seyyed sadr al din taheri

René Descartes (1596-1650), the French philosopher and reviver of Western philosophy, based his philosophy on grammatical skepticism and the abandonment of all previous beliefs, even his own objective existence. He then came to his first definitive belief i.e. his own existence as "I think," by relying on the undeniable intuition known as Kezito, manifested in the proposition "I think, therefore I am". Afterward, he argued for the existence of God through the thinking soul, and considered the real existence of God, in addition to the assurance of divine power and will and the certainty that God is not deceitful, as the guarantor of the correctness of other conventional beliefs and scientific and philosophical doctrines. Descartes gave three reasons for the existence of God, the first of which is the "Trademark Argument". This article discusses this argument using authentic translations of some of Descartes' works. It will then briefly explain the criticisms leveled at this argument during Descartes' time as well as his answers, and finally evaluate the body of the argument and its criticisms and responses.

This study investigates and criticizes five of Mullā Ṣadrā’s main arguments for the falsity of the infinite regress of efficient causes. Given the fact that many philosophers use this principle in order to demonstrate the existence of the Necessary Being, a study of the objections targeting its arguments is of great importance because of its relationship with proving the existence of God. In order to achieve the purpose of this study, four arguments have been examined and criticized separately, and the fifth argument has been referred back to the fourth in terms of content and method. These arguments include “limit and middle”, “conformity”, “the most concise and precise”, “correlation 1”, and “correlation 2” arguments. The criticisms of the arguments of the falsity of regress and the importance of the falsity of the regress of efficient causes in developing some of the arguments adduced to demonstrate the Divine Essence have provoked philosophers, both Islamic and Western, to seek for other arguments to prove the existence of God in order not to rely on the falsity of the regress of causes. It is worth noting that they have had some success in this regard. At the end of this paper, without discussing the arguments and while summarizing and concluding the remarks, the authors refer to two famous arguments: Mullā Ṣadrā’s argument of the righteous in Islamic philosophy and Anselm’s ontological argument in Western philosophy. These two arguments are semi-casual and semi-analytical because they are not based on any premise that needs to be proved.

In this article, after a brief explanation of some key terms, one of Avicenna's reasons for the oldness of the natural world and Ghazali's criticisms of him are examined and analyzed, and in some cases, Mulla Sadra's comments in agreement with Avicenna are mentioned. Furthermore, the problems of each point of view are stated separately and the limits of each view's defense of its own theory are pointed out and judged. In Avicenna's argument, two rules are used, one related to philosophical public affairs and the other belonging to the realm of philosophical theology. In the analysis and explanation of the arguments of each side, the conclusion has been reached that the main problem is the issue of the supreme will, and the key to solving the problem is understanding the nature of the will of the Necessary Being. For this purpose, we presented Avicenna's and Ghazali's views on this matter and tried to reveal the correct and acceptable opinion on the will of the Necessary Being, and the oldness or creation of the natural world, although the effort failed. Finally, an opinion of the early philosophers, from Avicenna to Sabzewari, regarding the unity of knowledge, will, and action in the Necessary Being is proposed. The final result, with these limits of reason, is the incompleteness of all theories about the will of the Necessary Being and the temporary preference of the philosophers' theory about the oldness of the world.

Based on the Quran, Man is the best creature of God. That is why Quran refers to him a lot, and some judgments have been made about man and his deeds. Given the importance of anthropological value and its impact on human behavior, in this article we have classified the Quranic judgments into two groups: condemnatory and complimentary features. Furthermore, these features have been briefly analyzed based on some contemporary and earlier interpretations of Sunnis and Shiites. It is important to know in what ways man in the Quran seems to be worthy of praise or condemnation, and to know what proportion exists between them based on the quantitative and qualitative assessment and which one is more fundamental. The main question in this case is what is the dual philosophy of the Quranic descriptions about man? This study is a library-based, descriptive, and hermeneutics with a theoretical approach which tries to seek the answers to the questions based on the Quran. It is suggested that all the instincts and attributes that the human nature are composed of, either positive and negative, pave the way for his excellence and perfection, and are necessary for the human growth. Moreover, if some human features are criticized in some verses of the Quran, It is because of the fact that man has misused or overused them or even the criticism is relative. That is to say man is attributed a condemnatory feature when he is compared with some creatures or divine greatness. Therefore, the reason of dual descriptions of man in the Quran becomes clear and the superficial contradiction between the verses of praising and blaming disappears.

After entering the Islamic philosophy, gradation underwent major changes to the point that gradation of existence became replaced with gradation of manifestation in transcendental theosophy as mystical epistemology gave no credit to gradation of existence.Allameh Tabataba’i not only criticizes gradation in existence but also suggests some methods for moving from gradation of ranks to gradation of manifestations.

The present paper discusses Mulla Sadra's views about the nature and features of angels. Focusing on Mulla Sadra's views, it tries to prove the existence of angels, their nature and their number, and show the philosophical view about the characteristics and types of angels. Angels are luminous and incorporeal beings whose duty is to effuse good and invite man to happiness. Mulla Sadra believes that there are different types of angels and each group of the angels have certain duties assigned by God. One of these groups have the duty of bringing down God's message from the celestial world to the terrestrial world. The discussion about this group of angels who are mediators between the Divine world and the material world is closely related with the theory of emanation, longitudinal hierarchy of intellects, and the way of the evolving of unity from plurality. To sum up, it is difficult, or to be more accurate, impossible to have access to Mulla Sadra's clear view about the compatibility or incompatibility of heavenly angels with intellects.

This paper focuses on the central question of what the correct method of interpreting the holy Qur’an is from the perspective of Allāmeh Tabātabā’i. The answer to this question is that according to Allāmeh, the correct method of interpreting the Qur’an is one that is ‘pure’ and the more pure the interpretation is, the more valid it will be. After providing reasons and documents as well as explanations for this given answer, the following questions are raised: What does ‘pure’ mean? It means that the interpretation of the verses is merely based upon other Quranic verses as well as the words of the holy Prophet (PBUH) and the immaculate Imams (PBUT).Has the above-said method been fully employed after the holy Prophet (PBUH)? Allāmeh Tabātabā’i gives a negative response to this question. What has caused deviations in the interpretation of the holy Qur’an from the correct method? The answer to this question is given in the paper. What solution does Allāmeh Tabātabā’i proposes for this problem? This question is replied in the paper as well. What can be said about the criterion Allāmeh Tabātabā’i has set for the correct interpretation of the Qur’an? A few questions are posed in this regard.