موسی ملایری

English Today in parallel with the growth of technology we are witnessing the danger of the earth due to human incorrect exposure to it, so that the environment and accordingly, the nature of Iran has been involved in an uninteresting crisis, which is the result of inappropriate human behavior against nature this crisis has caused concerns among thinkers, for the continuation of human life And he has been compelled to think about the effects and consequences of his life and his excessive interference in nature, so many people have sought to solve the environmental crisis He is God who created you from the earth and chose you to build a mansion. God has not created man as a weed, but his creation is purposeful because he has made man his successor to benefit from the abundant resources of nature with his wisdom, but does not waste God has invited man to think about nature and ask him to protect the nature and prosperity of the earth, the crisis of the natural environment, the external manifestation of the crisis in the soul of a person who, because of the sky because of the earth, is now on the verge of destruction of the earth itself.

Gazali’s perspectives on gnosis and knowledge are so important, because he has known much different knowledge in his era. In this paper, the difference between revealed gnosis, as a particular knowledge that belongs to the Prophets and human knowledge specifically the terrestrial world, has been explained. He has divided the sciences based on the object of knowledge, and its method, and aims to show that revelation is the most transcendent one. He believed that the revelation can be called a gnosis. The value of revealed gnosis has two aspects: firstly, it is a piece of certain knowledge, and second, without it achieving felicity can’t be possible. Never the other sciences can replace it but he has not wanted to humiliate the other sciences. He has applied philosophical and mystical notions to explain the revelation, but has explicitly expressed the revealed gnosis can’t be considered the same as another knowledge.

Since the onset of intellectual development, belief and faith have played a natural part in human institutions, either rightly and intentionally or subconsciously and by imitation. The rise of schools, faiths, and other religions has been attributed to this. The masses of people frequently form their beliefs based on mindless imitation, while the elites, who truly serve as the leaders of various masses, frequently adapt and convey their opinions based on knowledge and research. The issue of reason, to which most philosophers and intellectuals have attempted to find a solution, is unquestionably one of the fundamental problems of the human mind. One of the Islamic philosophers, Sadr al- Mutalahin Shirazi, also known by the moniker Mullah Sadra, was able to synthesize the philosophy of the Masha'i and the Ishraqis and adapt it to Islamic teachings in a way that resolved the fundamental issues that the sages of the Masha'i and the Ishragi were facing. Mulla Sadra integrated the three approaches of self-improvement, revelation, and reason. This strategy had a significant part in developing religious knowledge and philosophical ideas. The current study uses a descriptive-analytical approach to analyze Mulla Sadra's theories and establish the role and levels of reason in transcendental knowledge.

"Is this world moving towards a goal or an end, or is it abandoned and without a clear destination?" This question has always been one of the main problems of humans from the beginning of facing the natural world. Today, the root of many fundamental differences in cosmology, anthropology, and even legal and moral systems is the difference in the purposefulness or purposelessness of man and the general system of nature. In this article, first, the philosophical roots of the difference in the purposefulness of creation between Muslim sages and Western philosophers are examined and then, the arguments of those who believe in purposefulness based on its imaginary and affirmative principles are calculated and formulated in a disciplined manner and then the effects of negation of purposefulness of creation are studied in the challenges posed to the contemporary Western man in several important areas such as family crisis, environmental crisis, identity crisis and regulation of legal systems. The main research question in this article addresses the arguments of those who believe in the purposefulness of nature and the basis of such arguments as well as the practical effects of denial it on the contemporary man, family and society.

One of the brightest points of view of Muslim scholars is their reflection on the criterion for distinguishing sciences. The popular opinion is that the purpose and subject as a criteria have been the tools for distinguishing between two or more sciences. This article answers two central questions in this regard. One is whether the criteria used by scholars to differentiate between sciences have an ontological origin or it had abstract origin. Another question is whether the answer to this question will have a significant effect on the philosophical issues. Studies of this article will shed light on three issues: First, scholars have used the end, not only as a criterion for distinguishing between two or more sciences, but also as a criterion for the large classification of sciences (theoretical and practical). Second, the end of all knowledge is not merely a  non- factual value, but an existential end. Third, if the said end is existential and objective, the distinction between the various forms of wisdom is also objective and real, and this means that none of these sciences can play another role. One of the important results of the ontological approach in the division of sciences, especially in practical wisdom, is that the separation of home management from civil politics is a real separation and the rules and requirements of these two fields cannot be considered in another field. The virtues and perfections of the soul, the categories in society (civic wisdom), the categories in individual life (morality), and the categories in the family (home wisdom) can be studied. Thus, as much as individuality and individual life are genuine, family and community are also original, and this is contrary to the opinion of many late individualist thinkers.

Most Muslim philosophers – including the Peripatetics, Illuminationists, and Sadrians – have rejected the possibility of change and motion in immaterial things based on their own principles. However, during the last two decades, some authorities in the field of philosophy have opposed this idea and argued for the possibility of motion and change in immaterial thing. This theory has attracted the attention of a number of academic centers, and some papers and books have been written on this subject. The proponents of this view have provided some arguments in its favor, and its opponents have rejected them. Following an analytic approach, this paper defends the theory of the existence of motion in immaterial things at two stages. Initially, the authors provide a response to the criticism targeting the main argument of this theory and defend its legitimacy; secondly, through resorting to the createdness of the soul, they present a new argument in its favor. Finally, they conclude that the mentioned theory is acceptable in the realm of rationality and reasoning and is superior to its counter-theory.

Ibn Sina believes in a metaphysical and ontological view between existence and the creator of possibilities - or his transcendence -. While creatures are changeable, and what is changeable and arises from non-existence cannot be the cause of its existence, then the cause of its existence is an absolute and eternal being. He thinks of the world as follows: The world was created out of nothing and with time. This means that time came into being with creation. Augustine and Ibn Sina both believed in the creation of the world by God. Ibn Sina proves time through motion. But in his early research, Augustine tried to define time in terms of motion, but in later theories rejected the definition of motion by time. Ibn Sina considers the category of motion to be precisely related to the concepts of power and action, and by considering the category of motion, he divides the material world into two worlds, the sub-moon and the supermoon. In Augustine's view, the one true God is made up of three persons under the headings: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Augustine believes that God created the world from formless matter, and that matter was created from non-existence.

This study is intended to provide an answer to the following questions: Does induction generate certain knowledge or tentative conclusions? Is perfect induction possible or impossible? If it is impossible, could the addition of a supplement to imperfect induction result in certain and absolute judgments? In order to provide some answers to the raised questions, the writer has explored the historical development of the theory of induction and then discussed the theory adopted in this paper. This theory has not undergone many fluctuations in the history of Muslim thinkers’ logical thoughts and can be studied in three historical phases or periods. In the first phase, the greatest player of which was Fārābī and, more than him, Ibn Sīnā, induction was divided into perfect and imperfect types. At the same time, Fārābī explicitly stated that perfect induction is impossible and emphasized that imperfect induction results in uncertain conclusions. In order to compensate for the defects of induction, Ibn Sīnā demonstrated how the conclusions of an imperfect induction can be promoted to the level of an empirical judgment through using a compound syllogism and benefitting from the chance principle so that it would turn into an ensuring and certain conclusion. The main player of the second period is Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. He maintained that imperfect induction does not yield certain results, and what has been interpreted as empirical judgment and placed within the category of certainties and even axioms is not anything more than an analogy. The third phase is characterized by the efforts and ideas of Muhammad Baqir Sadr, who believed that, although imperfect induction results in certain conclusions, the mentioned certainty, in contrast to Ibn Sīnā’s view, does not result from the mediation of a compound syllogism and the chance principle. He, rather, acknowledged that the certainty of inductive judgments arises from a specific feature of human intellect which persuades it to ignore fewer possible instances in the face of numerous possible ones. He calls this kind of certainty subjective certainty. The present paper, after reporting and analyzing the three- fold periods, demonstrates that the only defensible and justifiable standpoint regarding the theory of induction belongs to Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and concludes that induction, whether by itself or with the help of a syllogism, yields nothing more than a tentative conclusion.

The supreme place of the issue of the final cause is no secret to the people of thought. This topic is so important that some great figures, such as Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, have considered it as the most important component of wisdom. At the same time, there are some salient differences in this regard among its advocates and opponents. In Islamic philosophy, the problem of final cause has been mainly tackled by responding to the advanced criticisms while, in contemporary Western philosophy, the discussion of this topic is considered to be unimportant and superfluous. Rarely ever have either Islamic or Aristotelian philosophers dealt with the fundamental reasons and roots of the confirmation or rejection of the final cause; however, no consensus will be arrived at regarding superstructures without first analyzing the basic ideas. Here, through an analytic study of the conceptual and assertoric bases of the final cause, the authors have tried to investigate and evaluate the main roots of the conflicts over this problem in order to facilitate the judgment of superstructures. In doing so, they have focused on such concepts as the relationship between efficient and final causes, origin of motion, potency and predisposition, and essentialism and archetype.

Knowing sciences or the philosophy of sciences developed by Muslim philosophers has had many different aspects. The most important of which is the problem of "the more particular accidents"or" accidents by the more particular". Although such difficulty had been just one of the problems for knowing science for the predecessors, it has been gradually changed to the most important problem and then to the only problem for some. The product and result of this problem is that based on rules for knowing science, it is not authorized in sciences to discuss about the attributes and accidents which are predicated on subject through a medium. At the same time, we see that in many sciences, such advice is not observed, and mostly in various sciences, the discussion involves the modes and accidents specific to all kinds of subjects of sciences, all of which are with mediums. So far as the time of Sadra, four solutions have been presented by Ibn-e Sina, Qutbe-e Razi ,Jorjani, and Mohaghegh Davaani. First we report the predecessors' solutions for solving this problem, and then we study the criticisms made by Sadra against each one of them.He believes that none of the predecessors have managed to solve the problem and all have become perplexed concerning it. Sadra maintains that the problem is originated from the intermingle of two groups of accidents, i.e.,the more particular accidents and the accidents by the more particular;so by distinguishing between them, the problem shall be settled. Stating Sadra's view, this paper treats its assessment showing that although the solution tends to open up some of the ambiguities, the difficulty in another area shall still be remained unsettled. In the last it is stated that the newer assertions of Jorjani's view,so called "the theory of convention",shall be more efficient for solving the problem.

Since Allameh Tabatabai designed firstly the theory of derivation purposing to protect the rational identity of a part of human knowledge confirming that human knowledge is not at all the result of his livelihood. Therefore this theory quickly showed its impact on the realm of moral philosophy. Recently, there are some attempts to establish philosophy of culture on the basis of this theory. This article addresses the theory of abstraction and its application in the political philosophy and global peace. Finally, it suggests that the theory provides an important basis to establish a kind of political philosophy and global peace by regarding ethics, religion, culture and language as derivative affairs. It will be able to reduce the strength and intensity of conflict on ethnic and cultural affairs and facilitate peace and stability and ethnic coexistence. All of these cannot be achieved except by a profound consideration of the epistemological nature of religion, culture and morality.

The issue of immorality or materiality of the soul, is still a challenging issue for theologians and philosophers. Philosophers believe in immortality, and some of the theologians believe in its materiality. Bring up the theory of the human’s triple dimension and studying the properties of the third domain as an ideal dimension, seeks to resolve this conflict so that, the religious texts, which refers to the materiality of the soul, do not need to any symbolic hermeneutics. Apart from immaterial “soul” and material “body” human being has “spirit”, which can be considered as a kind of state of matter, that today is called plasma, very tiny particles, pregnant, formless, and yet fluid. One of the evidences of the adaptation of the “plasma” with purgatorial immortality is the theory of movement in abstractions, which is accepted by some later philosophers. Accordingly, the ideal world cannot be considered abstract if it has the ability to change aside from the domain. Using the library method, this paper brings up the theory of existence of the energetic objects and plasma as the ideal body and then it brings some evidences from the traditions and physical and metaphysical experimental observations.

The present paper deals with the issue whether the concept of substance, can be considered as a genus and constituent of substantial species or it is an abstract and non- essential concept. Most of Muslim philosophers have defended the genus of substance, but some like Fakhr- e Razi maintain that substance is not a genus and constituent for substantial species, Mulla Sadra has advocated the substance as a genus and widely criticized the arguments which stated by the opponents. In this paper, first of all we will report the most important arguments of the opponents and then review Sadra's critics against them in detail to show that not only his criticism has not reduced the strength of its arguments, but also in many places, he has unconsciously strengthened the claims of the opponents. In the next step, two arguments supporting the genus of substance, one of them is demonstrated by Sadra and the other by Allameh Tabatabaeiare, are explained and then they put into assessment. finally, it is stated that the theory of regarding the substance as a genus has not been supported by any strong argument, whereas there are considerable arguments for denying that. As a result, we will survey that denying the genus of the substance will be led to the positive philosophical consequences, three of them will be discussed as following: a) new categorization of substances. b) removing ambiguity from substantiality of soul and the other simple things. c) eliminating the vagueness of substantiality of the Necessary being.

Al-Ghazali, as one of the greatest thinkers of the Islamic world, has proposed notable views on religious language. He has addressed the language of revelation according to ontological and epistemological bases and theological-mystical approaches. His most important work in this subject is Jawaher-al-Koran. In this book, which pertains to the period of his engagement with mysticism, al-Ghazali has comprehensively addressed the esoteric understanding of the Qur’an. Based on his notion of revelation and his theory of the conformity of different worlds, he tries to explain how and by which criteria the revelation descends, and also the way the entities of the spiritual world are represented in the mundane world. He, then, presents the way through which mystics can attain the purposes of revelation. This view which should be named the representative language of revelation theory is not similar to any of the theories of other philosophers of religion.

The present paper deals with one of the most important and complicated epistemological problems targeted by Muslim philosophers, that is, determining the referents and realm of essential accidents. The main question here is whether accidents are considered to be essential through the more particular. In this historical study, the writer examines the development of the various theories regarding this problem over three centuries (1050-1312 AH) and then reports and evaluates the solutions suggested by four of the most prominent theoreticians of this historical period. To this end, he initially explores Mulla Sadra’s solution, which is based on the necessity of distinguishing between particular accidents and accidents through the more particular. Then he discusses the view of Hossein Khwansari, who, after criticizing Mulla Sadra’s theory and acknowledging its weakness in solving the problem, presents his own theory of juristic preference and consensus in determining territories and setting boundaries between sciences. Later the writer deals with the views of Mulla Mehdi Naraqi, who accepts a part of Mulla Sadra’s theory but solves some parts of the problem using a different method. Naraqi’s method necessitates the screening of sciences and extracting some problems from the domains of related sciences. Finally, the writer focuses on the last character of this period, Mirza Habibullah Rashti. He was a capable fundamentalist who enriched this discussion more than ever before in the light of his own profound insight and increased the accuracy of the technical language used to describe the problem. Although he benefitted from the words of other thinkers, he did not accept the solution of any of the preceding philosophers in its totality. He believed that the scholars working in each field are allowed to discuss the related scientific problems within the borderlines of their own knowledge as long as no specific sciences have been devised for investigating them. This view, as explained in the body of the paper, is quite compatible with the apriori-historical approach to the development of various disciplines.

Qazi Saeed Qomi is one of the famous Islamic thinkers of Safavie era who, in his works, by the means of a philosophical, theological, mystical method and Ptolemy school, has evaluated the nature of spheres, containing the Throne and the siege. Although his words have been read in different ways, in overall, in a library research, from his point of view these two are prescience and pervasive knowledge of both earthly and divine worlds. The Throne is the symbol al-Mohit and al-Modabber, and the name of al-Rahman, the roof of heaven and the last and the most covering sphere among all the 11th spheres, a hallow spherical object with two floors, the abstract at the top and the physical at the bottom which organizes the Universe of Composition first and its edict continues to the center of the Continuous universe. Siege is also the symbol of Distinguished Existings and the name of al-Mofassel, the seat of the title Merciful, the 10th sphere, covering the starless sphere and covered by the throne, heaven stands between the siege and the throne and the hell places at the fungus of it. The theory of permeation of wisdom into Corporality (matter) and of the holiness of the Corporality are two new and also notable issues which he presents in explaining his opinions.

This article is an comparative study between Mulla Sadra and Tabatabai common approach regarding the efficiency of the causal argumentation, in the realm of philosophy. Mulla Sadra relying on the theory of simplicity of existence, and on which is simple have not essential definition and therefore no argument, found that the causal argumentation is not useful to existence recognition. Sadra based on the rule Zavatol Asbab, says that the Aposteriori Demonstration sometimes completely invalid, and sometimes with poor performance valid. He then weaken or even condemn the role of argument in the realm of philosophy. Then resign to antilogical approach..
Tabatabai based on three cognitive science major rule, first, deny the causal argumentation then existence recognition too. Then design a new argument, the argument by the public obligations, Molazemate Ammeh. This problem shows the inability of the essential logic in the realm of existential philosophy. This article denes the efficiency of the causal argumentation, but believes that, the theory of argument by the public obligations, Molazemate Ammeh, is the worthwhile discovery, which compensates for shortcomings of the essential logic.

Although the concept of the ‘Rule of Grace’ can be accurately deduced through some Qur’anic verses and traditions (Hadiths), the Mu‘tazilites among all theological denominations pioneered in its extraction, compilation and application within the context of theology. The present article discusses the attitude of Shi‘ite theology toward the above-mentioned rule within the framework of three historical periods. In the first period, including the beginning of Shi‘ite theology to the time of Khawaja Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, the mentioned rule remained more or less the same as that of its Mu‘tazilites structure, where grace was divided into two folds: Providing and Determining Grace. In the second period, i.e. from the time of al-Tūsī until the late 14th century A.H., those two kinds of divisions were reduced to one: Providing Grace. In the same era, Allameh Helli did not acknowledge the sending of the prophets and the proclamation of religious obligation as part of the instances of Grace. As a result of this position and in addition to a series of doubts denying the necessity of Divine Grace, the logical credit and validity of sending prophets was gradually weakened and lost in the perspective of certain theologians. A third group of Shi‘ite theologians, from the late 14th century up until now, have attempted for nearly five decades to overcome the mentioned problems and objections in order to recreate the validity of the rule. Thus, the present article studies and explains the details of the three periods and seeks to shed some light on relevant historical developments and transformations.

The theory of “the simplicity of the reality of existence” is one of the achievements of transcendental philosophy. Having accepted this theory, Mulla Sadra (Sadr al-Muta’allehin) infers three important epistemological (a) the reality of existence is unimaginable and unperceivable, rationally and through acquired knowledge; (b) the reality of existence is non-affirmable, rationally and through acquired knowledge; (c) knowledge by presence is the only way to perceive and affirm it. In the present article, first the principle of “theory of simplicity of the reality of existence” is challenged and it is proved that we cannot consider limited and substantive beings as simple, and substantive being can only be considered simple when it is negatively conditioned from quiddity. And existence with such consideration exists just in the mind and not in the outside world. The article continues with criticizing related epistemological upshots. It is clarified that those effects face with criticisms as well. The author has tried to show that epistemological upshots of “the principality of existence” as well as commitment to epistemological consequences of Mulla Sadra’s theory in mental existence require that Neo-Sadraites give up the epistemological results of the “theory of simplicity of existence”.

Philosophyof science, among Muslim philosophers, embraces certain priory and crucial rules which the discursive-real sciences must take them as their logical structures. On the basis of the rules, each science should have its own subject and follow in the explanation, the principles and rules of proof expand their domination in their determined boundaries, in their researches should intend the essential properties of subject as well. The later point has not been respected in the metaphysics and violated repeatedly by the philosophers. The subject of metaphysics is being qua being, and all predictions of issues must be essential accidents of the topic while many metaphysical predictions are not such. This methodological error has not been considered by most philosophers. Some others, representing certain solutions, having confessed and acknowledged this error. The most important solutions are two things: the first, the metaphysics has no specific subject. The second, the rules of the philosophy of science are preferable and unnecessary to be followed. The first solution which is the ancient one with a little revise has been accepted in this article as a modern solution. Accordingly, the different branches of philosophy which have their own specific and independent subjects and issues, in virtue of their method and basic issues, can be laid under general topic of philosophy as we can put the sciences under the title of experimental sciences.

Depicting God's attributes of the act in a way that ascribing those attributes to Him does not contradict the belief in His absolute indivisibility is one of the most important theological issues in monotheistic religions; an issue whose solution is not possible without considering logical and philosophical bases. This article has aimed to describe the quality of existence of such attributes applying the specific definition offered for the concepts of existence and Vujūd-e Rābiṭ (connecting existence) in Transcendent Wisdom. Ṣadrā changed the triple division used to be considered for all beings by dissolving the Vojūd- e RābiṭĪ (connector existence) into Vujūd-e Rābiṭ (connecting existence). His main point in this issue is to explain the way that changing beings are connected to God with indivisible existence.In peripatetic school, all the beings, as the embodiment of God's attributes of act, are regarded as connector existence. Considering them as connectors assumes a sort of identity and independence for them before the existence of God. By considering the propositions as simple and indivisible, and dissolving the connector existence to connecting existence, Mullā Ṣadrā established a stable logical and philosophical structure for a great upheaval in having a different perception of all beings. Based on this view there is no independent identity for beings before God and their existence is regarded as unreal. Accordingly the existence of all beings is similar to the existence of a connecting element in a proposition which is dissolved in the existence of the subject. Such new definition would remove the contradiction available between the existence of God's attributes and the indivisibility of His essence. The most important findings of this study are:1- Mullā Ṣadrā, by developing the MĪr Dāmād's theory in distinguishing between the connector existence and connecting existence concluded that after rejecting the idea of principality of essence there is no distinction between the connector existence and the concept of connecting. Therefore, there is no way to imagine that such a connector existence as an interdependent being with a distinct essence exists, since assuming the existence of such a being is totally inevitable based on the principles accepted by Mullā Ṣadrā. Thus, the only valid theory to describe the beings of the world is to consider them as connecting. Therefore, based on this theory, the same function which is assumed for the connecting elements in every propositions, it is considered for all the beings created by Almighty God. In fact, their existence is seen as just a connecting reality before His existence just like the existence of a connecting element between the subject and predicate in a proposition. Based on this view, as the linguistic and logical stance, like whether the propositions are simple or compound, can determine the attitude toward the connecting element in a proposition, in the same way, the philosophical stance can determine the status of the connecting existence and the reality of existence of all beings which are regarded as connecting. 2- Assuming the existence of effect as connecting, can determine its existence sort as an act of Almighty God. That is, any kind of independence or essence would be removed from its existence. This will lead to this notion that all beings except God are the instances of His radiance or manifestations of His reality. Thus, the existence of effect is unified with the existence of the cause. 3- Various attributes have been attributed to God in the holy Quran. Their semantic analysis and ontological exposition have been the main concern of all Muslim schools of thought. In Transcendent Wisdom, based on its bases of principality and analogicity of existence, a solid system of philosophy is established based on which the religious beliefs especially the issues related to God's attributes are precisely explained. Besides the above mentioned philosophical attitude, Mullā Ṣadrā has a special view in logic with specific consequences in defining the proposition and its simplicity and compound which is different from those suggested in Aristotelian logic.

Will occurs in man along with imagination, affirmation and spiritual changes. This kind of will definitely is not apt forthe necessarily existent nature ofGod. On the other hand, all the qualities of perfection have been attributed to the Supreme Essencesince the pre-time eternity. Will is among the attributes of perfection too; therefore, the Supreme Essence rationally cannot be devoid of this eternal perfection. Hence, MullaSadra considers will one of the inherent attributes of God and the very knowledge, enthusiasm and delight of God for the most befitting system in all his philosophical works. But apparentlyrejecting inherent will and its unity with knowledge, narrations stress that God's will is an acquired attribute and His creation and action. To obviate the discrepancy between the perspective of intellect and that ofnarrations,Sadra affirmscreated will and believes that, like knowledge, will is of various degrees and its highest degree is the undifferentiated primordial will and its lowest level is the differentiated will or the very acquired willwhile stressing primordial will and its identicalitywith knowledge. However, considering the strong emphasis narrations place on rejecting primordial will and its lack of identicalitywith knowledge, this view is not very expedient. Following a review of Sadra’s views and the implications of narrations aimed at resolving the above-mentioned discrepancy,this paper suggests thatprimordial will can denote controlover will. And the acquired will emphasizedin narrationsis its manifestationand realization. Therefore, God has enjoyed will since the pre-time eternity. The emphasis of narrations on the acquisition ofwillindicates God’s using will power the fulfillment of whichnecessitates action and is unnecessary for His essence. That's why it will not lead to any change in the Divine essence.