The naturalistic approaches to ethics try to find some solution to problems of moral philosophy with an emphasis on finding of empirical science. One of the most famous naturalistic approaches to ethics is evolutionary approach. Evolutionary explanations of morality have always been accused of committing naturalistic fallacy. The naturalistic fallacy has two Humean and Moorian versions. Hume's reading, also known as deductive version of the naturalist fallacy, suggests that the inference of values from facts is a kind of fallacy. Moore's version of naturalistic fallacy, says that defining moral properties based on immoral properties, and in particular natural properties, is impossible. In this article, after introducing Ruse's evolutionary ethics, his reasons for not having been committed to naturalistic fallacies are brought. Then we answer this question if he really avoided the fallacies. Our answer to this question is yes. But, along with critics like Rottscheafer and Martinsen, we will show that the cost of avoiding these fallacies has been to discarding the objectivity of ethics.Would Ruse without endorsing an illusionary and subjective account of morality avoid the naturalistic fallacy? We will demonstrate that such a reading can be offered by giving a greater role to culture. Thus, the purpose of the article is to oppose the Ruse's illusionary readings of morality and to defend an objectivist reading. In our opinion, elements of this reading can also be found in the work of the Ruse himself and will be offered at the end of the article.

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Moore's view regarding the indefinability of good: is good undefinable? On his view, the concept of good is not derivable of any other concept. Therefore "good" is irreducible to other concepts. According to him, goodness is simple and undefinable. What is meant by definition? Among different definitions, Moore focuses on the most important sense thereof. In addition, Moore considers the "good," as a non- natural quality. He thinks that any effort to identify the good with other natural qualities is a fallacy. It is a naturalistic fallacy as he calls it. He supports his idea by the open question argument. In this paper we will argue that Moore's argument shows at most that the meaning of good and pleasure, for example, are not the same. They are conceptually different but it does not preclude the supposition that they both refer to one and same property.

In the last two decades, there have been numerous calls for a culturally sensitive bioethics. At the same time, bioethicists have become increasingly involved in empirical research, which is a sign of dissatisfaction with the analytic methods of traditional bioethics. In this article, I will argue that although these developments have broadened and enriched the field of bioethics, they can easily be construed to be an endorsement of ethical relativism, especially by those not well grounded in academic moral philosophy. I maintain that bioethicists must resist the temptation of moving too quickly from cultural relativism to ethical relativism and from empirical findings to normative conclusions. Indeed, anyone who reasons in this way is guilty of the naturalistic fallacy. I conclude by saying that properly conceptualized, empirical research and sensitivity to cultural diversity should give rise to objective rational discourse and criticism and not indiscriminate tolerance of every possible moral practice. Bioethics must remain a normative discipline that is characterized by rigorous argumentation.

This article pointed out some scopes of convergence between logic and ethics to talk about new challenges and solutions which are the result of these convergences. Among the issues in the field, the outher tries to report and explore these philosophical and logical conflicts: the gap between "is" and "ought" (The problem of Hume) and also some solutions proposed to solve it and some other paradoxes of logic of duty, the moral logical principle that "ought requires the ability" and its logical analysis, naturalistic fallacy (and also reasoning throughe open question),and issues or conflicts concerning the practical and moral deduction (in the context of the role of principles in moral reasoning and also the problem of weakness of moral will).These challenges and conflicts in the new history of philosophy have made a new literature and also many neoteric issues in realm of both logic and ethics which is continue nowadays as issues that their primary followers had not enough attention to them.

Undoubtedly, the problem of “fact-value” gap should be considered as one of the most important issues in moral philosophy. Drawing the problem of “fact-value” gap has been ascribed to the skeptic empiricist Scottish philosopher, David Hume. Hume claimed that it is impossible to derive the ethical propositions containing “ought/ought not” from the ethical propositions containing “is/is not”. The moral philosophers have regarded the Humean doctrine as the "is/ought” fallacy. After Hume, the English analytic philosopher, George Edward Moore, revived the Humean doctrine. Moore claimed that the concept of “Good” cannot be defined in terms of non-moral concepts/natural properties. He challenged the philosophers who defined this concept in terms of the non-moral concepts/natural properties to committing the “Naturalistic Fallacy”. Some of the moral philosophers have tried to confirm the fallacies proposed by Hume and Moore, while some others have attempted to refute those fallacies. The American neo-Aristotelian philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre is among those who have tried to offer a specific explanation of how the theories of disseminating the “fact-value” gap have emerged. He has made some arguments to show the invalidity of that gap. In this paper, we will consider the doctrines of Hume and Moore on the “fact-value” gap, and then will examine MacIntyre’s considerations on the gap.

In this article, by analyzing the opinions of Avicenna and Moore, about the indefinability of good and bad morals, their attitude is explained from the epistemological point of view, The main problem of the research is Avicenna and Moore's attitude about criticizing the naturalistic criterion and criteria for carrying moral characteristics such as good and bad in moral issues. Avicenna states in his opinions that moderation as a metaphysical and natural matter cannot be a criterion for the good or badness of moral issues in all fields, and Moore, by analyzing the naturalistic fallacy, considers pleasure or harmony with nature as the criterion and criterion for carrying good and bad. He does not know moral issues. The results of the research show that the approach of these two thinkers to prove their claim is to pay attention to the logical problem that occurs in the comparison of knowing good and bad with things such as moderation, pleasure, and harmony with nature. To answer the problem, Avicenna and Moore defend the non-naturalistic realism of moral propositions, in the meantime, emphasizing the intuition of the characteristics in the intellectual intuition of the people to find criteria and criteria for the truth and falsity of moral propositions makes it possible to discuss the opinions of these two thinkers. The research method is to analyze the content of the opinions of these two philosophers in order to create a dialogue to compare their opinions.

One of the most perplexing problems in the epistemology of Ethics is the "Is/ought problem." This conundrum stems from a passage in David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, where he observes, "In every system of morality … I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual of propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation... This small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality... ." (Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p.215) As a result, this problem has come to be called "Hume's Law" or "Hume's Guillotine." It has also been referred to by many other names, such as the Is/Ought distinction, Is/Ought Split, Is/Ought fallacy, Is/Ought gap, Is/Ought dichotomy, Is/Ought controversy, Is/Ought thesis, Is/Ought relation, Is/Ought separation, Is/Ought divide, Is/Ought alienation, Is/Ought impasse, Is/Ought gulf, Is/Ought fallacy, naturalistic fallacy, fact/value problem, and more. It is important to note that Hume's paragraph has been interpreted in different ways. Some have taken it to imply that "Ethics" arises from "Emotion" rather than "Reason," while others believe that "Ought" cannot be deduced from "Is." The second interpretation is the prevailing one and has proven to be a significant challenge in the epistemology of ethics and law. Indeed, many philosophers, such as Hume in the current interpretation, contend that we cannot deduce "Ought" from "Is." John Searle and others hold a different view on the Is/Ought problem compared to Professor Allameh Mesbah Yazdi. It is worth noting that Professor Yazdi put forward the "Derivational Theory," which argues that we can derive "Ought" from "Is." According to this theory, "Ought" sometimes represents "Objective Necessity," which can be grasped through "Comparative Necessity." This provides a powerful solution to the Is/Ought problem. The present study aimed to explore this theory using a comparative and analytic approach. We will argue that the Is/Ought problem stems from the mistaken belief that "Ought" always signifies a prescriptive (normative) sentence, which naturally contradicts a declarative one. However, this is not the case because "Ought" can refer to "Comparative Necessity" in reality. Professor Mesbah believed that when there is a complete cause, the existence of an effect is comparatively necessary. This type of necessity can be apprehended through comparison. Therefore, if a sentence describes this kind of necessity, it should be a declarative sentence. According to Islamic philosophical terminology, there are three types of necessity: Necessity by itself, necessity by something else, and necessity in relation to something else (comparative necessity). Professor Mesbah's theory states that real values are derived from facts and can be comprehended through comparative necessity between value acts and their ultimate purposes. The use of the word "Real" here implies that some values come from actual facts that are connected to Allah (God) as the foundation of all real values.

This paper scrutinizes William Lane Craig’s perspective on the relationship between religion and ethics. According to Craig, knowledge of moral values and obligations is not inherently tied to theism, as he posits that God has embedded moral obligations within the human heart. However, in terms of ontology, Craig contends that theism provides the best explanation for moral realism. Atheistic realists, in avoiding the naturalistic fallacy, are urged to conceptualize moral properties as abstract Platonic entities akin to numbers and propositions, a stance unnecessary within the theistic framework where God, a concrete entity, serves as the supreme good and ultimate source of moral goodness. Critically assessing Craig’s viewpoint, the paper contends that 1) real property should not be conflated with an essential constituent. Drawing on Moore’s perspective, moral predicates are construed as second-order philosophical concepts inherently tied to the existence of subjects. 2) By centering on the existence of “moral evil,” Craig’s argument can be inverted, providing grounds for an argument supporting the existence of Satan. 3) The consequence of Craig’s argument is the negation of any moral obligation for atheists. 4) Positing obedience to God’s command solely for its own sake as irrational, Craig’s argument may potentially exhibit circular reasoning.

The Platonic belief that philosophy begins from wonder has been welcomed by the worldwide and Iranian philosophers. To critique this belief we argue that the explanatory and normalizing function of knowledge in societies together with naturalistic ontology, neutralizes the astonishment and makes ineffective its impact on philosophical thoughts. In contrast, we argue that genesis of philosophical thought is due to deep speculation and introspective temperament of the mind together with skeptical exploration of the existing knowledge and beliefs. Abduction has been the research subject of various disciplines from logic and philosophy of science to artificial intelligent. The second part of the paper is devoted to a new investigation of abductive inference, subjective abduction and its relationship with the emotion of surprise and surprising events. We explain this amazing mental ability in terms of subjective estimation of probability and intuitive expectation. At last some fallacies arising from abductive reasonings are discussed.

Moral reductionism attempts to simplify some moral concepts and beliefs into someconcrete concepts and beliefs to provide a more clear and verifiable explanations.Reductionism takes place sometimes in the same field and among compatible conceptsand beliefs; as in the field of empirical psychology which is under the empirical sciences.In this field, certain psychological findings are simplified into some neurological andbiochemical concepts. But sometimes it may be applied to two non-compatible realms,one of which is normative and the other one descriptive. Moral concepts, beliefs, andtruths are among the most important normative affairs. Epistemology and semantics areamong the normative sciences as well. Contrary to them, naturalistic cognitions are a setof descriptive, non-normative concepts and propositions that their truth may be verifiedby referring to the objective world providing a causal explanation. Now an importantquestion here is that whether the normativity of normative sciences, especially ethics, is apart of their essence and structure or they are like the other sciences, especially empiricalones, which are non-normative in nature or they could be non-normative. Put differently,is it possible for us to reduce their normative content to a set of non-normative truths?Ethical naturalism as a kind of moral reductionism has asserted that it is possible. In thispaper we examine this claim and its efforts and policies for reducing moral facts intonon-normative facts.