucial decision to combine Shiism with the Iranian plateau that retooled Iran for the modern era. The emergence of a new, powerful Shia state in the region had a huge ramification for other Shia communities in the West Asia, particularly the Shia Turks in Minor Asia, while urged Sunni powers of the Ottoman Empire in the west and Uzbek Khanate in the east to ally against the Shia Safavid. For the next time, Iran was surrounded, though this time it was much more intensified since the geopolitical competition in Western Asia overlapped by geo-cultural forces of the Shia-Sunni dichotomy. Such a harsh encirclement in thong term put the country again in the defensive position, made Safavid kings be constantly preoccupied with fighting Sunni powers in the western and eastern fronts, and ultimately left the country prone to domestic rebels.The important point is that the Safavid shahs were not able to disentangle Iran from such a destructive military encirclement. Rare opportunities emerged but the Safavid shahs never defended Iran’s national integrity through power projection beyond its territory to deter external threats. One of these opportunities came up when the Shia Turks, led by Shahkulu, launched a widespread insurgency in spring 1510 and threatened the Ottoman power effectively. For the Middle Eastern Shia, Shah Ismail was both their Shah and Morshed-e Kamel (Complete Su Master). Harshly persecuted by the Ottoman Sultans, the Shia Turk welcomed the Safavi Shah’s sequential victories. Shah Ismail was aware of the power of his supporters; however, he was preoccupied with fighting the Sunni Uzbek Khans in Khorasan, north-eastern Iran, at that time.Furthermore, he did not want to have Iran surrounded by two Sunni powers of the Uzbek and the Ottoman. Therefore, he refrained from inciting Ottoman Sultan, Bayezid II (1481–1512), by siding with the Shia rebellion. Nonetheless, Shahkulu and his 3000 followers were killed in a decisive battle on 2 July 1511. The Ottoman brutally suppressed the Shia Turks. Three years later, Sultan Selim I attacked Iran and defeated Shah Ismail in the Battle of Chaldiran (23 August 1514). Tabriz, the capital of Safavid, was temporarily captured and then destroyed by the Ottoman Jeni Seri forces.

The present article utilizes an intimate historical engagement with the issue through adopting an “analytical process-tracing narrative.” The strength of this narrative lies in its potential to generate a “conceptual framework” organically and incrementally along the unifying theme and guides post of our specific interpretation of Geopolitics. Process tracing allows us to capture the dynamics of change and the causal mechanisms behind these changes within the evolution of the subject under study. Put another way, in analytical process-tracing a theoretical narrative presented in the form of a chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event came about is embedded into an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical terms.

While much ink has been spilled on the battle of Chaldiran, there has been a theoretical void in the analysis of the explanation of geopolitical, Geo-economic, and Geo-cultural factors behind the outbreak of battle. From this perspective, the present paper is an attempt to explain major forces that shaped the battle of Chaldiran. Heavily based on the first-hand documents, the paper illustrates the Ottoman’s intervention in the middle of Iran’s civil war and against Shah Ismail’s military campaign. It also shows the destructive impact of the Iranian’s lack of modern weapons and wrong military tactics taken by Shah Ismail in the battle. Last but not least, the paper sheds light on the consequences of this battle for the trajectory of the power arrangement in West Asia.

“Which factors were behind the outbreak of the battle of Chaldiran?” This is the central question that guides the analytic narrative in the present paper. The paper shows that, along with major factors, Shah Ismail’s lack of ‘ability’ and ‘intention’ in the support for a non-state entity of the Shia Turk movement ultimately led to the defeat of Iran’s Army. Elaborating the impact of geopolitical factors in the outbreak of the war, the paper argues that it was rooted in Iran’s ‘historical strategic loneliness’. Accordingly, the deployment of Iranian forces to conflict abroad has a notable struggle of Iran’s power projection beyond its territory to compensate its strategic loneliness and to deter external threats. However, Shah Ismail was not able to follow this very logic and, therefore, lost the battle. Phrased differently, Shah Ismail’s lack of ability and intention in the support for a non-state entity of the Shia Turk movement ultimately led to the defeat of Iran’s army and the permanent loss of Western regions of Safavid Empire

With the emergence of the Chinese New Silk Road, as the most important international geo-economics initiative, the power arrangement of the geopolitics of greater Eurasia and its coastal waters, particularly the Indian Ocean, are subject to a great change. Comprised of the land-based Belt and the Maritime Road, the "New Silk Road", also known as 'One Belt One Road' or ‘Belt Road Initiative (BRI)', is a major manifestation of the Chinese power projection beyond its borders. Along with the United States of America, Delhi leaders have expressed their resentment towards the Maritime Road as the BRI could encircle their country by utilizing the ‘String of Pearls’; a very strategic term referring to the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and investment ports along its sea lines of communication, which extend from the China’s mainland to Port Sudan in the Horn of Africa. Not surprisingly, India has reacted to the BRI by crafting their new grand strategy called Mausam to contain both belt and road. As the most ambitious Indian megaproject in the contemporary world, Delhi aims at rebuilding maritime and economic connections with the thirty-nine countries bordering the Indian Ocean. Among its major initial plans, this strategy has so far been manifested in two sea-land roads: the Kaladan Road and the Cotton Road. While the former connects Kolkata in the East of India to the South East of Asia through Myanmar’s port of Sittwe, the latter makes ties between Mumbai and West Asia through the Iranian port of Chabahar on the shore of the Gulf of Oman. Indeed, it is the Cotton Road that has a strategic potential to contain the land-based belt by providing a fertile ground for Indian influence in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Located at a geostrategic position in the southwestern rim land between the Persian Gulf and the classic Heartland, in Mackinderian terminology, Iran would be a centrally geopolitical bridge between India and Eurasia. From this point of view, the present article sets forth a new understanding of major driving forces lurking beneath the strategy of Mausam and its following impact on Iran's national interests. "What are the factors shaping the Indian grand strategy of Mausam?" This is the pivotal question that guides the analytical narrative of the present article. The article highlights the fact that Chinese and Indian increasing leverage in West Asia has raised regional ‘Road Diplomacy’; a concept that shows the impact of diplomatic actions in shaping the trajectory of international and regional roads while, at the same time, revealing the consequences of these roads on states’ diplomatic decisions and strategies. The recent emergence of several economic corridors comprised of regional and international transport networks and massive infrastructure investment has brought this concept to the fore in West Asia. In following, the article sheds light on the impact of India's presence in West Asia, in general, and Iran, in particular, by explicating the role of Mausam. Furthermore, the present article details India's special action in response to China and its policies in the periphery of Iran while the scope of Delhi policies under this new-crafted strategy in the region will also be examined. Finally, the present article briefly shows how this grand strategy affects Iran's national interests. In brief, the article argues that Iran’s geostrategic location has framed the country as a key player in the implementation of the Indian Mausam. Combined with the Chinese interests in including Iran to its BRI, along with the US ongoing sanctions on Tehran, Tehran-Delhi cooperation on the Mausam will reconfigure the geopolitics of the region with a huge ramification for the power arrangement of the West Asia.

With the rise of China and its stable economic growth in the new millennium, the New Silk Road has caught eyes and thoughts as the most significant international initiative.  Indeed, One Belt One Road is the most ambitious megaproject, expressing China's will and capacity for external power projection. In the contemporary world, there are rare projects with a huge ramification for the transformation of international security and power arrangement within Iran's periphery, particularly Central Asia.  Within this context, the New Silk Road is an exceptional grand-strategy, affecting geopolitics of Central Asia, in particular, and Greater Eurasia, in general.  Central Asia has been geographically and historically the center of gravity of the Silk Road, controlling roads from China to Iran and the Middle East, as well as South Asia and Southern Russia. From this point of view, the present article shows the significance of Central Asia, Xinxiang and Afghanistan with a huge ramification in shaping trends of the new Silk Road.

The depth and extension of Iran’s controversial connections with its proxies have caught eyes and thoughts. While much ink has been spilled to Iran's regional policy, the majority of these analyses, either intuitively or deliberately, build their explanation on the so-called ‘Persian-Shia offensive intentions’. Conversely, the present paper seeks the roots of Iran's regional policy in its specific geography and history. From this perspective, Iran’s regional policy is inseparable from its geopolitical strategies. To shed light on these strategies, the paper begins with the rise of the Persian Achaemenes until the establishment of the Islamic Republic, focusing on major driving forces behind Iran’s regional policy and strategies. The paper elaborates on a foundational concept of ‘strategic loneliness’, as Iran’s permanent feature, by highlighting the country’s curse of geography and its long-standing historical insecurity. In following, it shows the consequential impact of Iran’s strategic loneliness for the country’s non-state foreign policymaking strategic connections with military non-state actors—in the containment of its regional enemies. The paper ultimately argues that while this policy has kept Iran’s national integrity and security while entrapped the country in a durable ‘geopolitical predicament’ and deepened regional crisis in the Middle East.

Social movements and revolutions have been at the core of the politics and attracted many eyes and thoughts. While much ink has been spilled on the emergence, dynamics, and outcomes of these phenomena, there has been a theoretical void in the explanation of their major driving force(s). Such an unfortunate poverty is no more obvious than in an analysis of the recent movements in the Middle East, known also as the Arab Spring. From this perspective, the present study is an attempt to explain major forces shaping emergence, dynamics, and outcomes of social movements and revolutions. Therefore, the paper will accomplish this mission by combining new concepts of Collective Identity, Cultural Opportunity, Meaning Production, Ideology and Framing, Enemy Recognition with more mainstream ones of Political Opportunity, Mobilizing Networks, and Movement Strategy.

The controversial Iranian Nuclear Program (INP) has attracted many eyes and thoughts for more than a decade. While much ink has been spilled on the evolution and impact of the INP on the international security and the Middle-Eastern politics, there has been a theoretical void in the explanation of its major driving force(s). Such an unfortunate poverty is no more obvious than in an analysis of the relation between Iran’s specific narrative of security and the INP. From this perspective, the present study is an attempt to explain major forces shaping Iranian leaders’ views towards national security and the INP. I will accomplish this mission by highlighting the interconnection of the INP and Iranian state identity as well as the priority of ‘Ontological’ security over ‘Physical’ security for Iranian leaders. In following, the paper touches central, yet ignored, concepts of ‘Shame’, ‘Face’, and ‘Reputation’ to illustrate motives behind the INP. Lastly, it traces the impact of ‘Master Frame of Trust’ on the trajectory of the INP.