جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "ابن‏سينا" در نشریات گروه "علوم انسانی"

Undoubtedly, one of the most important philosophical discussions among the majority of philosophers is the problem of the existence of the soul, its essence, the quality of its appearance, its immateriality, and its subsistence. This problem is also one of the most fundamental and crucial issues for Muslim philosophers, and its kālāmī and philosophical outcomes cannot be ignored. This is because several religious beliefs can be explained depending on accepting this main element in Man’s existence. Without the soul, Man is not responsible for any obligation issued on the part of the holy legislator and, naturally, resurrection and the related problems become pointless. The importance of the soul for philosophers who are not committed to kālāmī and religious views indicates that this problem, irrespective of its religious nature, holds an important place in philosophy. Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā, as two philosophers who are also concerned about religious beliefs, have paid particular attention to the problem of the soul. Mullā Ṣadrā has discussed the existence of the soul, demonstrated its essential nature and subsistence, and explained the quality of its appearance in the form of corporeal origination, in fact, his new views in this regard are quite famous. However, this paper is intended to reveal that many of his discussions regarding the problem of the soul have been exactly borrowed from Ibn Sīnā. Referring to Avicennan views in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy can greatly contribute to a correct understanding and justifiable interpretation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s ideas, particularly concerning the perception of the concept of the corporeality of the soul, which some wrongly equate with the corporeality of the soul at the beginning of its creation. Here, the author demonstrates that neither is this interpretation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s words correct, nor is this principle solely attributed to him. Rather, he has borrowed Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical views in this regard, as is the case in his other discussions in relation to the soul.

This article examines the role of tawakkul (trust in God) in religious and ethical education from the perspectives of Islamic theology and philosophy. Tawakkul, defined as complete reliance on God and the submission of affairs to Him after utilizing human capabilities, is recognized as one of the fundamental principles of faith in Islam. This study analyzes various dimensions of tawakkul through the views of prominent Islamic thinkers, including Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, and Al-Ghazali, while exploring its impact on the spiritual and ethical development of individuals. The findings indicate that tawakkul acts not only as a religious practice but also as a key element in the process of spiritual perfection and moral growth. Tawakkul assists individuals in facing life's challenges and adversities, allowing them to continue their efforts with peace and confidence in divine wisdom rather than succumbing to anxiety and worry. Furthermore, this concept is closely related to ethical principles such as patience, piety, and asceticism, significantly influencing individual behavior and character. Lastly, the article provides suggestions for future research on the impact of tawakkul on various aspects of personal and social life. This research contributes to a deeper understanding of the multifaceted dimensions of tawakkul and its importance in religious and ethical education within the Islamic community.

The concepts of good and evil are foundational topics in Islamic ethics and practical philosophy, consistently engaging the attention of philosophers and religious scholars. This study aims to comparatively analyze the teachings of Hadith and practical philosophy regarding these two essential concepts. Initially, the research introduces and examines the notions of good and evil in practical philosophy, where philosophers like Avicenna and Al-Farabi define good as the pursuit of perfection and moral virtues, and evil as the deficiency and deviation from this path. Subsequently, relevant Hadiths are explored, illustrating that good is characterized by obedience to God and adherence to divine commandments, while evil is depicted as disobedience and estrangement from divine mercy. In the comparative analysis section, the similarities and differences between these two perspectives are scrutinized. The findings indicate that both approaches emphasize the importance of justice, honesty, and benevolence towards others; however, they differ in defining the origin and nature of good and evil. Hadith teachings focus on religious and spiritual aspects, whereas practical philosophy centers on rational principles and social outcomes. The study concludes that integrating these two viewpoints can contribute to the formation of a comprehensive and applicable ethical system that encompasses both religious dimensions and rational principles. Suggestions for future research include examining the social and cultural impacts of these concepts and adapting traditional teachings to contemporary needs.

This article presents a comparative study of revelatory epistemology in the Quran and Western philosophy, focusing on the role of revelation in shaping philosophical and intellectual systems. In Quranic epistemology, revelation is recognized as a divine source that transcends human reason and experience, playing a crucial role in guiding individuals toward truth and spiritual perfection. This perspective is clearly reflected in the works of Islamic philosophers such as Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, who introduce revelation and reason as complementary sources of knowledge. Conversely, in Western philosophy, especially since the Enlightenment, revelation has been less regarded as an independent source of knowledge, with philosophy constructed primarily upon reason and experience. Philosophers like Descartes and Kant sought to establish a strict distinction between reason and revelation, limiting human knowledge to rational and experiential domains. This article highlights that, despite the fundamental differences between Quranic epistemology and Western philosophy, both traditions emphasize the importance of reason in understanding. It further analyzes the epistemological differences between these two traditions and provides suggestions for future research in the field of comparative studies among various religious and philosophical traditions. The findings of this research can contribute to the development of philosophical dialogues between Islamic and Western traditions and pave the way for expanding comparative studies in philosophy and epistemology.

The concept of the soul's abstraction in Islamic philosophy is a fundamental topic that has a profound impact on mystical journey and spiritual evolution. This article examines and analyzes the teachings of Avicenna and Mulla Sadra regarding the abstraction of the soul, comparing the influence of this concept on the mystical journey in their respective philosophical systems. Avicenna, with a rational approach, considers the soul as an independent and inherently abstract substance that inherently possesses the capability to comprehend intelligible forms and attain truth. He emphasizes the importance of reason and intellect in the mystical journey and regards the soul's abstraction as the key to entering the intellectual realm. In contrast, Mulla Sadra, employing the theory of substantial motion, views the soul's abstraction as a gradual process achieved through self-purification and practical mysticism. He highlights the significance of mystical experiences and devotional practices in attaining the soul's abstraction and spiritual perfection. The results of this study indicate that while both philosophers acknowledge the importance of the soul's abstraction in spiritual evolution, they propose different paths to achieve it. These differences reflect the diversity in Islamic philosophical approaches and offer multiple strategies for spiritual self-development. In conclusion, it is suggested that future research delve deeper into this concept within other philosophical schools and explore its impact on psychological and social dimensions.

This paper examines the relationship between faith and doubt within Islamic philosophy, analyzing the role of each concept in the epistemological process. Drawing on the perspectives of prominent Islamic philosophers such as Ibn Sina, Al-Farabi, Al-Ghazali, and Mulla Sadra, the interaction between faith and doubt is presented as two complementary aspects of knowledge. These philosophers argue that doubt serves as a crucial stage in purifying false beliefs and attaining truth, ultimately guiding individuals toward heartfelt faith and certainty. Ibn Sina and Al-Farabi highlight the positive impact of doubt on strengthening faith, asserting that doubt acts as a driving force for the pursuit of more rational justifications. Conversely, Al-Ghazali and Mulla Sadra believe that doubt is not only an essential phase in the spiritual and intellectual evolution of a person but also facilitates personal growth and spiritual excellence. This paper endeavors to explore the philosophical analysis of these two concepts, investigating how doubt and faith influence the cognitive process and their impact on an individual’s intellectual and spiritual life. Furthermore, the study provides recommendations for future research on the interaction between faith and doubt and their effects on epistemology and religious psychology. The findings suggest that in Islamic philosophy, faith and doubt are not contradictory but rather work synergistically to enhance an individual’s quest for truth and personal development.

This paper examines the epistemological foundations of Tawakkul (trust) and Tafwid (delegation) in Islamic thought, analyzing the role of these two concepts within Quranic teachings, the traditions of Ahl al-Bayt (AS), and the perspectives of Islamic philosophers and mystics. Tawakkul and Tafwid, as two fundamental principles in the Islamic belief system, encourage individuals to place their trust and surrender in the divine will and wisdom. Initially, this study explores the position of these concepts in individual and social life through an analysis of Quranic verses and the traditions of Ahl al-Bayt (AS). Subsequently, it compares the viewpoints of philosophers such as Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Mulla Sadra on Tawakkul and Tafwid with the teachings of Ahl al-Bayt (AS), demonstrating that these concepts are not only treated as matters of belief but also as epistemological and rational principles within Islamic philosophy. Furthermore, the study examines the influence of teachings from Sufis like Rumi and Ibn Arabi in reinforcing the concepts of Tawakkul and Tafwid and their role in spiritual ascension and mystical journeying. Finally, the paper discusses the impact of Tawakkul and Tafwid on the individual and social lives of people from the perspective of Islamic epistemology and provides suggestions for future research. The findings of this research indicate that Tawakkul and Tafwid, in addition to being spiritual strategies for coping with life's challenges, can play a significant role in fostering psychological tranquility and spiritual growth in individuals.

An existential analysis of dispositions is a significant matter. Based on this perspective, the place of dispositions within the soul and its impact on the theoretical and practical aspects of human life is explained philosophically. This paper intends to examine this issue from Avicenna's perspective. According to him, the essence of dispositions is formed in the relationship between the soul and the body through faculties. If the practical intellect has a superior position relative to the animal faculties, the soul acquires a mediating disposition; and if the superior position belongs to the animal faculties, a disposition of excess or deficiency befalls the soul. This occurrence takes place through the Active Intellect and with three preparatory causes: addiction, temperament, and society, and it has an impact on both the theoretical and practical aspects of the soul. In the theoretical realm, if the soul is purified, it becomes more prepared to receive the intelligible. In the practical realm, the formation of dispositions leads to the continuity of action and the formation of habits, which can determine subsequent dispositions. Despite Avicenna's more precise explanation of this issue compared to previous philosophers, since he considers the soul to be purely immaterial and the changes in the soul to be of the type of accidental changes, he cannot provide a suitable explanation of how human beings can be perfected through dispositions.

The perception is one of the new fields of contemporary philosophy, which focuses on the main object of perception and the possibility of ordinary conception of perception. The core of the problem of perception is illusion and hallucination; In such a way that the response to the problem of illusion and hallucination is considered to determine our response to the true object of perception. Aristotle and Muslim Peripatetic Philosophers, especially Ibn Sina, paid attention to sensory error, but they did not consider it as a basis for the theory of perception. In this paper, relying on the argument of sensory error, we show that there are two meanings of sensory error in Aristotle, which lead to two conceptions of perception: The meaning that requires the sense data interpretation leads to the acceptance of indirect realism, and the meaning that requires the material object interpretation leads to the acceptance of direct realism. Commentators and philosophers after Avicenna, especially Tousi, often considering something similar to sense data interpretation, have promoted a kind of indirect realism interpretation from Avicenna’s views, which has finally been accepted as the theory of mental existence. We show that according to Razi’s considerations, it is possible to interpret a material object interpretation for sensory error in Ibn Sina, just like Aristotle, and therefore, a kind of direct realism can be attributed to Ibn Sina, which is consistent with sensory and imaginary perception being material in Ibn Sina’s philosophy.

Undoubtedly, Ibn Sina is the most important philosopher in the Islamic world. Understanding his thought requires new readings that can enable us to comprehend and explain philosophy in the Islamic world more accurately. To this end, in the first step of this research, the concept of philosophy in Ibn Sina's view has been analyzed. This analysis is refined in the reading of the idea of philosophy as a way of life, whose architect is the French philosopher Pierre Hadot. Hadot's work on ancient philosophy challenged the understanding of that period by contemporary philosophers. It seems that such a reading can also be applied on the philosophy in the Islamic world. This can be better understood in light of the Muslim philosophers' view of happiness. To this end, by presenting a holistic view of Ibn Sina's thought, we will show that Ibn Sina's existential view is consistent with his philosophical system. It seems that such an explanation offers a more useful reading of Ibn Sina in Hadot's idea. Therefore, to achieve this goal, this research has attempted to briefly explain the importance of the question of what philosophy is among contemporary thinkers and then present a theory of philosophy as a way of life. In the following, an attempt has been made to examine the concept of philosophy in Ibn Sina's thought with the aforementioned idea and an analysis of the necessity of accepting Ibn Sina's holistic system.

The explanation of the possibility of the reality of the primary intelligibles in the realm of habitual intelligence is an important epistemological issue. Two perspectives on explaining this matter are noteworthy: first, the speculative intellect at the level of habitual intelligence possesses the primary (non-acquired) intelligibles, and these intelligibles themselves (independent of anything external to the intellect) are valid. Second, verifying the reality of the primary intelligibles is not possible without relying on presential sensory perception. In the tradition of Islamic philosophy, this dependence has been emphasized more in the discussion of the "levels of speculative intellect." However, in the reinterpretation of Avicenna's epistemology, attention has generally been paid to expressions that demonstrate the independence of the intellect from the senses or any matter external to the intellect. In the forthcoming paper, after expounding and criticizing the first perspective, we will show that Avicenna's views support the second perspective. Any kind of reinterpretation of Avicenna's epistemological perspective in this regard, without considering his views on the "levels of speculative intellect" and the intellect's dependence on presential sensory perception, is not in line with his perspective. In general, according to the selected perspective, "sense intuition" is the first psychical reality to which the self is connected. The prior connection of the self to the psychical reality is the origin of actualization and the basis of the validity of the primary intelligibles; therefore, the speculative intellect relies on presential sensory perception while being independent in other respects.

The question of the relationship between the rational soul and the body, and the mediating role of the vaporous soul, has led to the formation of many philosophical discussions in this area. One of these cases is the causes and symptoms of mental illnesses, such as melancholic depression, which, from Avicenna's perspective, the most important reason for its occurrence and the most effective method of treatment should be sought in the relationship between the rational soul and the body. Melancholic depression means the deviation of human thoughts and mental images from the correct path, in which case the correspondence of cognitive concepts with the external world is disrupted, and therefore the person is immersed in their own incorrect thoughts and beliefs. This mental illness has different levels, and in its most severe form, mania, the patient's perceptions are greatly deviated from the real world, they constantly think about the dead, and may consider themselves dead. From Avicenna's point of view, the main cause of this disease should be sought in the weakness of the vaporous soul, which weakens the connection between the soul and the body. The root of this weakness is also the predominance of the melancholic temperament in the brain, which disrupts the function of the vaporous soul as the link between the soul and the body. Overall, Avicenna's approach to melancholic depression shows his comprehensive approach to mental disorders, an approach that is rooted both in his philosophical foundations and in empirical evidence and studies.

A miracle is one of the most important signs of proving the truthfulness of a prophet in his claim of prophethood. Therefore, discussing what a miracle is and explaining how it differs from magic and other supernatural events, is one of the basic issues in this field. In the present study, we first compared the philosophical explanations of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra on this issue; then, by referring to the content of the Qur'an and using clear historical semantics, we have evaluated the extent of matching the philosophical findings with the Qur'anic content. As a result of these investigations, it became clear that Ibn Sina, by emphasizing the specific characteristics of the prophets, and Mullah Sadra, by considering miracles as gifted, explained the philosophical differences between miracles and magic. They have considered the prophet's soul to be the proximate agent for the miracle. Ibn Sina also implicitly accepted the proof of the signification of a miracle on the truth of the claim of prophecy, while Mulla Sadra considers this signification to be unique to nonsensuous miracles. Qur'anic studies showed that the interpretations regarding miracles in the Qur'an show the inherent signification of miracles and proof of the truth of the claim of prophecy, and in this way, the distinction between magic and miracles is also clarified. On the other hand, by categorizing the types of miracles in the Qur'an, it became clear that a prophet is considered the proximate agent only in certain types of miracles. In the end, it is concluded that the philosophical efforts of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra were in many cases consistent with the Qur'anic intentions, and in cases where this concordance does not exist, newer philosophical explanations should be followed.

In order to comprehensively describe and explain the intellectual system of Sheikh Al-Raees Abu Ali Sina, especially to recognize the amount and quality of his philosophical innovations, it is necessary to refer and cite his lesser-known works, including the book Al-Insāf. This necessity goes back not only to the need to complete the geometry of his "Eastern wisdom", but also to the correct presentation of the principles and foundations of the philosophical thought of the Islamic world and the degree of independence and identity of the phenomenon called "Islamic philosophy". Another aspect of the importance of this reference and research is that Ibn Sina, in the mentioned book, examines and evaluates the opinions of the old and new commentators of Aristotle, among the conventional philosophical traditions up to his time. Something that can be seen in few works of this kind. Despite the certainty of attributing the authorship of the work to Ibn Sina, there are many questions about the themes and subjects of this book. In addition, discussions have been raised about the time of creation and authorship of the work, the quantity and quality of the content, and the issue of its rewriting. In this article, an attempt has been made to answer some of the aforementioned questions by using historical and philosophical sources and parts of the text of the Al-Mubahasat as an important witness and proof. In general, it should be said that Al-Insāf has an original version and a rewritten version, and in each of them, Ibn Sina had a different treatment compared to the descriptions of Aristotle's books. His effort has been to resolve the ambiguities in Aristotle's books based on rational and definite criteria, while making a fair judgment between different opinions, by determining the principles that he obtained from the main books of wisdom. In the meantime, the process of Avicenna's and his students' scientific relations with the thinkers of that time, especially the people of Baghdad, has been clarified to some extent. In order to refer to Ibn Sina's own works and literature in this context, the translation of a part of the text and the appendices of Al-Mubahasat have been attached to this article.

Thought is a fundamental and intrinsic characteristic of humans, setting them apart from other beings. For this reason, one of the influential factors in education is the cultivation and strengthening of the rational faculty. In Islamic philosphy, rational education has also been given serious attention. The main purpose of this research is to explain the methods of rational education in Ibn Sina's philosophical system. To achieve this goal, a descriptive-analytical method has been used. The research population includes the works of Ibn Sina, from which materials related to philosophical and educational foundations and methods of rational education have been purposefully selected. The findings indicate that the methods of rational education should be in line with the goals and principles and in accordance with them, and should guide the learners to choose the correct rational path and enrich the levels of reason until they reach the ultimate goal of rational education -which is divine proximity. These methods include cultivating creativity (creating a creative space), cultivating reason (through play and argumentative dialogue), question-based dialogue, participation, controlling the excesses of the soul, intellectual intuition, and the method of asceticism, which have been identified and explained. The application of the aforementioned methods can be effective in creating a foundation and smoothing the path for rational education in the educational system.

The question of human perfection and the perfect human is a subject of attention for all religions and philosophical, ethical, and educational schools of thought. The ultimate perfection is a level of human existence in which all innate, spiritual, and human potentials are actualized through spiritual practice. The main goal of this research is to examine human perfection from the perspectives of Ibn Sina and Ibn Arabi. A comparative method has been used to achieve this goal. In Ibn Sina's epistemological approach, only rational intuition is applicable, and it is not possible to speak of mystical knowledge and heart intuition. Ibn Sina considered the ultimate goal of knowledge and happiness to be rational and cognitive understanding, and connection to the Active Intellect, which is based on theoretical reason and rational intuition. However, in Ibn Arabi's intellectual system, every being is ontologically a manifestation of the name or names of God, and epistemologically, their understanding of God depends on their ability to receive divine manifestations. In Ibn Arabi's epistemological and intellectual system, the higher truths are received with the help of discovery and intuition and are of the nature of presentational knowledge. In Ibn Arabi's epistemological and intellectual system, human perfection is depicted based on love and discovery and intuition. Therefore, the perfect human of Ibn Sina, in his rational-intuitive perfection, is consistent with the mystical perfect human of Ibn Arabi. Therefore, the perfection of theoretical reason within the Peripatetic framework is a connection to practical reason and is incomplete without it. In both viewpoints, it is stated that humans have different levels of perfection. Acquiring these levels is gradual, and after going through this process of gradual perfection and ascending the levels of perfection, a human finally reaches the lofty position of his ultimate perfection. A review of Ibn Arabi's religious and mystical texts shows that he was by no means separate from society but was rather within it and considered the isolation of mystics and shunning society to be wrong. The perfect human of Ibn Sina, in a philosophical-mystical view, is the same as the mystical perfect human of Ibn Arabi and has no superiority over the perfect human of mystics. Therefore, it is not only the perfect human of Ibn Sina who is closer to the human of Islam and the Quran, but also the mystical perfect human of divine mystics, due to his complete manifestation of God, is the same as the Quranic and Islamic perfect human.

The central issue of this paper is to explain the place of pleasure and happiness and their relationship in the thought of Ibn Sina and Epicurus, and to conduct a comparative study of these concepts. For this purpose, using a descriptive-analytical method and library sources, we will examine the Epicurean approach to pleasure and happiness, with a focus on superior pleasure, the four-part cure, and the various dimensions of their hedonism and sensualism. In fact, Epicureans consider the primary goals of moral theory to be describing the nature of happiness and outlining the methods to achieve it. In the case of Ibn Sina, we will explore superior pleasure and types of happiness in his philosophy, drawing on his teleology and focusing on the concept of perception. Ibn Sina connects happiness to specific types of pleasure. Finally, since Epicurus and Ibn Sina present unique concepts of pleasure and happiness based on different worldviews, we will conduct a comparative analysis focusing on virtue-oriented approaches and perception, because both philosophers emphasize the central role of ethics and virtue in the pursuit of happiness. Based on the aforementioned points, this paper compares the views of Epicureans and Ibn Sina on pleasure and happiness.

Since Avicenna considers the main function of the estimative faculty to be the apprehension of intentions (maʿānī), other functions of this faculty must be understood in light of this form of apprehension. His primary and well-known meaning of intention is something inherently non-sensible that nonetheless exists within the particular sensibles. These intentions can generally be categorized under the duality of agreeableness (muwāfaqa) and disagreeableness (muẖālafa). Thus, a connection can be established between this class of intentions and particular accidents of existent qua existent. However, intentions never lose their relational aspect to the sensibles neither in the actualization nor in conceptualization. Avicenna also considers another kind of intention apprehended by estimation. This type of intention is nothing but the relation among the sensible forms, which is perceived from the external sensible objects and entities. Although this intention is non-sensible, unlike the first type, it is derived from and reducible to sensibles. Based on this second kind of intention, one can explain how, in estimative propositions (wahmiyyāt), judgments about sensibles are generalized to non-sensible objects. Furthermore, this generalization, if applied to the sensibles and their attributes, leads to the formation of induction. Given that Avicenna considers methodic experience (tajriba) to be the result of the conjunction between sensory induction and syllogism, it can be concluded that the estimative faculty and its apprehended intentions play a central role in the formation of empirical method and knowledge.

The discussion of existence and quiddity and the relationship between them is one of the fundamental debates in philosophy, and various portraits of this relationship can be shown in distinct natural, logical, and philosophical molds. The word “distinct” is a homonym in these cases and has a particular meaning in each one. However, these meanings have been frequently confused with each other in the history of philosophy. One of the innovations of Islamic philosophy is the theory of the distinction of existence from quiddity, which was only possible in the light of understanding the meaning of the truth of existence. Islamic philosophers, particularly Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, tried to perceive existence differently from Aristotle and not to reduce the question of being to the whatness of objects because of their epistemological distance from the Greek tradition in philosophy. Nevertheless, this approach has also had its own critics. One of the philosophers who criticized the distinction of quiddity from existence is Ibn Rushd. He accused Ibn Sīnā of misunderstanding and heresy regarding the relationship between existence, quiddity, and accidents of existence and believed that Ibn Sīnā had confused the different meanings of existence and the one and had fallen in the trap of sophistry due to homonymy. Ibn Rushd maintained that the origin of the formation of objects is substance and considered existence to be merely a concept that can be abstracted from existing objects. His main criticism of Ibn Sīnā concerning this problem was that viewing existence as an accident for quiddity leads to several misconceptions such as equating existence with substance. However, Ibn Rushd himself had in fact failed to understand the meaning of existence as an accident in Ibn Sīnā’s view. He believed that Ibn Sīnā had equated existence and accident in the sense of a quiddative affair with each other, while Ibn Sīnā’s intention of occurrence of existence to quiddity as an accident was its addition to quiddity.

Ibn Sina, In several parts of his books, when he is talking about perception or perceptive powers, has mentioned the word mind, which indicates the special importance of the mind in the realization of perceptions; Because of this reason, it seems correct to say that on necessary precondition to understanding many issues of Ibn Sina's philosophy , including epistemological issues, is to have a detailed understanding and insight into what the mind is and its relationship with all kinds of perceptions; This is despite the fact that Avicenna, in his works, did not independently explain what the mind is and its characteristics; As a result, this research aims to explain and solve the mentioned problem by considering the various phrases mentioned in Ibn Sina's works and their analysis. Some of the important findings of this research have been that unlike many philosophers and also contemporary cognitive science who consider all cognitive abilities to be attributed to the mind, Avicenna does not consider the mind to be the cause of all type of cognitions. In his works, the existence of mental abilities is only limited to the human type, which of course is caused by the absence of nonmaterial soul in other types of animals. Although all animals have some special cognitions, which are called the first cognition, but according to Avicenna's philosophy, they cannot be considered mental.