فهرست مطالب faysal ameri

In the 2000s, some projects were defined to export Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) in order to increase Iran’s presence in gas export markets.However, despite the initial planning until 2020, when this research was conducted, none led to a result, and Iran could not play a role in this market. Delay in executing these plans will lead to losing the opportunity to use the joint South Pars field and billions of dollars of foreign exchange earnings. The purpose of this study, which was conducted 2019 to 2020, is to identify the factors leading to the failure of Iran’s LNG projects. In order to identify and prioritize these factors, the opinion of experts and the Fuzzy Delphi technique is employed. Investigating the condition at the national and international level indicates that some factors have prevented all of these projects from being successful, including political issues, international sanctions on Iran, lack of domestic capital, lack of appropriate foundation for attracting foreign investors, constraints of domestic rules and regulations, especially in the upstream sector for choosing the contract format, not having access to the liquefaction technology, and the issues pertinent to marketing, and the most important one, lack of suitable commercial structural design. Identifying these factors and planning for tackling them is the key to escaping this current situation and a guide for prospering in future projects of the country.

the formation of the current legal system is a function and is influenced by a basic element called time. An element that influences not only the formation of the legal system, but also its evolution.so, the legal system in the Iranian oil industry began with a contract and not with the legislation of a law. In relation to the term "contractual framework", it seems necessary to explain that the contractual framework refers to the criteria which give the contracts such a feature that it distinguishes that contract and similar contracts from other contracts concluded in that field. What were these contracts? How did they form the legal system of the Iranian oil industry? What has been their impact on technology transfer in the oil industry? These are some of the questions that will be addressed in this work. Disappointment with the framework of previous agreements (concession agreements), along with socio-political contexts such as the nationalization of the oil industry, led to a re-examination of this industry's contract frameworks in the light of past experiences, better future benefits and national independence and sovereignty. But how successful it was, that is another matter. Because the oil companies did not simply want to transfer the maximum benefits to the countries with oil resources, and used the dependence of those countries to their industry as a tactic against this trend as much as possible. Therefore, the structure of contracts governing the oil industry should be considered as a result of this conflict of interests.

One of the most important factors that negatively affects trade liberalization in the international arena is the non-tariff barriers that are often imposed by developed countries based on political, economic, social, and environmental necessities. These barriers have violated trade freedom and challenged the economic development of countries, negatively affected the achievement of sustainable development goals, and created various problems for developing countries. In this paper, in order to investigate the impact of non-tariff barriers on international trade and sustainable development goals, after a preliminary explanation of the concepts, the role of non-tariff barriers in international trade and their impact on access to international markets, their role in economic development, and the reciprocal impact of non-tariff barriers and sustainable development goals are addressed. Finally, it is concluded that cooperation and coherence in national and international policies will create positive interactions between these barriers and the issue of sustainable development, and eliminate the limiting effects of non-tariff barriers to trade.

To have a strong presence in the gas export market during the 2000s, Iran had designed projects to export more than 70 million tons of LNG per year. If these plans came to fruition, Iran would now be one of the largest exporters of LNG in the world. But so far, none of these projects have been put into operation, and with the existing conditions in the future, it will not be possible to use them. This delay represents a loss of access to South Pars' shared resources and millions of dollars in foreign exchange earnings. Failure to use a proper business structure as a reason for past projects' failure shows the need for structural reform.The purpose of this study, which was conducted from 2019 to 2020, is to identify the optimal structure for the country's projects. In this regard, by evaluating a wide range of criteria by experts in the oil and gas industry and using the ELECTRE-TRI technique, we classify the existing structures and introduce the optimal structure. The results show that the optimal structure will be achieved by using the IPC contract in the upstream sector and combining it with the participation of the upstream partner in the construction of the liquefaction facility. This structure, by the domestic laws and regulations and by attracting foreign investors by ensuring a long-term presence in the upstream and downstream sectors, can counteract international sanctions, increase efficiency, and speed up the implementation of projects. Provide.

Understanding of the interplay between IP rights and competition law in the context of technology transfer in the Iranian oil industry is a point that is discussed in this article. While intellectual property rights enjoy a historic record and appropriate rules in this regard, the competition rights in Iran are taking their initial steps. This imbalance stems from the root of the formation of the legal system of oil in Iran based on contractual frameworks over time. The point to be made in this article is that technology transfer can be expected to take place when the type and purpose of technology transfer have already been defined by legal organizations in relation to the relevant industries. Also, the general targeting in the upstream laws alone cannot meet the legal requirements for the transfer of appropriate technology. Therefore, when even one of the mentioned factors does not exist, one cannot expect constructive interaction in the above-mentioned legal systems.

Valuing reserves is important and essential for international oil companies because it enables them to finance projects at low rates in the financial markets.  One criticism of buyback contracts is that they do not allow the contractor to reflect the value of reserves on its books. The purpose of this study is to investigate this issue in comparing Iran and Iraq oil service contracts with respect to joint fields.  We undertake the study by examining primary sources such as rules and regulations related to oil producing companies in the USA, related international financial standards and financial provisions of Iran and Iraq oil service contracts.Our research indicates that procedures for valuing reserves on contractors books are not clearly stipulated, but in theory it should be possible to reflect reserves under all contracts reviewed. However, in practice reserves can be reflected on contractors books under the new Iran petroleum contracts and Iraq service contracts, through use of percentage work completed under long term contracts, but use of this method is not possible in buyback contracts.

One of  success factors of public-private partnership contracts is the effective public supervision on their implementation, including standards to be observed by the private party to the partnership. In other words, a key element in using private sector’s potential is defining activity standards and precise supervision of their implementation. In this research we identify the factors that impact effectiveness of government’s supervision of public-private partnership contract, in addition to studying the principles and foundation of this supervision.  To this end, we first spcify our research goal, method and scope and then define the concept of optimum supervision and control. We analyze the role played by the government or public entity in BOT (build-operate-transfer) agreements. In the following section, we analyze contract management and method of supervision in public-private partnership. After defining the statistical population, statistical sample, and method of data analysis methods, we proceed to test our hypotheses. The results of quantitative data analysis and tests performed would be discussed in the next sections.  We will then proceed to analyze the results of our sudy,  Our research provides valuable insights on factors that impact government’s supervision and provides some suggestions for improving it.

The purpose of this study is to compare stringency of and compliance with environmental requirements in upstream sector of oil and gas in law of Iran and the USA. This study is conducted using the inter-spinned mix method (qualitative – quantitative). In the qualitative part, library studies are used. In the quantitative part, the studied society is a group of six professionals in the field of oil and gas, who filled out a questionnaire consisted of 34 questions prepared by the Worley Parsons in a similar research approved by jurisdictions of ten countries. The questions are prepared by a team of experts with international experience. The components of stringency and compliance with law during the phases of approval, operation, and closure of a hydrocarbon project are studied using the Delphi method. At the level of stringency, the environmental assessment in the US is carried out with 10 times more human resources and 26 times more costs than in Iran. In the US, with 13 scores, it is more stringent than Iran with 5 scores. In the project closure phase, Iran does not put in place any obligations for rehabilitation and restoration. At the level of compliance, the Construction Environmental Management Plan (CEMP) is mandatory in both countries. In Iran, the list of violations and their consequences will not be published. The US regulatory mechanisms of restoration are an appropriate model. Totally, Iran gains 29 and the United States 42 scores. The recommendations are based on these two scores.

Car accidents are the most common and important traffic accidents that courts have been dealing with for the past fifty years. Because of their significance in relation to the liabilities they entail, car accidents have secured a special position in the legal world and have accordingly created their own legal rules. The principal purpose of this Article is to highlight such legal rules and examine the impact which they have on reducing the loss that both the insured and insurer may incur. Our focus of intention in this regard is the insurance policy and the probable risks that would be taken into account for determining the coverage and thereupon the premium that would be paid for future protection. To this end, Article 21 of the Law Amending the Compulsory Insurance Act, which deals with the civil liability of motor vehicle owners against third parties and the Compensation Fund which has been established thereby are examined. In doing so, we employ the economic analysis approach and as such take into account the price – cost analysis and the aversion risks which for the determination of the latter may be taken into consideration. In a nutshell, our study demonstrates that by establishing the Compensation Fund for compensating the injured party, the Iranian legislator has adopted an economic approach.

Oil contracts are supposed to facilitate knowledge transfer from foreign investors to the host country staff improving local knowledge and managerial skills. This paper aims at examining knowledge management in Iran's oil buy-back contracts using structural equations modeling. According to Probst et al. (1998) knowledge management is a multi-dimensional phenomenon including knowledge targets, identification, acquisition, development, allocation, deployment, preservation and measurement of knowledge. Based on the two questionnaires relating to KM in Probst model and practice of KM in Iran oil industry, data gathered from experts of National Iranian Oil Company have been used to evaluate the knowledge management implications of buy- back contracts through structural equations modelling approach. According to the results buy-back contracts have no effect on the existing knowledge management situation in the oil industry. All of KM dimensions should be taken into account in buy-back contracts to improve the KM status in the oil industry.

The main purpose of this Article is to examine the new concession agreements، and to compare relevant modifications and changes with the traditional concessions، they have undergone. To this end three subjects are examined: The ownership of the oil، governmental control and management of the oil production and the fiscal regime of the agreements in question. In an attempt to deal with the first issue، the study has differentiated between two situations: A situation where the oil is still in place and has not yet been exploited. In this case، as is with other new oil contracts، under the new concessions the government still owns the oil. The other situation is when the oil is produced and is technically speaking at the wellhead، in which point the concessionaire acquires the ownership of the produced oil; while the host government retains ownership of resources that remains in the subsoil. This salient feature of the concessions (both the new and the traditional ones) makes it distinguishable from other petroleum contracts. For instance، in a production sharing agreement a percentage of the ownership of product is conveyed to the contractor at the exporting point، whereas، under a service contract، the contractor does not acquire any ownership rights over the oil production. With respect to governmental control and management، we have found that due to awareness of the host governments of the benefits of their natural resources، they were able to obtain the right of control and management of the exploration and exploitation of their resources، which found expression not only in the new concessions but also in such agreements as service and production sharing contracts. In practice، however، because of the paucity of the requisite skill and technology for exploration and exploitation operations، they have not been able to achieve such a purpose. As regards the question of the fiscal regime، where such matters as taxation، royalty and bonus were examined، we found that all changes made، were in favour of the host countries: except، however، where the risk of failure to explore successfully was very high; in which case more attractive and incentive rewards were granted to the concessionaire.

This article tries to examine Cooperation Treaties and their impact on the transfer of technology. To this end, the study distinguished between two types of cooperation agreements: those which, because of their indirect effect on technology acquisition, are considered as passive, and those active ones, which have a direct impact on the transfer of technology. The first kind varied on their object and purpose. The most used and popular type of this group of arrangements were the bilateral and multilateral foreign investment agreements. Having examined them, we found that there was no causal relation between those and the transfer of technology. Instead, as available evidences suggested factors such as economic and political stability, national legislation and local market capacity were more powerful than the treaties in attracting foreign capital and technology. Yet, our conclusion was rather optimistic as we believed that such arrangements could have some positive impact although minor and time-consuming on the acquisition of technology. As to the second type of governmental cooperation, our finding was quite different. Accordingly, there was a causal link between the two with some major limitations. Some of these limitations were germane to the conditions under which the donor country required the receiving one to apply (e.g. tied-aid) and some were related to the policy of the former in limiting such cooperation to the extent that it would not impair its competitive and comparative advantages at the regional and global level. The other obstacles were the failure of the receiving state in devoting the requisite resources to the acquisition of technology and the enhancement of its technological capacity. The lack of appropriate governance in the host country was also another impeding factor in attracting the necessary foreign technology.