جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « حکمت نظری » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

The purpose of the present research was to prove justice in the creative will and, accordingly, in the legislative will of God. This basic and theoretical research was done by analyzing data from the Holy Quran and Shia hadith sources. By analyzing the data, it was concluded that whether by rational method or by following the narration, the foundation of theoretical wisdom is based on the understanding of divine justice in development and based on the acceptance of this principle that values and prescriptions return to beings and non-beings. Therefore, the foundation of practical wisdom is based on theoretical wisdom. Therefore, the understanding of how divine justice flows in legislation is based on the understanding of moderation, both in the world of names and the levels of human worlds. On this basis and due to the correspondence of the perfect human being with the universe, a human being who is obliged to guide and lead others should be under the control of reason in perfect moderation of the powers of imagination and illusion and even senses, and no matter how successful he is in this matter. It can extend moderation to families, clans, and civilizations. As a result, the condition of any social reform act will be to accept the necessity of creating a reasonable moderation in youth and youth forces, as the creator of creation has manifested this moderation in his creation verses.

Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, in addition to narrative evidence in proving the embodiment of actions, also points to its rational stabilization. Therefore, this research, using a descriptive-analytical method, examines the intellectual evidences of the embodiment of moral actions from the perspective of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli to reach the rationality of religious data; On the one hand, he does not accept the rational arguments of some thinkers in explaining the embodiment of moral actions based on the transformation of energy into matter, and considers it to be neglect of intention in ethics, He rejects Fakhr Razi's point of view on reject of the embodiment of actions based on to be width of actions and impossibility to Convert width to essence .and considers it a confusion between theoretical and practical wisdom; It seems that the rational explanation of the transformation of energy into matter can also be presented in the intention, Also, since breadth the width has the dignity of substance in the transcendental wisdom, so by explaining the movement of substance, the embodiment of actions can be stabilized from a rational point of view, therefore, the embodiment of actions is still It is acceptable as one of the proofs of moral realism.

 TDefinition and different approaches to “eudemonia”, as a principle idea of the human life, and “politics, as a collection of power-based cross-social agreements, have always drawn the attention of the Muslim Philosophers, including Sadr-ul-Motealehin. The present study seeks to find out what is the relationship between eudemonia and politics and how are these concepts defined in Mulla Sadra’s thought. Sadr-ul-Motealehin advocates concomitance of existence and eudemonia, and believes that eudemonia is the ultimate goal of humans corresponding to their place and power of perception. Indeed, Mulla Sadra’s definition of eudemonia is reflected by his cross-linking perception of the concept of blessedness, and concomitance of existence and goodness, blessedness, perfection, joy, and happiness. He plots his theoretical philosophy aiming to promote and encourage personal development, and believes that eudemonia is achieved be means of personal development with the help of theoretical and practical wisdom. In his perspective, sublime happiness is not in contradiction with the worldly happiness. In his explanation of the worldly happiness, he draws the attentions to the significance of household management and politics as the prerequisites of the hereafter bliss. In terms of politics, the politics that Mulla Sadra plots in brief is a part of the process of personal development, and the soul’s blissful becoming on the two wings of theoretical and practical wisdoms that direct the soul to the Heaven. Referring to the definition of the transcendent practical philosophy, Mulla Sadra defines the politics as reflection of the Divine’s attributes in the political realm of human life, and bringing the same order of the Heavenly World into this realm. The ultimate goal of this process is promoting personal development. Personal development and blessedness are similar concepts that are separated merely in analysis. Involvement in the society is considered as a condition for evolution and blessedness of the humans, and material prosperity is the only way to the hereafter bliss. This cannot be achieved unless the human is in good physical conditions, human generations are continued, and humankind is well protected. These goals cannot be realized without instruments that protect them, keep them away from harms, and meet their interests. Such instruments are the functions carried out by the states and general affairs of their political life. On the other hand, realization of this goal requires full involvement of human as head of the society, who has achieved the ultimate bliss. The politics plotted in Mulla Sadra’s theory is not a religion-free political philosophy. In his definition of politics, he spares his utmost effort to ensure blessedness of the people of the utopia, so that the perfect human achieves the ultimate goal, which is annihilation in God. In this study a method, similar to Eric Hirsch’s objective hermeneutics and its principles, is used to answer the research question and explain the findings.

There is an inseparable connection between practical and theoretical wisdom. The five crafts, as a part of theoretical wisdom, can play a role in practical wisdom, which is used sometimes as knowledge and sometimes as temperament or virtue. The present study was conducted to answer the question of the extent and quality of the role that the five crafts play, firstly, in producing the cognitive elements of practical wisdom and, secondly, in the origins of the emanation of act. It also aims to identify the factors and variables in relation to the five crafts that construct the practical wisdom. The significance of explaining the relationship between the two types of wisdom lies in the fact that mental habits determine the human identity, and that the five crafts are mental habits that can play a role in determining the human life by influencing the origins of emanation of acts. As a result, they can affect all aspects of human life, such as academic, social, or political ones. In this paper, the author initially introduces the five crafts and, particularly, their common features based on logical books. Then, following a descriptive-analytic approach, he examines their effects on the elements of cognitive and temperamental practical wisdom. The first section discusses an epistemological turn of erroneous concepts and judgements, the efficiency of the methodology of practical wisdom, formation of mentally-posited concepts at the level of act, and attainment of the intellection of practical wisdom by different human beings. The second section explains the regulation of the particular task of practical wisdom, the development of the skill of matching cognitive affairs with administrative ones, affecting the cognitive origins of emanation of acts, and the formation of human acts as the results of the study.

In Nicomachean ethics, Aristotle divides the soul into two fundamental parts, the knowing part and the calculating part, the virtue of the first part is theoretical wisdom (Sophia) and the virtue of the second part is practical wisdom (Phronesis). This distinction is based on the ontological distinction between becoming and stability because the subject of practical wisdom is the realm of changeable affairs and the subject of theoretical wisdom is eternal affairs. In this research, we will first show that the intuitive intellect or Nous is the connecting factor of these two realms: Nous receives the ultimate principles from both sides, in the framework of theoretical knowledge, Nous knows the most general concepts of eternity and in the framework of Practical wisdom receives the partial individual. We will also argue that practical wisdom is the agent of realization of theoretical wisdom: Phronesis is the power of receiving the highest good, that is, the life according to the Sophia. The interpretation of the relationship between Phronesis and Sophia as a “necessary – end” suggests a way out of two conflicting interpretations of Aristotle’s ethics- the rationalist and holistic interpretation of happiness – which we will address.

One of the famous divisions in the tradition of Peripatetic philosophy, rooted in Aristotle’s texts, is the division of wisdom into practical and theoretical, and Avicenna, in line with this tradition, introduces this division in his works. But the question of the nature of normative (moral/practical) propositions is controversial. Some commentators consider practical wisdom as belonging to practical intellect and non-cognitive and others, by accepting this belonging, consider it cognitive. There is no agreement in this second category: some claim that propositions of practical wisdom are based on accepted belief and the product of rational construction and the result of the dialectical method, while others consider these propositions to be the product of demonstration; so, they interpret practical propositions realistically. At the same time, practical wisdom is considered a field independent of theoretical wisdom. In this essay, after critical consideration of the first two views, the possibility of two types of realistic interpretations of the nature of practical wisdom from Avicenna’s point of view will be distinguished from each other: according to the first interpretation, practical wisdom is a field independent of theoretical wisdom and has its own principles; then, by criticizing this interpretation, the possibility of the second realist interpretation is defended. Accordingly, propositions of practical reason firstly have a cognitive aspect; secondly, are the result of demonstration and are mind-independent; thirdly, they belong to theoretical reason and are included under theoretical wisdom, in such a way that practical wisdom is dependent on theoretical wisdom in its principles and does not have its own self-evident principles.

Sabzevari is one of the influential philosophers of the Qajar period. The characteristic of Sabzevari's philosophical method, which has also been influential in his interpretive method, is the accompaniment of transcendent philosophy and the illuminative philosophy. In a change of method, he seeks to present the truth desired by the philosophers (Suhrawardi and Sadra) without any slight inconsistency and conflict, but in consistency and harmony, by esoteric interpretation and methodical interpretation of the views and principles of these two philosophical currents. Therefore, one of the important features of Sabzevari's philosophical interpretations is a methodical combination of the principles of transcendent philosophy and the illuminative philosophy.The problem of research is the study of comprehensive interpretations (ontological and epistemological) based on coherent light and existence principles of water as the first of the purifications and similar interpretations of other purifications (sun and fire). Results of this research Sabzevari's philosophical interpretations of water, while being comprehensive of transcendent philosophy and the illuminative philosophy, also look at the inner rules of Sharia and the science of jurisprudence and are considered as a combination of practical and theoretical philosophy. In this way, and implicitly, the possibility of the potentiality of philosophy (Islamic philosophy) in the general sense as a bridge between contemporary Islamic sciences and humanities is also examined.

There are at least three definitions in writings by Islamic philosophers for theoretical reason and practical reason. If we want to get Farabi's opinion as one of the most prominent and influential muslim philosophers in this matter, it is not so smooth and at first glance in terms of the sum of his works it may not be possible to came up with a clear answer, because the appearance of Farabi's words in this regard is sometimes inconsistent with each other. However, this article is seeks to show behind this incompatibility that Farabi's thought on theoretical reason and practical reason and their function can be interpreted uniformly and in line with Ibn Sina's view. In this regard, we examine Farabi's remarks in three discussions "The functioning of reason forces ", "How the creation of optional good and evil acts" and "What is human virtues" and obtain that, in his view, theoretical reason relates only to the domain of generals knowledge, and practical reason is the power of understanding practical details that can be possessed and created in outside by human beings and manage to create them by employing other powers, namely, sense, imagination, motivating and factor.

There are some evidences in Suhrawardi’s works about the preference of the practice compared with theoretical research that it can direct us to the preference of practical thosophy towards theoretical wisdom with giving some reasons. Theoretical wisdom was prioritized compared with practical theosophy before Suhrawardi, especially in Peripatetic school, but Suhrawardi established a wisdom by using illuminative way with the discussing way and by prioritizing this way compared with the discussing way by criticizing Peripatetics in which practical wisdom is prioritized,the priority in terms of essence not time. Mystical journey and aceticism is a impartible part of Suhrawardi’s practical theosophy. His wisdom is an intuitive and mystical wisdom in which Hakim experience the realities objectively not subjectively. Hence we can called Suhrawardi an empiricist philosopher, an intuitive and mystical experiment. The priority of practical wisdom over theoretical wisdom is investigable in his written thought and also in his practical life.

Philosophers have defined wisdom in different ways. Most definitions refer to knowledge, but they do not agree that knowledge includes or is limited to both theoretical and practical knowledge. The definition of wisdom to understanding or to justified beliefs instead of justified true belief, that is knowledge, is another difference. In addition to all this, the definition of wisdom to virtue, due to its variety and complexity, is another thing that makes the definition of wisdom more difficult. The present article, while analyzing the various definitions offered by contemporary analytical philosophers on the nature of wisdom, explains first the relationship between wisdom and knowledge; knowledge as a necessary and sufficient condition for wisdom, a necessary but not sufficient condition, and neither necessary nor sufficient condition. Then considers wisdom as a rational or epistemic virtue and a necessary condition for acquiring knowledge. Finally, it emphasizes the importance and necessity of a more accurate explanation of this phenomenon.

The relationship between phronesis or practical wisdom and Sophia or theoretical wisdom and, at another level, the relationship between ethical virtues and intellectual virtues are among the important subjects in Aristotle’s philosophy of ethics. Their importance is due to the fact that not only in case of the priority of phronesis to sophia, contradiction will arise between Aristotle’s teachings in Metaphysics and Nichomachean Ethics, but also because it seems that such a priority will eventually lead to a kind of diversion from prime philosophy and, hence, considering human being as the noblest subject in philosophy. Of course, Aristotle himself disagrees with this position. This paper mainly inquires whether in Aristotle’s philosophy priority belongs to sophia or phronesis, and what the significance and consequences of the priority of one over the other is. The authors argue that, although phronesis has a supreme place in his philosophy, it is sophia which enjoys fundamental priority. On the other hand, in Aristotle’s system of thought, eudaimonia or the highest human good cannot be attained unless through possessing phronesis and Sophia at the same time. Hence, it seems that, in order to learn about the ultimate goal of philosophy, it is necessary to further deliberate over the concepts of sophia and phronesis and their relationships with each other and with other virtues.

Practical wisdom is a theorematic discipline of knowledge not only different from practical disciplines of knowledge but also from theoretical wisdom. From one side, it is different from the former which might be mentioned as the disciplines of professions and skills, since practical wisdom is a syllogistic discipline about man’s voluntary acts in the course of man’s happiness, i.e. it infers the general rules of dispositional habits through syllogism and thinking. And from another side, it is different from the latter because it deals with what there is thus irrelevant to man’s voluntary acts; propositions of what there is are not characterized by good or evil nor they have value judgments.That wisdom is divided into theoretical and practical categories stems from the fact that man’s nature has two dimensions. That is to say, viewing man’s incorporeal soul and connection to the metaphysical world man enjoys theoretical wisdom, and viewing the attachment of the soul to the body and the management of the latter by the former man enjoys practical wisdom.In order to reach its goal i.e. man’s happiness, practical wisdom needs theoretical wisdom, because the discourse on what man’s happiness is falls in two sections of theoretical wisdom: the study of soul and that of final cause. Thus we might consider practical wisdom as complementary to the theoretical one and in line with it. Practical wisdom has two other valuable functions: first it is the origin of theorematic humanities and second it helps set up a rational system for religious doctrines.

“Moral character” is a subject related to the psyche and an important topic in moral psychology. The question is whether the formation of moral character is inherent and unchangeable. If it is acquired, what factors affect it? If a character becomes vicious, is it possible to correct it? Considering the importance of the aforementioned questions, it was necessary to study the issue of “shaping and reforming moral character” and compare the factors affecting it from the viewpoint of Kristjansson, Battaly and Motahhari in the present article. Kristjansson believes that vices can be corrected by the internal factor of theoretical wisdom. Battaly emphasizes the tremendous impact of the external factor of modeling. But Motahhari’s vision shows that, in addition to accepting the issue of forming and reforming the moral character and unlike those two Western philosophers, he considers necessary the existence of both factors of the theoretical wisdom and modeling, and from this perspective, his view has special comprehensiveness in relation to the two western approaches.

Phronesis or practical wisdom is one of the intellectual virtues which Aristotle has defined as a predisposition for continuously becoming involved in practice while thinking wisely about good and evil affairs. The outcome of this predisposition or phronetic act is the product of a kind of philosophical thinking which, in addition to viewing certain established principles, attends to madīna (polis) as a cradle for the development of acts; to finite, particular, and changing affairs as the subject of knowledge, and to Man as a free agent. The irregularity and, at the same time, legitimacy of phronesis provides individuals with a strategy not to surrender to fixed and strict scientific laws as the only legitimate tools of knowledge acquisition. Through making a methodological distinction between sophia or theoretical wisdom and phronesis, Aristotle has in fact founded the independence and irreducibility of practico-ethical knowledge about what is correct; practical deliberation cannot be reduced to logical arguments. In Aristotle’s ethical philosophy, accidental knowledge, as the knowledge of finite, particular, possible, and changing affairs, is a complement to essential knowledge, which pertains to pre-eternal and universal affairs and primal and fixed basic principles. Sophia and phronesis can lead to happiness only in case they function as the two sides of the same coin.

Philosophers have divided wisdom into two parts of theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom; then they have divided the latter into three parts including siyasate modon, tadbire manzel, and ethics, which is partt of wisdom and includes four virtues of chastity, courage, wisdom and justice. Now the question arises as: what is the diference between second order wisdom and forth order wisdem in this structural division? In this article, we are going to look at the viewpoints of Buali Sina and the late Mullah Mehdi Naraghi on the difference between philosophical wisdom and moral wisdom. Comparing these two Views, the result is that Avicenna's response is comprehensive and has confirmed by such philosophers as Sheikh Ishraq and Mulla Sadra. The research method in this paper is analytic and information is collected based on library and documentary data.

Developing a natural- experimental sociology science based on Aristotle's Middle Ages principles of classifying science faces difficulties. Considering historical nature of the science of sociology these problems are ascribed to the limited scientific value of history science as ancient scholars especially Aristotle say; besides, this kind of classification takes in to consideration such things like accuracy, necessity and demonstrative ability of this science. In his inquiry of Islamic scientific tradition, Ibn-Khaldun finds three ways: 1. regarding sociology as part of speculative philosophy 2. Placing it with applied philosophy 3. Disregarding Aristotle's mode and initiating a new course of human science in addition to its being natural and experimental. Ibn-Khaldun chooses the third way. Although he doesnt offer a comprehensive classification of science, he places sociology neither with applied philosophy nor with speculative philosophy. This paper shows that developing a science with the subject of sociology cannot fall into Aristotle's common category; first because it will be a kind of breaking with the normative aspects of applied science and secondly because it has human tendency towards natural science.

For a long time، philosophers have considered contemplative knowledge and thinking to be the specific perfection of the human species. From this point of view، philosophers such as Aristotle and Avicenna thought that the act of thinking was the highest activity leading to man''s happiness. On the contrary، illuminative philosophers and gnostics in the Islamic world only considered speculative philosophy to be a preliminary to the attainment of noble qualities of character and moral virtues; in other words، they thought that practical philosophy was the only necessary criteria leading to practical happiness. This article presents the different theories of Islamic philosophers which aimat justifying the development of the human soul through knowledge and speculative sciences. The main justificatory theory in this field is the theory of the unity of the intellect and the intelligible which is a legacy of Neoplatonic philosophy and was revived by Mulla Sadra. In addition to the theory of the mental existence، this theory may be considered to be the basis of the theory of the soul’s development. However، this article will show that Mulla Sadra''s statements on this matter are not clear and are subject to serious criticism. Finally، through the reorganization of the sadrian pattern، Gnostic theory and transcendental philosophy will remarkably get closer to each other.

Aristotle and Descartes have been known as two permanent philosophers belonging respectively to ancient Greek and modern times. Their views on ethics have been studied comparatively in this paper. In his “discourse de la method”, Descartes has argued against the scholars of ethics, particularly against Aristotle, in detail. Knowing their ethics as a kind of exaggeration, figment of the imagination and a descriptive field, he claims that in their ethics, one can never find a way to ascend the highest point in morality. Descartes himself, however, promises that he will show the straight way for reaching the highest morality and found an applicable and prescriptive ethics in his system.In this paper it has been made clear that neither Descartes` claims against scholastic scholars have proven true nor his promise has been performed. In spite a great and fundamental utilizing Aristotelian ethico-metaphysical teachings, one can say that Descartes has not gone in justice toward Aristotle.