پژوهشنامه کلام
سال یازدهم شماره 20 (بهار و تابستان 1403)

The issue that arises about the issues of ʿIṣma (Arabic: العصمه, lit.: infallibility) studies is the need to recognize and distinguish the rational reasons for the ʿIṣma of the Prophets (Arabic: الانبیاء, al-ʾAnbiyāʾ) from each other. Sometimes, the reason of “Wuthūq” (Arabic: وثوق, trust) and the reason of “Tanfīr” (Arabic: تنفیر, aversion) are conflated and considered as a single reason; whereas, the reason of Wuthūq pertains to the realm of knowledge and intellect, while the reason of Tanfīr relates to the sphere of inclination, emotions, and the generation of aversion. Sometimes, the reason for “the necessity of following the Prophet” is confused with the reason of “Tanfīr”, while the reason for “Tanfīr” indicates that disobedience (Arabic: معصیه, romanized: Maʿṣīya, meaning disobedience) causes Tanfīr and reduces the peace of mind of people, but the reason for “the necessity of following the Prophet” indicates that the Prophet’s disobedience is contrary to absolute obedience to him, because it is not permissible to follow Maʿṣīya. Sometimes, the reason for “violation of the purpose of guiding the people” is confused with the reason of “the necessity of following and obeying the Prophet”. The main focus of the reason for “violating the purpose of guidance” is on proving al-ʿIṣma from al-Khaṭaʾ (Arabic: الخطا, error), forgetfulness and ʿUṣyān (Arabic: عصیان, lit.: disobedience or refusal to obey) in deliberately changing the revelation or waḥy (Arabic: الوحی) or not communicating the revelation, but the main focus of the reason for “the necessity of following the Prophet” is on proving infallibility from sins. This research uses a descriptive and analytical method to explain the distinction between these reasons and show the mistakes that have been made in this field.

In Shiʿism ḥadīth (Arabic: حدیث) sources, there are riwāyāt (Arabic: روایات, lit.: narrations) about the method of ḥukm (religious ruling) of Imām Mahdī ʿalahi al-ṣalātu wal-salām and due to the apparent differences between them, some Wahhābīyyūn (Arabic: ٱلوهابیون), including Walīd bin Ṣaliḥ Bāṣamad (Arabic: ولید بن صالح باصمد), have agree on conflict and have attacked al-Mahdawīyya (Arabic: المهدویه) desired by the Shiʿism. The present study, with the aim of responding to the aforementioned conflict claim and using the method of “description and analysis”, first categorizes and reports the claim under two parts of aḥādīth (Arabic: احادیث, singular: ḥadīth, traditions and narrations) that indicate the ruling of Imam Mahdi (AS) based on evidence and the hadiths that indicate the ruling of ḥukm (religious ruling) of without bayyina (Arabic: البینه, the evidence), and then it concludes by examining the document and the text of narrations, that both categories of narrations are valid from the perspective of the science of rijal (Arabic: علم الرجال, lit. knowing men) and they can be together in terms of signification. The explanation is that Imām Mahdī ʿalahi al-ṣalātu wal-salām is one of God’s chosen ones and has Divine knowledge, and he also has the possibility of issuing a verdict without evidence in addition to ruling with evidence.

The two rules of “words are to be understood according to their general meaning, not special meaning in a case” (Arabic: العبره بعموم اللفظ لا بخصوص المورد, romanized: al-ʿibratu bi-ʿumūmi al-lafẓi la bi-khuṣūṣi al-mawridi) and “adaptation” (Arabic: الجری و التطبیق, romanized: al-jary wa al-taṭbīq) are among the rules of interpretation that are used in many books of Qurʾānic studies and exegesis. In this sense, the verses that have the generality of the words but have a specific reason will be generalized to similar cases. The channel of these two rules are also verses that have a general word and a specific (particular) cause. The main questions of the present study are as follows: What is the difference between these two rules? What are the characteristics of both rules and what is the feasibility of these two rules under the verses of noble characteristics (Arabic: الفضائل)? The results of the present study inform that the rule of “words are to be understood according to their general meaning, not special meaning in a case” is more specific than the rule of “adaptation” and is only related to the verses that have sabab al-nuzūl (Arabic: سبب النزول, cause of revelation). However, the rule of “adaptation” is related to verses that may have a cause of revelation and riwāyāt (Arabic: روایات, lit.: narrations) have found examples for the verse and generalized it to others. These two rules are not meaningful in the realm of the verses of noble characteristics and virtues, and they cannot be applied in similar cases later than the cause of revelation, because they do not have conceptual development and applicability. In this study, the two aforementioned rules and the criticism of data have been examined using the library method for gathering content, the documentary method for quoting views, and the descriptive-analytical method.

Ibn Ḥazm (Arabic: إبن حزم) is a well-known theologian whose views are now being paid attention to by Muslim thinkers in the Arab world, necessitating an analytical re-reading of his views. He does not consider God to be the cause of the universe, because on the one hand, he believes that the Divine Names are non-restricted (Arabic: توقیفی, romanized: tawqīfī), and on the other hand, he considers God’s causality to require impossible things such as negation of God’s will, the limitation of Divine power and action, the passivity of the Truth (Arabic: حق تعالی), the eternity of the world, and the potential existence of the world in the essence of God. Ibn Ḥazm expresses most of his views on this issue in his criticisms of al-Kindī (Arabic: الکندی), without the individual al-Kindī being significant, and he denies the principle of causality from God while excommunicating (Arabic: تکفیر, romanized: takfīr) him. On the other hand, Mullā Ṣadrā (Arabic: ملا صدرا), based on his fundamentals, which critique Ibn Ḥazm’s views, does not only consider the Divine Names to be non-restricted, but he also affirms every attribute of perfection and existence for the Truth, after eliminating any additional qualifications. Mullā Ṣadrā’s intellectual foundations completely reject Ibn Ḥazm’s views and do not consider causality to be the cause of the negation of God’s will or the limitation of His power. The passivity of the cause in relation to the effect is only applicable in the material world, and even then, in a manner distinct from the effect of the cause. This article has been written in a documentary way and in processing the data in a descriptive way and with a logical and rational analysis of them.

One of the most important and vital issues of human beings that affects their views and actions and obliges them to learn them is the issues related to the necessity of doctrinal maʿārif (Arabic: اصول الدین, romanized: uṣūl al-dīn or the foundations of the religion or the roots of faith). The present study seeks the method of understanding doctrinal maʿārif by referring to the theological opinions of religions with an analytical method and critical descriptive data processing. Is man obliged to know ijtihād (Arabic: إجتهاد, independent reasoning by an expert in Islamic law) and search, or is his duty waived by taqlīd (Arabic: التقلید, imitation or following a mujtahid)? There are at least three theories in this issue: 1. Inadequacy following a mujtahid; 2. Permissibility of taqlīd; 3. Theory of giving complete details about it: The first interpretation refers to the mukallaf (Arabic: مکلف, accountable people or subject to taklīf or accountability) and distinguishes the prepared (prone) person from the unprepared and considers the research to be related to the prepared people, and the second interpretation refers to the object of taklīf (Arabic: تکلیف), which means that if the object of legal and moral responsibility is tawḥīd, (Arabic: توحید‎, lit. oneness of God) and ʿadl (Arabic: عدل, justice), then the search (Arabic: التحقیق, al-taḥqīq) is necessary, otherwise taqlīd (Arabic: التقلید) is permissible. It seems that since the theory of giving complete and more details about this issue is without reason, it can be said with a correct explanation of the issue, that each of the search and imitation has a place and it is not the case that taḥqīq and ijtihād are possible for everyone, and it is also not the case that taqlīd is absolutely reprehensible, and in some cases, taqlīd is the prelude to taḥqīq and ijtihād.

The ontology of God’s attributes and the relationship between His Attributes and His Essence is one of the oldest debates in theological and doctrinal discussions and is one of the most important and controversial issues. Since Qāḍī ʿAbdul Jabbār Muʿtazilī (Arabic: قاضی عبدالجبار معتزلی) is one of the experts in such discussions, the present study has examined and criticized his view on this issue. The findings of the research indicate that although Qāḍī ʿAbdul Jabbār Muʿtazilī has proved the Perfect Attributes of God in the ontology of the Attributes of God, through the analogy from man to God, but this analogy faces serious criticisms and challenges and the most important challenge is that this analogy is an analogy deprived of relevance (Arabic: قیاس مع الفارق). Although Qāḍī ʿAbdul Jabbār Muʿtazilī has not made any distinction between the Essence of God and His Attributes, and has considered the attributes as mental conceptions that have no truth in the essence, nor are they distinct from the essence, but he has considered the attributes to be the essence itself, and the important challenge of his view is that his presentation of this view is due to his inability to correctly conceive of the view of objectivity. His view is that we assume that God is a possible and limited being, who lacks perfect attributes, while God Almighty possesses perfect attributes. This is because the requirement of his view is that we assume that God is a contingent and limited being, who lacks perfect attributes, while God possesses perfect attributes (Attribute of Perfection).

Knowing God and His Attributes is the basis of all religious beliefs and a necessary condition for faith (Arabic: إیمان, romanized: ʾimān) and action. Therefore, Shubha (Arabic: شبهه, lit.: doubt, obscurity, or mis-grounded conceit) and theoretical disorder in this field will cause irreparable damage to the belief system and consequently to the practical conduct of human beings. The current research is going to resolve some doubts about Divine justice with the aim of the redefinition of Divine justice in the light of an inquiry into the ontology of theologians. The research method is descriptive-analytical and the research data have been analyzed through documentary review, note-taking and an argumentative approach. The books of Imām Khomeinī and Fakhr Rāzī are the research sources, and other sources related to the research goals have been used as explanatory and supplementary sources. The findings indicate that the act of bringing-into-existence from Fakhr Rāzī’s point of view is a direct act of God and man has no act of bringing-into-existence. Good and evil are based on the will of Shāriʿ Muqaddas (Arabic: شارع المقدس, the Sacred Legislator), and God’s justice is also due to the fact that He is God. However, Imām Khomeinī believes that humans, as voluntary agent (free agent) have a role in creation. Good and evil are intrinsic and are based on intellect. Therefore, God is just, as He does not commit evil deeds and the divine realm is free from imperfect creation.

Shīʿite mysticism aims to determine its distinct principles between the pressure of two schools of thought, i.e., traditional Islamic jurisprudential scholars, and the progressive and religious intolerance foundations of modernity. The main issue that we intend to research is what the principles of Shīʿite mysticism have to say about the foundations of modernity and how the principles of Shīʿite mysticism differ from other mysticism in this regard. This research extracts the distinct foundations of Shīʿite mysticism from the words and teachings of Imām Khomeinī raḥimahu llāhu by using the method of text analysis, and explains the conflict and agreements of Shīʿite mysticism with the foundations of modernity by using the method of analytical comparison. The results of this research are as follows: 1. Shīʿite mysticism has original and distinct foundations from other mysticism, and it is completely based on the true Islamic principles in this regard. 2. The foundations of intuitionism, esotericism, and the necessity of the purity of soul in mysticism are in conflict with the foundations of rationalism, scientism, religious intolerance, and economic welfare of modernity. 3. Imām Khomeinī by presenting the foundations of Shīʿite mysticism, harmonized scientism, rationalism and economic development of modernity with religiosity and mystical spiritualism and redefined the material, social, and political dimensions of man in the heart of the spiritual dimension and the unified truth of the universe. In this way, Shīʿite mysticism, in the form of the political system of the Islamic Republic, will be able to respond to the needs and problems of the believer in modern society.

ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī (Arabic: علامه طباطبائی), based on the ontological argument (romanized: Burhān-i Ṣiddiqīn) in his special statement, has based the belief in the existence of God only on the belief in the negation of sophistry, and he has turned theism into an idea with the largest global audience with such an approach, but contemporary Wahhabism, like its predecessors, by ignoring rational reflection on the existence of God under the pretext that no human being denies the existence of God, and with juristic preference divisions as well as well as improper interpretations and comparisons of monotheism in worship, have only fanned the fire of excommunicating (Arabic: تکفیر, romanized: takfīr) in relation to other Muslims. This research has compared ʿAllāma Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s approach to the issue of the existence of God, intrinsic monotheism, and attribute monotheism with the approach of Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUthaymīn (Arabic: محمد بن صالح العثیمین) in the interpretation of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s at-Tawḥīd book (Arabic: کتاب التوحید; romanized: Kitāb at-Tawḥīd, lit.: The Book of Oneness) to those issues, and then has addressed the consequences of al-ʿUthaymīn’s approach with the citation-analytical method and has shown that the inability of the Wahhabism to rationally and beyond sectarianism of the issue of the existence of God, their avoidance of the rational analysis of intrinsic monotheism, and their escape from answering the fundamental question about the monotheism of attributes has led to the inefficiency of the idea of monotheism in their reading, while their emphasis on the instances of monotheism has had no result other than the expulsion of all Muslims from the circle of the people of monotheism of divinity.

Regarding the knowability of God and the way of knowing Him, in the early theology, the discussion of “Taqlīd” (Arabic: تقلید, conformism) and “Naẓar” (Arabic: النظر, speculation) has been discussed. “Taqlīd” is an intra-religious view of the knowledge of God, and “Naẓar” is an extra-religious view of rational knowledge. In the new discourse, “Naẓar” is contrasted with practice (Arabic: العمل, practice) and becomes important in the field of theology in the early Islamic theology. This article, written using a descriptive and analytical method, aims to examine and analyze the issue of the role of opinion in the theology of the book Yāqūt (Arabic: کتاب الیاقوت; romanized: Kitāb at-Yāqūt, lit.: The Book of Ruby) and its commentators. The question is, what does “Naẓar” mean and what is the application of “Naẓar” in the theology of the book Yāqūt and his commentators? What is the method of knowing God before them? With the dual design of “Taqlīd” and “Naẓar”, the author of Yāqūt has placed “Naẓar” in contrast of “Taqlīd” and has chosen the path of “Naẓar”. The findings of this research are that “Naẓar” in Yāqūt and its commentators means “ratiocination and cogitation” and the position of “Naẓar” for them is “epistemological” and they provide reasons not only for the necessity of knowing God, but also for the rational necessity of speculation, and accordingly, their approach is “issues related to outside religion”. Raising this issue illustrates the importance of the method of knowing God.

One of the most important innovations of Ṣadr al-Mutiʾallihīn (Arabic: صدرالمتالهین), the theologian, in the field of ontology is the theory of the copulative existence of the effect, which plays a significant role in drawing the relationship between the existence of God and those other than Him. The true instance of existence and self-existence (essentially) is only God, and the multiplicity and possible objects acquire an existential character with the appearance of God’s existence, and their existence is accidental, which is only gradation conceivable in them due to the true unity of God’s existence. The union of limitation mode and causation in the specific particular gradation (Arabic: تشکیک خاص الخاصی) is understood from the point of view of Ṣadr al-Mutiʾallihīn and will be compatible with the individual oneness (particular unity) of existence. In this research, using a descriptive-analytical method, according to Ṣadr al-Mutiʾallihīn’s interpretation of the theory of the copulative existence of the effect, the conclusion that was reached was that the stronger the levels of existence and it is closer to the intrinsic obligation, the more perfections and simplicity that existence will have, but this rule is based on the specific particular gradation, which is that every perfection belongs to the true existence of God firstly and essentially, and it has been realized in possible things in a greatness way secondly and accidently, because the real essential being and the true perfection are exclusive to God, and the possible objects, whether in existence or perfection, are among His manifestations and greatness.

Considering Imamate as a foundation means that the Imamate (Arabic: إمامه, ʾImāmah) is the principle of religion and the act of Allāh, so turning away from it will lead to departure from the religion. The issue of the article is the position of Imamate from the viewpoint of Ḥaḍra Zahrāʾ salāmu llāhi ʿalayhā (Arabic: حضره زهراء سلام الله علیها) and the claim is that Imamate from her point of view is considered the principle (foundation) of religion. Ḥaḍra Zahrāʾ salāmu llāhi ʿalayhā, in her sermon of Fadkīyya (Arabic: الخطبه الفدکیه‎), introduces Imām ʿAliī ʿalayhi ṣ-ṣalātu was-salāmu (Arabic: امام علی علیه الصلاه و السلام) as having worthy qualities and a superior position and does not consider the other (Arabic: الصحابه, romanized: aṣ-ṣaḥāba) to be his equals. She has presented two strong arguments for Considering Imamate as a foundation and principle. She considers in the first argument that turning away from the Imamate to be equal to turning away from the Qurʾān, and based on the verse of Tablīgh (Arabic: آیه التبلیغ, lit.: communicate, deliver, make known or proclaim) and introduces the Imamate as the principle of religion, which leads to turning away from the Qurʾān and coming or going back and in the second argument, she introduces turning away from the Imamate as Shirk (Arabic: شرک, lit.: polytheism) and considers those who follow the path of the khilāfah (Arabic: خلافه) from its original position to be worthy of Divine punishment and departure from religion. This issue has been explained analytically based on the case study of sermon of Fadkīyya.