جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "ijtihad" در نشریات گروه "علوم انسانی"

The influence of the Holy Quran on various Islamic and human sciences is undeniable for those who believe in its divine authenticity. Usul al-Fiqh (Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence) is among the disciplines deeply indebted to the Quran, as its authority and legitimacy are established through Quranic verses. Beyond this, the Quran has played a fundamental role in the formation, development, and evolution of Usul al-Fiqh, just as Usul al-Fiqh provides essential tools for a proper understanding of the Quran. This study examines the mutual reinforcement between the Quran and Usul al-Fiqh in shaping a systematic methodology for deriving Islamic knowledge. The research employs a library-based data collection method and a descriptive-analytical approach to explore their interrelationship. The findings indicate that the Quran directly contributes to the dynamism of Usul al-Fiqh by influencing key jurisprudential principles, including ijtihad and taqlid (independent reasoning and adherence to scholarly authority), linguistic analysis (interpretation of Quranic terminology and expressions), evidentiary principles (certainty vs. probability in deriving rulings), and legal maxims (Usul ‘Amaliyah) for decision-making in cases of doubt. Conversely, Usul al-Fiqh serves as a prerequisite for Quranic interpretation, significantly contributing to the comprehension of theological, ethical, and socio-legal Quranic teachings. The study underscores the inseparable relationship between the Quran and Usul al-Fiqh, demonstrating how their synergy fosters a more systematic and comprehensive approach to the derivation of religious knowledge.

The presuppositions of any scientific theory are a set of pre-interpretive norms that play an effective role in the processing and formulation of the principle of the theory, and are considered and observed in the interpretation and analysis of sub-issues and inferring its results. The function of presuppositions is to maintain the internal coherence of the theory and the theoretical justification of its results and their meaningful connection with each other. Based on this, jurisprudential presuppositions are a priori assumptions based on which the jurist organizes the framework of his jurisprudential theory and remains loyal to them in the stage of interpretation of Sharia texts and derivation of secondary rulings. The presuppositions of jurisprudence are mainly the product of the jurist's general understanding of Sharia and his expectations from its set of rules and rulings. Therefore, the distinction between the preconceptions of the jurists should be considered as one of the most fundamental factors of jurisprudential differences. This research, using the descriptive-analytical method and referring to library sources, after explaining the meaning of jurisprudence default, has come to the conclusion that jurisprudence defaults are influenced by factors such as: educational environment, family and social conditions in addition to the psychological characteristics and scope of the jurist's information. Considering the importance of the issue and the lack of comprehensive research in this regard, it seems necessary to investigate such an issue.

The Law of the Islamic Republic of Iran emphasizes the necessity of aligning all legal norms with Sharia standards within the hierarchy of legal norms. The Islamic nature of Iran's legal system is fundamental, rooted in the fourth principle of the Constitution, which stipulates that all laws and regulations must be based on Islamic standards. This principle empowers the jurists of the Guardian Council to assess the Islamic nature of all legislation.Mechanisms for this assessment include:Monitoring the approvals of the Islamic Council (Principles 91, 94, 95, and 96 of the Constitution).Provisions in accordance with Principles 170 and 173 of the Constitution.The Guardian Council's interpretation authority, which allows for:Complaints filed with the Court of Administrative Justice on Sharia grounds.Opinions issued by the Guardian Council's jurists in response to court inquiries (as outlined in Articles 84 and 87 of the Law on Organizations and Procedures of the Court of Administrative Justice). Article 87 of the 2012 Law on Organizations and Procedures of the Court of Administrative Justice mandates that general and specialized boards of the court adhere to the opinions of the Guardian Council's jurists. Furthermore, Article 87 of the 2023 amendment to this law limits the court's jurisdiction in cases of Sharia-contravening decrees to declaring them invalid, not annulling them.The Head of the Judiciary possesses the authority to issue administrative approvals. These approvals constitute "laws and regulations" and are therefore subject to the requirements of the fourth principle of the Constitution. However, note (1) of Article 12 of the Act of the Court of Administrative Justice exempts the Head of the Judiciary's approvals from the General Board's jurisdiction, bypassing both legal and Sharia review.Article 157 of the Constitution states that the Head of the Judiciary must be "just, knowledgeable about judicial affairs, and a capable manager." While this suggests the Head of the Judiciary possesses some level of independent judgment, the fourth principle of the Constitution unequivocally establishes the Guardian Council's jurists as the ultimate arbiters of Sharia compliance for all laws and regulations.The amendment to Article 87 of the Court of Administrative Justice differentiates between approvals subject to Sharia-only complaints and those subject to complaints on both Sharia and other grounds. In both cases, the opinions of the Guardian Council's jurists are mandatory. The new law also explicitly grants the Guardian Council the authority to declare provisions contrary to Sharia invalid. These reforms enhance the Guardian Council's jurisdiction in cases of Sharia complaints against the Head of the Judiciary's approvals.The new law also empowers the creation of a suitable structure for handling the Guardian Council's jurisprudence. This raises the crucial question of whether and how the Guardian Council can directly exercise Sharia supervision over regulations approved by the Head of the Judiciary.Is it feasible for the jurists of the Guardian Council to exercise Sharia supervision over regulations approved by the Head of the Judiciary, either through the Court of Administrative Justice or through independent means?Does the requirement for the Head of the Judiciary to possess independent judgment preclude Sharia supervision by the Guardian Council's jurists?Does Sharia supervision of the Head of the Judiciary by the Guardian Council create a conflict of authority?If Sharia supervision through the Court of Administrative Justice is possible, are there any obstacles to Sharia supervision through other means?The jurists of the Guardian  Council have the authority to supervise the approvals of the Head of the Judiciary. The new Act of the Court of Administrative Justice establishes the Guardian Council's jurisdiction as a criterion for assessing the ability to file a complaint against regulations, including those issued by the Head of the Judiciary. The creation of an appropriate structure is essential to facilitate this supervision by the Council's jurists. This research employed a descriptive and analytical research method. Data was analyzed using documents and library resources.The findings of this research indicate that Sharia supervision of the Head of the Judiciary's approvals falls within the jurisdiction of the Guardian Council's jurists. Article 87 of the new Law of the Court of Administrative Justice allows for Sharia complaints against these decisions to be filed with the Court. Furthermore, the Guardian Council's jurists can directly declare the contradiction of these approvals with Sharia to the Court of Administrative Justice.

This article examines the role of insight (Basira) in the process of ijtihad and the derivation of Sharia rulings, evaluating its impact on the accuracy and validity of fatwas. Insight, as a mental and spiritual attribute, assists scholars in understanding religious texts beyond their apparent meanings and enables them to derive rulings aligned with the objectives of Sharia, considering the circumstances of time and place. The study first explores the concept of insight from a jurisprudential perspective, analyzing the views of past and contemporary jurists regarding its significance in ijtihad. It then assesses the impact of insight on the accuracy of fatwas by examining examples from contemporary issues, such as Islamic banking and new financial transactions. The findings indicate that insight directly influences the quality of issued fatwas and helps prevent extremism and laxity in religious rulings. Additionally, insight aids jurists in distinguishing between the superficial appearances of texts and the deeper purposes of Sharia, allowing for the issuance of comprehensive and practical rulings for modern challenges. Finally, recommendations are presented for enhancing insight within religious seminaries and educating future jurists. These suggestions include promoting the teaching of insight to students, conducting comparative research on fatwas, and further encouraging the application of insight in addressing new issues. This research concludes that strengthening insight among scholars can improve the ijtihad process and contribute to the development of Islamic jurisprudence in response to contemporary challenges.

This article examines the fundamental role of insight (Basirat) in the process of Ijtihad and the derivation of Fiqh rulings within Shia jurisprudence. Given the rapid social changes and technological advancements, jurists face new challenges that require a deeper understanding and insight beyond traditional interpretations. Insight, as a form of spiritual enlightenment, enables the jurist to look beyond the apparent texts of religious scriptures to grasp the objectives and spirit of Sharia. In this research, after introducing the concept of insight and reviewing the perspectives of both contemporary and classical jurists on the subject, a comparative analysis of deduction methods in various Shia legal schools is conducted with an emphasis on the role of insight. The findings indicate that insight not only contributes to a deeper understanding of divine rulings but also plays a pivotal role in addressing new issues and offering innovative legal solutions. The importance of insight in preventing misinterpretations and deviations from the correct path of Ijtihad is also emphasized. Finally, suggestions for future research on strengthening insight in the process of Ijtihad and the derivation of rulings are presented.

One of the methods for resolving new issues in the science of Usul al-Fiqh is by utilizing the Objectives of Islamic Law (Maqasid al-Shariah). Adhering to its principles can lay the foundation for moderate and conscious ijtihad (independent reasoning). This article examines the role of the Maqasid al-Shariah in establishing a conscious, moderate ijtihad and discusses the most important foundations of such ijtihad. These foundations include awareness of the levels and positions of the evidences and their application, understanding the general principles, using them, and referring specific details back to them, as well as distinguishing between religious matters and matters of belief and the consequences that arise from them. Furthermore, it emphasizes awareness of the outcomes and taking them into account when obligating or prohibiting individuals from performing an act. The result of this article is the presentation of key principles, adherence to which leads to logical and conscious ijtihad that brings us closer rather than further apart, unites rather than divides, and preserves rights and freedoms rather than undermining them. This ijtihad aims to protect religion, life, and property, and offers solutions to problems with wisdom and moderation. The article also recommends that higher education institutions, especially Sharia faculties and universities, pay greater attention to the Maqasid al-Shariah and make it a core subject taught practically to students. This would demonstrate the significance of the Maqasid al-Shariah within Islamic sciences and its substantial impact on ijtihad and fulfilling the needs of Muslims.

The interpretative insights and ijtihad of the companions of the Prophet Mohammad (Peace Be Upon Him and His Progeny) hold significant importance; however, their authoritative role in the realm of exegesis is a subject of debate. Accepting their opinions as authoritative could allow them to be used as evidence for interpreting the divine intent, similar to Prophetic traditions. Existing studies, mainly within jurisprudential and usuli sources, suggest a distinct conceptual system with specific principles and evidence, which are often overlooked, especially in the context of exegesis. Therefore, both proponents and opponents face challenges such as insufficient clarification of the issues and lack of thorough examination of the principles and evidence. This article uses an analytical method to first explain the aforementioned issues and then critiques them, concluding that the theory of authority lacks a solid basis and sufficient evidence. The article critiques principles such as the primacy of the authority of presumed knowledge, the applicability of the theory of authority in exegesis, and the permissibility of following the deceased. It also critically examines evidence such as the distinctive features of the companions, the reliance of the ignorant on the knowledgeable, the closure of the door of ijtihad, and other Quranic and hadith-based evidence.

The issue of "legislative ijtihad of the Holy Prophet" dates back to the early history of Islam. Some Sunni scholars believe that Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him and his progeny), in some religious rulings where no revelation was revealed upon him, acted based on his own ijtihad (i.e. independent reasoning). The research problem is that the admission of legislative ijtihad in divine rulings undermines trust in the rulings taught by the Holy Prophet and opens the door to personal opinions and discretion in religious rulings. The aim of this paper is to examine the theory of "legislative ijtihad of the Holy Prophet" based on Quranic and narrative arguments and evidences, with emphasis on the views of Ibn Ḥazm Al-Andalusī and ‘Allāmah Ḥillī. The research method is descriptive-analytical and through utilizing library sources, the data is described and historical analysis of the research problem is made. The research findings in brief suggest that according to ‘Allāmah Ḥillī, the concept of legislative ijtihad of the Holy Prophet in an absolute sense is rejected, and is only acceptable in the case of divine permission and within the framework of principles of revelation. Ibn Ḥazm also believes that the narrations cited to prove the legislative ijtihad of the Prophet have weak chains of transmission and contradict the apparent meaning of the Quranic verses.

Criminal policy varies in every era as a way to fight crime according to social transformations. Considering the position of human being in the center of attention and preserving human dignity, this policy has undergone significant changes and has led to the discussion of human rights and has been specially reflected in international documents so that the international community is required to comply and align with these policies. shows The criminal law of Islam has special infrastructures and foundations that seem inconsistent with this development in some places. Apparently, there seems to be a mismatch between the international criminal policy and Islam, but the similarities between the two systems are more than what is seen in the world of science. and politics are expressed. Islamic law operates based on a unique logic that cannot be drawn through the categories provided by classical international law. The purpose of this research is to use the descriptive-analytical method, and with regard to politics Modern criminal and Sharia foundations and capacities of Islamic jurisprudence, which is mostly based on the inherent capacity of Islamic rulings for globalization, expressed the points of difference and similarity, and then by presenting solutions such as evolution and change in the sources of ijtihad, proved the method of having Islamic punishments based on evidence. rationally and figuratively, accepting the signature of corporal punishments based on the acceptance of the validity of the rational way of life and the lack of the validity of the single news in important matters, should also turn the points of difference into alignment and companionship

The term “Kisfan” in the Quran has been pronounced with both a fathah (opening) and a sukun (silencing) on the letter sin by various reciters. Linguistic sources attribute multiple meanings to this term, encompassing both nominal and verbal interpretations, including “cutting,” “covering,” “a piece,” “casting down,” “moving away,” “decline,” “overpowering,” “collapsing,” and “being overwhelmed.” Azharī was the first to explore the variations in the recitation of this term within lexicographical studies, referencing Farrāʾ’s insights on its pronunciation and meaning, as well as Zajjāj’s claim that these two recitations imply different meanings. The discourse surrounding the differing recitations of this term is notably more pronounced in exegetical literature from the fourth to the seventh centuries compared to other eras. In the field of Qirā’āt (Quranic recitations), the semantic distinction between these two forms is particularly clear, as one denotes a plural and the other a singular. For example, Ibn ʿĀmir interprets “Kisfan” with a sukun as singular and with a fathah on the sin as plural. Consequently, in contexts suggesting plurality, such as verse 92 of Surah al-Isra, he opts for the fathah, diverging from the majority of reciters, while in verse 48 of Surah al-Rum, he employs the sukun to indicate singularity, again differing from the consensus. Shu’bah, a notable narrator from ʿĀṣim, reads “Kisfan” with a sukun in verses where the particle “min” is used in a partitive context (e.g., kisfan mina al-samāʾ), treating it as singular. The findings of this descriptive-analytical study highlight the presence of “ijtihad” (independent reasoning), “rule-based decisions,” “non-reliance solely on transmission,” and “choice” among certain reciters and narrators, as well as the non-revelatory nature of all variations in recitational recitation.

Arbitration is one of the important methods of dispute resolution in domestic and international law. The traces of this legal institution can also be found in Imamiyyah jurisprudence, known among jurists as the appointed judge (qadi tahkim). Imamiyyah jurists have resorted to religious evidence from the Quran, Sunnah, and consensus to legitimize arbitration under the title of appointed judge. The present research, using an analytical-descriptive method and library data collection tools, answers the question: What is the basis of arbitration in Imamiyyah jurisprudence? Should the appointed judge have all the conditions of an appointed judge, or is having some conditions of an appointed judge sufficient? The findings of this research show that the majority of jurists, citing verse 35 of Surah An-Nisa, consider the basis of arbitration to be appointment and have considered all conditions of an appointed judge necessary for the appointed judge as well. It should be said that the evidence of the majority of jurists does not have the power to prove all the conditions of an appointed judge, including ijtihad, for the appointed judge.

Waḥīd Behbahānī (d. 1205 AH) was one of the most prominent jurists of the 12th century Hijri, who passed away in the early years of the 13th century. He left behind a significant legacy in jurisprudence and principles and trained many distinguished students, some of whom are among the most notable jurists of the 13th century Hijri. Most importantly, in his intellectual life, he defeated the Akhbari movement that had dominated most Shiite seminaries during the 12th century. Some of his works are collections of jurisprudential questions and answers, known as Istiftā'āt. These questions and answers contain social, cultural, and civil information and emphasize certain key concepts crucial for understanding the religion and its interpretive methods. This article is based on one of these collections of Istiftā'āt and presents a selection from them.

One of the issues raised under the topics of "ijtihād and taqlīd" is the invalidity of an obligatory act in the absence of taqlīd and caution, which almost all Shi'a jurists believe is invalid. The need to address this issue is because a person, after years of acting without imitation and caution, decides to perform actions with imitation of a mujtahid or caution from then on. Now, if his past deeds are invalid, he will suffer a lot of hardship to make up for his past deeds. In this article, in an analytical-descriptive method and citing library sources, the theories and arguments of Shi'a jurists have been criticized, and the basic question has been answered that, "in the case of action without imitation and caution, are all the past actions of the obligee (mukallaf) are considered void and should be made up for?" "And what is the criterion of the validity or invalidity of such a person's action the opinion of the mujtahid during the action or during the recourse?" By examining the evidence, it has been concluded that if such an action is in accordance with the facts or in accordance with the opinion of one of the two mujtahids during the action and during the reference (valid evidence), it is permissible and valid and does not require the compensation of past actions.

“Prophetic ijtihad” is a challenging issue among Sunni thinkers that has its roots in the early history of Islam. The ijtihad of the Prophet means that the Holy Prophet (PBUH) ruled in some cases based on his personal opinion and ijtihad. Due to the opposition of a large number of scholars to this issue, the main question of this article is whether the Holy Prophet inferred the rules of Sharia based on his ijtihad or not? Our hypothesis is that according to the explicit verses of the Holy Qur'an, any ruling and word of the Holy Prophet is based on divine revelation and he never ruled on the basis of opinion and ijtihad. The finding of this article is that based on the convincing Quranic reasons and the narration of the issue of ijtihad of the Prophet, it is considered a rejected thing. This is because a mujtahid is not infallible and may make mistakes. However, finding error in the ijtihads of the Holy Prophet contradicts his absolute infallibility.

Muhammad Shahrour is one of the contemporary Quranists who aim to weaken the place of Hadith in jurisprudence.  To prove this claim, he presents Quranism as a complete alternative and then questions the doctrine of  the Justice of the Companions and rejects the Sunni hadiths regarding the justice of the Companions. He then challenges the infallibility of the prophets and the concept of the Sunnah in order to discredit the hadiths transmitted from the Prophet and to discredit the position of the Sunnah as a foundation of jurisprudence. For this purpose, he rejects the validity and effectiveness of the teachings found in the prophetic tradition and emphasizes their historicity. By adopting the descriptive-analytical method, this article attempts to provide a critique of the disregard for Hadith in the jurisprudential inference system of Shahrour. For this purpose, an attempt has been made to respond to the controversies so that the position of hadith is recognized as one of the pillars of valid jurisprudence.

The issue of ijtihād has gone through many ups and downs since its inception until now. Undoubtedly, ijtihād among Sunni scholars has not followed an acceptable process and they have ended up committing ijtihād by voting and then turning to obstruction. However, ijtihād in the Shia school has always been dynamic and mobile since the fifth century and has played a significant role in human scientific innovation due to the acceptance of the immediate caliphate of Amīrul Mominīn and benefiting from the problems of Alawite jurisprudence. The element of ijtihād is the driving engine that advances Islamic Shari'ah along with time, place, needs and questions. This research, with a descriptive and analytical method, deals with the essence and components of ijtihād, and its comparative analysis in Imāmiyyah and Sunni jurisprudence. Ijtihād in Imāmiyyah is ijtihad in the general sense, that is, extracting and inferring secondary rulings from verses and hadiths using logic. But ijtihād in Sunnis is special ijtihād and interpretation is based on opinion. This writing presents the image and definition of ijtihād that is approved by the innocents, and shows the true face of Salafi ijtihād, which is rooted in Sunni ijtihād, especially Hanbali ijtihād. What distinguishes this research is the comparative investigation of what is ijtihād and its components from the perspective of Sunni and Imāmiyyah, because in many books and articles, only the views of Shia are limited and less has been done to compare these two religions in the matter of ijtihād.

In the Islamic legal system "sharia" as the main source of constitutional law goes beyond the written document and gives content to the norms of the constitution. The idea of ​​an Islamic constitution is neither a mere adherence to the principles of the constitution nor a formalist adherence to its writings, but in fact the same adherence to the spirit of the constitution. In addition, "Ijtihad" and “Maslahah” as two dynamic elements of sharia to deduce sharia rules; Built to suit the needs of each era. In this regard, the study of the nature of the Sharia, which can prevail and influence the principles and concepts of the Constitution as a superior spirit and unwritten norm, compared to the written text of the Constitution; It is essential. The present study examines the position of Sharia in the Islamic legal order as a Hypertext value that has subjugated the identity and foundation of a nation, and also by emphasizing the dynamic elements of the Sharia and their impact on the vitality of this superior norm, tries to clarify the relationship between sharia and the unwritten constitution.

This research aims to answer the central question: What capacities exist in the thought of the governance system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, based on the foundational principles of Imam Khomeini, for moving towards the indicators of desirable governance? Elements of ijtihad, general policies, and governmental decrees are among the capacities of the Islamic Republic system, and research and examination of them can effectively promote the legislative system towards adapting to the requirements of the time and the complexities of governance in today's world. The research methodology is descriptive-analytical, and the results indicate that ignoring good governance in the individual and collective life system seems impractical in today's world. This process can facilitate personal exploitation of rents and corruption, eroding public confidence in the government. This can lead citizens to be deceived by violent groups and foreign enemies, and in such a situation, terrorism and violence can occur in society. General policies, ijtihad, and governmental decrees all contribute to completing a roadmap that can be used to pursue the path of implementing desirable governance and better managing the country. The dynamism of Shia jurisprudence enables these three capacities to solve society's problems according to the requirements of the time. This makes it possible to guide the Islamic Republic system towards the indicators of desirable governance, achieve a more favorable situation, and increase social capital through public support for the country's policies.

With the industrialization and secularization of culture, the social activities of the institution of religion have been limited and gradually marginalized. Based on this, religious theologians have sought to formulate and expand a faith-based social life and not only harmonize industrial and technological development with their religious identity but also base its construction on religious identity. This effort requires presenting religion as a coherent and universal whole so that theologians can present appropriate theological answers to the needs of contemporary humans. However, the degree to which religion can be systematic depends on how theologians deal with religious propositions and how these propositions are formulated to solve social problems. On the other hand, religion goes beyond determining an individual's personal program, duties, and religious rituals and becomes a critic and founder of social and political structures. Based on this, social systems are founded on the text of religion in society. This article, through a comparative study in Christian and Islamic theology, seeks to address the methodological requirements and how to deal with religious propositions and how to formulate them in solving social problems, focusing on the views and thoughts of Paul Tillich and Ayatollah Khamenei.

Mirza Mohammad Akhbari (d. 1232 AH) is one of the Akhbari scholars who is known for his numerous works containing sharp criticism of Mujtahids. In the present research, a less-explored aspect of Mirza Muhammad Akhbari's ideas and works, which includes his mystical tendency, has been studied. This research also study impact of the intellectual context of the time (the first decades of the 13th lunar century) on his ideas. That time was the era of conflict between the three discourses of Ijtihad, Sufi and Akhbari. The questions of this research are: How was Mirza Mohammad Akhbari's connection with Sufism and mysticism? How this kind of connection has been manifested in his works? and to what extent mystical aspect of his thought has been affected by his Akhbarism? The results of the research indicate that Mirza Mohammad Akhbari’s positions on mysticism and Sufism were influenced by his hostile literature against the mujtahids. Mirza Mohammad Akhbari defends mysticism and criticizes Sufism, using the dualism of mysticism/sufism. He also wrote treatises on mystical wisdom and was in contact with Sufis. He likened Sufis to Mujtahids and mystics to Akhbarites and considered Sufis and Mujtahids to be similar to each other in their heresy and dependence on Sunnis. Furthermore, by defending Sufi figures that have been criticized by scholars, he has practically taken the side of Sufis in the debate between mujtahids and Sufis.