جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « شیخ اشراق » در نشریات گروه « علوم قرآن و حدیث »

Sheikh Shihabuddin Suhrawardi, known as Sheikh Ishraq, and Mir Muhammad Baqir Astarabadi, known as Mirdamad, are two great philosophers who believed in the principality of nature in their philosophical system and organized the other issues of their philosophical system based on it. At first glance, it seems that these two philosophers principally agree on the principality of nature and the sub-principles on which it is based, but by examining the works of these two philosophers some differences appear, differences which have had a special impact on their philosophical system and have led to completely different results. By collecting data through the library method, this article addresses the differences between Sheikh Ishraq and Mirdamad on the principality of nature. Therefore, using the descriptive-analytical method, the views of these two philosophers on the principality of nature are reviewed. The research findings show that although both philosophers believe in the principality of nature, they differ in their interpretation and the sub-principles that are based on it.

Sheikh Ishraq considers perception by presence - at least within the limits of vision, absar, - as a category of the knowledge by presence. By criticizing his point of view, Sadr al-Muta'allihin accepts a correspondent mental image of this perception. He believes that in this perception, the mind creates immaterial forms like those of material beings in itself. According to this, essential tangible from for Sheikh Ishraq is the material external form; while for Sadr al-Muta'allehin it is the immaterial mental form similar to its correspondent material external form. In this article, after a brief explanation of Sheikh Ishraq's view on the truth of tangible perception, we have examined the six major objections of Sadr al-Muta'allihin on this view and have shown that these problems can be answered at least with the help of the principles of the transcendent wisdom. Then, by proposing some objections to the view of Sadr al-Muta'allihin, we have proved that his view, although it can be considered a suitable explanation for imaginary perception, is insufficient to justify tangible perception. The purpose of this study is to show that Sheikh Ishraq's view on sensory perception can be defended with the help of the principles of Sadr al-Muta'allihin, and the ideas of these two eminent sages are more complementary than contradictory

The ideas of Avicenna and Sheikh-i Ishraq as the scholars of Peripatetic and Illumination Philosophy have always received the critical attention of the reviewers. One of the most important discussions in this regard is the exegetical method of the above philosophers: Sheikh-i Ishraq, contrary to Avicenna, does not have an independent exegesis but his exegetical ideas can be inferred from his collection of writings. In fact, Avicenna has a completely rational trend whereas the exegetical trend of Sheikh-i Ishraq is mystical. The exegetical method of Avicenna has been rational while Sheikh-i Ishraq has often used an innovative method. Furthermore, Avicenna has rarely applied the Qur’an to the Qur’an method in his rational arguments. The abovementioned philosophers have one thing in common in their commentaries and that is impartiality in interpretation and not using the traditions in the interpretation of the Qur’an.
 

Sometimes human beings, through imagination, make new faces and bodies from the tangible realities that these imaginative forms refer to. And sometimes the imaginary forms are some reflections of the incorporeal world in human`s peaceful hearth. Some imaginary forms, however, which are called evil and dark forms of imagination, are neither originated from natural principles nor from incorporeal principles, for the world of nature is that of natural earthly beauty, and the incorporeal world is that of heavenly beauty.
 Thus, what meant by the imaginary forms for philosophers in ontology and epistemology includes both good and evil imaginary forms. Ibn Sina and Sheikh Ishraq, in a common view, consider some evil forms of imagination as being unrealistic and originated from agitation of imagination, and in a different way, Ibn Sina attribute some of these forms to the incorporeal world, while Sheikh Ishraq refers to them with such names as hayula, monster, ghool, giant, dark forms, jinn and devil occurred by the absolute and limited imaginary world. In this article, along with expressing the viewpoints of these two philosophers, we will elaborate the place and the manner in which the forms of imagination are realized, as well as the implications and consequences.

One of the major issues in logic, philosophy and epistemology is that of knowledge and its parts. Since far away, in Islamic philosophy and logic, knowledge has been divided into two forms of concept and assent. But in this regard, the truth of the assent, especially since the time of the Sheikh Ishraq, has been considered seriously. According to him, assent is not knowledge, although it can belong to knowledge; while for philosophers, it is considered as knowledge truly. On the other hand, Fakhruddin Razi, while acknowledging assent as a form of knowledge, considers it to be composed of concepts and judgments, while other philosophers have viewed it to be simple not composed. Of course, here it is important to note that if the conception and assent are types of knowledge, they must be separated from each other by a bond. So, how can one acknowledge that assent is simple knowledge? Therefore, Mulla Sadra, with a very detailed analysis, sees assent as a simple fact at the same time as an analytic compound. In Mulla Sadra's view, assent is a concept just the same as judgment and the judgment in assent as a species, fasl, and the concept itself is its genus. Therefore, a judgment like every species is the same as the mode of its genus. In terms of Mulla Sadra, the philosophers` views on the simplicity of assent and conditionality of concept for it return to his view.

Suhrawardi, despite the Peripatetics, hold that there is a kind of category, namely, “degrees of intensity”, and he says it is a part of ancient Persian wisdom. From Illuminationist philosophy viewpoint, there are degrees of intensity of lights, which it distinguishes between different kinds of lights. This kind of differentiation is build on the very same criterion that is their criterion for their resemblance. Sadrian “degrees of intensity” have derived from Suhrawardian “degrees of intensity” of lights. Although, Mulla Sadra, following Suhrawardi’s footprints, maintain that “degrees of intensity” in quiddities is possible, but finally, he rejects this theory and hold that “degrees of intensity”, in first place, is attributed to reality. Although philosophical position of these two philosophers about “degrees of intensity” are different and each of them have its own grounds and roots, but they reflect a kind of closeness.

The present article aims to explain the quality of Divine knowledge of creatures which is the matter of controversy among Muslim scholars including theologians and philosophers and in this regard, explains the theory of peripatetics and Avicenna in particular about the problem and then the critiques posed by al-Tousi of it and as fallows, expressing Muhaqiq al-Lahiji's responds to Muhaqiq al-Tousi in support of Avicenna, examines al-Lahiji's responds with a critical approach and proves that Avicenna’s theory of the quality of Divine knowledge of creatures necessitates Divine Essence's lacking detailed knowledge of creatures, ascription of real additional attributes to Divine Essence and also ascription of passive reception and receiving from the other to the Essence which are regarded as impossible by Avicenna and Muhaqiq al-Lahiji themselves. Obviously, the present article aims to estate the responds ignoring their bases, otherwise Avicenna’s basis and also his follower's (al-Lahiji) basis and Muhaqiq al-Tousi's basis need to be criticized so the basal critiques are alluded to amidst the critiques and studies.

Concepts are divided into self-evident and theoretical ones. The focus of definition discussions are theoretical concepts. Different questions are raised: what are theoretical concepts? Are general concepts given through sense self-evident or theoretical? How is it possible that particular sense concepts are regarded as self-evident but those derived from them as theoretical? Is it possible to take whole in the definition of part? If not, how can counterexamples be explained? Is real differentia knowable? If not, what substitute is offered by logicians? Is the purpose of definition to clarify the concepts or analyze the essential notions which lie in the defined? Is it easy or difficult to present a complete definition? With the distinction being nowadays made between logic and philosophy of logic, the above questions and similar ones are to be discussed in the latter.Mulla Sadra, at any rate, touched on these problems and provided answers. In general, he was in favor of Peripatetics and attempted to meet the challenges raised by the Master of illumination.