فهرست مطالب محمددهقان منشادی

Despite the emphasis on the importance of partnership contracts in the economic literature, especially Islamic economics, the share of these contracts in the total facilities of the Iranian banking system has decreased in recent years. This indicates the existence of fundamental problems in the implementation of these contracts. Problems that have caused the central bank of Iran to recommend that the banking system turn to non-participatory contracts. Due to the importance of using real participation in the allocation of financial resources, this study with analytical-descriptive method and using the provisions of a sample of existing lawsuits in this field and reviewing existing studies, examines the problems of using partnership contracts in the banking system and Has provided the institutional innovations needed to address them in Iran. In this regard, the existing problems in arranging partnership contracts in the Iran banking system have been identified. The results show that financial dominance management, increasing the central bank's authority in supervision, organizing the customer credit rating system and the relationship between the bank and the firm, developing investment banking, using the capacity of official judicial experts, reducing the risk of paying facilities, updating the law on interest-free banking. Creating unity of procedure in the format of arranging contracts and calculations related to facilities, improving the staff training system and creating diversity in bank documents have been introduced as the most important institutional innovations needed to solve the existing problems.So, it is suggested that these institutional innovations be seriously included in the agenda of banking network managers.

In the economic literature, institutional quality and the factors affecting its changes, have become one of the important issues in economic growth of countries.One of theis factors in oil exporting countries such as Iran is oil revenues and shocks. Although in existing studies the effect of oil shocks on the destruction of Iranchr(chr('39')39chr('39'))s institutional quality has been accepted, few studies have focused on policy-making in controlling institutional destruction of oil shocks. Hence, this study with a review of the literature, attempts to introduce Institutional innovation for control the institutional destruction of oil shocks in Iran. In this regard, the principles of macroeconomic stability, risk management, good governance and financial discipline have been considered. The results of the study indicate that applying specific financial rules, sufficient central bank independence Plus reforming the budget structure to reduce the direct dependence on oil revenues via reforming the tax system, expanding the debt market and productivity of government assets, reform the national development fund structure, establishing a operational budgeting system, reform of subsidized payment system and modify the structure of pension funds  are the most important institutional innovations for control the institutional destruction of oil shocks in Iran. The findings may imply important policy implications for authorities, so it is suggested that these institutional reforms be seriously pursued.

The interaction between institutional quality and the mechanism of oil shock diffusion might have a significant effect on macroeconomic dynamics in an oil-exporting country. The literature lacks a formal model to address the role of institutional quality in the economic performance of an oil-rich developing economy. Using a new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework, this study develops a model to investigate the response of macroeconomic variables to changes in institutional quality resulted from oil shocks in Iran as an important oil-exporting country. Our modeling allows us to show how institutional quality and oil revenues affect households, firms, government, and the central bank. The model is solved and calibrated for the period 1959-2017. The results indicate that the destruction of institutional quality caused by a positive oil shock prevents the Iranian economy from reaping the fruits of an increase in oil revenues. Oil revenues and their shocks by destroying the institutional quality through the expansion of rent-seeking ‎activities, increasing transaction costs of production, reducing the impact of government spending, and ‎diverting monetary and fiscal policies from the targets result in negative effects on Iranchr('39')s non-oil ‎production in the long run.‎ To reduce the destructive effects of oil shocks on institutional quality in the Iranian economy, we suggest the policymakers in Iran reduce the dependency of the government budget on oil revenues.