فهرست مطالب محسن بهلولی فسخودی

In the liberal school of education, the factor of indoctrination with a disturbance in critical thinking and a deficiency in the power of rationality leads to the loss of intellectual autonomy and the independence of the student's personality. In this approach, instructional education, relying on the authority of the teacher and the educational institution, seeks to instill specific moral, political, and religious teachings in the student's mind. Hence, indoctrination is the boundary between good and bad education. But is indoctrination completely negative and inappropriate? Does liberal education itself have the characteristics of inductive education? This qualitative research with the method of conceptual analysis seeks to understand the nature of indoctrination in the discourse of liberal education. The research claims that the discourse of liberal education is not justified in indoctrinating other forms of education. Because first of all, indoctrination is appropriate and even necessary in some times and educational and ideological subjects. Second, the realization of components such as the development of rationality and critical thinking, and autonomy in an ideal and absolute way in education is not possible or even appropriate. Third, liberal education itself, by supporting the sources of power and authority of the hidden curriculum, seeks to instill a special doctrine of scientific objectivism in the educational process, and therefore its criticisms of other forms of education have a kind of self-referential nature. Therefore, emptying the space of education and training of moral values and religious teachings is a wrong and dangerous thing.

Michael Hand regards compliance with ethical standards as the primary objective of moral education. He believes that directive moral education is a kind of thoughtful reflection which aims to promote compliance with justified ethical standards. Therefore, one cannot remain impartial to justified ethical standards and one needs to purposefully contribute to the debate so as to arrive at a reasonable conclusion. Hand sees this as a necessary condition for the continuity of social life. The main question of this study is whether it is an appropriate way for moral education to justify ethical standards by means of argument. This study seeks to challenge Hand’s commitment to argument and rational justification for ethical standards as the most effective method for moral education. This is because logical reasoning is not by itself sufficient to convince others and to promote compliance with moral principles. The present research claims that there is a sort of implicit compliance with ethical standards. General agreement on ethical standards depends upon some implicit understanding obtained by living in an especial culture with a distinctive identity. This cannot be formulated in rational arguments. Moral education based on this understanding may lead to a deep insight into ethics that plays a crucial role in acquiring moral virtues. The current research defends this quality as implicit compliance with ethical standards.

Indoctrination is the act of inducing and transmitting ideas to another, which causes the person indoctrinated with the opinions and ideas expressed to be immune from error and revision. Ignoring the evidence and arguments to the contrary will weaken the power of reason and rationality and cause dogmatism. But anti-indoctrination approaches also use inductive methods in promoting and expanding their fundamental views. This situation leads to a phenomenon called “the paradox of indoctrination”. The question is whether indoctrination can be avoided and if not, what kind of indoctrination is not only necessary but also useful? Those who do not consider indoctrination as a completely negative concept and point to its positive and involuntary dimensions have resorted to solutions such as world-picture, strengthening rationality, and initiation to respond to the above paradox. This qualitative research by using conceptual analysis and comparative methods after critiquing the proposed solutions introduces an alternative approach to better understand the necessity of indoctrination and its place in human thought and life. The research claims that by resorting to epistemology and distinguishing between two types of explicit and implicit knowledge, we can speak of implicit indoctrination. The negative and removable part of indoctrination is related to the explicit and expressive aspect of indoctrination in the form of explicit propositions and teachings. Implicit indoctrination, on the other hand, is a vital component in sharing and transmitting lived experiences and individuals’ intuitive perceptions of their community and culture due to their contextual, procedural, narrative, and rule-following.

Is moral education a rational thing free from indoctrination or is it necessarily accompanied by moral indoctrination? In answer to this question and the relationship between moral education and indoctrination, there are two completely different perspectives. The opposite view of indoctrination denies any relation between genuine moral education and indoctrination. In this view, indoctrination is based on four criteria: intention, method, content, and outcome. In the proponents of indoctrination, the role of indoctrination is moral and vital, and inevitable. In this approach, since it is impossible to acknowledge the ultimate moral standard, the effort in moral education is certainly indoctrinated. The common denominator of the above two views is ignoring the age of the learner in the matter of moral education. The present study considers moral education without indoctrination to be impossible. But on the other hand, by confining the positive and necessary function of indoctrination to the early stages of child development, it will also distance itself from the perspective of indoctrination moral education. Since the child in the early stages of development lacks the necessary critical and argumentative powers to understand and accept and adhere to a moral standard, moral education in this period is mixed with indoctrination. This type of indoctrination affects the child's desires, habits, and expectations, which will lead to the formation of a moral commitment in her. Therefore, instilling moral principles in childhood will not violate the thinking and critical assessment of moral judgments in the period of her intellectual development and maturity.

Scheffler examines the relationship between reason and teaching to design philosophical models of teaching. He analyzed three models under the titles of influence, insight, and rule. He evaluated their weaknesses and strengths. His main thesis on education is the concept of a rational teaching model based on the special position of rationality and the development of theoretical and critical powers among students, which, along with a kind of respect for the judiciary and rational assessment of the reasons presented to the student. This attitude has been criticized largely based on a completely rational approach and in keeping with Scheffler's analytical approach to the philosophy of education. The study examines the dimensions of Scheffler's theory of the relationship between rationality and teaching through conceptual analysis. The purpose of this study is to analyze and critique Scheffler's perspective from the perspective of tacit knowledge and to suggest a tacit teaching model as an alternative model. The research finding indicates that the rational model of teaching based on cognitive powers has adopted a one-dimensional approach to student education. In contrast, the implicit teaching model, with its contextual and paradigmatic nature, instead of the knowledge of propositions and textbooks, through intuitive understanding and use of implicit language, causes familiarity with values and creates a sense of empathy between teacher and student.

Meno's dialogue covers a wide variety of topics, including the discussion of what virtue is, the possibility of inquiry, learning, teaching methods, the relationship between knowledge and imagination, and finally the theory of recollection. Discussion of the method of teaching and learning is one of the most important topics in Meno’s dialogue. In the text of this dialogue, important educational points such as the condition of teaching a subject, the method of learning based on recollection, and the dialectical method of Socrates are discussed. Conversation with Meno's paradox plan has shown that learning and inquiry the nature of something is difficult. To solve this problem, Plato spoke of the theory of recollection as to the most original way of learning.

The method in this paper is philosophical-analytical based on Meno’s Text and its interpretations.

The research aims to design a dialectical method in Meno’s dialogue as the most appropriate method for teaching and learning critically and collaboratively in the educational system. This method is the product of cooperation between the teacher and the learner and will not be possible without the active participation of the learner and his critical attitude towards the learned material.

Meno’s dialogue can be divided into two separate parts. The focus of the first part of the article is an epistemological question about understanding the nature of virtue. In the second part of the dialogue, Plato focuses on an ontological approach to get rid of the paradox of research and learning and move towards the desired result. In the final part of the dialogue, the theory of recollection. The research question is whether the theory of recollection is the best explanation for the original way of learning? Research claims that the answer is negative for two reasons. First, this theory is not able to cover any learning. Second, this theory contradicts Plato's original theory of the teaching of virtue, in which Plato claimed that any learning requires education and, consequently, a teacher.

The Dreyfus skill acquisition model is a phenomenological explanation of skill development over time. This model has five stages: novice, advanced beginner, competent, proficient, and expertise. The more one increases one's skill, the more one distances oneself from the rules and propositional knowledge and finds a kind of skillful conflict with one's skill. Teaching is one of the most popular professions in Dreyfus literature. This research is qualitative and its method is descriptive-analytical. The main issue of the research is to investigate the implications of the Dreyfus skills acquisition model in the teaching profession. For this purpose, it is necessary to first examine the components of Dreyfus's phenomenological approach to skill acquisition, the most important of which are the relationship between propositional knowledge and skill, the role of following rules in skill development, and the position of position and intuition. Then, according to these principles, the implications of the model of acquiring Dreyfus skills in the teaching profession from the novice teacher to reaching the highest level, i.e. the expert teacher, will be presented. The research finding is that to expertise in teaching practice, the teacher must change her attitude from abstract situations of theoretical ideas to active action in the real space of the classroom. As a result, the expert teacher will be able to rely on her own experiences in real-life classroom situations and be able to plan as she grows in the skill development phase instead of abstract principles.

Plato has identified Meno’s paradox as one of the most important theoretical challenges to learning. Meno’s paradox is that research and learning about what one does not know is impossible and about what one knows is useless. To solve this paradox, Plato proposed the Theory of Recollection. According to this theory, learning is the recollection of pre-existing knowledge that the human soul has forgotten in mixing with the body. Augustine does not find the Theory of Recollection convincing. Of course, the relationship between Augustine’s position and Plato’s view that knowledge is a recollection is very vague. According to Augustine, learning is not simply the mere receipt of information, but the ability to recall what we already know. Contrary to the early days of his intellectual life, Augustine believes that the example of Socrates’ question and answer with a slave cannot show the correctness of the Theory of Recollection. Augustine’s reflections on the book of The Confessions also show that remembrance involves the a priori existence of the soul. But in the second half of his intellectual life, Augustine believes that divine light brings rational things to the mind and causes them to be known without the need for innate knowledge or the pre-existence of the soul in another world. Some commentators believe that the main reason for this approach is the difficulty of accepting the past life of the soul as the main component of the Theory of Recollection. But there is no consensus among them on the timing and quality of Augustine’s change of approach. According to Gilson, Augustine never categorically disproved the notion that the soul existed before the body, and never explicitly referred to where the soul existed before the body. According to Teske, in the second period of his intellectual life, Augustine retreated from the Theory of Recollection as he had put it in his earlier writings. From O’Daly’s point of view, nowhere in Augustine’s writings can one find an explicit comment on the past life of the soul. The research question is whether the subject of the pre-existence of the soul is the only way to understand Augustine’s position on the Theory of Recollection? In other words, is the only way to get closer to an optimal understanding of Augustine’s change of epistemological approach, to take another ontological position among other opinions? The research claims that the reading of Augustine’s philosophy of language and semiotics opens a new entrance to the theory of divine enlightenment as a novel solution to the Meno paradox. In fact, instead of ontologically, the focus of Augustine’s discussion is on the discussion of language and its ability to convey meaning, real teaching, and learning. According to this linguistic approach, nothing can be learned through words and questions and answers. Therefore, unlike Plato, he concludes that learning is not the same as recollection, but the understanding of knowledge and realities of the outside world is done with the help of the light of the inner teacher, God. Augustine called this thesis divine enlightenment. The purpose of this study is to analyze and explain this claim by emphasizing the treatise on Augustine’s “The Teacher”. In this treatise, he talks about the nature of language and its role in teaching and learning. In this treatise, he emphasizes that words are insufficient to transmit our thoughts and ideas to another, and therefore, the mind reaches the level of enlightenment and understanding of the world with the knowledge it has received from its inner teacher. As a result, enlightenment of the mind by God provides the best explanation for the Theory of Recollection

The present paper aims to evaluate Augustine's view of education and its affinities with language in teacher talk. It accomplishes its aim by proposing three teaching models based on recollection, ostension, and illumination. Adopting a descriptive-inferential research method, the article first describes Augustine's view on the role of language and word in education and then discusses its implications for the method of teaching. According to Augustine, education, in its normal sense, begins with a focus on the use of words as indicators of reality, but, in later stages, it has to move from the verbal signs to the reality behind them as the primary purpose of teaching. The study shows that, based on Augustine's view in the illumination model, teaching and learning occur not through language but through internal understanding and some kind of insight and illumination. In fact, from Augustine's point of view,

The rules are components of our biological experiences that shape all social institutions and human activities, including education. When we invite others to follow the rules, there is always a presupposition in our mind that we and others have a common and clear concept of the rules. Wittgenstein believes that one can be trained to follow the rules. But he puts forward an important paradox about the rule of law, according to which one cannot speak of a conformity or non-compliance with the rule. The logical dimensions of this paradox have attracted the attention of educational philosophers. Following the rules of education in the school and classroom space is one of the most prominent examples of compliance with the rules. But do we have enough reasons to persuade our children and students to follow the rules? The two views of rationalist and authoritarian are among the most important approaches in the area of education to the question of rule-following. Relying on Wittgenstein’s context-based approach to escaping the paradox, this paper claims that the best way to understand the category of rule-following is to form a tacit agreement between the community and educational environments, which can only be expressed in practice without being expressible.

Wittgenstein begins the important work of his later period of thought, Philosophical Investigations, by critiquing Augustine's view of language. He goes on to show that Augustine's theory is based on a limited understanding and, in his words, an element of language that has limited it to the realm of communication and imagery. He also acknowledges Augustine's remarks as a way of ostensive teaching for language learning and has criticized this view. In this study, inferential qualitative method and using one of Augustine's completely specialized and philosophical works on the category of language and its relation to teaching, Teacher dialogue, has been shown that Wittgenstein's critiques of the picture theory of language, the criterion of meaning of language, and the theory of ostensive teaching and definition are, though not entirely, largely based on a limited understanding of Augustine's linguistic positions. Thus, the findings of the study suggest that Wittgenstein's criticism of Augustine's view of the narrative of his work was limited to the Confession book and since this autobiographical work is written more for the general audience and Augustine's aim was not to pose complicated and complex language issues and philosophize about them, Wittgenstein's understanding of the geography of Augustine's thought is strongly in doubt.

According to Chomsky's view, the main part of our linguistic knowledge is genetically determined. Therefore, language is inherent and this unknowing or tacit knowledge lies at the foundation of our ability to speak. The purpose of this article is to analyze the nature of tacit language in Chomsky's philosophy. This research is based on a qualitative research approach and conceptual analysis method to study the concept of tacit language and its relation with other main components of Chomsky's attitude toward language including linguistic competence, generative linguistics, universal grammar and argument of stimulus poverty. According to the three main critiques of tacit linguistic knowledge, tacit linguistic ability, and tacit linguistic rule, the tacit access to the reservoir of linguistic rules in the philosophy of Chomsky is not well explained and it is not empirically verifiable. Therefore, when this knowledge is valid, it is based on a kind of explicit language knowledge of grammar and rules which are expressed in the form of a statement and can be recognized and verified by the user of the language.

In medical education, the exclusive role of explicit knowledge has been emphasized, and tacit knowledge has been driven to the irrational, even mysterious, sphere of thought. The issue is why physicians and policy makers in the field of health and medicine, based on a long tradition, regard the components of tacit knowledge as unpleasant and unfamiliar. In their view, contrary to explicit thinking, the concepts of this type of knowledge are obscure or unobtrusive.

Evaluation of an alternative model for clinical diagnosis has important implications and results in medical education. This study demonstrates the disadvantages of the conventional model in explicit knowledge-based medical education that has no place in physicians' tacit knowledge. By analyzing the tacit knowledge components, including observation, training and narrative, an alternative model of tacit education model in medicine is proposed.

The dominant approach to this research is qualitative. In this research, conceptual analysis method has been used. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the concept of medical education as an implicit knowledge gate. In this method, the concepts used in a new structure are analyzed and redefined.

The tacit teaching model is a suitable method for moderating reductive and quantitative approaches in medicine. This type of attitude derived from tacit knowledge should consider motives, beliefs, aspirations and personal connections as the main and tacit basis of the medical education system.

The main purpose of this study is to examine the implications of tacit knowledge in the field of teaching and learning. The argument is that tacit knowledge cannot be described explicitly in the form of propositions. Tacit teaching and learning is based on factors such as personal experience, relation to text, and subjectivity of knowledge than being dominated by scientific objectivity and rationalism on a series of fixed and predetermined rules and principles. In this research, conceptual analysis method with the aim of clarification was used through the analysis of the concepts of teaching and tacit learning. In this method, the concepts used in a new structure are analyzed and redefined. The results of this research are that belief in the existence of a tacit and implicit dimension of knowledge can lead to a new attitude in the education system. Therefore, the purpose of learning and teaching in the tacit approach is not the transfer of knowledge but the discovery and creation of knowledge in the close relationship between the teacher and the student

The traditional approach to education advocates a dichotomy between vocational training and academic education. Some scholars contend that the knowledge which resides in minds of individuals is more valuable than hands-on skills, whereas their opponents argue that academic education incorporates abstract concepts which are of little practical use. In the present article, an attempt is made to scrutinize liberal education and vocationalism. The results indicate that the two worlds of practical and conceptual endeavors are less distant than they may seem, and these simplistic views of education and training are the result of considering education and training as polar extremes. At one end of the continuum is devaluing vocational training and its exclusion from tertiary education; at the other end is pure vocationalism with no development of the mind. Accordingly, the proposed approach in this paper is a synthetic one which favors integration of practical and theoretical components in any type of education, prioritizes theoretical knowledge, and supports incorporating more academic content in vocational courses.

Gilbert Ryle distinguished between knowing that and knowing how. Prefer to believe that either of these two forms of knowledge than others, radical intellectualism or anti-intellectualism has shaped. This article aims to analyze and critique of radical intellectualism and anti-intellectualism attitude and suggest new model is as moderate intellectualism. The method used in this paper is Ryle's analysis of ordinary language. In order to illustrate this, the concept of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism in the relationship between knowing that and knowing how on the one hand and knowing how and abilities on the other hand has been dealt. In moderate intellectualism pattern propositional knowledge independent of practical knowledge, and ability is not necessarily require a knowing how. This new scheme to distinguish between two types of knowledge and at the same time believe to the fundamental role of knowing that to achieve s appropriate knowing how. In this approach, knowing that is implicit and gradual in shaping the knowing how.

In his discussions about aesthetics, Hume seeks for a key to the controversial issue of passion. He thinks things are not fine-looking in themselves, rather the mind which considers the objects creates the beauty. Apparently, he raises a paradoxical claim. On the one hand, beauty is regarded something mental and completely subjective arisen from feelings, but on the other hand not only he suggests that we can judge about a work of art assessing its aesthetic value but also we can prefer one aesthetic judgment over another which implies an evidence of objective criteria on artistic evaluation. It is taken for granted by Hume that the intersubjectivity of aesthetic perception gives rise to achieving a collective agreement about it. Embracing the importance of aesthetic experience, nonetheless, Hume puts emphasis on the role of critics, those with some characteristics whose judgments may turn into the criterion for taste which is not of the affection category, but something real. In this paper, the author attempts to survey Hume’s emphasis on the role of critics as the reference standards for different tastes of individuals.