جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "deterrence" در نشریات گروه "علوم سیاسی"

Delineation of the implementation model of deterrence in the Islamic Republic of Iran's IRIB The deterrence strategy, though imported from the military sector to other areas, is not only limited to the military sector, but it can also embrace the media sector. In this research, an attempt was made to compile the “deterrence Strategy in the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting " by taking advantage of the opinions of professionals and media experts, the way this strategy is implemented, methods, and tools instrumental to the deterrence strategy in providing national security is the object of this research. In order to deeply understand the research question, the present research used the data-based method, or in other words, the grounded Corbin and Strauss method, which is a subcategory of qualitative research. The experts who participated in the interview unanimously believed that the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting does not have the necessary deterrence power to cope with media attacks from hostile countries.

The abstract of the thesis (including summary, goals, implemented methods, and results). The deterrence strategy, though imported from the military sector to other areas, is not only limited to the military sector, but it can also embrace the media sector. In this research, an attempt The challenges and opportunities of using the media deterrence strategy in the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting will be investigated by taking advantage of the opinions of professionals and media experts, The components, application method, methods, and effective tools of deterrence strategy in providing national security is the problem of this research.In order to deeply understand the research question, the present research used the Theme analysis method, or in other words, the grounded Corbin and Strauss method, which is a subcategory of qualitative research. From the point of view of experts and experts in this field, the indicators and components that create them are: ...

Deterrence is a system of conflict control in the international system that has undergone fundamental changes since the beginning of the Cold War. Following the 9/11 attacks and during the age of chaos, modern wars do erupt and affect all levels of interaction between actors. In this context, deterrence has lost its classical conceptualization and has become ambiguous and dysfunctional. The international system increasingly tends to behave like a complex adaptive system. Even the function of power dynamics in shaping conflict control systems seems to have transformed. Therefore, there is a need to develop a new deterrence model as a control system for modern warfare as one of the emerging phenomena in the international system. In this respect, the new generation of power dynamics possesses unique features and plays a fundamental role in the age of chaos. The present article aimed to answer the question of how networked wars impact deterrence in general and particularly in the context of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It intended to develop an appropriate deterrence model for controlling networked wars as the fourth generation of warfare within the chaotic–complex international system. To meet this objective, the study proposed intensive networked deterrence as an effective model for controlling networked wars.

Literature Review:

The extensive literature on the topic can be categorized into four groups. The first group deals with the transformation of warfare in the chaotic–complex international system (e.g., Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Freedman, 2017; Henrotin, 2016; Krieg & Rickli, 2019; Levy & Thompson, 2011; Lind & Thiele, 2015; Moffat, 2003). The second group of studies examines deterrence and its evolution (e.g., Freedman, 2004; Kaufmann, 1954; Quackenbush, 2011; Snyder, 1960). Knopf (2010) recognized four waves in the evolution of deterrence from the beginning to the end of the Cold War. In addition, Prior et al. (2018) explain how the fifth wave, termed resilience deterrence, controls modern wars, and Ghasemi (2021) has introduced the sixth wave, called nonlinear deterrence. The third group of studies is concerned with the relationship between deterrence and modern wars (e.g., Kello, 2017; Sutherland, 2011; Whyte et al., 2020). Finally, the fourth group focuses on deterrence in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Ghasemi, 2007, 2021, 2022; Gunzinger & Dougherty, 2011; Hicks & Dalton, 2017; Krepinevich et al., 2003). Despite the extensive research, the issue of networked wars remains underexplored in the literature on deterrence methods. This gap is particularly relevant for actors like the Islamic Republic of Iran, given its unique geopolitical situation. The present study aimed to address this gap by innovatively designing a new deterrence model specific to the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Given the uncertainty and emergent nature of the subject, the study relied on abductive reasoning to answer the research question. The process consisted of four steps. First, the emergent phenomena were explored and interpreted. Second, the deductive reasoning was used to conceptualize and theorize. Third, the inductive reasoning was used to conduct a case study investigation, followed by testing the validity and theoretical inferences through both inductive and deductive reasoning. This approach could provide the best explanation for the behavior of the complex international system as a complex adaptive system in the age of chaos, ultimately shaping the most functional deterrence model to control networked wars.

The study modeled the so-called intensive networked deterrence as a subdivision of the sixth wave of deterrence theory. The analysis also examined its impact on the current status of the Islamic Republic of Iran within the regional network of West Asia. Having introduced new concepts such as networked wars and intensive networked deterrence, the article explained how networked wars can be controlled by intensive networked deterrence, applied by the holder of intensive power. It examined how power dynamics within the chaotic–complex international system affect the control of modern wars and shape intensive networked deterrence. This kind of deterrence is an instrument used by those with intensive power at regional or international levels to create a threat equation through a cascading failure process. Considering the transformation of the international order from structural stability to bifurcated order, it is the holder of intensive power, rather than the holder of extensive power, that determines the structure and shape of the control system and create the threat equation. As the discussion made clear, intensive networked deterrence can be applied to the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran as a holder of intensive power within the regional network of West Asia. The hypothesis was tested using historical events involving the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly from 2016 to 2023. To apply intensive networked deterrence to the Islamic Republic of Iran, specific requirements were pointed out, and several policies and actions were recommended.

Intensive networked deterrence is characterized by a multilayered structure with overlapping strategies resulting from the fluidity of threats. It relies on deterrence functions based on cascading failure processes, rolling feedback mechanisms, and broader communications within international or regional networks. This approach is marked by interactions and uncertainty at all levels. Intensive networked deterrence can effectively control networked wars, which have the potential to erupt at geopolitical, geoeconomic, geocultural, and geocyber levels. It underscores the importance of technology and modern knowledge in waging war, achieving final objectives, and targeting infrastructures, with a significant overlap of political and social environments. In an age of chaos and the second phase of the fourth generation of warfare, intensive networked deterrence can be employed by the holder of intensive power, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran within the regional network of West Asia.

The aim of the current research is to design a model of security deterrence in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran based on the “Operation True Promise”. The current research is applied In terms of objectives, exploratory in terms of data collection method, and mixed in terms of the nature of data. The method of data collection and analysis in the qualitative part is the interview type, and the analysis method is the thematic method, and in the quantitative part, the questionnaire and structural equation modeling with the partial least squares approach. The statistical community includes experts and experts in the fields of political science, international relations, geopolitics and a number of military elites. In the qualitative part, using the snowball sampling method, the opinions of 16 experts (10 university professors and 6 military) were used, and in the quantitative part, based on the available sampling method and Cochran's formula, 225 related experts were used. The results showed that the system model of Iran's security deterrence has four main dimensions of input indicators, processes, output and consequences of the system. Input indicators (the attack of the Zionist regime on the Iranian consulate and the war in Gaza) with legal and military-political dimensions; the processes (carrying out the Operation True Promise) include Iran's minimal response and the Zionist regime's maximum defense, the difficulty of normalizing relations with the Zionist regime and increasing the gap between the Zionist regime and America; the output indicators of the system (increasing Iran's deterrence) include the redesign of the deterrence system in the region by the Axis of Resistance, the redesign of the regional governance model of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the soft power dimension, the economic dimension, and the change in Iran's nuclear doctrine, and finally, the outcome or outcome includes efforts to stabilize the security system. It is the Middle East region.

Although deterrence can be traced back to the military literature and the writings of Carl von Clausewitz, deterrence theory neverthelessflourished in the Post-World War II era and after the advent of nuclear weapons. The deterrence strategy is especially important in some regions such as the Middle East, Eurasia and South Asia, which are among the most intense  conflict zones in the world.Research question: What are the conceptual coordinates of the internationalization of deterrence as a theoretical framework and its application to Iran's deterrence strategy in the peripheral regions?

Research hypothesis:

 In response to the main question of the article, using the case study method, the author proposes the concept of internationalization of deterrence and examines its application first by the great powers of the world and then by Iran in its peripheral regions including the Middle East, Eurasia and South Asia. The internationalization of deterrence means a situation where the deterrent power provides part of its military and security capabilities including weapons, forces, and allies to other actors who intend to raise the level of deterrence, increase its effectiveness and expands its geographical scope, thereby creating fundamental changes in the strategic calculations of a potential aggressor. Internationalization of deterrence using missile power and paramilitary groups has been a part of Iran's military and security strategy in peripheral regions including the Middle East, Eurasia and South Asia.

Methodology and theoretical framework:

 In this research, using Qualitative case study method, the concept of internationalization of deterrence and its application by Iran at the regional and global level has been analyzed. This paper presents the theoretical framework of the internationalization of deterrence. In the framework of this theory, political actors in the field of world politics transfer part of their military and weapons capacity to allied actors with the aim of strengthening deterrence.

Deterrence theory flourished after World War II and after the advent of nuclear weapons. The United States as the first nuclear power, maintained a monopoly on nuclear weapons for four years. During the Cold War, as part of the nuclear sharing policy, the United States deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Europe to counterbalance the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries. Nuclear sharing was in fact a kind of internationalization of US nuclear deterrence. In addition to nuclear deterrence, world powers internationalized their conventional deterrence at lower levels. The deployment of Jupiter missiles in Turkey, the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, the deployment of the American and Soviet missiles on European soil, and the AUKUS treaty are among the most important examples of internationalization of conventional deterrence after World War II. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new threats such as terrorism, cyber attacks and limited wars, caused a change in the deterrence strategy of countries and more attention to improving conventional deterrence.Iran is one of the countries that has changed its conventional deterrence strategy in the last few decades. The 1979 revolution can be considered as the origin of Iran's proxy deterrence because one of its most important goals was the export of its revolutionary thinking for the freedom of the nations of the region. Although this ideal did not change any country in the region, it aligned some groups in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Palestine, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and etc.  with Iran’s regional doctrine. The 8-year Iran-Iraq war can be considered as the source of Iran's missile deterrence. In the early years after the victory of the revolution, the structure of Iran's military forces was practically in disarray. Saddam Hussein also tried to use this opportunity to achieve his expansionist goals in the oil-rich areas of Iran. During the war, while the Iraqi army had access to many conventional and unconventional weapons from 80 countries, Iran was under arms embargo and in order to receive a limited number of missiles, it had to enter into tough diplomatic and military negotiations with four countries: Syria, Libya, North Korea, and China. After the end of the war, the development of the missile program became a key to Iran's deterrence strategy. Due to arms embargoes and financial problems after the war, Iran first built its pillars of deterrence on the two bases of proxy and missile deterrence, and in the second stage, it internationalized its deterrence in peripheral regions such as the Middle East, Eurasia and South Asia.

The 1979 revolution and the 8-year war with Iraq prompted Iran to use a different deterrence strategy in its peripheral regions in order to internationalize its deterrence. Financial problems after the 8-year war with Iraq, as well as arms embargos, led Iran to internationalize its deterrence using missile power and allied groups. This policy has changed the strategic calculations of possible aggressive powers and has prevented a new large-scale war against Iran.

The principle is personal responsibility; No one bears the burden of another's sins. However, in all the civilized legal systems of the world, including America and Iran, in some cases, this principle is deviated from. Whenever someone helps someone else in committing the material element of the crime or causes the crime to occur, even though the specific person or the facilitator does not have a role in committing the material element of the crime, due to the causation of the crime, he is liable to punishment. In the instrumentalist American legal system, the deputy is punished as the mastermind of the crime. Although this is justifiable from the point of view of deterrence, it is against the standards of criminal justice. In Iran's legal system, based on adherence to the principles of criminal justice, the punishment of the deputy is lower than the punishment of the supervisor, which is weak in terms of deterrence, at least in some cases, but seems more consistent with the principles of criminal justice. Based on this difference, it seems that in the two systems, the concept, nature, territory, conditions, and effects of aiding and abetting crime in American and Iranian laws have fundamental differences. The question of the current research is how the analysis of the criminal deputy is done based on the principles of criminal law, especially instrumentalism. In this article, while answering this problem in an analytical-descriptive way, it has been suggested that by applying some criteria, it would distance itself from the excesses in America and Iran, so that in addition to the realization of criminal justice, other ideals and goals such as deterrence be realized

The logic of deterrence as one of the solutions and control systems to prevent war has been challenged by the proliferation of tactical nuclear weapons. On the other hand, coercion means trying to influence another's behavior by using force or threat of force. The question that arises is whether tactical nuclear weapons as a means of strategic coercion have brought the international system into the era of nuclear coercion? The main goal of this research is to achieve a theoretical model in the form of a theoretical model in order to analyze the variables and finally understand the important role of tactical nuclear weapons in contemporary international politics. The research method is descriptive and analytical and corresponds to two steps; In the first step, an attempt is made to examine a theoretical model called the state of structural complexity, which is considered a kind of theoretical arrangement by the author, in order to study the cross-sectional state of the international order (after the Cold War until now) and in The second step related to analysis, relationship and correlation between variables should be examined. According to the research hypothesis, statistics and current trends, it can be claimed that tactical nuclear weapons in the conditions of structural complexity and increased probability of strategic surprise among governments as an efficient tool for applying coercion without possibility they are considered mutual assured destruction.

After the end of the Cold War, the international system was placed in a state of structural complexity due to variables such as the unipolar structure of the international system, the development of technology, and the development of the international system. According to these changes in the international system, we are witnessing a change in the control system of nuclear deterrence due to the Proliferation of nuclear weapons. The question that arises is whether tactical nuclear weapons as a tool of strategic coercion have brought the international system into the era of nuclear coercion? According to the hypothesis of this research, it can be claimed that tactical nuclear weapons in the conditions of structural complexity and increased probability of strategic surprise among governments are considered as an efficient tool to apply coercion without the possibility of mutual assured destruction.

In this research, by emphasizing the theoretical foundations of the state of structural complexity, it is possible to see the act of coercion very differently from the classical system. In structural complexity, instead of the Newtonian and materialistic perspective, it is tried to pay attention to phenomena such as power dynamics and the nature of the international system from a social and semantic framework. When discussing the socialization of the structure of the international system, it means that the actors of the international system use identity and social tools to gain, maintain and increase power. In the past, due to the existence of rationality and predictability, the strategy of coercion was only applied by governments in cases where they could bring reasons based on the rationality of a tool for it. Elements such as non-linear dynamics, coordination and adaptation, unexpected qualities and affairs, and social role networks can each be a stimulus for adopting coercive strategies in contemporary international politics. For example, non-linear dynamics can play a role in creating an imbalance between inputs and outputs, and ultimately, governments will suffer a strategic surprise.

The method of this research is to first describe the state of the international order so that it can be examined in the step related to the analysis, connection and correlation between the variables. Data collection is based on the library method.

According to the current statistics and trends, it can be claimed that tactical nuclear weapons are considered as an efficient tool for coercion without the possibility of mutual mutual destruction in the conditions of structural complexity and increased probability of strategic surprise among the states. The number of tactical nuclear weapons was in a sharp decline between 1980-1990. This downward trend was more due to the arms control regime of medium-range nuclear forces in 1987 between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. At the operational level, this regime required the removal of ballistic and land-based cruise missiles with a range between 500 and 5500 km in a period of three years, along with launchers and related equipment. In a unique feature, it covered nuclear, conventional and dual-use systems, some of which could be considered purely tactical in mission. this decreasing trend has had an increasing trend from 2000 to 2023. The security environment has become very complicated after the weakening of the weapons control regime of medium-range nuclear forces. According to these statistics, there are indications that several countries equipped with nuclear weapons may be thinking of returning to tactical nuclear weapons. For example, some United States and multinational experts and officials explicitly want to increase the tactical capabilities of nuclear weapons.

 The production process of this type of weapons according to published statistics and information can promise the importance of this type of weapons for the purpose of nuclear coercion of states against each other for political interests and compensation for the consequences of negligence. to be strategic in the contemporary international system. The author's only suggestion to return to the era of deterrence is that the states possessing tactical nuclear weapons establish a regime of control and removal of tactical nuclear weapons in order to maintain the deterrence system as in the Cold War period.

This study was conducted to identify the effective considerations in designing a comprehensive deterrence model based on the soft power of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The study population includes commanders, university professors, and military experts who are knowledgeable about the subject. The whole number sampling method is purposeful and for the interview they are purposefully selected in whole number. The collected data were analyzed by studying the documents and interviews and sending a questionnaire using descriptive and inferential statistics using a computer and SPSS software program.The final results indicate that all components and sources of soft power counted for the Islamic Republic of Iran in soft deterrence within the framework of comprehensive deterrence are effective and valuable and the three sources of Shiite influence and authority, art and humanitarian action have the highest impact. To be

The ideological rivalries and conflicts between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America in the West Asian region are so widespread that they have turned these two actors into an objective threat to each other. Each of these two countries, due to their different interests in the region, consider the other as a destructive factor to achieve and secure their national interests in the region, and this issue, in turn, causes the emergence of a mutual perceived threat between the United States and Iran in West Asia. This sense of threat has given a different flavor to the regional competition between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America in this geopolitical region and has forced them to try to create deterrence against each other's objective threats in order to achieve a balance of power. In this process, each of these two countries tries to create a balance against the other by using the advantages and opportunities they have, and it seems that both of them are largely successful in this matter. However, the level of perceived threat between them is so wide and the mutual hostile intentions between the US and Iran are so obvious that in practice it has encouraged both of them to continuously participate in this threat balance to create deterrence. In this way, it seems that according to the effective factors in the emergence of this balance of threats in the current situation, it is not possible to draw a clear vision of the end of the efforts of the US and Iran to create a balance of power against each other.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as an actor that has challenged the hegemony of the United States and the ruling system of international relations and is a serious and active critic of the oppressive and unjust relations ruling the world, is always one of the strategic and main goals of the United States in combined war and coercive diplomacy. It has been in the field of foreign policy that with different methods and tools such as arms embargo, political pressure, economic embargo and efforts to isolate and narrow the circle of encirclement of the Islamic Revolution, it has demanded the submission of the Islamic Republic and following American regional and global policies. has been Considering that along with the conventional and unconventional means of combined warfare, including economic war, information war, political war, cultural war, psychological operations, cyber attacks, insecurity and internal destabilization, "diplomacy" and "diplomatic war" are also one of the The main and important axes of this type of combined war, this article seeks to investigate and analyze the nature and dimensions of combined war of America against the Islamic Republic according to the narrative of diplomacy and negotiation.

The aim of this research is to identify and analyze the asymmetric warfare model in the security doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran in response to the potential threats in the Persian Gulf. This research addresses the question of what is the asymmetric warfare model in Iran's security doctrine in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, the research hypothesis is as follows: Due to the asymmetry in military capabilities in terms of quantity and quality between Iran and its adversaries, including the United States, in the Persian Gulf region, Iran has adopted an asymmetric warfare method as a component of its security doctrine, which involves using military tools such as speedboats, mines, and cruise missiles. Through this method, Iran seeks to achieve the necessary deterrence for itself. The findings of this research indicate that Iran has chosen this method of war due to its constraints and necessities, and that this method has resulted in deterrence, self-sufficiency, self-reliance, structural change, and ultimately a change in the enemy's strategy. In this research, the researchers have used the theories of "asymmetric warfare" as a theoretical framework. The study of books, articles, dissertations, and scientific and military documents available has also been utilized. The nature of this research is descriptive and partly explanatory, and the data collection method is documentary library.

They showed the system of the Iran to be inefficient in the international arena, and although they imposed a heavy cost on the nation and the government of Iran, they did nothing with the vigilance of the officials and the perseverance of the people. After the end of the war, the military and national officials thought of strengthening the deterrence power in the country, because according to the military and defense capabilities created in the war, the unique combination of the Iranian armed forces, national spirit, experience of sacred defense, made Iran a regional power. and a kind of deterrence was created in the country. Deterrence is a strategy in which a power uses the threat of retaliation to prevent an enemy attack. The idea of ​​deterrence has a long history, some believe it is as old as war itself.Deterrence does not mean that you necessarily use weapons; Rather, one of the important dimensions of deterrence is its managerial and psychological aspect. As much as Iran's capabilities are analyzed in the world, it leaves its effects in the international system, but this is not enough. Because the of Iran needs deterrence at a high level to advance the goals and ideals of the revolution, and it must have both types of deterrence, i.e. symmetric and asymmetric, according to regional and extra-regional threats and manage them. This research is applied and its method is descriptive and analytical, and its purpose is to address the need to improve Iran's defense deterrence power.

With the discovery of gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean, a new capacity was created for the countries located in this geographical area to take advantage of this strategic resource to meet their strategic energy needs and reduce economic problems and dependence on foreign sources. The Karish and Qana gas fields are among the resources that, due to being in the maritime border dispute between Lebanon and the Zionist regime, the possibility of identifying reserves and extracting from these resources faced serious considerations. Hizbollah's pressure and threat in determining the conditions of these resources following the Zionist regime's abuses of the said resources led to an agreement to determine the maritime borders of Lebanon with the Zionist regime, based on which Qana was handed over to Lebanon and Karish to the regime. The question of the current research is, how will the effect of the naval agreement between Lebanon and the Zionist regime regarding the gas fields of Qana and Karish be on the situation of Hezbollah in Lebanon? The hypothesis of the research states: "Hezbollah's protection of Lebanon's national interests in the Qana and Karish field of energy, stabilizing the political and national activism of this movement in Lebanon, creates a new arena for increasing the asymmetric deterrence power of Hezbollah in the field of maritime and energy against the Zionist regime. »