محسن رشیدی باغی

Managers with accounting competence have more skills in performing and concealing misstatement because they have experience in the field of auditing as a manager or partner. The purpose of this article is to examine the role of managers' accounting competence, compensation, and aggressive reporting financial statements restatement.The data of the companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 2010 to 2022 have been extracted and the combined data regression and logit models has been used to test the research hypothesisThe results of hypothesis that show the effect of surplus compensation on financial statements restatement (audit fee) is confirmed (rejected). The hypothesis states that the accounting competence of managers has no significant effect on the financial statements restatement (audit fees). The results of the study that managers' accounting competence has a significant impact on the relationship between surplus compensation and financial statements restatement (audit fee) are confirmed. Finally, the results of the hypothesis indicate that the aggressive approach of financial reporting leads to a change in the relationship between the interactive effect of accounting competence and the excess compensation with financial statements restatement (audit fees).Based on the research findings, the restatement of financial statements in firms with managers motivated to receive surplus rewards is high. Auditors also increase audit fees in order to control managers' opportunistic behaviors and reduce the level of estimated risk.

Investors use the growth index to stabilize their expectations of stock returns. In addition, uncertainty based on the type of news and business situation has an asymmetric effect on stock returns. In this paper, the aim is to investigate the role of growth indicators and environmental uncertainty in the relationship between the quality of accounting information and expected fluctuations in returns. For this purpose, data related to 120 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange for the period 1389 to 1398 extracted and the regression model of composite data used to test research hypotheses. The results indicate that increasing the quality of accounting information leads to reducing the expected volatility of returns. In addition, the growth of the company using the Q- Tobin index has a significant effect on adjusting the relationship between the quality of accounting information and the expected return on volatility. Finally, the results show that environmental uncertainty has a negative and significant effect on adjusting the relationship between the quality of accounting information and fluctuations in expected returns.

The opportunistic nature of managers in order to receive rewards may lead to manipulation of financial statements. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of comparability of financial statements on the relationship between the quality of financial reporting and the compensation paid to managers. In order to investigate the subject, data related to companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange for the period 1385 to 1397 have been extracted and the combined data regression model has been used to test research hypotheses. Findings indicate that the ability to compare financial statements has a significant effect on remuneration paid to managers. The second hypothesis of the research is that the ability to compare financial statements has a significant effect on the relationship between the quality of financial reporting and the remuneration paid to managers. According to the research findings, it can be said that the comparability of financial statements leads to a reduction in information acquisition costs. Also, the comparability of financial statements reduces the opportunity for managers to manipulate profit and reduce the dispersion of their forecasts.

Contractual conditions violations leads to the transmission of bad news due to weaknesses in performance of obligations and credit status of creditors can be a factor in modifying it. The purpose of this paper is to investigate contractual obligations violations, risk aversion of managers, and remuneration based on credit status.

The data of the companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 2007 to 2018 have been extracted and the combined data regression model has been used to test the research hypothesis.

The results of the first and second hypotheses of the research indicate that CEO compensation and the riskiness of the managers have been materially affected by contractual obligations violations. The third hypothesis of the research suggests that credit status has a significant effect on the relationship between contractual obligations violations and CEO compensation. Finally, the results indicate that credit status has a significant effect on the relationship between contractual obligations and manager risk appetite. It should be noted that the third and fourth hypotheses are only confirmed by the credit relations and rejected by the credit rating.

This paper aims to examine dividend smoothing based on financial flexibility and capital structure adjustment.

In this study, the data of 120 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period 2009 to 2016 were collected, and the pooled regression model was used to test the research hypotheses.

Findings verified the first and second hypotheses of the research. In other words, the results of the first hypothesis indicated that financial flexibility leads to dividends smoothing. The results of the second hypothesis showed significant relationship between capital structure adjustment and dividend smoothing. Finally, the results of the third hypothesis indicated that capital structure adjustment does not have significant effect on the interaction between financial flexibility and dividend smoothing.

According to the research findings, there is a tendency to change the method of dividend payments as a result of lack of transparency in the financial status and unfavorable capital structure, so that managers limit changes in dividends to limit the risk of non-transparency.

Agency problems arise as a result of the conflict of interests between managers and shareholders. Auditing is considered as an effective way to limit the power of managers in contractual relationships. The basis of this paper is examining the role of funding constraints in changing the interactive effect between managers’ over-confidence and auditing fees.
The data of the companies, listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange for the period 2006 to 2016, have been extracted and the combined data regression model has been used to test the research hypotheses.
The results indicate that excessive self-confidence and financial constraints lead to changes in audit fees. Also, the results indicate that financing constraints have a significant effect on the joint interaction of management`s over-confidence and the audit fees.

Investors seek private information in order to cover the risks of lack of transparency of information. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of audit quality in adjusting the distribution of information and limiting the availability of latent information.

The subject of the study was based on the regression model of the combined data. During the period of 2009 to 2018, the data of the companies accepted in the Tehran Stock Exchange were collected and used to test the research hypotheses.

The results of the research indicate confirmation of the first and fourth hypotheses of the research. In other words, the research results indicate that the quality of accounting information leads to a change in the pricing of information asymmetry, but audit quality does not change the price of information asymmetry. The third hypothesis of the research also suggests the ineffectiveness of audit quality on the fluctuation of the returns from private information. Also, the results of the fourth hypothesis indicate that, when changing the level of information quality of accounting information, the fluctuation in the return on private information is also changed so that with the change in the quality of accruals, the return on the investor also fluctuates and changes.

According to the results of the research, it can be stated that even in the presence of high information asymmetry, information quality can be an effective measure to reduce the costs of information asymmetry. In other words, increasing the quality of information leads to more optimal pricing and lower cost of capital.

Changes in the value of information asymmetry lead to a recognition of the risks and opportunities associated with changes in the behavioral factors of the investors and the opportunity to improve performance, reduce risk or delay the negative outcomes of investment (due to weaknesses in the information quality).

  Flow of information is a key parameter in an economic activity and acts as a crucial factor in the emergence, stability and efficiency of capital markets. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of the comparability and ineffectiveness of the market on the value of information and changes in the distribution of accounting information. For this purpose, the data of the firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 2006 to 2016 were extracted and the regression model of the pooled data was used to test the research hypothesis. The results of the research show that information asymmetry, comparability and market inefficiency have a significant effect on the expected returns (cost of capital) of investors. On the other hand, the interactive effects of comparability and imperfect market on the relationship between information asymmetry and cost of capital have been confirmed. Finally, the results of the research show that information asymmetry is a function of comparability and that the capital cost resulting from information asymmetry fluctuate and varies at different levels of comparability. Information asymmetry and market inefficiency can increase the firm's cost of capital, as less informed traders recognize that they are in a bad state of information and therefore maintain fewer assets within the market. The comparability along with creating high-quality information reduces the overall ambiguity and thus reduces the benefits that particular investors receive from private information about the company.

Information flow is a key parameter in an economic activity and acts as a key factor in the emergence, stability and efficiency of capital markets. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of disclosure quality on the pricing of information and changes in the quality of accounting information. For this purpose, the data of the companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 1383 to 1395 were extracted and the combined data regression model was used to test the research hypotheses. The results of the research show that information quality pricing is a function of disclosure quality criteria and the cost of capital arising from information quality fluctuates and changes in different levels of disclosure. Also, the quality of information environment has a significant effect on the expected returns of investors, but when the level of disclosure quality changes, information quality also changes and affects the cost of capital so that by changing the interactive level of disclosure quality and the quality of the information environment, by changing the level of the interactive effect of the disclosure quality and the information environment, the cost of capital imposed on the company also fluctuates and changes.

The excessive self-esteem of managers leads to postponing bad news due to weaknesses in performance, and conservatism can be a factor in modifying it. In this paper, the purpose is to examine the role of accounting conservatism in limiting the functional outcomes results from overconfidence managers.

The data of the companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 2005 to 2017 has been extracted and the combined data regression model has been used to test the research hypotheses.

The results of the first hypothesis of the research, based on the significant and interactive effect of conservatism and overconfidence on company's performance, are approved. Also, the second hypothesis of the research indicates that environmental uncertainty has a significant effect on the overall interaction of overconfidence managers and accounting conservatism on future performance. Finally, the results indicate that financing constraints have a significant effect on the overall interaction of overconfidence managers and accounting conservatism on future performance.

The results of the research indicate that business units with over-confident managers and conservative practices in accounting have a favorable future performance. Conservatism controls the managerial behaviors and it leads to improved performance, and the presence of funding constraints and environmental uncertainty due to fluctuation in the results lead to a reduction in management's optimism.

The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of Khoms payment on earnings quality of mines in Tehran Stock Exchange. The most common criteria of earnings quality include: earnings stability, forecast ability of earnings and reliability of earnings. In this study, the information about 100 stock companies during the period of 1384-1393, based on the combined data, was analyzed. Results showed that there is a significant positive relationship between earnings stability and Khoms payment. Also, the results of this research indicated a significant effect of Khoms on earnings forecastability due to the fixed rate of Khoms and that it is based on actual events. Results, likewise, showed increase of earnings reliability as a result of Khoms payment, because it is proportionate with investors’ utility.

The aim of this study is to investigate the relation between audit fees and Board compensation. The sample includes 72 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during the period from 2005 to 2009, which their shares are actively traded in the Exchange. The results indicate a positive relation between the audit fee and compensation of the Board. With the increase in compensation of directors, their incentives to manage earnings will be greater and sine it requires a higher quality audit, payment of fee will be higher.

The purpose of this study is review of cross sectional variation in cash flow asymmetric timeliness and its effect on conditional conservatism. In this study data from 120 firms in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period between the years 1384 to 1390 were examined. Regression model that used in this research is panel data method with fixed effects approach. The most common measure of conditional conservatism in accounting is asymmetry Timeliness in recognizing Profits and losses. Nevertheless، this measure combines both asymmetry timeliness of accruals and cash flows from operation. With respect to this that asymmetry timeliness of operating cash flow is not belong to the domain of profits and losses، Cause variation in the test of conservative. In this research and with respect to good and bad news show that asymmetry timeliness of operating cash flow cross sectionally is different with lifecycle variable of company (Size، age، growth and capital expenditure). The results show that conservatism is higher in the early stages of the company lifecycle.

According to agency theory, auditing plays an important role in leading opportunistic behaviors of managers. In this research, we examined the audit quality including size of audit enterprise and how they influence the relationship between free cash flow and the quality of financial reporting. Therefore, Tehran Stock Exchange data were extracted for the period of 1386 to 1392 and the hypotheses were tested with a regression model. The results show that there is a significant negative relationship between the quality of auditing, free cash flow and the quality of financial reporting. Also, the result showed that the relationship between free cash flow and the quality of financial reporting is more meaningful and negative when CPA firm size increases. Managers willing to invest free cash flows in projects with personal gain did not follow the foreseen procedures and even ignored negative net present value projects. Total investment of some activities may have a positive ROI, but ROI is less than the cost of capital.

As an important course of corporate value creation, investment is deeply subject to information asymmetry and agency problems. What’s commonly believed is that information asymmetry adds to market friction and exerts influence on the cost of external financing, easily leading to insufficient investment for companies under liquidity constraint. On the one hand, listed companies are currently struggling against, due to agency problems, widespread over investment and serious abusive use of free cash flow and on the other hand, obvious financing constraints and severe shortage in investment attributable to information asymmetry. Both over investment and insufficient investment belong to inefficient investment behaviors which will cause tremendous losses to investors and waste of social resources (Xu et al, 2013). Also known as the cautious principle or the prudence principle, conservatism represents a prudent reaction to future uncertainties, serving as one of the most critical principles employed both by international accounting standards and China’s accounting standards, as well as a significant feature and practice of financial statements. Stemming from contract needs, accounting conservatism is clearly affected by institutional factors and managers’ motives (Watts, 2003). We believe the functions of accounting conservatism, market signaling and internal government, exert varying effects, according to different environment and conditions, on investment decision-making. When internal capital proves insufficient for current needs of investment and a firm is in need of external financing, the role of accounting conservatism as a market signaler dominates. However, accounting conservatism predominantly plays an internal governance role when internal capital is enough for investment, rooting out the need for external funding. Through internal governance, conservatism suppresses over investment and reduces agency cost, which ultimately shrinks firm investment. Research Hypothesis 1.When a company needs external financing because its internal capital cannot meet the need of investment, conservatism functions to advance investment by removing information asymmetry and when external financing is unnecessary with thanks to sufficient internal capital, conservatism works to suppress the level of investment through reducing agency cost. 2. The promoting or suppressing effect of conservatism on investment weakens as agency and information problems become worse. Specifically, with other conditions fixed, enterprises whose ultimate controller is local governments or individuals react less obviously to the promoting or suppressing effect of conservatism on investment compared with other enterprises. The data related to the companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 1384 to 1390 were extracted and the combination regression model was used to test the hypotheses. 1384-1390 data of all companies listed at Tehran Stock Exchange before 1384 is our research samples. Samples have undergone the following treatment in order to find out the influence of abnormal data and ensure company homogeneity and data effectiveness. (1) Listed financial companies are removed (2) Companies with absent audit report or with “reserved opinion”, “reservation with explanatory notes” or “disclaimer of opinion” are removed (3) Some special abnormal samples are also removed, such as listed companies with negative or close to zero expenditure on investment and those with negative net assets (4) Companies with incomplete seven-year data are also removed. The remaining are 120 companies with 840 sample observation values. The results show that there is a significant relationship between accounting conservatism and investment efficiency in both larger and smaller than the net worth of internal capital but, relationship between accounting conservatism and investment efficiency with respect to the level of institutional ownership and managerial ownership has not been confirmed. Discussion and With the 840 samples of the 120 companies listed at Tehran Stock Exchange from 1384 to 1390 as its object, this paper studied the relationship between investment and accounting conservatism. We have argued that the influence of conservatism on investment depends on whether external funds are needed. When investment exceeds the net worth of internal capital and external financing is needed, there is a positive correlation between investment and conservatism, indicating the promoting effect of conservatism on investment; but in this research, we can observe the negative correlation between investment and conservatism because of low level of specialty knowledge in our managers. When investment is smaller than the net worth of internal capital and no external funds are needed, however, there emerges a negative correlation between investment and conservatism, indicating the suppressing effect of conservatism on investment. This conclusion is true for the analysis of both total samples and individual samples. Moreover, we’ve found that the degree of seriousness of information and agency problems faced by a company, to some extent, affect the relationship between investment and conservatism and such relationship is weakened when the ultimate ownership is either institutional or managerial. When the ultimate ownership is an institutional, there are more information problems resulting from multiple-agency and lack of strict restrictions and the inadequate supervision from major shareholders over the management adds to the risk of over investment. When the ultimate ownership is managerial, there emerge the problems of lack of restrict and consummate governance mechanism and strong personal pursuit of interest, leading to the implementation of radical accounting policies and ultimately more information and agency problems. Therefore, companies of both kinds face serious agency and information problems, greatly weakening the advancing effect of conservatism on investment as when external capital is needed and the suppressing effect of conservatism on investment as when external is not needed.

Agency problems were created between managers and shareholders as a result of conflict of interest. Auditing is an efficient way to limit the authority of the directors in contractual relationship. In this paper، we investigate fluctuations and changes of short term and long term audit fees. For this purpose، the data of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange for the periods 2007 to 2012 were extracted. To test the hypotheses، the cross-sectional regression of the combined data was used. The results show that the stickiness of audit fees not follow a clear trend. In other words، it will be changed in a multi-year period and in short periods of time (usually annually) changes in the fee will not be visible. Also، the results show that the audit firm will not change their fee in the early year but، in subsequent years، adjust their fees according to the understanding of the client. Finally، the results indicate that auditor change resulted in audit fees closer to the standard model.

Companies looking to increase the quality and effectiveness of smoothing procedures payout information. In this paper, the influence of historical earnings and dividend patterns of information content at lower incomes, profits and dividends, has been studied. The results of this study suggest that managers tend to have a uniform policy of historical dividend payments, however, are not reluctant to lower profits and dividends, so that this reluctance is rooted in the politics of the past payment. When companies are faced with a loss or reduction of earnings, long-term historical patterns of margins and profit: (1) Information on dividends, regardless of future profits will strengthen and (2) increase the role of legal identification of margins in decision-making relating to dividend policy.