جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « ارسطو » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

One of the fundamental concerns of humanity since its inception has been the question of the meaning of life. Meaningfulness has two connotations: purposefulness and value. Certainly, the meaning of the meaning of life depends on the type of worldview and perspective of each philosopher. The present research seeks to examine the answer to the question of whether pleasure is related to meaningfulness or not. Does pleasure require pleasure to achieve the meaning of life? This research compares and contrasts the theories of Aristotle and Mulla Sadra on the relationship between pleasure and the meaning of life. In this article, the descriptive-analytical method is used to analyze the concepts. The most important philosophical bases that distinguish and differ between these two philosophers are the question of equivocation of existence. Aristotle does not believe in the equivocation of existence. From Aristotle's point of view, pleasure and happiness are a constant for all human beings and he does not believe in different levels of pleasure. He considers happiness to be limited to this world and exclusive to the rational part of man. He considers the way to reach meaning to be limited to the realm of virtue. However, Mulla Sadra, based on the principle of equivocation of existence, believes that pleasure has different levels, with intellectual pleasure being superior to sensory pleasure and being higher in terms of rank and existential dignity than the world of sense and matter. Mulla Sadra considers happiness to be related to the physical and spiritual dimensions, so Mulla Sadra believes in comprehensive happiness. He considers the way to reach meaning to be wisdom, imagination, and inner forces. He considers the way to reach happiness to be a human voluntary action. He considers the true example of happiness to be in the afterlife.

Eliot Cohen is one of the contemporary pioneers of philosophical counseling. He considers philosophical counseling as one of the branches of applied philosophy. His logic-based therapy (LBT) or his logic-based counseling and therapy is also a subcategory of this claim. His reason is that a philosophical counselor, especially a counselor with Logic-Base Therapy (LBT), empowers the skill of applying philosophy in everyday life, and this method provides his audience with a coherent, clear, and most importantly, methodical framework for applying philosophical ideas and methods in solving psychological problems (Cohen, 2015, p. 34). Cohen has always sought to develop logic-based therapy as an independent and reliable branch among philosophical counseling approaches. We can see this specific trajectory in his works from the very beginning of using philosophy in treatment.
On the one hand, we know that Aristotle, as a systematic philosopher, in the practical dimensions of his philosophy, not only asked what happiness is in life, but also sought to realize it. Cohen was inspired by this issue and generally believes that applying Aristotle's philosophy in philosophical counseling leads to the "self-care" of clients (Cohen, 2003, p. 18). In his treatment system, he has used not only Aristotle's logic and especially his approach to fallacies and his theory of practical analogies, but also Aristotle's moral philosophy and the concept of virtue and its practical application.
The main field of this research is philosophical counseling with a focus on Cohen's logic-based therapy (LBT method). Our main goal is to see how Cohen was able to use Aristotle's philosophy, especially his logic and moral philosophy, in philosophical counseling in his logic-based therapy system.

The main issue of this research is, in what sense Cohen's logic-based therapy should be considered Aristotelian. Answering this question requires answering at least two other questions: first, what is the contribution of Aristotle's moral and logical teachings in the establishment of logic-based therapy; secondly, how Cohen used the classical concepts and themes of Aristotle's philosophy during the establishment and development of this contemporary treatment method.

Following the development of philosophical counseling in recent years, and specifically about Cohen's method as one of the contemporary counseling and treatment methods, numerous articles and books have been written. Some of these researches have generally developed and described Cohen's LBT method, but none of them have directly addressed the influence and role of foundations and themes derived from philosophy and especially Aristotle's logic and methodology in the establishment and development of this method. However, the past valuable research about the LBT method will certainly help us in advancing the goals of this research.
The article Metaphysics of logic-based therapy (LBT) in Cohen's view (Nazarnejad, 2021) is a research that overlaps with part of our research goal and explains Cohen's method and its theoretical foundations. But this article does not focus specifically on the Aristotelian foundations and Aristotelian methodology of logic-based therapy. Perhaps Cohen himself made the most review of the background of our research. In 2000, he published a book called Philosophers at Work, and in its seventh chapter, he discussed the role of Aristotelian logic in professions such as law and medicine. He also wrote a book titled What would Aristotle do? in 2003, where he discussed the role of Aristotle's philosophy in philosophical counseling. In fact, this book may have emphasized the importance of Aristotle in philosophical counseling among other important works of Cohen in his logic-oriented method, but so far, no independent or critical research has been published - especially by commentators - that simultaneously analyzes the effect of Aristotle's moral and logical foundations in logic-based treatment.

Our philosophical method in this research is analytical, and as one of its aspects, we have analyzed documents. In this step of the analysis, we first collected the documents and then organized the claims and their content. Then, by explaining logic-based therapy (LBT) and searching for the obvious and hidden Aristotelian roots in this treatment method, we have presented our analysis and evaluation in connection with the Aristotelian foundations of logic-oriented therapy, especially based on the three aspects of the hypothesis proposed in the problem statement section.

In a comprehensive statement, from Cohen's point of view, the field of human feelings, emotions, and decisions has an inferential structure that is often hidden. What endangers a person's psychological health is the transformation of these internal conclusions into pseudo-inferences or so-called fallacies. It is for this reason that a person's will and then his words and actions fall into error, and therefore the relationship of a person with himself, others and the world around him becomes restless and confused.
But at the same time, he believes in this Aristotelian teaching that human happiness depends on living according to virtues. The solution to this psychological confusion in logic-based therapy (LBT) is to identify and fix these fallacies by replacing them with appropriate virtues in the same field of thinking.
Our analysis of the Aristotelian foundations of Cohen's logic-based therapy shows that: 1. In some subjects, Cohen has completely taken the basics of his discussion and his method from Aristotle; topics such as the Doctrine of the Mean, some types of fallacies and virtues, as well as the role of practice in establishing virtues in a person's existence. 2. However, in matters such as the deductive nature of human emotions, feelings and decisions, as well as being inspired by Aristotle's theory of "logical slips" and Aristotle's theory of practical analogies, Cohen only has an Aristotelian framework. This means that the foundations of Cohen's claims are Aristotelian, but when applied to LBT, new results were obtained. Overall, it seems that the scope of this second meaning is wider.

The philosophy of music is a branch of philosophy that studies the meaning of music, the relationship between the artist and the creation of music, the relationship between the audience and music, and such issues. Since emotions and feelings constitute the meaning of music, the primary focus of theorists in this field is devoted to the fundamental question of where the emotional impact of music originates from. In the philosophy of music, there are two rival theories regarding the source of musical emotions: the expressive theory, which prioritizes the emotions of the artist in creating the work and considers the meaning of music in the expression of the artist's emotions, and the arousal theory, which gives priority to the emotions evoked in the listener and considers the meaning and purpose of music in eliciting the emotions of the audience.
The aim of this research is to facilitate the scientific examination of the relationship between music and emotions. The specific objectives of this research are as follows: _ Introducing and examining the most important theories and discussions in the philosophy of music. _ Investigating the most important criticisms that have been made on various theories in the philosophy of music and showing the efforts of theorists and philosophers to respond to these criticisms. _ Showing that old theories put forward by philosophers like Aristotle can still be relevant in current philosophical discussions. This highlights the importance of mastering the history of philosophy for researchers in this field. _ Demonstrating that music can (or even should) be subject to contemplation and philosophical inquiry. This research is classified as fundamental research in terms of the data collection method, which is qualitative research using a library research approach. Additionally, this research specifically utilizes up-to-date and primary sources in the field of philosophy of music.

Research Question(s):

Which of these two theories of Expression and Arousal provides a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between music and emotions and offers a better explanation of our emotional experiences when confronted with music?
Which theory can better respond to the criticisms raised against it?
Literature Review
Some of the most important articles published on the arousal theory of music are as follows (in chronological order):Mew, P (1984) The musical arousal of emotions.British Journal of Aesthetics 25 (4):357-361.
Robinson, J (1994) The expression and arousal of emotion in music. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 52 (1):13-22.
 Beever, A. (1998) The Arousal Theory Again? The British Journal of Aesthetics 38(1):82-90.
Kingsbury, J (1999) Why the Arousal Theory of Musical Expressiveness is Still Wrong? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (1):83 – 88.
Matravers, D (2007) Musical expressiveness. Philosophy Compass 2 (3):373–379.
 Arbo, A. (2009) Some Remarks on “Hearing-as” and its Role in the Aesthetics of Music. Topoi 28 (2):97-107.
Cochrane, T. (2010) Music, Emotions and the Influence of the Cognitive Sciences. Philosophy Compass 5 (11):978-988.
Eerola, T. (2016) Being Moved by Unfamiliar Sad Music Is Associated with High Empathy. Frontiers in Psychology 7.
Levinson,  j (2016) Music-Specific Emotion: An Elusive Quarry. Estetika 53 (2):115-131.
Wu-Jing He (2017) Emotional Reactions Mediate the Effect of Music Listening on Creative Thinking: Perspective of the Arousal-and-Mood Hypothesis. Frontiers in Psychology 8

This research is classified as fundamental research in terms of its objective. The general aim of this research is to establish a conceptual framework for the philosophical examination of the relationship between music and emotions

In response to the first question, we first need to see what each of these two theories offers in response to the most important issue regarding emotions and music, namely the issue of the "relationship between expressed emotions in music and evoked emotions in the listener." The expressive theory addresses this issue with the concept of "grounding," while the motivational theory uses the concept of "emotional codes." Our analysis shows that the concept of "emotional codes" is more effective than "grounding" for two reasons:"Grounding" is a concept that claims objectivity, while by definition, the meaning of music lies in its sensory content. The conflict between the expressive theory and the motivational theory is essentially a conflict over determining the place of sensory content in music. The expressive theory places the sensory content in the expressed emotions in the musical piece and considers these emotions as a crystallization of the emotions of the creator, while the motivational theory places the sensory content of music in the emotions evoked in the listener through music. Referring to an objective concept to explain the place of sensory content, if not a theoretical impossibility, is an additional effort that only complicates the conflict between these two theories.
The concept of emotional codes conceptualizes the issue at the mental (or intermental) level and provides an effective framework for explaining the position of the sensory content of music. Different and varied reactions to music are appropriate. Furthermore, by introducing the concept of emotional codes, one can pave the way for framing research issues in an interdisciplinary context. This way, the issue of the sensory content of music can be explored in the interdisciplinary fields of musicology, philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience.
Our analysis has shown that the theory of motivation with our experiential intuition is more compatible. This is because the basis of judging a musical work is the experienced emotions, not the assumed emotions that the artist intended to express. For example, when we label a piece of music as sad, it is not because the composer intended to express sad emotions, but rather it is simply and intuitively because that piece evokes a sense of sadness in us.
As a result, the theory of motivation provides a better and more valid explanation of the relationship between music and emotions.
In response to the second question, it is important to consider the main criticism that challenges each of these two theories and how they respond to it. Our analysis has shown that the main criticism of the expressive theory is the "expression of unexperienced emotions," and proponents of the expressive theory, in response to this criticism, question the principles of this theory. They do not necessarily consider the expressed emotions as belonging to the artist, but rather see the artist as simply a narrator of the emotions of another individual (or even a completely imaginary person). In this way, they raise the larger question of whose emotions are being expressed in music. Since the answer cannot be the audience (as that would essentially turn it into a motivational theory), this question remains shrouded in ambiguity and mystery.
On the other hand, in our research, we demonstrated that the responses that have been presented to the issue of "liking sad music" are not defensible and valid. Furthermore, by using the concept of catharsis from Aristotle, we were able to propose an acceptable response to this criticism. We showed that our proposed response can address all the criticisms that were present in other responses.

In the analysis of "Philia", Aristotle has deriving friendship from self-love in Nicomachean Ethics, speaking the importance of selfishness on achieving eudemonia. Dose books VIII and IX provide for an altruistic or egoistic view of friendship? Self-love is evident in Aristotle’s words; although the attribution of Aristotle's theory to moral-egoism has been rejected as a teleological theory. Altruism is expressed by the phrase '(to want good things for another 'for his sake and not for one's own'). The theory of Philia is a pattern including love to virtue found by a person in his own self first, and then extends it to the other. , i.e., our feelings or attitudes of friendship are derived from attitudes towards ourselves. The term “another self” represents a motivation for friendship that leads to altruistic goals, That is, attention to the other for the sake of other which arises from the similarity of people in intellectual part (nous).

The examination of the concept of mind in Aristotle’s psychology poses aconsiderable challenge within his work, De anima. This paper unravels thecomplexities by scrutinizing Aristotle’s expressions as both a response to and anadvancement of Anaxagoras’ Mind theory. Anaxagoras’ theory, whether explicitly orimplicitly, presents mind as both indeterminate and everlasting. However, thesecharacteristics contradict the primary function of the mind, namely, its capacity forknowledge and thought. Anything that is entirely indeterminate lacks resemblanceto anything else, thereby rendering it incapable of comprehending anything, in accordance with the widely accepted axiom that “like is known by like”. Besides, knowledge and thought involve a transformation from potentiality to actuality, implying the involvement of matter, while a material entity cannot possess eternity. In this paper, it is contended that the fourth and fifth chapters of the third book of De anima address these two dilemmas. Aristotle reconciles these attributes by endorsing and reinterpreting Anaxagoras’ theory.

In his book "al-Shifā" (The Healing), Avicenna distinguishes between the concepts of possibility and probability and presents three approaches to differentiate these two concepts, although it is evident from the conducted studies that he did not specifically and independently address the issue of probability. In this study, we investigate the distinction between possibility and probability based on the Avicenna's works. The findings suggest that the distinctions which Avicenna made between possibility and probability are rooted in their specific historical contexts. Although most logicians maintain that probability is subjective and possibility is objective, they cannot draw a precise distinction between the two concepts. The second distinction is, in fact, between the future-possibility and the probability of occurrence of an event in the future, which reflects the difference between Avicenna's future-possibility and Al-Fārābī's future-possibility. The third distinction also seems to be a confusion between the meanings of the words 'probability' and 'narrowest-possibility', which has its roots in the translation of Aristotle's works.

Every performance, despite the special elements it contains, aims to establish the best kind of communication with its audience and to challenge its different human aspects in a wide range of understanding and experience in the field of watching! The question is, how can this kind of encounter affect the human soul and act beyond what was imagined at the beginning of the drama? Catharsis is a concept that has been of interest in Western philosophy for a long time, a concept that was seriously proposed for the first time as a concrete matter by Aristotle in tragedy and subsequently in his dramatic works, entered the macro concepts of Western philosophy, and thinkers; From the past until today, they have presented various topics and approaches to explain it. Accordingly, one of the approaches that can be discussed and paid attention to this context is the substantial motion principle that is assigned to Mulla Sadra. According to him, the truth of the essence is the gradual occurrence, and this happens in the form of the gradual movement of the object from power to action. He considers the substantial motion to be a process based on unity of connection; In this sense, according to Mulla Sadra, the world with all its parts is in constant flux. But the main topic of the current article is whether catharsis can affect the essence of a person, cause him to move towards transcendence and enhance his dignity in the course of evolution that is taking place in time and space?

The theory of mental existence has been seriously discussed in Islamic philosophy and theology since the time of Fakhrazi. Meanwhile, some philosophers have proved this theory and others have denied it. Mir Qawamuddin Razi Tehrani can be mentioned among the philosophers who denied the theory of mental existence. This philosopher is influenced by his teacher Melar Jabali Tabrizi in denying the existence of the mind, and as Tabrizi connects the theory of the existence of the mind with self, science and perception, Mir Qawamuddin also pays attention to these axes like the teacher. The main issue in this article is the denial of evidence of mental existence by Mir Qawamuddin Razi Tehrani and how it is connected with the problem of perception and science. Of course, this review will not be devoid of critical and analytical aspects. The discussion method in this article is the descriptive-analytical method and the library data collection method. The brief conclusion reached by the article is that Mir Qawamuddin Razi, by denying the existence of the mind, cannot give an adequate answer to true propositions, and Mir Qawamuddin Razi's theory about the existence of the mind should be interpreted in the light of Aristotle's words, although he presented A revised theory of self-affection is unsuccessful except as a way of perceiving things.

Philosophers have presented different views about the whatness and truth of the soul based on dualism (immateriality of the soul based on the pre-eternity and origination of the soul before the existence of the body or along with it) or monism (corporeal origination of the soul). Mullā Ṣadrā believes that the soul is corporeally originated. The principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, including the trans-substantial motion, the principiality and gradedness of being, and the corporeal origination of the soul, have made it possible to demonstrate corporeal resurrection. Aristotle also believes that the origination of the soul is corporeal. However, the extent to which Mullā Ṣadrā is influenced by Aristotle’s ideas in this regard has never been studied so far. This paper is intended to explain the Aristotelean roots of Mullā Ṣadrā’s discussion of corporeal origination following a comparative-analytic method. The findings of this study indicate that in defining the soul as a “natural and organic body” and, following it, considering the soul as a formal substance and a primary perfection of the body, as well as believing in the unitary synthesis of the body and the soul and the unity of the faculties of the soul, all indicating the corporeal origination of the soul, Mullā Ṣadrā is under the influence of Aristotle. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s approach suffers from some ambiguity because of the existing implicitness in some of his words and not referring to an explicit standpoint regarding the principiality of existence or quiddity, presence of motion in substance, and gradedness of existence.

Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility, as a pioneer theory of ethics of virtue, presents a new approach to responsibility because of its particular attention to moral conduct. Aquinas, a follower of Aristotle, has provided a new interpretation of moral responsibility with an emphasis on character and a focus on completely voluntary human acts and the role of apriori reflection on act. In the views of these two philosophers, moral agent is an agent who possesses knowledge, personality vice, and the ability to perform completely voluntary acts. Accordingly, children and animals are never subjected to moral evaluations because they lack such moral capacities and characters. Aristotle and Aquinas believe that the realm of moral agents, in addition to evil and virtuous people, includes restrained and non-restrained ones. Following a descriptive-analytic method, the present paper investigates the conditions under which the acts of moral agents are subjected to ethical evaluations in the views of Aristotle and Aquinas. Based on the findings of this study, those acts that become the subjects of moral responsibility must be done voluntarily based on the moral character of the agent as a non-accidental stimulus for act, even if they do not originate in deliberation and are not based on prior decision making. This is because sudden acts also originate in certain sources and function as clear references for moral evaluations.

Rhetoric, being among five arts of logic (i.e., Sana’at Khams), is a persuasive yet uncertain art. However, philosophers consider it as a non-philosophical and invalid art. In such a view, this art has no philosophical value and its users seek to deceive and influence the audience in order to attract their attention, so logical speech must be de-rhetorical. The study of early philosophers, especially Aristotle, shows that rhetoric is not one of the branches of uncertain logic, but it is a political tool and is a complementary art in practical philosophy, and because practical philosophy is one of the branches of philosophy, it is also related to philosophy. Plato considered rhetoric to be against the politics of society. Aristotle, also under the influence of Plato, first criticized the common discourse of his time, which relied on the Forensic type and sophistic method. Then, he tries to teach a desirable version of rhetoric for the prosperity of society, considering the necessity of rhetoric in political societies. Aristotle uses enthymeme to relate rhetoric to premises and to highlight its political nature by emphasizing the deliberative rhetoric. This study aims to investigate this proposition in Aristotle’s thoughts, and clarify the political implications of rhetoric.

The present study provides a description and analysis of the historical development of the notion of Aristotelean-Platonic agape (love) in the philosophical thoughts of Fārābī and Khwājah Nasīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. Following a historical method, the author deals with the reasons behind this development in addition to describing it. The discussion of friendship (agape) in Aristotle’s philosophy is propounded in his Nichomachean Ethics, where some traces of Platonic notion are also observable. This discussion was transformed in Islamic Philosophy in certain respects, including the variety of the beloved (and the most beloved), individualistic or socialist aspect, and selfishness or selflessness aspect. Regarding the variety of the beloved, the discussion has moved from virtue-based friendship (agape) to the love of the Wise (God). As to its range, one can observe a change of dialog form social-political friendship to agape as an internal characteristic with individual and social effects. Moreover, it has moved beyond selfishness and selflessness and, in conformity with the principle of congruence, reached the love from Him (Godly). The influential views of such thinkers as Plotinus; the role of religion, culture, and gnosis, and the ideas of Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Miskawayh, and Suhrawardī are of great importance in explaining this development. The particular philosophical and Kalāmī principles of Fārābī and Ṭūsī as well as some of their ethical views are the most important factors in the interpretation of the underlying reasons of the mentioned development.

Time is one of the most important features of the world of matter, and the knowledge of which has always attracted the attention of philosophers. The simplicity of perception of time and the difficulty of its explanation have resulted in some disagreements among philosophers concerning its definition. Islamic philosophers are no exception in this regard, and the roots of their disagreements go back to Plato’s and Aristotle’s different definitions of time. Plato defined time as a self-subsistent and essentially independent substance that is a differentiated form of the world of Ideas. In Aristotle’s view, time represents the number of motion from its priority and posteriority aspects, which cannot be gathered with each other. While acknowledging the difference between these two definitions, Islamic philosophers have usually chosen one of these definitions and tried to respond to the suspicions about their selected definition and reject the arguments in favor of the opposing one. Some philosophers such as Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sīnā, and Suhrawardī adopted Aristotle’s definition, while Zakarīyyā Rāzī and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī advocated Plato’s definition. Nevertheless, no effort as to demonstrating the contrast between Aristotelean and Platonic definitions of time is justified because both philosophers believe that although time is different from motion, their existences are inseparable from each other. In other words, the perception of one depends on the perception of the other. accordingly, the present paper, while clarifying Plato’s view, initially intends to explain that it is not in contrast to Aristotle’s view and, secondly, aims to demonstrate the effects of their view on those of Muslim philosophers.

Happiness is a fundamental topic in practical philosophy, captivating the minds of philosophers, from the ancient Greeks to the contemporary philosophers. Throughout history, philosophers have explored this concept from various philosophical perspectives. One of the most influential theories of happiness was developed by Aristotle in his renowned work, Nicomachean Ethics</em>. His theory had a profound impact on subsequent philosophers, including Muslim philosophers like Avicenna, who was heavily influenced by Aristotle’s ideas on happiness. Aristotle believed that human happiness is attained through a rational life enriched with moral virtues. Similarly, Avicenna regarded intellectual pleasure as the highest form of good and happiness and emphasized achieving happiness through reaching the level of acquired intellect and striving for likeness with the active intellect, and maintaining control of reason over bodily desires. In this paper, we employ a comparative approach to examine and analyze Aristotle and Avicenna’s theories of happiness. We aim to highlight both the similarities and differences in their perspectives, while also employing a critical perspective to identify weaknesses and shortcomings within each theory.

What is presented in this article is the explanation and confirmation of three claims about the Knowledge of religion of Muslim philosophers: First. Muslim philosophers influenced by Plato and Aristotle have considered man as a social being. This means that man continues to live and survive in the form of presence in city, and the formation and survival of city requires law. But the law they introduce for the administration of city is not a human law, but a divine law, and that law is nothing but the divine religion. Therefore, according to Muslim philosophers, the nature of religion is the law. Second. Since Muslim philosophers have considered religion as a law, they have never questioned the existence of this law; That is, they have not asked what kind of existence religion as a law has in the outside world. Third. Although Muslim philosophers have expressed ontological points under the concept of religion as words and books and the like, they do not consider religion to be ontologically authentic. They have never had a coherent, codified and independent discussion about religion from the perspective of ontology. The basic question about religion, which has been neglected in Islamic thought and culture so far, is this: How does religion exist as an entity? The difference in approach regarding the existence of religion will cause a difference in the way of encountering religion and establishing a relationship with religion. Therefore, the ontology of religion is not just a theoretical discussion and it has many practical effects.

Plato's narrative of the educational nature of Socratic political philosophy ultimately leads to the negative position towards the political way of life. On the other hand, Aristotle tries to give a narrative of Socratic political philosophy in which, in addition to emphasizing the final purpose of Socrates, i.e. defending the philosophical way of life against non-philosophical ways, one can defend the political way of life positively. In this article, we attempt to show that Aristotle's first step in this direction is necessarily to defend the political way of life as a natural way for human beings. We show here that Aristotle's claim that "man is a political being by nature" has a fundamentally ironic and rhetorical characteristic. On the other hand, it seems that this ironic and rhetorical position is a necessary part of his alternative educational plan against the Platonic one. Therefore, confronting the complexity of Aristotle's interpretation of the term "nature" is in a way the focus of our considerations in this article.

The basic problem of this research is the analysis of the quiddity of the first propositions (τἀ πρῶτον: to Proton) in Aristotle's philosophy and its purpose is to discover the relation of these propositions with the sextuple self-evident propositions. In Posterior Analytics, Aristotle puts forward the first propositions in response to the problem of epistemic regress. These propositions are known by two characteristics: 1- They are association of knowledge and have its conditions such as completeness and necessity. 2- They have no middle term. In this research, it is revealed that the instance of first propositions in Aristotle's philosophy is more specific than the instance of self-evident propositions; this means that self-evident propositions are more general than these propositions; but on the other hand, the first propositions in Aristotle’s philosophy are more general than "primary premises" in the Islamic philosophy. Among the sextuple self-evident propositions, Aristotle includes two groups of them, i.e. primary premises and natural propositions, under the first propositions. Exclusion of sensory premises and unanimous traditions premises from the first propositions is due to the lack of conditions of knowledge, and the exclusion of empirical and intuitive premises is due to their provability and causality. In Aristotelian philosophy, the cause’s chain of empirical propositions cannot continue indefinitely; but he fails to express the unprovable principles of nature and clarify their meaning. Also, the lack of providing a suitable criterion for distinguishing the first propositions from other propositions seriously challenges his logical-philosophical system regarding the structure of "demonstrative knowledge"