Abstract The concept of law is one of the most fundamental concepts and theoretical foundations of the rule of law, which has played an important role in the formation of the theory of constitutional government. Given the fact that no society was at any time without law and with the presupposition that the concept of law has a developmental syrup and two forms of "new" and "old", and that the new concept of law is in "breakdown" "Or the" continuity "of the old concept has evolved. This article shows that the new concept of law has evolved in the continuity of the old concept but with a different conception of the old sense. Mashtar al-Dawla is the first thinker who, by understanding the different legal basis in both the "old" and "new" forms of the law, comprehended the necessity of establishing a new concept of law and some preliminaries to accomplish this.

The concept of law has been one of the fundamental, though controversial, concepts for early constitutional writers. This concept was discussed in a context in which the absolute monarchy, on one hand, and the conservative and traditional sharia-based religion, on the other, had intermingled the possibility of building and establishing the law in its strict sense with political considerations and sometimes incorrect readings. There already existed two normative systems: the conventional system of the monarchy and its bureaucracy and the sharia. The latter one of course had put forward the exclusive claim on the concept of law. In result, it seemed that the most important problem in the way of building and developing the modern law in Iran at that time was the very problem of relationship between law and sharia. Early constitutional writers on the concept of law, however, believed in the following basic requirements of a modern law: humanly enacted, reflecting the public will and being flexible.

Law is one of the key concepts of the constitutional era. Examining this concept from the perspective of the history of concepts is important because it shows the course of its creation and evolution. In this regard, to examine the concept of the law, the details of the parliament's deliberations were used and the opinions of Sheikh Ibrahim Zanjani, one of the constitutional clerics, as a representative of the second and third terms of the National Assembly, were researched. The purpose of this research is to answer the question of how much he understood the concept of law as one of the supporters of constitutionalism. Considering that Zanjani had a seminary education and, on the other hand, due to his interest in the developments of the new era, he had studied the works of the Intellectuals and the laws of other countries, it is important to examine the concept of law in his opinions from the perspective of Iran's constitutional history. In this research, relying on the details of the negotiations, with the analytical-descriptive method, documentary and library sources and other internet sources have been used to investigate the issue. The results of this research showed that Sheikh Ibrahim Zanjani had a relatively accurate understanding of the concept of law and its characteristics, but he was not familiar with the logic of law and the methods of interpreting laws in modern law.

Emergence of the concept of law in the Constitutional era should be considered as the result of intellectual endeavours of those thinkers who had striven to explain it long before the official date of the Constitutional Revolution (1906). Therefore, learning about intellectual and objective backgrounds and also about the first discussions and analyses on the nature of law will bear great insights. This paper shall deal with the development of idea of change in the political system in the pre-Constitutional time up to the Constitutional Revolution. This in fact reveals the process of emergence and evolution of the concept of law among the thinker or that era. It was not an accident that people sought a constitutional system and laws appropriate to this system. The existence of an unregulated (independent) absolute monarchy accompanied with an absolute law and then introduction of the idea of a regulated absolute monarchy along with the law as regulations were all background elements that contributed to the rise of a will for a constitutional system which in turn had occupied the mind of the main constitutional thinkers. Law for them was the law of a constitutional system. This understanding went serious changes later on.

Law is one of the most fundamental propositions of the modern science and system of rights. Even though this concept is self-evident, it has acquired many different meanings in the various schools of thought contained in the philosophy of rights. Aside from its historical nature, the transformation of the concept of law in the tradition of the positivistic school of thought in the west only has meaning in a total network of concepts, axioms, values and structures. From this point of view, in understanding the fundamental propositions of the humanities, by using an analytical method that proposes a tripartite structure of ‘apparent, hidden and hidden in the hidden’, it is possible to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the concept of law in the positivistic legal school of thought. This methodology is not only innovative it also clarifies the profound relation between rights, politics and philosophy based upon consumer-like essence of the science of rights. The result of such a method will be the understanding of law as a historical concept that is founded on specific philosophical foundations, not law as a vessel that has the ability to accept any and everything. Since law is the center of the modern system of rights, the proper understanding of the concept of law is necessary for the understanding of the modern system of rights. It is only then that we can accept or reject it.

More than a century ago, a great revolution occurred in Iran, the fundamental aim of which was to establish a rule of law system. Accordingly, the concept of law has been one of the most essential though challenging concepts of the constitutionalist movement in the country. This issue is so significant that we may seek the root of the Iranian constitutional crisis in the failure of providing a clear and workable concept of law. A serious impediment in this regard was the old concept and system of Shar`, which prima facie left no room for law. Shari`atist thinkers took two approaches to the relationship between law and Shar`: compatibility and incompatibility. Not only did the compatibility approach believe in the possibility of combination and sometimes identity of Shar`i and legal rules, it finally gave the upper hand to law and its requirements. One of the fundamental disputes related to the legislating authority. Shari`atists ultimately embraced legislation by the human being. Nevertheless, this brought about controversies and debates on the last prophet-hoodness of Muhammad (pbuh), religious innovation, and rational preference. This paper shall analyse the concept of law from the perspective of Shari`atist thinkers living during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution era, on the basis of their works and the related documents. This analysis will lay the historical and theoretical ground for the similar and still unresolved problem under the legal system established after the Islamic Revolution in the Country.

The fluent and simple structure of the ordinary language philosophy paved the way for many analytical philosophers in England to turn to this field, so that they based their analysis on current propositions in people's daily lives. J. L. Austin as one of the most influential philosophers in the intellectual law in the UK, especially the thoughts of Herbert Hart, has been taken into consideration. In The concept of law, Hart does not explain the philosophical foundations of his discussion, but uses the results of the views of analytical philosophers, especially the philosophers of ordinary language, in explaining and analyzing the concept of law. Therefore, this study tries to explain the view of J. L. Austin as the most influential philosopher of conventional language in Hart's thought, in order to get acquainted with Hart's philosophical thought and to clarify the quality of application of these principles in legal issues.

Examining the process of constitutionalism in Iran shows that the intellectual currents and thoughts related to the law and legalism of that time, not only could not limit the power of the law-abiding system of the monarchy, but it was also the tyranny that With relatively long survival after the constitution, it blocked the way for any evolution and maturity of the fundamental concept of law and its place in the control of government affairs. The debate that finally ended with the collapse of the authoritarian system after the Islamic revolution has left this tradition of thought, which is the main specialty of the Legislative Assembly in general issues of society. However, by reflecting on the contemporary jurisprudential thoughts as well as the intellectual developments of recent centuries, the concept of law in the West can be seen that the rule of law no longer means that the legislator wants to enact any law, nor necessarily any text that The approval of the legislator is called a law. Therefore, assuming that there is a significant difference between the intellectual thoughts of the constitutional era and the current public law in relation to the concept and functional scope of the law, the conducted research tries to analyze the related documents and information data using the method libraries have been collected, to this question that in the public law of our country, to what extent is the interference of the law in controlling the authorities of the government, and basically, how far is the moderation of this interference? Give a logical answer.

The function and the concept of law in trials and adjudication has ambiguity. Based on the soul and the evolutionary process of law, the intent of Sharia (Arabic: شرع Islamic law) in the current rules is an independent concept from law, public order and good morality (desired virtuous values) but sometimes this term in the rules has not been used right (accurate). From functioning aspect, after realizing the illicitness of the claim (case), it should not be trusted in the appearance of law i.e. Article 89 of civil procedure code of Iran indicating issuing the abatement. Also referring to the Islamic law from both parties, court of appeal and supreme court of Iran in appealing to the initial judgment limits to the decisions that issuing of the initial decision depends on the silence of law and with referring to Islamic law has been issued. The ambiguity originated from the concept of Sharia (شرع) in the rules, it is possible to study in the area of the adjudication. In this paper it has been surveyed the duty of the adjudicator to the Islamic law and the duty of the court on adjudicating the appeal against the decision of the court (dispute) from the point of view of being in contrast to the Islamic law principles.

"Justice" is one of the clear concepts of law and to the extent that this notion is evident in law equally as sophisticated as it is meaningful, this sophisticated concept may seem strange. One way to dispel such a stranger Radiation means this category in legal documents. This article has tried the meaning of this concept which is discussed in the context of the Article 251 repeated in order to eliminate the ambiguity surrounding it, as the legal meaning of the word is discovered. So in answering to the question that: What is the legal concept of justice in the repeal of Article 251 repeated of the direct tax law? Using the Research Method:The descriptive-analytical approach is that First, the concept of justice itself does not have a purely legal meaning at the concept level when it is by entering the field of law that it becomes legal. Secondly, we have to explain the legislatorchr('39')s conception of this concept to understand the legislatorchr('39')s understanding of this concept. Thirdly, it can be argued that the legislatorchr('39')s written position is that Justice in Article 251 repeated, basically, can be perceived in forms: balance, right, fairness, moderation and equality.