mohammad mehdi ardebili

What is the Truth in Nietzsche’s philosophy? This is the main problem of the present article, in the light of which an attempt has been made, within the framework of the requirements and limitations of this article, to provide an introduction to the discussion of presenting a monistic-idealistic-dynamic conception of Nietzsche. In this regard, first of all, as the introduction, the crisis facing any form of Nietzschean research will be briefly mentioned in order to provide possibilities for formulating the main idea of the article. Then, focusing on Nietzsche's various functions of truth and his dualistic (negative/positive or critical/supportive) encounter with this concept, we will address his main critiques of truth in three ways: 1. Critique of dualism; 2. Critique of essentialism; and 3. Criticism of stability. Finally, with the help of the results of these discussions, a preliminary outline of Nietzsche's monistic-idealistic-dynamic conception will be drawn at the end of the article.

The title of the present article describes its main problematic. The text begins with Nietzsche's various uses of culture (cultivation, education, civilization, etc.). From his first serious texts, such as the Birth of Tragedy, to the mystical fragmentations of the last days before insanity, and even to the last unpublished writings of The Will to Power, Nietzsche has always been involved with "culture." This conflict, however, is not a conflict with a concept alongside other concepts, but something beyond it, a confrontation with the density of all forces under a single common name. In this regard, we first look at the positive and negative aspects of culture in Nietzsche's view. Then, through a radical interpretation and internalization of both sides, we will penetrate into the layers of Nietzsche's critical encounter with culture. Finally, we utilize these discussions in order to briefly point to what Nietzsche predicted for today's world: the inevitable Nihilism of our age.

The theory of 'Death of God' is Nietzsche's most famous theory. In this article, we will attempt to analyze Nietzsche's idea of the functions of ‘Death of God’ at three levels. The first level (the level of belief) is the primary level of ontological and ideological discussion about the existence or non-existence of God; the second level (humanistic encounter with the death of God) is the atheistic happiness of the absence of God, and the third level (the critical encounter with the world after God) is about the legacy of the Killers. Finally, we will discuss the question that whether Nietzsche is happy or sad about the death of God. Given that Nietzsche has adopted different approaches to the issue of "death of God" in his various works, it will be attempted to provide an interpretation of Nietzsche's position as "a whole" without regard to the temporal primacy of these works. Meantime, there are three key passages from the three books that guide our interpretation: first, Human All Too Human, second, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and third, The Gay Science. From a critical perspective, it will be shown that 'Death of God' in Nitsche's philosophy should not be regarded as an ontological or creedal theory, but it depicts a cultural situation.

Kant's conception of 'culture' is largely confined to his later works in the field of history, anthropology, and teleology. But no research has so far exclusively analysis the meaning of culture in Kant's Critical Philosophy, and also the metaphysical and philosophical foundations of this concept. Also, due to the vague and irregular use of the terms Kultur and Bildung (and combining them with concepts such as Zivilisation and Erziehung) in the second half of the eighteenth century, in the intellectual space of Germany, the understanding of the meaning of culture is largely obscure and controversial. Therefore, the present paper not only limits the scope of its discussion to Kant's critical philosophy and its three major books (Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of Judgment, with the consideration of Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals), and not only has shown the usage of the Kultur and Bildung in these works, but also has always focused on the theoretical and metaphysical foundations of these applications. In a word, the present paper tries to clarify the meaning and implications of these terms by categorizing the subject matter and the analysis of different practices of Culture (whether in the Bildung or Kultur form) in three of Kant's main books, and ultimately answering this main question that 'What does the term "culture" mean in Kant's critical philosophy'?

Although “Philosophy of Culture” is commonly taken to refer to a rather new and interdisciplinary branch that has been developed in Germany since late twentieth century, one can trace the first philosophical ideas about culture, in the modern sense of the term, back to Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803). In this context, one of Herder's most important legacies (or lasting contributions) is "cultural pluralism,” which he utilized as a tool against the colonial totalitarianism of Enlightenment. Herder was critical of the commonly held belief in the superiority of European culture over other cultures, and introduced a new definition and understanding of culture that could potentially be used to defend the cultures of other parts of the world, especially Eastern cultures. With the aim of explaining Herder’s concept of "cultural pluralism," the present article will organize and explain this concept under three key sub-headings of "cultural singularity", "internal judgment," and “concept of force.” It will analyze its opposition to "cultural Europeanism" and demonstrate its possibilities for confronting the European-centric concept of totalitarianism. Finally, a brief section will be devoted to the discussion of the charge of relativism against Herder’s "cultural pluralism”.

The concept of Bildung is one of the key concepts that has been influential for more than three centuries in the Western intellectual and cultural space, and in particular in Germany. This concept has multiple and varied implications both philologically and in its application in various fields. In this article, to examine the meaning of this term and then its impact on different epistemic and cultural fields, we have to begin with the lexical etymology of this term and its advent in the Middle Ages and its propagation in the eighteenth century. In the third step, a history of its application in the German intellectual and cultural space will be presented so that it can be used to analyze the various functions of the term. In the fourth step, the conceptual network of the implications, symmetries, and contradictions of this term with other related terms (such as Kultur, Zivilisation, Erziehung, Humanität, and even terms such as Geist and Wissenschaft) will be drawn up. It is only on this basis that in the fifth step, a kind of category of different meanings of the term Bildung was obtained; and in the sixth step, in addition to the philosophical and theoretical meanings, functions of this term in the ordinary literature will be analyzed. In the seventh and last step of the article, while referring to the inner conflict and the blockade in the concept of Bildung, some critical points of this concept, especially for us and our world, will be mentioned.

The concept of subject, along with concepts such as object, God and substance, is one of the most important concepts in the history of philosophy. Each of these concepts can be used to narrate a history of the philosophy. This is precisely the mission of Robert C. Salman sets out for himself in his book The Rise and Fall of the Self (A History of Western Philosophy, Vol. 7). He began the history of the subject, or, in his own terms, 'history of the Self' from the beginning of German idealism in the second half of the eighteenth century, with Kant (together with prominent idealists such as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel), to the first glimpses of the collapse of modern subjectivity And proliferation of critical approaches, such as Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Heidegger. In the end, he ends his discussion with the most prominent postmodern figures, such as Foucault and Derrida. The present article focuses on the first Persian translation of this book, rather than the formal and content review of this work. As a result, the present article is more than a mere critique of the book's content itself, a critique of translation that, although it criticizes a particular translation, hopes that this critique will provide an critical analysis about the translation of philosophical works in general.

Hegel and Nietzsche are mainly represented as two opposing poles in the nineteenth-century intellectual and philosophical sphere. Nietzsche has been introduced as the fierce critique of the Hegelian dialectic and the radical opposite to the modern metaphysics that Hegel was represented. This image has gradually faded away since the second half of the twentieth century. Although Hegel is the peak of modern metaphysics and Nietzsche as the initiator of postmodernism, criticizing metaphysics, but the philosophical similarities and conceptualizations of these two figures show the falsification or at least the inadequacy of this modern/postmodern duality. In spite of some superficial perceptions, Hegel and Nietzsche are very close in their intellectual and philosophical foundations. We can read Hegel by Nietzsche and Nietzsche by Hegel. This is the goal Elliot Jurist has outlined in Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency. But for doing so, he put the concept underlying his work, which is very important for both philosophers: the concept of culture. The present article will review the book from three perspectives: First, a formal critique of the work; second, a critique of the author's general approach and, finally, a critique of the Persian translation of the book and his approach.

Though thinking about culture returns to ancient Greece, "culture" as understood today is a modern concept influenced more by the speculations of the German thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries than ancient Greek thinkers. Despite the ideas of Rousseau, Diderot, Voltaire, Vico, Leibniz, and others, it can be shown that Johann Gottfried von Herder (1764-1803) was the first thinker that provided a metaphysical and philosophical grounding for culture. He portrayed the human being as essentially a cultural being. However, Herder does not have an independent book or treatise specifically about the "philosophy of culture" or even the meaning of culture. Consequently, the present paper tries to analyze how Herder's "philosophy of culture" implicitly emerges from his vast oeuvre by extracting his diverse and diffuse discussions about language, man, history, politics and culture; and, finally, its impact on the subsequent thinkers of this field, especially Hegel. Accordingly, this paper, regardless of its short introduction, has three main parts: First, the theoretical foundations of Herder's thoughts and his sources of inspiration; Second, Herder’s philosophy of culture, extracted from a variety of his works and focusing on his critiques of Enlightenment; and third, examining Herder's influence on subsequent thinkers, focusing on the evolution of the concept of culture.

Place and role of God in Hegel’s philosophy have become one of the most controversial problems in philosophy and interpretation for the past two centuries. The main distinction between the two Hegelian movements (the left and the right wing) depends on how we answer this issue. Contrary to the development of modern philosophy which has gradually diminished the place and role of God in explanation of the world, Hegel brought this concept into the center of philosophy once again; he revived the arguments, and put it on the throne, although with a new name: Absolute Spirit.
At the moment the most important question is the relationship between Hegelian Absolute Spirit and Christian God. Did Hegel make philosophy theological or theology philosophical? Did Hegel bring God into its high place or did he negate the common-theological concept of God?
In Hegel’s Concept of God, Quentin Lauer attempts to deal with these questions. Although the reader cannot derive explicit answers for these questions, he or she can understand the approach of the writer about Hegelian analysis of the concept of God, and consequently grasp a brief impression of Hegelian metaphysics.

Søren Kierkegaard, a Danish philosopher who has been known as “The Father of Existentialism”, was a great critic of Hegel’s philosophy and a passionate defender of faith and individual morality.
However so many books have been published of Kierkegaard’s idea due to his influence on modern philosophy, in this review we, by emphasizing on Kierkegaard’s different critical conceptual aspects to the Hegelian system, try to retrieve his thoughts. Since the thinkers can be understood more precisely in the light of negation by their oppositions, in our discussion we analyze Kierkegaard thoughts at the context of his time and his antagonistic connection with Hegel. Despite the evaluation of the truthiness of Kierkegaard’s critics against Hegel in reference to the inner conflicts of his thoughts, we also try to understand several aspects of Hegel’s philosophy that were criticized during the second half of the nineteenth century.

For understanding origin and grounds of Hegel’s Logic, in addition to Science of Logic as main source employed by interpretations, we need to analyze First Hegel’s logical Treatise in his Jena period. There is no interpretation of this treatise available in Farsi while the English sources on the interpretation of the text are also scarce. The current paper will try to provide an account on process of the genesis of Hegel’s Jena Logic for the first time in Farsi. Thus, at first, it will consider the system as a whole briefly and then it will analyze three constituent parts of Jena’s Logic – ‘Simple Connection’, ‘Relation’, and ‘Proportion’, depending on English translation of the text (translated by Hegel Society of America). Finally, the study deals with a comprehensive outline of the remaining parts of the Hegel's System of Jena (such as Metaphysics, Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit).