جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « avicenna » در نشریات گروه « علوم قرآن و حدیث »

The problem of resurrection, one of the most important issues in the philosophy and theology. Some of Muslim philosophers and the vast majority of theologians always discussed about this topic. Some of Muslim philosophers accepted this problem and prove it, but, in quality of occurrence of them, they have differ believe from each other. However, some of Muslim theologians except those who believe in transmogrification, they consider the resurrection to be one of the principle of religion, beside monotheism and prophecy. Moreover, they proved the principle of resurrection through reasons, and explanations them elaborates through the Holy Quran and Prophetic saying (Traditions- Hadith). Avicenna and Suhrawardi have been proving resurrection. Of course, for prove of this problem, they adopted of different manner from Muslim Theologians. Both of philosophers according to codify of ordinary psychological system, have proved and explanation this issue. Thus, for understand of Avicenna and Suhrawardi’s eschatology. First of all, we must understand of their psychological system. Furthermore, in this paper, we will discuss about survival of the soul according to immaterial soul and perfecting of soul as two premises for prove of resurrection.

Scientific methods are tools for solving the problems of any science. In the new and contemporary era, the independent discussion of some of these popular methods gradually fueled the formulation of science methodology. Although the issue of the method of philosophy was also discussed in the past, today this discussion is followed in an emerging field called meta-philosophy. This article seeks to take an initial step in order to identify the coordinates of Avicenna’s philosophical method. Avicenna does not have an independent and exhaustive discussion of the method of philosophy, and therefore, to identify his philosophical method, one should use his implicit meta-philosophy and by reviewing his works, identify the methods that he actually used. In this article, after an introductory discussion on the method of science and philosophical methodology, I review Avicenna’s discussions on the method of philosophy. In the next step, with a look at the more or less common methods in analytical philosophy, four methods of comparative reasoning, conceptual analysis, logical analysis, and mental test will be selected as models and frameworks for discussion and some examples will be presented for the application of these methods in Avicenna’s philosophy. Recognizing Avicenna’s philosophical method in this framework shows that his philosophy is very similar to contemporary analytical philosophy in terms of method.

Avicenna, one of the greatest Muslim scholars, while paying full attention to reason and argument, also pays special attention to the Holy Shari'a. In addition to belief issues, he has also explained the truth of many religious sub-practices, practices and rituals. One of these religious rites and rituals is prayer, and one of the philosophical debates in the field of prayer research is the issue of answering prayers. One of these issues is how the Supreme Being and the supreme principles, who are completely immaterial, respond to the prayers of the distressed person in a way that is compatible with their Ineffectiveness. There are three views left by Avicenna on the issue of answering prayers that are seemingly contradictory and inconsistent, but with precision in them, they can be considered as three parts of a comprehensive theory. In this article, with the focus on the views of Sheikh Al-Ra'is, the issue of answering prayers, the truth of prayer, the compatibility of answering prayers with the Ineffectiveness of supreme principles, and the compatibility of prayer with divine destiny and providence are discussed.

The purpose of the present study is to explain the theory of state in the political philosophy of Avicenna in order to display the way of presenting a favorable government in terms of political issues based on Spragens' methodology. In this regard, by delving deep into the political ideas and doctrines of Avicenna, it was attempted to answer this main question: How does Shaykh al-Ra'is (Avicenna) think of a favorable political system? Thus, the present research is compiled in four parts investigating problems, causes, goals, and solutions. The method of study is historical-descriptive and the results convey that Avicenna's political philosophy has an integrated intellectual-philosophical system including the social nature of human beings, the necessity of a prophet's leadership due to his connection with demiurge, and the necessity of prophethood in politics. In presenting his approach to statism and proposing the theory of state, Avicenna deems that the best system is the prophetic political model in which a prophet or his successor is at the center of affairs. In fact, the theory of state in Avicenna's political philosophy has been based upon the divine nature of humans and the utmost role of government in people's prosperity and salvation in both worlds.

The principle of al-wāḥid is one of the principles that has long been of interest to philosophers so that some references to the contents of this principle can be found in the works of Plotinus, but Ibn Sina seems to be the first person to have tried to logically prove the principle of al-wāḥid. Although his theories seem to differ in his various works to justify the issuance of plurality from unity, he can generally be considered as one of the defenders of this principle with the contents intended by philosophers. The authors of the present article intend to refer to Avicenna’s works, and while extracting the differences in his statement about the issuance of plural from one, to critique the arguments he has presented in support of the principle of al-wāḥid. Although some criticisms have been written about Avicenna’s opinions (on this subject) and some people have sought to answer, we have, in this article, by analyzing Avicenna’s own words, reached some instances, most of which are not brought up by the critics and are therefore considered as a new analysis. For example, it can be said that, firstly, proving the principle of al-wāḥid logically causes a vicious circle, and secondly, other principles accepted by Avicenna show that the issuance of plural from the simple one is possible and will not lead to insertion (tarakkub) in essence.

Although hermeneutics as a systematic theory is a modern area, informally has had a long history especially in the interpretation of sacred textures. In Islamic world, we mostly find it among philosophers and Gnostics that suppose a pure reality beyond the formal aspects of words and phrases. In this regard, Avicenna is the first philosopher who offers independent and formal interpretations of some Quranic Surahs and whose rational and philosophical interpretations of some Quranic Surahs and verses leads to the philosophical attitude in interpreting Quran. On one hand, he finds the verses of Quran symbolic and metaphorical that carries another realms of the meaning and then he aims to discover those; on the other hand, based on his metaphysical basics and philosophical assumptions of the existence, the origin and the resurrection, cosmos and human, soul and body and so on, he represents an innovative interpretation in which religious phrases goes beyond their common meaning and enters to another semantic square and find metaphysical meanings. This article, with a glance to Avicenna's interpretations, studies Quran as interpreted by a philosopher and the process of turning concepts into metaphysical ones. At the end it will evaluate this method of interpretation. Avicenna's interpretations can pave the way to new areas of study in comparative interpretation, methodology, hermeneutics and its history in Islamic flow of thought.

The ideas of Avicenna and Sheikh-i Ishraq as the scholars of Peripatetic and Illumination Philosophy have always received the critical attention of the reviewers. One of the most important discussions in this regard is the exegetical method of the above philosophers: Sheikh-i Ishraq, contrary to Avicenna, does not have an independent exegesis but his exegetical ideas can be inferred from his collection of writings. In fact, Avicenna has a completely rational trend whereas the exegetical trend of Sheikh-i Ishraq is mystical. The exegetical method of Avicenna has been rational while Sheikh-i Ishraq has often used an innovative method. Furthermore, Avicenna has rarely applied the Qur’an to the Qur’an method in his rational arguments. The abovementioned philosophers have one thing in common in their commentaries and that is impartiality in interpretation and not using the traditions in the interpretation of the Qur’an.
 

One of the fundamental topics in philosophical psychology is the criterion of the multiplicity of the powers of the soul. The main research question is: What has been taken as the criteria for mental powers as being numerous by Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra for multiplicity of souls? How one may view on what they said in the field? Ibn Sina introduces five criteria in terms of differences in intensity and weakness, rapidity and slowness, existence and absence, contradiction and sexual difference as the criteria, and, relying on the rule of alvahid accepts only the fifth criterion. Sheikh Ishraq, limiting the rule of alvahid to the very essence of God, explains the difference and multiplicity of mental powers in terms of different directions and modifications of the soul. Mulla Sadra, having criticized Ibn Sina`s, also examines the distinction of powers based on the criterion of the separation of one power from another and contradiction in the functions of the soul. In this study, while analyzing these criteria critically, we discuss the drawbacks to them, and prove that none of them may be taken as a criterion in the field.

Metempsychosis is one of the Common approaches to justify and explicate eternality and Perennial Life. Although different viewpoints have been brought up in its definition and elucidation, Avicenna introduces any belief in the incarnation of the soul in a body other than the original body as a metempsychosis belief.  From his point of view, although the believers in metempsychosis may have some disagreements concerning the cause, the manner, or the kind of body in which the soul after separation enters, all of them share the same opinion in decisive distinction of the soul and the body and primordial existence of the soul in relation to the body. By his interpretation of the essentially cogent connection between the soul and the body and the creation of the soul with the body, Avicenna deals with two types of critique of the opinions of those believing in metempsychosis. In the first critique, by accepting the premises of those believing in metempsychosis, he shows that the theory of metempsychosis is incompatible and unjustifiable even with his own preconceptions;  and in the second critique, he considers metempsychosis as an improbable notion according to the principles of Peripatetic philosophy. With a descriptive method, the present research with reliance on Avicenna's works, especially “Al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiya”, tries to explain his specific viewpoint concerning metempsychosis on the one hand and coherently express his critiques of this viewpoint, on the other.

In the beginning of his fourth book (Gama), Aristotle introduces metaphysics as an “existent qua existent” science and has called it “primary philosophy”, whereas, sometimes he has named it as “wisdom” and “theology”. Also, besides various names, he has set forth various and numerous subject for this science. Therefore, since long ago the commentators and interpreters of Aristotle have had trouble determining the subject of metaphysics and each has taken a separate path. With Avicenna entering the Middle Ages discourse, many developments have taken place on the subject of metaphysics. He knows metaphysics as existent qua existent, but he considers the existent generally, in such a way that it includes both God and the sensible beings and this is regarded as a development in metaphysics. Suaréz is a Middle Ages philosophers who has enjoyed the presence of Avicenna but has separated himself from Avicenna and others who came after him by a subject that he presents for metaphysics. His interpretation is an Aristotelian-Avicennan one that involuntarily leads to establishing the Modern metaphysics, which is different from the Aristotelian-Avicennan metaphysics system. This article is mainly intended to deal with metaphysics as compared between Avicenna and Suaréz and attempt is made to explicate and analyze the similarities and differences in the two Islamic and Christian traditions concerning metaphysics.

Human soul`s motion is regarded as a quite new problem brought up by reflecting on past philosophers` ideas. Though such philosophers as Avicenna and Mulla Sadra have not discussed the subject in isolation, one may prove the problem on the basis of their fundamental principles. Denying substantial and incorporeal motion, Avicenna views human soul as changing only in accidental and corporeal states, he does not deny development in purgatory. Mulla Sadra, however, views human soul as being of substantial motion; but this motion is limited to corporeality. In the paper, the philosophers` views on the subject have been mentioned at first and then, the place of dispute and main problem on the human soul`s motion have been studied. finally, six way as the capabilities of transcendental philosophy for proving and explaining the soul`s motion after death have been given.

Point of view of Avicenna concerning explanation of revelation and appealing to the faculty of imagination (al-Qovvah al-Motakhayyellah) in changing universal perceptions to particular ones has inspired some contemporary intellectuals like D.R. Soroush to maintain that Avicenna has believed in agency of soul of the prophet in process of revelation. Separating between though of Avicenna in sphere of peripatetic and illuminationism philosophy, this paper analyzes his idea. This separation proves that, in sphere of peripatetic philosophy, Avicenna has appealed to change in faculty of imagination in the way of explanation of revelational particulars, since he maintains that faculty of imagination and imaginational perceptions are material, as well as he negated the belief to the world of intermediate discontinuous imagination. However, he, in the sphere of illuminationism philosophy, has other explanation of this issue within the topic of functions of faculties of commonsense and imagination of the prophet, because he believes ,in this sphere, in immateriality of the faculty of imagination and its perceptions, as well as implicit acknowledgement to the world of intermediate discontinuous imagination. According to Avicenna, faculties of common sense and imagination of the prophet can save particular revelational forms and perceptions without any change in them. Accordingly, no reason remains for any change in faculty of imagination or changing abstract intelligible to sensory perception, since they, in contract with human souls, have intensity of being.

The proof or the way of the truthful is the method of the godly philosophers in which the pure existence or the absolute existent is considered, not the divine action and its qualities like contingency, creation and movement. Seddiq is homogenous with “fi’,'il” and is used to exaggerate in truthfulness and what philosophers intended from seddiq is the one who merely regards the existent or the existence and does not consider the divine action and its quality. Farabi is the first philosopher who indicated to this method and adopted it from the Quranic verse: Is it not sufficient tat your lord is witness to all things? Avicenna has accounted this proof in his works extensively and attributed it to the truthful for the first time. Many eminent men of philosophy, theology and mysticism have been effected by the account of Avicenna and whether recounted the same Avicenna's account or innovated a new account inspired by the bases of his thought. These accounts can be categorized in three groups: the account of the proof based on the nullity of cycle and endless regress, the account of the proof based on nullity or cycle, the account of the proof needless of nullity of cycle and endless regress.