جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « حاکمیت شرکتی » در نشریات گروه « علوم انسانی »

The results of the model estimation show that information transparency has a significant and positive effect with an impact factor of 0.08 at a significance level of one percent. Therefore, it can be said that information transparency as a component of corporate governance has a significant effect on the economic growth rate of listed companies. Also, the results of the model estimation show that audit quality has a significant and positive effect with an impact factor of 0.10 at a significance level of one percent. The duality variable of the CEO and the chairman of the company's board of directors has a significant effect on the economic growth rate with an impact coefficient of 0.012 at a significance level of five percent, and the concentration of ownership as a component of corporate governance has a significant effect on the economic growth rate. Examining the estimation results of the model shows that the concentration of ownership or the influence coefficient of 0.03 at the significance level of five percent has a positive and significant effect on economic growth. Also, the size of the board of directors as a component of corporate governance does not have a significant effect on the economic growth rate of companies. According to the findings of the research, the variable of institutional ownership of the percentage (ratio) of institutional ownership to the total number of shares of the company has an impact coefficient of 0.02 at a significant level of five percent.

The main goal of this research is to extract the most important factors affecting the quality of financial reporting by accountants and auditors in Iran by using the expert consensus approaches proposed by Lawshe , Waltz and Bussell, and then to determine the most important factors using DEMATEL's approach. First, the completion of open questionnaires by 14 experts and then ensuring its content validity with the approaches of Lawshe Waltz and Bussell, were considered. In the following, with the participation of 10 experts and using DEMATEL's approach, the cause and effect relationship between the factors has been identified. According to this study, the most important variables affecting the quality of reporting are: disclosure of information, management ability, corporate governance, audit committee, audit quality, information asymmetry, internal control system, rules and requirements of the stock exchange and conflict of interest. The three variables of management ability, corporate governance and audit quality have a significant role and importance in the quality of financial reporting. Analyzing the network of identified connections between these variables, it is possible to identify the most important variables more precisely and to set strategies and policies related to improving the quality of financial reporting based on them.

Technological advances indicate a new era of analysis and data-driven decision-making in capital markets. Blockchain, which is the main technology of digital currency markets, is being introduced as a disruptive technology, especially in the stock market. Today, there is a broad consensus among the majority of stock market actors about the significant power of blockchain technology in the position of a new approach to managing and exchanging data in financial markets, and especially maintaining reliable and transparent data records in stock markets, considering the huge volume of transactions that are carried out in them. has it. On the other hand, the two main factors that cause representation problems in the corporate governance of traditional stock exchanges are the difference in the interests of investors and representatives and the complexity of the investment chain. The purpose of this study is to investigate the benefits of implementing blockchain technology as a basis for stock transactions in order to improve the corporate governance of publishers through a two-stage review consisting of a systematic review and an online Delphi. The findings of the research show that compared to traditional stock trading systems, blockchain technology has several advantages, including high transparency of information, improvement of stock liquidity, high monitoring by different parties, availability of real-time information, reduction of price divergence from stock value, provision of accounting comparability. And it is preventing profit management, the final output of which will be the creation of better corporate governance. The implementation of blockchain technology will be able to reduce the information asymmetry in the relationship between the manager and the owner, which in turn can improve the quality of corporate governance due to transparency, accountability and high trust between all parties involved in the network

The ultimate goal of corporate governance is to achieve the promotion of fairness, transparency, accountability, and compliance with the rights of shareholders in companies and economic enterprises. However, there are doubts about its success rate in achieving the aforementioned goals. The disclosure of more and periodic information will reduce the cost of capital and the cost of transactions, reduce the error in profit forecasts, or demand more than usual for a company's bonds. Managers can pursue the goal of maximizing shareholders' wealth by managing variables (such as transparency) in the financial structure. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of corporate governance on the financial performance of companies using the mediating variable of transparency. In this study, using a meta-analysis approach, the impact of transparency on corporate governance and its effect on financial performance is investigated. A hypothesis about the effect of corporate governance on the mediating variable of transparency and a hypothesis about the effect of the mentioned variable on financial performance were proposed and 20 articles including a total of 81 effect sizes (of type r) whose publication dates were between 2003 and 2018 were studied. If the effect size was divergent, the random effects method was used, and for convergent cases, the fixed effects method was used to calculate the effect size. In addition to testing each hypothesis, after determining the size of the cumulative effect, a robustness test was performed and analyzed for each hypothesis. The results indicated that corporate governance has no effect on transparency, but the robustness test showed that the mechanisms of corporate governance, including the independence of the board of directors, and the dual role of the CEO and the audit committee, have a significant effect on transparency. In addition, the results show the significant impact of transparency on financial performance.

In recent years, the discussion of corporate governance has become one of the topics of professional and scientific research. In previous studies, the direct impact of corporate governance on the company's financial performance has been measured (Che Haat et al., 2008; Mardnly et al., 2018; Saidat et al., 2019). Corporate governance is expected to improve financial performance not only directly but also through the mediating effect of transparency. Corporate governance may affect the level of corporate disclosure, especially when the board of directors manages the information disclosed in annual reports (Gibbins et al., 1990). Centralized decision-making power (such as the same role of the CEO and the chairman of the board of directors) hinders the possibility of monitoring various aspects, including disclosure policies, due to the threat to the independence of the board of directors (Carver, 1990; Fama & Jensen, 1983). A good corporate governance system requires periodic, transparent, and comparable information reporting, especially information related to financial, managerial, and ownership issues of the company. Transparency, in terms of its role in reducing information asymmetry, is the preferred area for shareholders to control managers because it reduces risk and consequently improves performance. Therefore, the first hypothesis was formulated as follows:Hypothesis 1: Corporate governance affects the transparency of firms.
Reducing information asymmetry from the perspective of agency theory reduces the tendency to selfishness, and from the perspective of investment, it reduces risk and expected return. Both of these aspects make analysts expect that information disclosure can improve the firm's financial performance. Therefore, a high level of transparency has a positive effect on the company's performance. Accordingly, information disclosure such as periodical reports can reduce capital costs and information asymmetry (Lang & Lundholm, 1999). Therefore, the second hypothesis was formulated as follows:Hypothesis 2: Transparency has an effect on the financial performance of economic enterprises.

After reviewing various scientific sources, seven steps were selected for the meta-analysis (Glass et al., 1981; Hunter & Schmidt, 2004; Kohli & Devaraj, 2003; Rosenthal, 2001). The first step is to determine the thematic framework. The second step is to specify the keywords, determine the databases and search for studies, the third step is to screen the searched articles according to one of the research hypotheses, to report the effect size and the type of correlational study. The fourth step is to collect the data from the searched articles. The fifth step was to calculate the effect size for each member of the sample (each test). The sixth step was to calculate the common effect size for each hypothesis. Finally, in the seventh step, the homogeneity of the effect size was calculated for each hypothesis (each group of effect sizes).
If the within-group effect sizes are convergent (zero variance hypothesis is not rejected), it means that there is a common effect size that all sample tests have measured; and the fixed effects method is used to calculate the cumulative effect size. If the effect sizes within the group are divergent (zero variance hypothesis is rejected), it means that there are different effect sizes, one of which has been calculated in each sample of the tests; and the random effects method was used to calculate the cumulative effect size.

In this section, the robustness tests performed to test the hypotheses and comment on the confirmation or disconfirmation of each of the hypotheses. In both hypotheses, the common effect size is divergent, that is, it is related to a group of different effect sizes with high deviation, and the random effects method is the basis for calculating the common effect size. The results indicated the rejection of the null hypothesis related to the second hypothesis. In other words, the effect of transparency on financial performance is confirmed, but the effect of corporate governance on transparency is rejected. The robustness test in the first hypothesis shows the lack of influence of corporate governance on transparency in developed and developing countries. There is no significant relationship between corporate governance and transparency in different time periods, except for the years 2005-2009. The results show that there is a significant relationship between the independent variable of the board of directors and transparency. The CEO duality variable has a negative and significant effect, board size has a positive and significant effect at the 5% level, and the audit committee has a positive and significant effect on transparency. The indicators of concentration of ownership, the number of board meetings, and gender diversity in the board of directors have not been tested because the sample number is less than 5.
In the validation of the second hypothesis, the results show no significant effect between transparency and financial performance in developed countries. In the time interval of 2015-2019, there is a significant and positive effect between transparency and financial performance, and the results of other periods have not been tested because the number of samples is less than 5. In the financial performance section, a significant and positive effect was observed between transparency and ROA and ROE. No significant effect was found between transparency and Tobin's Q. The results of other indicators were not tested because the number of samples was less than 5.

The main purpose of this study is to meta-analyze the indirect effect of corporate governance on the financial performance of companies using the mediating variable of transparency. In the first hypothesis, the relationship between transparency and corporate governance was tested. The results of the current study did not show a significant effect between corporate governance and transparency due to the overlap of various corporate governance indicators. The study of various indicators of corporate governance shows a significant and positive relationship between the independence of the board of directors and transparency, the audit committee and transparency, and a significant and negative relationship between the duality of the CEO and transparency. In the second hypothesis, the relationship between transparency and financial performance has been tested. The results show a significant and positive impact on the company's financial performance. The robustness test shows that this effect is quite evident in the studies studied in recent years. The high level of information disclosure helps the stakeholders in improving the quality of their decision-making.
The above results, like any other research, may be criticized due to the researchers’ limited access to all published empirical studies, the time limit of studying past articles and looking at them retrospectively, the meta-analytic nature of this study, and the dependence on meta-analysis results on past experimental studies. However, due to the wide range of companies that support the results, the validity of the empirical studies collected and the robustness check performed are robust enough to be the basis for decision-making and policy-making for managers, policymakers, and investors. Therefore, it is suggested to the shareholders to emphasize the independence of the board of directors and the audit committee to improve the financial performance, through the index of the audit committee, control the level of transparency, and provide the basis for the improvement of the financial performance, through the indicators of the independence of the board of directors and the duality of the CEO to create the context of increasing the transparency of the company and thus improving the financial performance, pay enough attention to the concentration of ownership, the duality of the CEO, the size of the board of directors, and the number of board meetings in the development of the corporate governance system because it is a good basis for optimizing transparency and improving financial performance.

Pension funds play a crucial role in Iran by providing retirement provisions through paying pension benefits to retirees and their eligible survivors. However, the pension funds currently experience a critical situation due to a significant disparity between their financial resources and pension liabilities. This crisis stems from several factors, including the generosity of pension programs (in terms of retirement age and conditions and scope of support for survivors), demographic changes, and increased life expectancy leading to more pensioners and fewer contributors. Additionally, the challenges such as low returns on investment; transference of loss-making enterprises to the funds in order to settle government debts; and structural, governance, and management issues have exacerbated the situation.In fact, the primary factor contributing to the current crisis is the inefficiency of laws and regulations governing the Social Security Organization (SSO) and the Civil Servant Pension Fund (CSPF). The existing regulations on the governance of pension funds have changed the government’s role from regulator and guarantor to an intervening party. Consequently, most fund managers are appointed by the government, which sidelines beneficiaries and stakeholders from the governance process. Such a governmental structure, coupled with the lack of stakeholder involvement, exacerbates the problem of representation arising from the separation of ownership and management. This issue manifests itself not only in the traditional form but also in the political form.To address the problem of representation in pension funds requires supervision and increased stakeholder participation in fund management in order to enhance transparency, accountability, and managerial accountability. Therefore, it is crucial to revise laws and regulations to empower stakeholders’ role in the administration of pension funds. In this respect, the present study aimed to analyze the deficiencies in the laws and regulations on the governance and management of pension funds in Iran through the lens of corporate governance principles and mechanisms.

The regulations on the governance and management of pension funds play a crucial role in their performance. Establishing procedures and processes that promote good governance in pension funds can significantly contribute to the prevention and resolution of the current crisis. In this respect, corporate governance and its principles and mechanisms can serve as a vital tool for assessing the governance and management of pension funds. Pension funds in Iran, particularly SSO and CSPF, lack indicators of good governance in line with the corporate governance principles. The stakeholder involvement in company management, a fundamental right contributing to the mitigation of representation problems, is largely absent from the governance structure of Iran’s pension funds. Moreover, there are no legal requirements mandating transparency and reporting of the performance of pension fund managers. Additionally, the failure to recognize managers’ legal responsibility for their decisions, often influenced by their political affiliations, exacerbates the lack of accountability on the part of managers.

The present study used a descriptive–analytical method to address the research questions.

Considering the corporate governance mechanisms, Iranian pension funds (esp. SSO and CSPF) lack optimal conditions. The independence of the board of directors, a crucial aspect of corporate governance aimed at achieving its goals and principles, is fundamentally absent in Iranian pension funds. Moreover, the supervisory structure of pension funds fails to consider tripartism and the role of stakeholders. In addition, the absence of independent audit and actuarial committees within the supervisory framework severely undermines its effectiveness.The Audit Organization is tasked with auditing pension funds as per Paragraph (d) of Article (17) of Act on Structure of Welfare and Social Security Comprehensive System. However, the Audit Organization lacks the necessary independence and impartiality due to its governmental affiliation. Furthermore, the absence of official actuarial mechanisms to calculate the resources and liabilities of the funds, their exclusion from the establishment of rules and regulations related to fund liabilities, and the lack of public disclosure of report results to stakeholders and beneficiaries all have contributed to increased pension liabilities and financial instability of Iranian pension funds.

Due to the systemic importance of banks in the economy, the stability and health of banks, which is affected by the processes and frameworks governing the administration of banks, are considered key elements for the stability of the financial system. The realization of corporate governance in banks is considered as one of the most important ways to achieve the stability and health of the banking system.In response to the question, which of the components and elements of corporate governance, including the board of directors, executive board, risk management, auditing, service compensation and disclosure and transparency, is more important in achieving the stability and health of the banking system, in this article with Using the multi-criteria decision modeling approach, various elements and components of corporate governance in the banking system have been ranked in terms of importance in achieving the stability and health of the banking system. The results of the research show that two components of the decision-making and monitoring component include "non-executive and independence of the board members" and "adopting policies related to the identification and control of conflicts of interest" and the component of "creating the necessary infrastructure to create transparency..." from the disclosure component and Transparency with relative weights of 0.107, 0.089, 0.073, respectively, took the first three ranks of corporate governance components in achieving banking stability and health. The results of this research can be considered in determining the regulatory priorities of the central bank and modifying the structures and processes governing the banking system.

Banks are looking for this to be able to monitor the effectiveness of granted facilities within the framework of corporate governance. Because one of the most important current damages in the banking system is the failure to use the granted facilities correctly, which leads to the deviation of the facilities, and any weakness and shortcoming in this regard causes the blocking of large resources from the banks and the reduction of the speed of money. Therefore, the main goal of this research is to design a corporate governance model for effective monitoring of bank loans, which is the case study of the National Bank of Iran. The current research is qualitative. The community of experts studied are some senior managers of the National Bank of Iran in Tehran. These experts were selected by purposeful sampling and in the form of a snowball, and semi-structured interviews were conducted with twelve of them until reaching theoretical saturation. Validity of the model has been checked by expert review and reliability by retest method, and fifty sub-themes, twenty-one organized themes and ten overarching themes have been identified using the theme analysis method. The research is of qualitative and exploratory type and it is an extension research because by presenting a model, it seeks to expand the concept of corporate governance to effectively monitor the facilities granted by National Bank. The data collection method is field and library. The tool for collecting data in the field is a semi-structured interview. The statistical community of experts includes some managers of central offices of National Bank in Tehran. The number of these managers is thirty. Ten of these experts were interviewed by the snowball method in a targeted manner, but the interview was continued with two other experts to achieve theoretical adequacy. The data obtained from the interviews have been studied and analyzed with thematic analysis method. In thematic analysis, after conducting each interview quickly and without delay, coding is done until all interviews and first round codings are done. Then the second and third rounds of coding are done to obtain the research model. Internal validity is measured by the review method by experts, and reliability is checked by the retest method.Results  and The corporate governance models presented in our country have a structural weakness.  Because the design of the corporate governance system model for banks is derived from the existing reality of the nature of banks, and the real nature of Iranian banks is their government status. This is despite the fact that the implementation of corporate governance in a bank with government ownership or control is not efficient enough. The exploratory nature of the present research, by clarifying the dark and ambiguous corners of the implementation of corporate governance in banks, has succeeded in discovering its unknown facts and methods in order to effectively monitor the facilities granted in the National Bank of Iran.  The developed model for corporate governance to effectively monitor the granted facilities is shown in chart No. 1 listed on page 12, and the proposed model can be used and exploited for the National Bank of Iran and other similar banks. According to the opinion of experts and the researcher's interpretative view, the following suggestions are presented:1- in addition to exercising sufficient care in the selection of employees, special attention should also be paid to the issue of succession, training and strengthening of specialized human resources.2- while institutionalizing the thinking of responsibility, the necessary grounds for strengthening and continuity of this aspect of corporate governance should always be considered by bank managers..3- In order to provide various products, especially in the field of granting facilities and effectively monitoring its various stages, banks should use electronic tools to know how and how to use payment facilities.4- The laws related to the corporate governance system should be formulated in the amendment bill of the trade law.5- Correct implementation of corporate governance can contribute to a great extent in timely and appropriate response to all stakeholders.6- The employees of each of the three control departments of the facility should be different and one employee should not be used to control and monitor all three control departments.7- When granting the facility or even before any payment of the facility, the relevant officer in the bank should clearly announce the exact terms of payment of the facility installments to the applicants to receive the facility.8- They should distance themselves from bureaucracy and take steps towards becoming agile.9- Intelligent systems for collecting, archiving and disseminating information should be implemented in the facilities department.10- The implementation of corporate governance should be carefully followed up with consideration of the rights of all stakeholders. Examining the findings of the current research with the results of previous research shows the comprehensiveness of the current research and its similarity with the results of the findings of other researchers. For example, Rezaei, Sharifi, and Etimadi Ahri (1400), Falah, Haqshanas, and Rezaian (1399), Kurd, Bagheri, and Mohibi (1399), Isaei and Hasannia (1399), Babajani (1399), Rezaei and Nazimi (1398), Farzin Vash (2016), Seyd Noorani (2016), Ramadan Nia and Rezaei (2016), Talebi (2015), Mohajaran (2015), Yahyapour (2014), Sepe Vand (2014), Kashif Bahrami (2014), Manzoor and Yadi Pour (2017) also, from foreign researches similar to the research, we can refer to the researches of Sakawa, Hideaki et al. Haveril Chek (2018), Agarwal (2016), Masri, Abdul Fattah and Al Bahar (2016), Young et al. (2006), Alford (2006), Brindle (2005), Young (2001), Talwar (1999).

The purpose of the present study is to investigate the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between the quality of independent audits and the tax gap in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange.

A multivariate regression method based on combined data was used for data analysis. The statistical population of the research comprises the companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and OTC.

The findings of the first hypothesis of the research show that there is a negative and significant relationship between the quality of independent auditing and the tax gap. In other words, increasing the quality of independent auditing reduces the tax gap. The results of the second hypothesis indicate that the moderating effect of corporate governance on the relationship between independent audit quality and the tax gap is positive and significant. This means that with the increase in corporate governance, the relationship between the quality of independent auditing and the tax gap intensifies.

To accurately diagnose tax issues, the Tax Administration should focus on the tenure and continuity of the relationship between audit institutions and companies. Companies can also utilize expert auditors from auditing organizations and seek accreditation from "A" rated institutions to enhance the quality of reported profits and earn investors' trust. The research's second hypothesis indicates a lack of proper corporate governance in Iran, suggesting the need to enhance corporate governance criteria as a monitoring mechanism.

The present study investigates the effect of the CEO's power on economic added value with an emphasis on corporate governance. This research is practical from the point of view of purpose, and from the point of view of correlation methodology, it is causal type (post-event). The statistical population of the research is the companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange, and using the systematic elimination sampling method, 130 companies were selected as the research sample in the 6-year period between 1396 and 1401. The method used to collect information is a library, and Stata software was used to test the research hypotheses. The results of the research show that the CEO's power has a direct effect on economic added value. However, corporate governance does not affect the relationship between CEO power and added economic value.

The business strategy of companies plays an essential role in achieving the company's goals, and strategies should be adopted based on the company's ability, resources, and goals. Choosing the wrong strategy can jeopardize the interests of the stakeholders and the company. As a result, the adoption of strategy by managers should be monitored. Meanwhile, corporate governance with two arms of non-commissioned managers and the audit committee as tools for monitoring the performance of managers and the overall performance of companies, is probably effective in adopting business strategy. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to provide new evidence about the relationship between the quality of the board of directors and the audit committee as two fundamental pillars of corporate governance, in relation to the aggressive business strategy of commercial units.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

One of the variables influencing the policies and performance of companies is business strategy. Strategy includes a set of decision-making rules that direct the organization's overall behavior. These decision-making rules determine the organization's relationships with its external environment. In general, business strategy consists of integrated actions in search of competitive advantage. In the organizational literature, two major, different and complementary concepts are examined for the survival and progress of organizations, those two concepts are management and governance. In the concept of management, the main emphasis is on the methods of achieving organizational goals, while the concept of governance is a supervisory concept. The characteristics of the board of directors of companies refer to the mechanisms of corporate governance and the role of board members in monitoring the affairs of companies. Corporate governance is a system that not only enhances the relationship between different parties (shareholders, managers and investors of the company), but also ensures the availability of appropriate resources among competing users. In addition, it provides structures through which firm goals are formulated and ways to achieve goals as well as performance reviews. The purpose of creating an audit committee is to create a set of experts and specialists to monitor management activities on behalf of company owners.The audit committee is a sub-committee under the framework of corporate governance, in which the board of directors assigns some supervisory responsibilities to it. The board of directors and the audit committee are the main pillars of corporate governance and have the duty of fiduciary and protecting the interests of shareholders and supervise the implementation of the company's internal controls.

The current research is applied and from the methodological point of view, the correlation is causal type (post-event). The statistical population of the research is all the companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange, and using screening, 131 companies were selected as the research sample and were investigated in the 10-year period between 1390 and 1399.

The results of the research hypotheses test showed that in the first hypothesis, the quality of the board of directors has a direct effect on the aggressive business strategy of the companies. The results of the second hypothesis also showed that the quality of the audit committee has no effect on the aggressive business strategy of the companies.

CONCLUSIONS & SUGGESTIONS:

Companies that want to progress and surpass their competitors in the market by choosing an aggressive strategy and using new operational plans and new technologies, actually accept a kind of risk and hazard that should be in the shadow of principled and accurate planning, so such companies They require strict internal controls that are the result of managers' careful supervision and strong and quality corporate governance, and the results obtained show that improving the quality of the board of directors can have a positive impact on choosing an aggressive business strategy.

Some major factors influencing investment include the investment risk and the consequent cost of capital imposed upon companies. Different studies demonstrated that intra-industry information transfer significantly influences the reporting environment and the quality of financial information. In case intra-industry information transfer within highly connected industries influences investor decisions and disclosure quality, it is expected to affect investor reactions to earnings, perceived risk, and the cost of capital. This study investigates the effect of intra-industry connectedness and diversification of major shareholders' portfolios on the corporate cost of capital, considering the moderating roles of ownership concentration and board gender diversity.

To achieve this goal, panel data from 144 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange were collected from their annual financial reports from 2013 to 2020. A multivariate regression analysis was used. The diversification of major shareholders' portfolios was measured using the Rhoades (1993) method and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), while intra-industry connectedness was measured according to a model put forward by Chiu (2014). The diversification of major shareholders' portfolios was calculated by identifying the major shareholder's portfolio for each year, including listed and over-the-counter companies, and computing the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) based on this data. Subsequently, the diversification index for each company-year was determined by computing the weighted average, considering the ownership percentage of major shareholders.

The results indicate a significant negative impact of both the diversification of major shareholders' portfolios and intra-industry connectedness on corporate cost of capital. Additionally, the degree of ownership concentration and gender diversity on the board shapes the magnitude of these associations. Ownership concentration strengthens the relationship between portfolio diversification and the cost of capital, while it weakens the relationship between intra-industry connectedness and the cost of capital. However, the presence of women on the board attenuates both relationships, implying that in companies with female board members, these relationships are less pronounced.

The confirmed negative relationship between the diversification of major shareholders' portfolios and the cost of capital aligns with the informational perspective. According to this perspective, the increased number and diversity of major shareholders' portfolios lead to higher costs for obtaining insider information, prompting the major shareholders to focus on public information and demand the investee company to provide more transparent and higher-quality information. This, in turn, reduces information asymmetry and the cost of capital. Furthermore, the results indicate a significant negative relationship between intra-industry connectedness and corporate cost of capital. Finally, the findings confirm the moderating effects of ownership concentration and board gender diversity on these relationships.

According to the resource-based perspective, firms have specific and heterogeneous resources that enable them to implement value-creating strategies, which in turn lead to differences in inter-firm performance. The resource-based perspective proposes that a firm's resources and capabilities create competitive advantage and lead to superior performance. In this regard, the aim of the current research is the relationship between sales growth and company value with the moderating role of strategy ratio, market fluctuations in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. This research is an applied research in terms of its nature and descriptive method and in terms of its purpose, and since in the current research the current state of the variables has been analyzed by collecting information through past information, it is in the ranks of descriptive studies. And it is included after the event. In the course of conducting this research, three hypotheses were formulated and 150 companies were selected through systematic elimination sampling for the 8-year period between 1394 and 1401, and the data related to the research variables were collected in Excel software using the software Statistical analyzes were carried out. The results of the hypothesis test showed that there is a significant direct relationship between sales growth and company value with the moderating role of strategy ratio, market fluctuations.

This study investigates the impacts of corporate governance on the interaction between the agency costs and information efficiency of stock prices. In this research, the agency issues measured by the interaction between corporate growth opportunities and its free cash flows. Four corporate governance mechanisms examined in this research are financial expertise and independence of the board of directors, internal audit and institutional shareholders. The sample consists of 130 companies from 1394 to 1400. The results show that agency cost has a significantly negative effect on the information efficiency of stock prices. Moreover, the findings confirm that among the four corporate governance mechanisms, only institutional shareholders significantly moderates the negative effects of agency cost on the information efficiency of stock prices. However, we could not find any evidence on the moderating role of internal auditor, board financial expertise and independence. The results of this research showed that the growth opportunities and free cash flows of companies are among the most important variables affecting the information efficiency of stock prices in the Iranian Stock Exchange.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the increase in financing restrictions of companies has an effect on their financing strategies. Based on this, the strategies of company managers for financing were formulated in the form of their desire to finance internally instead of externally and through transactions with related parties and financing from debt instead of issuing shares in the capital market. In addition, this research, emphasizing the role of corporate governance and its effect on defined relationships, seeks to provide a reasonable answer in relation to the effect of corporate governance on reducing the adverse effect of financing restrictions on the financing strategies of companies. In this regard, the data of 150 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2015-2019 were selected, and according to the Kaplan/Zengales indices as a measure of supplier criteria governing the companies, research hypotheses were examined. The results of this study showed that financing restrictions have a negative and significant relationship with transactions with related parties and a positive and significant relationship with capital structure. In addition, corporate governance only has a moderating effect on the relationship between financing constraints and capital structure.

The present study examines the effect of corporate governance on ceo narcissism in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. In this research, three variables of management tenure, duality of management duties and institutional shareholders have been selected as corporate governance criteria. In this research, the institutional shareholders, the duality of management duties and the narcissism of managers have been identified with values of zero and one; Management tenure is also measured based on the number of years of continuous management activity. This research is a descriptive-correlation study based on composite data analysis. 120 companies admitted to the stock exchange during the period of 2017-1401 have been selected as samples. Based on this, management tenure and the duality of management duties have a positive and significant effect on managers' narcissism; While institutional shareholders have a negative and significant effect on ceo narcissism.

In recent years, the support of corporate governance has attracted the attention of capital market regulatory bodies, including the stock exchange. In this regard, the corporate governance index has been taken into consideration as a monitoring tool for companies so that companies that better comply with corporate governance mechanisms can be distinguished from companies that do not comply with these mechanisms. On this basis, companies should try to improve these mechanisms and take more effective steps to create more efficiency and value and thus improve the conditions of the capital market. In this research, an attempt is made to use a new index under the title of fuzzy corporate governance index, and according to expert opinion and formulation of fuzzy inference rules, three fuzzy expert systems have been designed to evaluate corporate governance criteria. Also, the data related to 160 companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange as a sample have been collected and their data has been processed using the aforementioned fuzzy systems. The output of the first system shows the quality of the ownership index and transparency in the sample companies. The output of the second system shows the quality of the board structure index and finally the output of the third system shows the quality of corporate governance in the mentioned companies. The results of these evaluations are shown in a list of the weakest and best companies in terms of ownership and transparency, the structure of the board of directors, and the quality of corporate governance.

Managers, having a higher level of awareness about the stakeholders, try to make the image of the business unit look favorable. Therefore, they make choices that can have different effects on users' decisions. The aim of the current research is to investigate the role of two factors, company size and corporate governance, on choices that increase or decrease accounting earnings.

The statistical sample includes 180 companies (1440 companies-year) from the manufacturing companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period of 2013 to 2014. The research hypotheses have been tested using panel data and multivariate logistic regression.

The results show that the corporate governance factor as well as the company size factor have an inverse and significant relationship with the choice of increasing or decreasing accounting earnings methods. 

In companies, the accounting earnings is determined by the accrual method and by applying the opinion of the managers.In this regard, managers influence earnings by choosing their methods. There are many choices for managers in the process of preparing financial reports that can increase or decrease the company's earnings.

Contribution: 

This research can provide a new study platform regarding accounting choices in the sense that it draws the attention of standard-setting institutions to the diversity of accounting methods and the freedom of action of managers in choosing methods.

This research examines The Role of Intellectual Capital Efficiency on the Relationship Between Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance (Evidence of Environmental, Social and Governance performance of Companies Listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange); The Time Frame of this Research is 2017-2021; The Statistical Population of this Research is all the Companies Accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange, 105 Companies were selected by Systematic Removal method. The Data of the Research was Extracted and Measured from the Financial Statements included in the Stock Exchange Sites; then, Statistical Regression Analysis was Performed Based on Panel Data. According to the Analysis, the Result of the First Hypothesis Showed that there is a Positive and Significant Relationship between the Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance. The Result of the Second Hypothesis indicated that there is a Positive and Significant Relationship between the Corporate Social Responsibility and Intellectual Capital. Finally, in the Third Hypothesis, the Findings indicated that the Mediating role of Intellectual Capital on the Relationship between the Corporate Social Responsibility and financial performance is positive and significant.

The novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) has rapidly spread all over the world. The first diagnosed cases in Iran were confirmed on 19th February 2020.The COVID-19 pandemic has a concentrated influence on all aspects of life as well as corporate activities; One of the most important issues that has been affected by the spread of the Corona disease is performance and financial reporting quality. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effect of COVID-19 on corporate governance, financial reporting quality, and firm performance. For this purpose, the information of 180 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2019 to 2022, is reviewed. The study indicates no relationship between corporate governance and performance. And coronavirus make negative the relationship between corporate governance and performance and corporate governance and financial reporting quality. And coronavirus make negative the relationship between corporate governance and performance and corporate governance and financial reporting quality. and