جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « ضرورت ازلی » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

When dealing with the proof of the righteous to demonstrate the existence of Allah, the philosopher studies the absolute reality. Considering the eternal necessity of objective reality through a posteriori concomitants argument, Allameh Tabatabaii has shifted to the essential necessity. Avicenna has established the existence of Allah as per the inherent necessity of objective reality and the fact that they are either in a state of "necessity" or "possibility". Unlike Avicenna, the late Tabatabaii believed in the eternal necessity of objective reality and its intrinsic necessity, thus he considered the existence of Allah as self-evident, on the basis of which it can be proposed as the first philosophical issue. Also, viewing the late Tabatabaii account, objective reality is one single reality, and what else than it is no more than a copula depending on that single reality as its state thus existing dependently. In what follows, the author goes to first present a novel analysis and description of Tabatabaii's account of the above proof and to examine the objections raised and some invalid accounts of it. Second, in the course of assessment of Tabatabaii's proof in comparison to Avicenna's, to demonstrate that Tabatabaii's account has characteristics that make it superior to other accounts.

This article discusses the modes in Ibn Sina’s logic and enumerates the types of absolute necessity and necessity and examines the relationship between the logical and philosophical meanings of the modes. Mulla Sadra’s interpretation of absolute necessity and its interpretation of eternal necessity are discussed in what follows, and we highlight the philosophical results that Sadra derived from this necessity, and it becomes clear that necessity in existence is of the type of eternal necessity and necessity in quiddity is of the type of essential necessity. The argument ability of the propositions of eternal necessity is also discussed. In the following, we discuss Mulla Sadra’s initiative on the possibility in the sense of need (existential possibility). Existence as the possibility in the sense of need is the same as need, and all beings in this sense are the same as belonging. According to the principles of transcendental wisdom, because of the gradation of being, possibility in the sense of need (existential possibility) may be subject of gradation. According to Mehdi Haeri Yazdi, Mulla Sadra’s initiative in proposing the possibility in the sense of need (existential possibility) is in fact a completion of the discussion of absolute necessity in Ibn Sina. Based on this, we have also, reviewed and expanded his views.

Mulla Sadra, as the founder of transcendent wisdom, has innovations in many of his views, which are the distinguishing feature of this philosophical school from the previous ones. For example, he has obtained a new interpretation of the Seddiqin proof. The advantage of Sadra's interpretation over Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi's interpretation is based on Sadra's specific principles such as the originality of existence, graded unity of being, simplicity of existence and the possibility of poverty. These innovations are also seen in the expositions of the followers of the Sadra’s school. Their culmination point is in the expositions of Allameh Tabatabai and the expositions that Master Javadi Amoli gives from the explanation of Tabatabai; His innovation is first in determining the exact place of the dispute, according to which the place of the dispute is the absolute status of the truth of existence, and also in correctly explaining the claim that the statement "the truth of existence is necessary (eternally)" is a first obvious proposition. So the main question is: "What are the innovations of Mulla Sadra and Sadrian sages in the seddiqin proof?" The purpose of this study is to be able to reduce the problems with the interpretations of the Seddiqin proof by correctly explaining the two exposition of Tabatabai and Javadi Amoli.

Several arguments have been adduced on demonstrating the individual unity of being. Most of these arguments, which have been presented by such gnostics as Dāvood Qayṣarī, Ḥamzah Fanārī, and Ibn Turkah, suffer from some defects in terms of a confusion of concept and referent. In his glosses on Tamhīd al-qawā’id (the section on the arguments on the demonstration of the individual unity of existence), Ḥakīm Moḥammad Rezā Ghomsheī has presented an argument which demonstrates the pre-eternal necessity of God. However, three criticisms have been advanced against it. The first concerns the meaning of the absolute nature of being, which has been stated ambiguously. The second criticism questions the confusion of concept and referent. The first part of the third criticism targets the whole argument, based on the presupposition of the realization of the essence of nature, and its second part objects to the consistency of the realization of the essence of the nature of existence with limited existences, as acknowledged in Ghomsheī’s argument. Finally, the fourth focuses on the absence of any kind of innovation in this argument. Following an analytic-comparative method, this paper examines all these criticisms and responds to the first three of them. Accordingly, the authors acknowledge the truth of Ḥakīm Ghomsheī’s argument by presenting a detailed discussion in this paper.

The arguments for the existence of God reach their climax in Islamic philosophy with the argument of the truthful ones. While dealing philosophically with the concept of 'necessary', we need more than anything else some ontological grounds that regard God from the very beginning as the principle of existence. In Islamic philosophy, Allama Tabatabaei's argument has attained this goal. He starts his discussion with reality and ends up in proving its necessity. His innovative point that distinguishes him from other Sadrian philosophers is that he does not deal with 'existence' as a merely metaphysical issue presupposing the priority of existence and the unity of existence. He commences his theory with the fact that 'reality exists', a thing which is the starting point of thinking, making a distinction between philosophy and sophistry. By focusing on reality, he directs attentions to an initial discussion that precedes the famous controversy between the primacy of existence and essence. This is because this reality is a pre-physical one termed in some languages as 'universal'. Every kind of thought inevitably accepts it. It is the prerequisite for being a realist and a pre-condition for entering into a meaningful debate. As a result, the very reality (necessary by itself) is equated with the very existence. The fact that Allama's premises for his argument are self-evident and the fact that his version of the argument of truthful argument is closer to the criterion of truthful ones pave the ground for answering some of the critiques posed in this paper.

The existence of God is such an important topic that has long preoccupied the human mind. In philosophy of religion, philosophers have tried in different ways to prove the existence of God. The proof of necessity and possibility is one of the cosmological demonstrations which involves proving the existence of God using a posterior approach. In Western philosophy, Thomas Aquinas, influenced by Islamic philosophy, has presented a particular version of this proof. In Islamic philosophy, the proof has been referred to as 'burhan al-siddiqin' (proof of the veracious). One of the scholars who has especially discussed about it is Allamah Tabatabai. His version of this proof can be illustrated through the following points. 1- The objective reality of existence is its true being which lies against fallacy. 2- This reality is what every sentient being must inevitably accept and cannot take in any form of nullity. 3- When a reality cannot be null, it means it is necessary and because reality cannot be mixed with inexistence, it has eternal necessity and everything requires reality if they are to exists. Thus, the necessary existence of God is clear and evident for human beings and the proofs of God's existence function as reminding element. The version of the proof of necessity and possibility presented by Aquinas can be explained as follows: 1- There exist the possible beings (the being which can be existent or non-existent) 2- The possible existents are eternal which means if the entire universe is possible existent, it did not exist at a particular time. 3- If the entire universe were possible existent, it wouldnt exist even now, while it exists now. 4- Thus the whole universe cannot be just possible existent, and it must include a necessary existent as well. 5- Every necessary existent receives its existence either from its own or from others. 6- The necessary existents that receive their existence from others cannot rely on others in an endless manner (infinite regress is invalid) 7- There is a being who is necessary self-existent. In this essay after the analysis and criticism of both versions, the similar and different aspects will be stated, some of which are as follow: 1- In Aquinas's version, God is looked upon as only the creative cause, while in Allamah's version, besides being creative cause, God is considered as continuing cause as well. 2- Aquinas's argument is based upon the philosophical principle of invalidity of infinite regress, also he claims a regress of material causes which is not in fact invalid, while in Allamah's version no philosophical principle is presupposed. It is worth mentioning that in philosophy, the invalidity of regress in causes depends on three requirements: actualization, sequence and unity of existence of all causes, therefore the infinite regress of material causes which lacks the mentioned requirements is not invalid. Also Thomas's version of the proof, although does not concern any divine act or attribute, when it comes to proving the existence of necessary existent, cannot prove His absoluteness. As his argument consists of the concepts such as gradation or multiplicity of existence and… fails to prove the absoluteness of Creator, on the other hand, Allamah Tabatabai's version of the proof, first focuses on proving the absoluteness of God's essence and then considers the necessity as its initial determining quality. Thomas's version presupposes and applies the concepts of necessity and possibility, while in Allamah's version such concepts are not explicitly mentioned and although in his argument, the existents are divided into necessary and possible, the intended meaning is different from that inferred by Aquinas's version

Spinoza, one of the major rationalist philosophers following Descartes in the seventeenth century,has commented on God. He tries to resolve dualism arising from Descarte's thoughtsin a philosophicalmanner and for the same reason, contrary to Descartes who believed in three types of substances, heaccepted the existence of only one substance in the world and identified it withGod.This is the substance the existence of whichdoes not depend onthe existence of other things; nor does its conception depend onthe conception ofother things. In fact, according to Spinoza, the substance is “self-caused”, “absolutelyinfinite” and “self-existent”and the actual existence belongs to itand other creatures depend on it for their existence. In Espinosa’s view,such a being exists by necessity.In this paper, an attempt has been made to analyze the implications of “substance”, “being self-caused”, “absolute infinity”, “self-existence” and“the necessityof existence for God” from Spinozasperspective and philosophically explicatehow “necessityof existence” is associated with God.

Seddiqin proof was firstly established by Avicenna, relying on nothing but the very existence and, then, different accounts of the proof were put forth Supporting the standards given in recent shools, one of his methods has been opposed to objection. However, regarding the proofs along with their precedents from both aspects of logical forms and philosophical contents and noticing the two states of being proof and seddiqin, it has been made clear that there is no place for the objection. In the paper, Avicenna`s accounts of the proof and the critiques in the field have been studied.

The issue of the individual unity of being is among the issues in the field of theoretical mysticism which all of the Muslim mystics have agreed upon. As such, some of them have attempted to base this theory on proof, among whom is Muḥammad Riḍā Qomsheʾī. Qomsheʾī’s proof has been accepted by some philosophers and criticized by others, among whom is Ḥakīm Jelve who was contemporaneous with Qomsheʾī. This article undertakes the investigation and critique of Qomsheʾī’s proof, showing that Ḥakīm Jelve’s critiques of it are not applicable, although the proof itself is not complete because of confusion between the concept and extension of being.

There are many paths to reach God because He enjoys an infinite number of perfections and directions, and each person follows his own path to move towards Him. Men of God, believers, and mystics all speak of the same truth; however, they use different languages, words, and proofs.In terms of firmness and perfection, the noblest of all arguments on demonstrating the existence of God is one in which the middle term is nothing but He Himself. In other words, it is one in which the end and the aim are the same. This is the same path and method of the righteous, who demonstrate the Necessary Being by means of the Necessary Being Himself. The unique feature of the “argument of the righteous” is that there is no mediator for the demonstration of the essence of the Necessary Being in it.It was Ibn Sina who used the term the “argument of the righteous” for the first time. However, it was Mulla Sadra who explained it on the basis of the fundamental principles of the Transcendent Philosophy in an innovative and most solid manner. His interpretation is superior to those of Ibn Sina and others in certain respects.This argument was interpreted and presented in different ways after Mulla Sadra; however, the writer believes that, given its philosophical premises, Sabziwari’s interpretation is the shortest, and, given its objective reality and needlessness of philosophical premises, ‘Allamah Tabataba’i’s is the most direct one. The interpretations known as the arguments of the people of knowledge and theology (kalam) suffer from formal and content-related problems. Moreover, most of their discussions refer back to the principles and consequences given by Ibn Sina and Shaykh al-Ishraq. These interpretations did not create a basic change in the presentation of arguments on the demonstration of the Necessary Being. Therefore, Mulla Sadra’s is the soundest, firmest, and most problem-free argument on the demonstration of the existence of God.This paper has accomplished two tasks: 1) A study of the different interpretations and explanations of the argument of the righteous; 2) a comparison, critique, and examination of these interpretations in terms of their solidity and comprehensiveness to be used for the demonstration of the essence of the Necessary Being based on the same argument.

Triadic matters (i.e necessity, possibility and impossibility) and modal propositions hold a special place in logics and Islamic philosophy. Meanwhile, due to the lack of a refined system of semantics, we are facing some ambiguities in some forms of modal propositions. This article analyzes these ambiguities after a general survey of modalities in logics and Islamic philosophy and a reference to some kinds of necessary propositions. In the second phase, there has been an attempt to utilize some of the modern systems of modalities, logics for giving suggestions about determining the rules of the semantics of these propositions.

The Seddighin demonstration, i.e. a reasoning which needs the least premises to prove the necessary being, has always been the desire and goal of Islamic theologians and every one of them has tried to decrease the premises of the demonstration of the necessary being proof. Considering the reality which is the supplier of the origin of reality, as necessary and pre-eternal, Allameh Tabatabaei introduced a demonstration that is so needless of premises that the self evidence of the necessary existent is concluded from it. The writer of this article investigates the epistemological roots of the origin of reality and explains its different expositions to prove that the origin of reality is just an epistemological essence and cannot end up proving the pre-eternal essence of reality.