جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « ابن‏سينا » در نشریات گروه « علوم انسانی »

Moral education is very important and vital in the structure of the educational system because ethics and moral education are the foundation of social development. The purpose was to explain the curriculum of moral education in the second year of elementary school based on Ibn Sina's opinions and thoughts. The current research was applied in terms of purpose and qualitative in terms of method. Using the qualitative content analysis method, the foundations and elements of the moral education curriculum have been extracted, and due to the multidisciplinary nature of the moral education curriculum, a qualitative approach was chosen to identify the subject under study. In this regard, all the contents of the books "Hints and Punishments", "Tadbir Menzel" &"Barhan Shefa" were studied and the parts that can be used to design the curriculum of moral education were extracted. According to the findings of the research, there are a total of 7 criteria of self-ownership and self-mastery, path-breaking patience, attention to encouragement and punishment in moral education, achieving true perfection, moderation in sensual powers. Emphasis on humility in character growth and attention to covering up flaws were identified as one of the moral virtues. The moral education curriculum model as a desirable model in response to the shortcomings in the moral education process and suggests that for effective moral education, one should consider teaching as a profession from the learning capacity in a curriculum such as collective education. For the pleasure of God and attention to the cognitive ability of students.

Understanding the reality of entities can be approached through two methods a) positively, to discern the essence of the object, and b) negatively, to delineate what the object is not. This study investigates Avicenna's perspective on the essence of the soul. While previous research has extensively explored the positive attributes, this study delves into the less organized negative attributes, shedding light on the soul's distinctions from nature, the Spirit of vapor, temperament, body, corporeality, intellect, and vitality. The significance of the soul's divergence from corporeality lies in its implicit deviation from temperament, the Spirit of vapor, the physical body, and other material elements. Notably, disassociating the soul from intellect is essential to prevent misunderstandings, avoiding the misconception of the human soul as a purely abstract concept. Furthermore, examining the soul's connection with vitality elucidates shared attributes and encompasses a diverse spectrum of entities characterized as living.

What role did Avicenna play in the evolution of philosophical thought regarding the recognition of presential knowledge? The clearest example of presential knowledge is human awareness of their own essence (self-awareness), and Avicenna used this self-awareness as the basis for his argument to prove the soul in the "suspended man" argument. However, what type of knowledge is this self-awareness: presential or acquired? Avicenna's statements about this self-awareness sometimes suggest it is presential knowledge and sometimes align with it being acquired knowledge. This article, using a descriptive, analytical, and critical method, examines and analyzes his statements, especially in the book "Mubahathat," where he defends the suspended man argument and addresses questions related to self-awareness. The aim is to clarify the connection between his concept of self-awareness and presential knowledge and to determine the position of his teachings on self-awareness in the development of the division of knowledge into presential and acquired in Islamic philosophy. The result of this research is that Avicenna's concept of self-awareness should be considered presential knowledge, even though he did not use this term and sometimes explained it using terms and concepts related to acquired knowledge. Therefore, he can be regarded as the pioneer in drawing philosophers' attention to this type of knowledge in the history of Islamic philosophy.

Mystical ethics constitutes one of the three tiers of Avicenna’s Neoplatonic ethical structure. Like his other works on mysticism, Avicenna presents mystical ethics within the intellectual framework inherent in mystical thought itself. In other words, Avicenna's discussion of mystical ethics cannot be fully understood without considering the intellectual tradition of Sufism. However, due to the particular place of scientific ethics in his work, the volume of Avicenna’s writings on mystical ethics is quite limited. Therefore, in this article, other texts written within this intellectual framework are also employed to elaborate on some of the mystical aspects of his ethics. Through additional explanations of these texts, Avicenna’s brief statements are further expanded. Furthermore, the ethics presented in mystical texts encompasses a broad range of concepts, and Avicenna’s mystical ethics also briefly touches on many of these concepts. This article aims to focus solely on the concepts shared between Neoplatonic ethics and mystical ethics. The research will demonstrate that the source of these shared concepts is Sufi thought, although Avicenna found no conflict between them and the Neoplatonic structure of his ethical thought.

Divine love stands as a pivotal aspect of the intricate relationship between humans and God. Despite its multifaceted presence in theological and mystical traditions, achieving consensus on its nature remains challenging. The inherently personal essence of divine love introduces a level of ambiguity when considering it in the context of an impersonal God, as exemplified by Avicenna's Necessary Existent Deity. Avicenna portrays God as a metaphysical entity characterized by pure transcendence, devoid of personal emotions and passions. In contrast, he positions love as the pinnacle of the human-God connection. This article seeks to elucidate the significance and realization of this love through a semantical lens. While Avicenna provides a comprehensive definition of love as a "propensity for goodness," constructing a cohesive semantic system, the culmination suggests that human love for The Pure Good ultimately sheds any personal attributes. Instead, it transforms into a form of inner metamorphosis, encompassing rational-practical perfection. Hence, articulating divine love in a literal sense seems implausible for The Necessary Existent. Avicenna, in his elimination of dialectics, metaphorically applies divine love to convey a metaphysical rationality and an inner transformative process.

Two general perspectives have been proposed regarding the existential realms of human beings. Proponents of the first perspective believe in two existential realms: the immaterial essence (soul) and the material body, attributing human actions primarily to the immaterial essence. Followers of the second perspective consider humans to be unidimensional and confined to physical existence, reducing all human actions to their physicality, especially the brain, and denying any immaterial essence. The present study aims to elucidate the first perspective by examining Avicenna's notion of the soul's immateriality in the context of critiquing the second perspective. The research method is descriptive-analytical. The findings and results indicate that Avicenna, by presenting elements of proof and various arguments, has endeavored to substantiate the immateriality of the soul through an explanation of the soul's actions. Accordingly, in Avicenna's paradigm, the immateriality of the soul is based on three pillars: intellect, immanence, and independence. Physicalists believe that the belief in an essence independent of the body to explain and understand human perceptions arises from a lack of sufficient awareness regarding the brain's and nervous system's functions and complexities. Furthermore, the claim that bodily changes are due to the body's instrumental relationship with the soul is unprovable. Thus, the denial and critiques of physicalists are formed around three axes: the capability of the brain and nervous system, the ambiguity of philosophy in logically explaining the soul-body relationship, and cognitive ignorance. Avicenna, with seven arguments in proving the immateriality of the soul, responds to the corresponding physicalist critiques. However, two physicalist objections remain ambiguous in Avicenna's paradigm: the inexplicability of the soul-body connection and the objection based on the premise of intuitive understanding.

The question of whether the universe is eternal and without beginning or created by God from nothing and thus temporally originated has long preoccupied philosophers and theologians. This debate has given rise to extensive discussions in philosophical and theological writings under the topic of "origination and eternity." Most philosophers have regarded the universe as eternal, while most theologians have considered it temporally originated. The conflicts and rebuttals between supporters of these two camps were to be expected. Imam Muhammad Ghazali's book The Incoherence of the Philosophers is one of the well-known rebuttals written against Ibn Sina and his belief in the eternity of the world. This paper, after summarizing the historical debate on this issue, reexamines the conflict and aims to provide a new interpretation. Essentially, the debate over origination and eternity can be understood as appearing to address the nature of the universe, but in reality, each side had theological preconceptions, and the underlying issue was shaped by different theological perspectives.

One of the advantages of Islamic and Iranian culture and civilization is the controversy, discussion and criticism of the opinions of its thinkers, which has increasingly developed based on the teachings of the Quran and the Prophetic tradition and show the religious atmosphere of its time relatively. Abu Hamid Al-Ghazzali is one of the great and rare scholars in the Islamic world. He also has been one of the strongest opponents of philosophy throughout history, who wrote the book entitled Tahafut-Al-Falasifah to examine the opinions and thoughts of philosophers, including Avicenna, and to express the weakness of their thoughts in a fair manner. Tahafut-Al-Falasifah is one of the greatest and most influential books that has been written throughout the history of criticizing philosophical ideas in accordance with Islamic and Iranian customs. The present paper has tried to elucidate the position of rational sciences in the era of Imam Muhammad Ghazzali and to explain disagreements between Avicenna and Ghazzali using descriptive-analytical approach. The research findings indicate that Ghazzali has sought to return the faith of Muslims to its strength and originality, but with his opposition to philosophy and philosophers caused the roots of philosophy to wither and dry up in many Islamic countries.

Avicenna, in his treatise called "Al-Siyasāt al-Ahliyyah", has discussed various topics about household management, among which are discussion about family formation and discussion about wife and children. The discussions about wife and child in this treatise are not only about family management, how to deal with wife and child. However, the issues related to women's rights and children's rights are also seen in it. The two fundamental questions of this paper are whether women's rights and children's rights, which are found in Avicenna's views in this treatise, are comparable to the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (first question), and if they can be compared, do they confirm or deny each other? Hence, the topics that will be examined in this paper will be in line with the answers to these two questions in a descriptive-analytical method.

Avicenna, with the theory of the spiritual origination of the soul along with the body, was able to overcome some of the problems of the Aristotelian method in a step forward. But the question is, how did this famous philosopher and medical doctor express this matter in his philosophical natural sciences and what natural basis did he use? Another question is, if Avicenna’s explanation of soul origination in the nature of the body is consistence with his explanation of the soul origination in the body in his mind philosophy? In order to answer this question, the quality of life, nutrition and growth from the beginning of the formation of the sperm in the embryo is investigated in the Avicenna’s philosophical natural sciences. He said that the sperm becomes ready to receive the life-giving heavenly potency by using heavenly heat, and the soul potencies take responsible of planning, maintaining and growing the embryo's body through the vapor spirit. Then, after the formation of the heart in the embryo, the soul belongs to the heart and will take over the leadership of the whole body. In the second step, this article presents a solution to compatible these two explanations by using a different interpretation of Avicenna's expressions.

One of the divine attributes is God's omnipresence in the universe. God's presence can be understood in various ways. One such interpretation is God's "sustaining" presence, signifying His general agency in relation to the world. According to this notion, God is the cause of both the existence and the persistence of the universe. Ibn Sina assigns a special place to the efficient cause among the four Aristotelian causes and elevates the concept of the efficient cause from a mere triggering cause to one that bestows existence. He offers two elaborations to elucidate God's effective causality with respect to the world, which are intrinsically related. These two explanations can be titled: "God's bestowal of existence upon essences" and "God's conferring of necessity upon essences." Using analytical approach in reading Ibn Sina’s works, in this article, after elucidating these two explanations, their interrelation is also clarified. Ultimately, considering Ibn Sina's hierarchical structure of beings, a kind of graded and tentative sustaining presence is derived from his philosophical system.

One of the main issues in the Islamic religion is resurrection, which Muslim theologians and scholars have investigated in terms of how it occurs. An important aspect of the discussion on resurrection is whether it is spiritual or bodily. One of the religious certainties among Muslims is bodily resurrection, as many verses and traditions indicate it. Muslim scholars are so sure of this belief that some have considered those who deny bodily resurrection to be disbelievers. Meanwhile, what is problematic is Ibn Sina's theory about resurrection. Some, citing certain works of Ibn Sina, have considered him a believer in bodily resurrection, while others, citing the book al-Adhḥawiyyah, have considered him an opponent of bodily resurrection and have condemned him as a blasphemer. In some of his works, Ibn Sina has accepted bodily resurrection and defers the judgment on this matter to Sharia. However, in al-Adhḥawiyyah, he apparently clearly denies bodily resurrection and even considers it to be against rational arguments. This article attempts to resolve the contradiction in Ibn Sina's views in Al-Adhḥawiyyah and his other works using an analytical, library-based methodology.

Ibn Sina, whose extensive research on the human being from biological and existential aspects, and especially on the human soul, is unparalleled in the Islamic world, considers the comprehension of universals to be the highest level of perception and the highest stage of the human soul. The comprehension of universals, which is the key to entering the boundless sea of knowledge and truths, has sparked long-standing ambiguities and debates among philosophers. These include whether its scope is limited or unlimited, and also to what extent humans can recognize the essence and properties of universals. In light of the importance and functional role of consciousness in all spheres of life, this research has endeavored to provide an appropriate response from Ibn Sina’s perspective to two questions: (1) what is the extent of human knowledge? and (2) is the only role of definitions to distinguish between things, or do they also enable humans to recognize all their essential qualities? To reach a scholarly judgment, two groups of Ibn Sina’s statements are first presented, evaluated, and analyzed. Then, drawing on general philosophical principles that do not consider human knowledge limited, and benefiting from Ibn Sina’s philosophical foundations, especially his view on the connection between soul and body and his emphasis on the ability to develop existential capacities, it is concluded that humans have no closed boundary in the horizontal path to acquiring perfections and are capable of recognizing the essence of things. If it is objected that, in addition to ancient philosophical texts, many treatises and articles have been written on the comprehension of universals and the subject matter of this research, the answer is that what distinguishes this research from previous research is the explanation of the existential capacities of humans. If these capacities are developed, they open up new horizons around the scope of knowledge for humans and reveal the fallacy of the assumption that Ibn Sina’s statements about the limits of human knowledge are not consistent with each other.

Some of Avicenna’s expressions about the rational soul and its relationship with intelligibles specify the union of the intelligent and the intelligible, while others clearly show the invalidity of this theory. This has caused a difference among philosophers after him regarding his final opinion on this issue. Some considered Avicenna's explanation contradictory and took a critical approach toward it, while another group has tried to resolve this contradiction. However, apparently, neither of the two groups has followed the right path. In this article, after evaluating the opinions raised, we have expressed three things: (1) the meanings of important terms in the issue of “union”; (2) the relationship between the soul and intellectual faculties; (3) the semantics of the “union” theory in Avicenna's view and, at the same time, the quality of the union of the soul and the intelligibles in the presence of the body and in separation from it. In general, it seems that Avicenna's statements about the theory of “union” don’t contradict each other. The illusion of contradiction arises from not paying attention to the different meanings of "union" in his works and not distinguishing the various positions that Avicenna expressed regarding the relationship between the soul and the intelligibles. Avicenna proves the union of the soul with the intelligibles and believes that it is similar to the union of matter and form. In his opinion, this union with a special intelligible form exists in the soul together with the body as long as the soul does not turn away from it. However, the soul, by going through the stages of perfection and separation from the body, can become an intellectual world in accordance with the objective world by instantaneously receiving all intelligibles and uniting with them.

Pleasure has been a topic of philosophical inquiry for centuries, with Islamic thinkers offering diverse definitions. This study employs an analytical and comparative approach to evaluate the most prominent definitions within Islamic philosophy, focusing on precision, inclusivity, and restrictiveness. The analysis reveals Ibn Sina's definition in Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat to be the most compelling. However, Ibn Sina emphasizes the conditions for attaining pleasure, linking it to intuition and attainment. This article proposes an alternative view, defining pleasure as a distinct quality of the soul separate from intuition and perception. More specifically, pleasure is the elation and contentment experienced through perceiving and attaining something harmonious and fulfilling for the individual. This experience ideally occurs in a state free from distractions that impede pleasure. According to the limitations outlined in this definition, pleasure is a quality of the soul, distinct from perception, voluntary, relative, and arises from human needs. An individual only achieves pleasure when they can understand the cause of the pleasure and recognize it as good and perfect for them. Ibn Sina considers rational pleasure to be the highest form of pleasure. He argues that conflicts can arise between different levels of sensual pleasures. To resolve these conflicts, a logical and comprehensive prioritization system is necessary.

Contemporary theories in cognitive semantics suggest that humans utilize conceptual metaphors, either consciously or subconsciously, to distill complex mental constructs into simpler forms. Philosophers, in particular, have extensively employed conceptual metaphors to render abstract philosophical notions comprehensible. This study delves into the application of conceptual metaphors in elucidating ‘knowledge by presence’ within Avicenna’s philosophy. Ibn Sinā employed these metaphors to articulate and streamline the concept of ‘knowledge by presence.’ He posits that such knowledge is actualized when the object of knowledge is directly present to the knower, that is, the soul. However, he asserts that mere presence is not the sole requisite for attaining knowledge; rather, conditions conducive to vision and illumination must also be met for presence to culminate in knowledge acquisition. Interpreting his discourse yields two metaphors: ‘knowledge by presence as seeing’ and ‘knowledge by presence as illumination.’ The ‘seeing’ metaphor hinges on three critical elements: the observer, the observed, and their interrelation. Conversely, the ‘illumination’ metaphor involves two key elements: the source of illumination and the object being illuminated. This article endeavors to explore the conceptual metaphors associated with ‘knowledge by presence’ in Avicennian philosophy through an exploratory approach, deliberately eschewing any hypothesis formulation.

The classification of sciences is a fundamental topic in epistemology and has a significant impact on determining the position, role, and function of each branch of knowledge. Considering the centrality of wisdom (ḥikmah) and Islamic law (shariʿah) in Islamic thought, the classification of sciences has sometimes been structured around these two principles. This paper investigates the relationship between philosophy and jurisprudence, or ḥikmah and shariʿah, as articulated in the classification systems of Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina. It examines the foundations, implications, and consequences of their approaches within their respective philosophical frameworks. The research employs a descriptive-analytical methodology. The findings reveal that both philosophers acknowledge the compatibility of philosophy and religion, but their prioritizations differ. Al-Farabi prioritizes philosophy, placing jurisprudence and theology under practical wisdom, which is subordinate to theoretical wisdom. In contrast, Ibn Sina prioritizes religion, considering shariʿah as an independent science within practical wisdom, distinct from human sciences and with a divine origin. Ibn Sina views shariʿah as an independent science alongside political science, not as a branch of it. By granting shariʿah an independent identity, Ibn Sina lends it credibility and creates conditions for its potential substitution for practical wisdom in the trajectory of Islamic philosophy. He lays the groundwork for the two sciences of usul al-din (theology) and furuʿ al-din (jurisprudence). It appears that Ibn Sina perceives the realization of philosophy in the Islamic society of his time in the Islamization of philosophy and the validation of religious sciences. Therefore, compared to Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina is more concerned with the Islamization of philosophy and seeks to harmonize the philosophy of his predecessors with his own society.

Intellectual education cultivates the power of reason. Intellect plays a crucial role in reasoning, analysis, and combining information within the education system. Therefore, this article aims to identify and explain the obstacles to rational education from Ibn Sina's perspective, proposing educational solutions to address them within the education system. The research employs a qualitative method with the Claysey model for data analysis. Data collection involved analyzing books, descriptions, and articles on Avicenna's views. Ibn Sina defines intellectual education as cultivating the intellectual power to reach divine proximity. By understanding and overcoming obstacles, this approach strengthens the educated mind. The article identifies these obstacles within three axes: cognitive, attitudinal, and practical. The cognitive axis includes elements like illusion, conflict with truth, sensory disorder, and emotional outbursts. The attitudinal axis encompasses components such as difficulty distinguishing good from bad (virtues and vices), anger, rage, lack of pure intention, and dependence on worldly affairs. Finally, the practical axis includes elements like disobeying God's commandments, satanic temptations, excessive desires (greed), and lust. Following the description of each element, the article proposes new educational solutions to address these obstacles to rational education.

Nasir al-Din Tusi, the pioneer of the “Philosophical Rationality” movement within the theological-philosophical school of Ḥillah, emphasized the examination of “first philosophy,” the effects of which could be seen in the more specific problems of theology. This study explains the problem of the meaning of Divine names in some works of Nasir al-Din Tusi and Fazil Miqdad, for which they adopted an apophatic approach under the influence of Ibn Sina. According to the rule of the “impossibility of abstracting two concepts from a simple reality,” Ibn Sina believed in the conceptual synonymy of Divine attributes. In response to the possible objection regarding the different meanings of God’s attributes in theological propositions, he proposed a threefold strategy: negation of opposing meaning, addition to the creature, or a synthesis of both. Nasir al-Din Tusi has not explicitly referred to Ibn Sina's conceptual synonymy theory; however, he has implicitly adopted his threefold strategy in Al-Fusul al-Nasiriyya. Tusi organized his discussion not around the meaning of Divine attributes, but around the “meanings of God's names,” categorizing Allah as the “name of essence” separately and expanding Ibn Sina's framework into a fourfold schema within his own theological-philosophical discourse. Subsequently, Fazil Miqdad, in Al-Anwar al-Jalaliyya, elucidated Tusi's framework with simplified language, addressing certain ambiguities. Tusi's apophatic perspective, as expounded by Miqdad, suggests that the multiplicity of God's names does not entail a plurality of attributes in His essence, thereby maintaining compatibility with the simplicity of Divine essence.