جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Reza Khan » در نشریات گروه « تاریخ »

The political psychology of Ahmad Shah Qajar, in whose time the Qajar dynasty was extinct and a new period began in Iran with the establishment of the Pahlavi government, is very useful for understanding the political developments of this period. This article tries to answer the question of what role did the political personality of Ahmad Shah play in the fall of the Qajar government with the descriptive-analytical method and with the help of Karen Horne's theory? The findings of this study show that Ahmad Shah Qajar was a character mixed with fear and despair, which manifested itself in fear of the history of his father and ancestors, fear of foreign powers, fear of internal opponents, and fear of rumors and propaganda. This fear, which was formed in his personality since his childhood due to internal and external sad factors, caused him fear and despair towards his leadership and was also given to him so that he could not take decisive measures with courage and resourcefulness to deal with Sardar Sepe and other domestic and foreign opponents, and finally, by leaving Keshu and not returning, he contributed to the downfall of Qajar.

In the last and critical years of Qajar reign the lack of a powerful central government caused Reza Khan to reach positions such as “Head of the Cossack Division”, “Minister of War and the commander-in-Chief of the Army (=Sardar Sepah)”, “Prime Minister”, and then he took over the temporary government and overthrew the Qajar dynasty. During this period, Reza Khan issued many declarations that contained various contents about the military, social and political situation of the country. The study and analysis of these declarations makes it possible to understand the causes, factors and the process of his rise to power, the way of changing the monarchy, and the important governmental, military and political changes of Iran in the 20th century. An important part of these declarations is about the military structure of the country, the security situation and its organization, prioritizing the independence of the fatherland, patriotism, establishing order, safety and welfare of Iranians, and social and political priorities. The research question is about:” What points did Reza Khan’s declarations contain about the situation of Iran during the end of Qajar period, and which political and social components did he emphasize? The findings of this research show that the study of the history of Reza Khan’s period from the time he became the Head of the Cossack division to the position of king, in addition to revealing his thinking and activities, also shows the change in his intellectual and political approaches from a soldier to a military ruler.

Apart from external factors and subsidiary influential forces, five main social currents have been involved in the Iranian political scene in every historical event from the Constitutional Revolution to the coup d’etat of 1299/1921. Princes, nobility, and supporters of the monarchy; intellectuals and libertarians; leftists; tribal leaders and nomadic chiefs; and the clergy. These five forces, who were different in character and influence and had conflicting but sometimes converging agendas and interests, lived in competition and conflict for the most part but were able to maintain their existence toward the end of the Qajar dynasty in the Fall of 1304/1925. Since the situations of these actors and the influence of their positions in the process of ousting Qajar have not been accurately studied; then, the present study attempts to answer this question: what were the circumstances and the status of the major social currents in Iranian politics during the overthrow of the Qajar and which were more influential than others. Based on the mentioned topic and by using the method of historical analysis as a coherent scrutiny of the documents in the historical course of events, the research concludes that the clergy realized the prospect of fundamental changes sooner than the other actors and by strengthening its credibility through the re-emergence of the seminary of Qom and the migration of religious leaders to Iran from Karbala and Najaf achieved organized and balanced relations with Sardar Sepah during the transfer of power. Other currents, however, were less aware of the facts of the day and the nature of their fierce rival or had lost their credibility altogether -either had to surrender to the will of Reza Khan- or by the beginning of the process of changes, they couldn’t cope with the situation and gradually had to crawl into a corner.

Following the coup d'état of March 1920 and Reza Khan's efforts to form a unified and modern army, the power of the central government increased in an unprecedented manner. This development took place at a time when chaos and insecurity spread all over Iran and establishing security was the most important expectation of the society from the government. With the formation of a uniform army, the suppression of tribes and nomads was put on the agenda and many confrontations took place with the tribes of Kurdistan, Lorestan, Kermanshah, Azerbaijan, Baluchistan and other regions. The aim of the current research is to investigate the phenomenon of army violence in confrontation with nomads and tribes and the nature of these clashes. Relying on reliable sources and researches, the article seeks to answer the question of what was the nature of the army's violence against the nomads and opponents in a descriptive, analytical and historical research method? The article comes to the conclusion that the violence committed by the first Pahlavi army against the tribes and nomads under the pretext of establishing security was largely unnecessary and tasteful; For example, commanders such as Amir Ahmadi, Shahbakhti, and Dolo mostly committed violence with the intention of looting and plundering the properties of the opposition, and those such as Alborz and Khazaei committed violence out of ambition.

In the middle of the fifth term of the parliament, when Reza Khan was the Prime Minister, he went to the south of the country to suppress the rebellion led by Sheikh Khaz’al. After visiting the Holy Shrines in Najaf, he met Ayatollah Sayyed Abulhasan Esfehani, Ayatollah Naeini, and several other religious leaders of Najaf. One of the sources that report this meeting is the book Ma’arif al-Rijal written by Shiekh Mohammad Herz al-Din. In his narrative, the author mentions that the religious sources of imitation asked Reza Khan two things in return for consenting to his monarchy; first, the presence of five first-class mujtahids in order to monitor the resolutions of the parliament، and second, maintaining the Ja’fari Shiite sect as the official religion of the country. Reza Khan promised to fulfill those demands. However, there are major doubts concerning this narrative, which makes it difficult to believe the report. Thus, the present article, using a critical approach, seeks to answer the following questions: In the mentioned meeting, did the religious sources of imitation make such requests from Reza Khan? Did Reza Khan make such promises to the religious sources of imitation? And, in this meeting, what was the main topic of Reza Khan’s negotiation with the scholars and religious sources of imitation?

Historical sources have many ambiguities regarding the upbringing and promotion of Reza Khan from a simple Kazakh soldier to high military ranks, before the coup d'état of March 1299 Shamsi. The oral history of Taj-ul-Maluk Ayramlu, the second wife of Reza Khan, who was not without power, has the special privilege of being logically coherent and less ambiguous. Due to Taj-ul-Maluk's familiarity with many issues, details and narratives from within the family, by historical criticism and comparing it with other sources, it is possible to obtain details of many events that are still ambiguous. The method of Reza Khan's entry and training in the Kazakh Brigade, his rapid progress in military work, the fields of communication with British advisers and his election to command the military forces in the 3rd Esfand coup, despite the presence of military officers, the problem and their analysis is the purpose of this study. It is presented with descriptive method and narrative analysis method. The important feature of Taj-ul-Maluk's memories is that it describes the representation of the historical scene simultaneously with the same conditions and is less influenced by sources, conditions and contemporary values.

Sheikh Khazal in Khuzestan was one of the centrifugal forces in the late Qajar period who, by relying on a series of internal and external factors such as the weakness of the Qajars and the First World War, was able to gain some autonomy. The governorship of Poshtkuh, which was allied with Sheikh Khuzal, as well as the strategic position of Lorestan, despite insurgent families such as the Khans of Zeinabi Biranvand, who acted as a barrier between Khuzestan and the capital, did not escape Sheikh Khuzal's eyes. The central government rebels. The present type of descriptive-analytical research using first-hand sources, documents, narrations and other research sources is based on the analysis of this question: Sheikh Khazal to maintain his power over a part of Khuzestan in the face of the central government. Established? The results of the study indicate that Sheikh Khazal, by secretly communicating, inciting and encouraging motivation, financial support and weapons from the governor of Poshtkuh and the insurgent Khans of Lorestan, especially Khans Zeinabi Biranvand, was able to enter the central government forces long ago. Khuzestan to prevent. According to a well-thought-out plan, a chain of centrifugal forces such as Khanin Zeinabi Biranvand and the governor of Poshtkuh stretched from Silakhor in Pishkuh to Hossein-Abad in Poshtkuh, sending weapons to the central government opposition in these areas to prolong the government's influence. Central in the area under its influence in Mohammarah.

This paper reviews the life of Vsevolod Starosselsky (1875–1935); how he rose up, became the commander of Persian Cossack Brigade, and finally dismissed. The process ending up with the rise and fall of Starosselsky paved the way for the British to take the control of Persian Cossack Brigade. This brigade had been stablished during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar. Shortly before the coup, Russians officers would command this force. Commanding this brigade was a necessary tool for 1921 coup since it was the most important military force in the country. Cossack Brigade did that coup headed by Reza Khan. Recognizing Reza Khan to attempt the coup was the other side of Starosselsky dismissal project.

Until Before the February 22nd 1921 coup, the Cossack division and the gendarmerie were the two main military forces of Iran with different origins. Despite their contradictions, the two forces became somewhat closer during the 1919 agreement and partly cooperated together following the February 22nd 1921 coup, but their contradictions and rivalries immediately reappeared after the coup in early 1922, led to the disappearance of the independence of the gendarmerie and the integration into a uniformed army. The present study by reliable sources and researches has studied the background of those two forces to deal with the rise and fall of the gendarmerie after the coup until the end of the Lahouti uprising and so tries to answer the question that the how did the gendarmery lost its position in favor of the Cossack force? By a descriptive-analytical method this paper has analyzed how the Cossack force prevailed over the gendarmerie in the period from February 1921 to February 1922. The findings show that the three events of Colonel Mohammad Taghi Khan Pessian's uprising, the defeat of the Iron regiment, and the Lahouti's revolt provided the required grounds for the realization of Sardar Sepah's long-standing goal of eliminating the gendarmerie and integrating it into the Cossack force. In the new organization, he again placed the gendarmes in a lower position than the Cossacks.

Abstract Before the formation of uniformed army, in most of the wars fought between the state forces and Ismail Agha Shishak (Simko Shishak), the state forces suffered heavy defeats. Following the formation of the uniformed army, the crackdown of Simko was given priority and this was the most important mission of this newly formed force who under the command of General Amanollah Jahanbani finally defeated Simko in Shakaryazi in summer 1922. The present descriptive-analytical study, relying on reliable resources and for the first time, aims to find the reasons for the victory of uniformed army in Shakaryazi and what made this war different from the previous ones. The hypothesis of this study is that Shakaryazi war was completely different from previous wars in terms of backgrounds as well as military and operational capabilities. The findings show that in addition to qualitative and quantitative advantages of the governmental force and their armament, the success in Shakaryazi war was resulted from diplomatic measures such as cooperation with Turkey and some other factors.

Recently, a valuable document of the Kermanshah police during the reign of Reza Khan related to the years 1310 to 1315 was found, which is the identity card of the prosecuted people at that time.  Among the various individuals mentioned in this document are the names and images of a number of fighters opposed to Rezakhani's tyranny, most of whom were killed on his orders and by palace prison agents.  This article uses a descriptive-analytical method and refers to library sources to introduce,battles and finally the bitter fate of some of these people. In addition to the formal and content introduction of this document,this paper seeks to introduce the battles of some of these fighters.  The results of the research indicate the role of the revolutionary people of that time in various fields: some of these fighters, such as Sheikh Mohammad Taghi Behlool, dressed as clerics and defended the sanctity of Islamic values ​​such as  hijab.  Some of them were tribal elders like Naser Khan Qashqaei and Yousef Khan Amir Mojahed who had a long history of fighting against tyrannical governments such as Reza Khan. Some of them were writers and thinkers, such as Farrokhi Yazdi and Yahya Dolatabadi.  Among them, somebody like Sheikh Khazal Kaabi thought of his personal interests more than anything else and did not have intellectual stability in the fight against Reza Khan.

Having been released from Seyed Zia al-Din Tabatabaei’s prison, Firouz Mirza Nosrat al-Dowleh entered the parliament (Majlis) from Kermanshah in its fourth period. Nosrat al-Dowleh, who regarded the British policy towards himself and his family as hostile at the time of coup d’état of 1921, employed anti-British policy during the fourth period of Majlis with the cooperation of Qavam al-Saltaneh (the Prime Minister). However, some incidents at the time of elections for the fifth Majlis made him change his attitude towards Britain. During two years of activity in the fifth Majlis, Firouz recovered his relationship with Reza Khan-e Sardar Sepah and became one of his allies. Undoubtedly, Nosrat al-Dowleh is one of the great men of politics in our country whose position and role in contemporary history are not fully explored. The present study seeks to criticize and evaluate the role and activity of this outstanding grandee during the fourth and fifth periods of Majlis.

The Socialist Party, as a leftist party, was formed by Suleiman Mirza Eskandari and Seyed Mohammad Sadegh Tabatabai. This party, although was mostly in minority in the fourth and fifth parliaments, but chains of events indicate that this party, in its own representative life, has shown itself as an effective party. Objecting against Qavam Alsaltane's cabinet, particularly regarding the issues of North Oil and the Law of Jury, supporting Mostofi-Al-Mamalek's cabinet and Reza Khan Sardar Sepah, and playing a role in changing the political system from the Qajar to the Pahlavi are parts of the political life of this party that has not been so far studied and evaluated. The present study is an attempt to answer these questions.

On August 2, 1922, a battalion of armed forces was attacked by Bakhtiari riders in the Strait of Shalil located in Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari. This incident had a large impact on the trilateral relations between Bakhtiari Khans, Reza Khan (as the Secretary of War), and the British Embassy in Tehran. In order to take advantage of the situation, Reza Khan Pahlavi tried to discredit and defame Bakhtiari Khans among the elite and the masses and undermine their financial strength by imposing a heavy fine on them. On the other hand, the British ambassador in Tehran adopted an ambiguous policy at the expense of Bakhtiari Khans and to the benefit of Reza Khan and the central government. Finally, after a period of conflict and negotiation between the three parties, a fine of 150,000 Tomans was agreed on to be paid by Bakhtiari Khans with the mediation of Sir Percy Loraine, the British Ambassador.

At the end of the Qajar era, during the Reza Khan’s Ministry of War, the plan of calming down and settling the Lorestani tribes was put into the attention of the government. Following this, the West Army commanded by Amir Ahmadi, attacked Lorestan by the order of Reza Khan in 1302/1923. Amir Ahmadi conquered Borujerd and Khorramabad and other areas under the influence of the leaders of the rebellious tribes. After that, in order to protect Republicanism, Reza Khan went to Tehran, and handed over the command of the West Army to Colonel Shahbakhti. At the time of Shahbakhti’s command, the leaders of the tribal tribes of Lorestan rebelled and surrounded him in Khorramabad; with the reappearance of Amir Ahmadi, the leaders of the rebellion fled. After Shahbakhti, the commander of the West Army was handed over to Brigadier Khazaee. The question in this research is regarding the influence of Brigadier Khazaee’s type of rule on the uprising of the tribes of Lorestan in 1927. The hypothesis of the research in answering this question is that Brigadier Khazaee applied a more rigorous policy to deal with the tribes than his predecessors, which caused a sharp reaction from the tribes. The research findings showed that he executed about thirteen tribal leaders from Lorestan to play a significant role in overcoming their traditional influence. Khazaee’s performance, like Amir Ahmadi, led to the escape of many Khans to Tarhan and their seeking support from the ruling there, Ali Mohammad Khan Ghazanfari, led to the recent mass rebellion of the tribes of Lorestan under the leadership of Tarhan’s governor. The study of Khazaee's rule in Lorestan and how his actions led to the massive rebellion are important in this article.

The process of Rising to Power by Reza Khan based on Institutionalist Approach Ali Jafari , Morteza Dehghan Nezhad , Fereydoon Allah Yari Abstract Using historic-analytic approach and based on institutionalist theory (in which it focuses not only on the role and importance of institutions but also the effects of institutions and people on obtaining a special goal), this paper tries to analyze and explain how proces Reza Khan rose to power from 1920 to 1925 With the help of the most important institutions such as the army, Majles and political parties given the difficult circumstance political-economic Qajar using library resources and archives. Hence, this paper aims to answer the following questions: Firstly, how much had the inefficiencies of institutions and the situation in pre-Reza Khan Iran been important in his rising to power? Secondly, what had been the role and function of institutions in his rising to power? Keywords: Reza Khan, Majles, parties, army, institutionalism

3 Esfand 1299 coup (coup black) which was designed by Britain and applied by the associated factors to them, Caused by changes of Britain’s foreign policy in Iran after the First World War.The Britain which had to evacuate their forces from Iran and on the other hand required the presence of an assured military force in Iran, first adjusted a contract known as 1919, but thought of coup for realization of its goals, when was disappointed of its final approval. The study aims to answer this question by descriptive-analytical method and based on documents and new research what were the impacts of 1299 coup in transformation of Iran’s society especially the process of Iran’s dependence on the West colonialism? In this regard, black coup was an act which happened for the formation of an authoritarian state in the late Qajar. The other hand, the coup was not only a displacement in power, but was the beginning of extensive plans for identity changes in Iran which first were effected the political system and finally Iran’s society.

Qajar was the last dynasty which came to power relying on the sword of the tribe men. But unlike the previous tribes, they surrendered without any fight and resistance in confronting with the most important issues of their monarchy period, i.e. the emergence of new rival of power. It’s very strange that the Qajari politicians and elites joined Sardar Sepah and supported passing the power and monarchy to their rival. The findings of the present research are based on rational explanation which reveales the case that time. Due to the uncompleted actions in the military reform, the Qajar tribe was collapsed and left the military arena and the monarchy significantly weakened in line with the constitutional movement (political reform) and they lost the full commandership over the modern military units. Those who affiliated with the royal family, instead of giving up the power and wealth, gave up the former to protect the later.

Twenty years after the establishment of constitutional government in Iran and simultaneously with head minister of Reza khan we can see the being discussion about establishment of republic government in Iran. The autocratic power loss of Qajar kings after establishment the constitutional regime played an important role in this field. By limiting the king's powers, the Qajar governors lacked the necessary power for suppression of opinions and ideas of political repression. Weakness of the Qajar kings reached a peak at the Ahmad Shah period. At this period strong organizational of Raeis-al-vozaraei of Reza khan emerged besides the demise of the monarchy. This new organization followed to convert Iran to republical regime at that point. Some of religiouses disagreed with republic regime with religious reasons. Because they knew equivalent republicational system with secularism. Such uncertainty (doubts) when it was created in the clergy's thought that neighboring country (Turkey) regime established and were figure secularism symbols. This paper sought to answer of main question with descriptive and analytical method. The main question is: how did the clergy reaction against republicational of Reza khan? The next question is: what issues were dissension between Reza khan and Saied Hassan Modarres? Based on our assumption, the refugee clergys were uncertainty their situation in Najaf because of Faisal government which proteged by Great Britain. They wanted to maintain Reza khan power as a protector in Iran Shiites. But some of clergys whom led by Modarres were dashed Reza khan plans and caused failure republicational schedume. The second hypothesis will: the main conflict between Modarres and Reza khan on new regime illegitimacy based on constitutional law-military regime of Qazaghs (Cossack) was inconsistent with constitutional law and constitutional regime and republicational was not based on will of the people.

The immigration of the Ulama of Iraq to Iran was one of the most important events of Iran, which has been occurred in the beginning of years 1301 and 1302 hijri shamsi. The result of that immigration was the accomplishment of gathering of a group of famous Ulama and figures that played a prominent role in the Iranian issues. This research has studied the immigration of Ulama to Iran and its reflections and consequences by applying the descriptive – analytical method. This immigration was conducted in two period, the first occurred in middle of 1301 shamsi, contemporary with Malik Feisal reign, which Sheikh Mohammad Khalesizadeh and Sayyid Muhammad Sadr along with some of Iraqi political activists have been exiled from Iraq to Iran on that period. The second wave of immigration which was followed by reflections has been started in the late spring 1302, whereby some of maraji and leading authorities of “Atabat” were exiled to Iran. Immigration of Ulama to Iran and its reflection in the society, the dealing of Ulama of Iran with immigrant Ulama and the results and consequences of this event are the main topics of this paper.