جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "divine will" در نشریات گروه "فلسفه و کلام"

Schellenberg, the main proponent of the proof of Divine Hiddenness, believes that if the God of monotheistic religions really exists and has attributes such as unlimited love and affection towards his servants, he must show much more than the love of a mother to her child and possess it in the first way. Now that he is aware of people's wandering in search of their God and has the ability to remove any obstacles in this regard; regardless of the fact, Divine disappearance has happened many times. As a result, there is basically no such God with such attributes. This article intends to deal with this issue with an analytical-documentary method and based on an epistemological approach, to criticize his inductive reading of the argument from the perspective of religious experience. The findings of the research show that with the investigation done on different types of religious experiences, some types of religious experiences definitely have epistemological value. Especially the cases which are from the tradition of present knowledge and establish direct knowledge about God.

Being the caliph of God is a position that God announced for Adam (PBUH) and his descendants before the creation; how to grant this position and Adam's position in the creation, the goals of the creation and how to live a person's life are all hidden in the head of the caliphate of the person. It is worth mentioning that different books and articles have been devoted to the issue of human caliphate, most of them have only dealt with the Quranic approach or about the concepts, examples, and principle of the issue of caliphate and human dignity. In this article, the concept of caliphate from everyone's point of view and the explanation of this meaning in the position of Adam (pbuh), the role of the divine spirit, knowledge and divine trust in this explanation, how to reach this stage and its evidence, and the reasons for the right to the divine caliphate of Hazrat Adam have been examined.

Death as one of the most important problems of human beings has always attracted the attention of thinkers. Mullā Ṣadrā has dealt with this problem in most of his works. He divides death into two voluntary and involuntary types. The experience of voluntary death is possible for some divine saints who attain a station whereby, through the purification of the soul, they develop the ability to part from their bodies and travel to the higher worlds. The second type is the same natural death. Mull Sadra views death as an ontological affair, and since being good is essential to each and every ontological affair, he maintains that any kind of death, whether natural or untimely, is a natural and good event. Given the fact that untimely or sudden death occurs because of disease or accidents and apparently seems bad, how could one explain the goodness of death in its general sense? Another question is: What is the role of purgatorial development in this process? This paper is intended to respond to these questions based on Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical thoughts.

Mullā Ṣadrā believes that, given the impossibility of occurrence of contingent will to the divine essence, the cause of the creation of things at a particular time is rooted in the divine knowledge of the most perfect and noblest order. Anything that conforms to the noblest order necessarily emanates from God and is the same divine will. Hence, given the return of divine will to the knowledge of the noblest order, this attribute must be considered to be essential rather than active. The present paper, while accepting the bases of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view regarding referring the divine will to the knowledge of the most perfect order, emphasizes the necessity of paying attention to God’s essential free will and ability to quit act. Later the author responds to the most important objections to Mullā Ṣadrā’s idea in this respect and demonstrates that the conceptual variation of the human will and divine will does not negate the idea of attributing the divine will to the knowledge of the noblest order. The active attribution of will is correct in a sense; however, it can never function as a response to the cause of the creation of things at a particular time. The traditions that emphasize the active nature of will can also be interpreted in a way to conform to Mullā Ṣadrā’s doctrine.

This article delves into the second part of a comprehensive inquiry into the nature of divine ‎agency. The central questions guiding this research are:‎‎(1) “Is God a moral agent?” This probes whether God possesses a moral nature and if His ‎essence, attributes, desires, will, and actions are subject to moral evaluation, akin to human ‎beings.‎‎(2) If God is a moral agent, “Is divine morality identical to human morality, or does it diverge ‎entirely or partially?”‎This article compares and critically examines the theoretical and practical implications of three ‎competing theories of divine agency: “God as an autocratic agent,” “God as a pragmatic agent,” ‎and “God as a moral agent.” The first part of this research, focusing on the conception of God ‎as an autocratic agent, was previously presented. This second part explores the remaining two ‎conceptions. A third article will elaborate on the consequences of each conception for ‎practical theology.‎

Deists, who are important and influential thinkers in the modern era, thought about God as the only creator of the world and does not interfere in the work of the world after creation. They expressed this view using the metaphor of "Divine clockmaker". Against this point of view, there is another view that is known as the "God of Gaps" and its history goes back to Newton. According to this view of God, whenever he sees fit, he intervenes in the work of the world and restores and corrects it. It seems that these two views are against each other; However, both deism and the idea of "God of Gaps" face important criticisms. Based on this, the view that can be without the problems of both views of God is the idea of "continuous creation" which has a history in Islamic and Christian theology and some new thinkers have also spoken about it.

Although the essence of will, as one of the most significant existential perfections of the Almighty (Truth, The), is an established and undeniable fact, there are differences of opinion among Muslim philosophers regarding its nature, how it is attributed, and its characteristics, such as whether it is intrinsic or actual. Some philosophers, by attributing “will” to Divine knowledge, regard it as one of the essential attributes, equating it with the knowledge of the most perfect order (system). In contrast, others, referring to transmitted texts, classify “will” as one of the attributes of the actions of the Almighty. Finally, some believe that the “will” has levels and has both essential and actual levels. In the aḥādīth (Arabic: احادیث, singular: ḥadīth, meaning traditions and narrations, Arabic: روایات, romanized: riwayāt), some of the meanings of the “will” have been proven to God and some of its meanings have been denied by the Almighty. The research question is whether a clear and acceptable explanation of the will of the Almighty can be presented by analyzing the voluntary actions of humans, which are among the closest and most significant means of understanding the essence and attributes of God. We have concluded through an analytical approach in response to this question, that some voluntary actions of humans are mediated and indicative of deficiency, and the traditions negating “will” pertain to this type of “will” in relation to God. Conversely, some actions of the soul (self) are unmediated and indicative of perfection. Based on this understanding, we can argue for the intrinsic (essential) will of God as the Divine desire that corresponds to the knowledge of the most perfect order (system), which is the origin of the emanation of the universe. Furthermore, the actual will of God is identical to the objective essence of things, and things, in their very known nature, correspond to the divine intention.

The section on monotheism (tawḥīd) is one of the most important areas of Islamic theology, addressing numerous issues related to the ontology and epistemology of God, including His names and attributes. A key challenge in this field has been the question of whether the divine names are divinely pre-established or ordained (tawqīfiyyat al-asmāʾ). This issue was considered in several hadiths even before the first theological works were compiled. As a result, theologians have sometimes drawn upon sacred texts, such as the Quran and the Tradition, to support their arguments on the matter. Among prominent Imami scholars, al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā (355-436 AH/965-1044 CE) was the first theologian to formally present and establish the view that divine names are divinely ordained, which subsequently became one of the main solutions to the problem. Given the significance of al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā’s views and their influence on shaping trends in the history of Imami theology, this article aims to examine the issue based on his theological texts and to derive his perspective on the matter from his writings.

From a mystical point of view, all the Divine Names are the Names of the Essence. The problem of the present research is to investigate and determine the Attribute of Power, in terms of the Essence Attribute or action Attribute. If we accept that Power is one of the Attributes of Essence, we must solve the problem that the Attribute of Essence must always appear, while Power does not appear at all times. A doubt that is sometimes answered from a mystical point of view is that the Attribute of Power can simply exist, but it has remained in the depth covered. Molla Hadi Sabzevari accepts the second case due to his mystical tendencies. This research has presented and explained Sabzevari's theory based on library sources and descriptive and analytical method. The findings of the present research indicate that Hakim Sabzevari, in the issue of "Divine Power" based on the definition of the necessity of being free to act or refrain from acting, does not deal with one of the two problems of God's approval or revolution in Essence, but with a mystical view, the ancientness of manifestation. Essence means the oldness of the four Attributes of life, Knowledge, Power and Lordship, and this is the Essence, not the Action.

Qazi Saeed Qomi is one of the important representatives of negative theology. Based on his own ontological and epistemological foundations, such as the complete difference between the creator and the created in essence, attributes and actions, he rejected the knowledge of divine attributes in a positive way and turned to the non-description of God's essence and presented the negative and active interpretation of attributes. Also, in order to get rid of the charge of stopping the intellect from knowing God, he has presented other ways, except the proof way, for the knowledge of the supreme truth; including negative knowledge and confessional and comparative knowledge, as well as God's knowledge of himself. The method of this research is descriptive-analytical and critical, and the problem of the research is to analyze the foundations of Qazi Saeed Qomi's view, in such a way that by analyzing the basis of his theory on divine attributes, he obtained the ontological and epistemological foundations of his view, which is actually the basis of his theory. Explain the relationship between this point of view and those foundations. The findings of the research show that there are some problems in this view according to the mentioned foundations.

Imagination is a mental activity with which we can imagine an event free from its temporal and spatial characteristics. This function of the mind provides us with the necessary conditions for secondary and internal observation of primary external observations. In a way, it can be said that imagination plays a fundamental role in human perception and not only makes a person capable of advanced theoretical understanding, but also gives a person the necessary ability to capture the outside world and achieve their goals. Farabi and Spinoza both paid attention to the importance and use of imagination. In a way, it can be said that for both, imaginative cognition is an important pillar in human perception. Farabi considers the re-summoning of the sensory form after its absence and the ability to analyze and combine sensory forms after the absence of sensory observation as the primary role of the imagination, which not only gives a person the ability to go beyond sensory perception and recognize external observations and their similarities, but also It prepares the human mind to understand the general perception. In a way, it can be said that the power of imagination is the link connecting sensory perceptions with intellectual perceptions. Spinoza considers the perception caused by the body's impressions from the outside world as vague experience or imaginative perception because this type of perception does not give us knowledge about the truth of objects and their relationships, and only gives us vague ideas that are useful for our living. Therefore, although Farabi accepts the realism of imaginary sensory perception, Spinoza places practical value on them and does not place theoretical value on them, and considers imagination to include sensory, experimental, and imaginary perceptions, knowledge resulting from the frequency of general concepts and even false notions.
 
 

The Ash'arites, in contrast to the ideological and violent controversy of the Hadithists and the Mu'tazilites over the creation and non-creation of the Qur'an and the occurrence and step of the divine word, presented the intermediate theory of the word of the soul. The Ahl al-Hadith, and with the creation and the event of the word, agreed with the Mu'tazilites and resolved the conflict between the hadiths and the Mu'tazilites to a large extent, but like none of them, he did not see the word as one-dimensional and one-sided, but considered it as a two-dimensional matter. This intermediate theory, which was elaborated by Baqalani, is based on special metaphysics and ontology. This descriptive-analytical research tries to express the nature of Baqalani's theology and metaphysical approach to it in the form of several issues in a logical order. In short, Baqalani considers the word to be an existential, single, fixed and meaningful thing, which is the manifestation of the attribute of God's essence, and is non-historical in three philosophical, theological, and linguistic aspects. It also finds a non-historical aspect of religious knowledge and understanding. The word of the single soul has appeared in a specific language in each period, and the holy books of the Abrahamic religions are the linguistic forms of the word of the single soul, which in each period have found a new legislative form. and linguistic interpretations.

Knowing God and His Attributes is the basis of all religious beliefs and a necessary condition for faith (Arabic: إیمان, romanized: ʾimān) and action. Therefore, Shubha (Arabic: شبهه, lit.: doubt, obscurity, or mis-grounded conceit) and theoretical disorder in this field will cause irreparable damage to the belief system and consequently to the practical conduct of human beings. The current research is going to resolve some doubts about Divine justice with the aim of the redefinition of Divine justice in the light of an inquiry into the ontology of theologians. The research method is descriptive-analytical and the research data have been analyzed through documentary review, note-taking and an argumentative approach. The books of Imām Khomeinī and Fakhr Rāzī are the research sources, and other sources related to the research goals have been used as explanatory and supplementary sources. The findings indicate that the act of bringing-into-existence from Fakhr Rāzī’s point of view is a direct act of God and man has no act of bringing-into-existence. Good and evil are based on the will of Shāriʿ Muqaddas (Arabic: شارع المقدس, the Sacred Legislator), and God’s justice is also due to the fact that He is God. However, Imām Khomeinī believes that humans, as voluntary agent (free agent) have a role in creation. Good and evil are intrinsic and are based on intellect. Therefore, God is just, as He does not commit evil deeds and the divine realm is free from imperfect creation.

The issue of Allah’s knowledge of particulars is one of the significant topics in philosophical theology. This subject has been discussed by various philosophers, including Hakim Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra. Shaykh al-Ishraq, by proving Allah’s immediate knowledge of particulars, managed to resolve the major problem of divine knowledge of particulars, namely the change and renewal in material things. According to him, in the presence of the possible before the necessary, change and stillness make no difference. Similarly, Mulla Sadra, by asserting the simplicity of the necessary being, which contains all the perfections of things in its essence, proved knowledge of the creatures. Thus, the necessary being, in its essence, has knowledge of the creatures and all the relations, proportions, and systems governing them, because the reality of knowledge is nothing but the presence of the immaterial before the immaterial. The views of these two philosophers on this subject have challenges that will be addressed and compared in this study. Additionally, the study will introduce a new approach to divine knowledge, which is “knowledge without the known.” This concept of knowledge without the known is essentially divine knowledge that, unlike human knowledge, is not related to any known object and transcends all existing or non-existing knowns. In this way, Allah has knowledge of infinite knowns, whether they have come into existence or not. This perspective does not limit divine knowledge to the realm of knowns, and the finitude of knowns does not affect the pinnacle of divine knowledge.

Divine love stands as a pivotal aspect of the intricate relationship between humans and God. Despite its multifaceted presence in theological and mystical traditions, achieving consensus on its nature remains challenging. The inherently personal essence of divine love introduces a level of ambiguity when considering it in the context of an impersonal God, as exemplified by Avicenna's Necessary Existent Deity. Avicenna portrays God as a metaphysical entity characterized by pure transcendence, devoid of personal emotions and passions. In contrast, he positions love as the pinnacle of the human-God connection. This article seeks to elucidate the significance and realization of this love through a semantical lens. While Avicenna provides a comprehensive definition of love as a "propensity for goodness," constructing a cohesive semantic system, the culmination suggests that human love for The Pure Good ultimately sheds any personal attributes. Instead, it transforms into a form of inner metamorphosis, encompassing rational-practical perfection. Hence, articulating divine love in a literal sense seems implausible for The Necessary Existent. Avicenna, in his elimination of dialectics, metaphorically applies divine love to convey a metaphysical rationality and an inner transformative process.

The hiddenness of God is a new challenge in the philosophy of religion. In short, the believers of this view say that if there is a god, he should not hide himself from the eyes of humans and should be clear in such a way that humans can communicate with him. If God exists and guides mankind, why hasn't He hidden Himself from the eyes of humans or at least given more signs of His presence to humans? Is it not possible for us to have more proofs of the existence and presence of God as well as the truth of religious propositions so that no one can claim that he has sought to find the truth of religion and has not succeeded? Couldn't it be possible for us to have options such as seeing purgatory, communication with the souls after death, and talking with religious leaders in a wider way than now, so that our religious doubts disappear and our certainty increases? How can "divine concealment" be combined with his guidance? Is it possible to combine the two and not fall into the trap of conflict? In this article, the conflict between God's guidance and His disappearance is examined in a descriptive and analytical way, and to solve the problem of His disappearance, His guidance is interpreted as "necessary" and "possible".

According to the view based on physical closure, the natural world is self-sufficient in terms of causal interaction. Therefore, any external and partial interference in the world entails the violation of this physical principle, which is not believable based on this view. From Avicenna's point of view, this principle cannot contradict divine agency; Because in the causal system he considers and also in accordance with the rule of the causality of the incident which governs the world of nature; Divine activity is established in the world in a consistent manner. In this view, there is no need to divide divine action into general and specific to justify miracles and answering prayers. By explaining Avicenna's philosophical foundations and examining his view of the causal system in existence, we show that by accepting the mind() and its place in the chain of causes and the quality of the causal relationship between the levels of extants, he presents a systematic explanation of the relationship between the world and divine effectiveness. Therefore, in Avicenna's philosophical system, the acceptance of dualism in the relationship between mind and body is the basis of the possibility of metaphysical intervention in the physical world.

Discussing about God and his attributes is always one of the central concerns of philosophers and theologians. Discussions about divine attributes are focused on the meaning of attributes and their proof for God, as well as expressing some related doubts, especially about the extent of divine power. The aim of the present research is to deal with the attribute of divine power. In this research, an attempt was made to express an image of divine power and then an ontological understanding that can be inferred from the speech of Imam Sajjad (peace be upon him) in the Sajjadiyyah. The result of the present research displays semantic reinterpretation of the extent of divine power, in this reinterpretation, the extent of divine power is determined as the limitlessness of God in action. The research method in the present article was descriptive-analytical, and the researchers have examined and evaluated the research problem in this research by referring to Safiha Sajjadiyeh.

The perception of the Divine essence is challenging in Islamic mysticism and philosophy. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli has a unique view on this subject matter, which has not yet been the topic of an independent study. This paper explains this kind of perception by using a descriptive-analytical method. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli considers the Divine essence to be "non-conditioned existence at the stage of division" and believes that the Divine essence is not perceptible due to indeterminableness and infiniteness. He provides reasons for the imperceptibility of the essence and holds that both acquired and intuitive knowledge have limitations in perceiving the hidden essence of the divine. He also does not accept the intuitive perception of the essence after mystical annihilation. Moreover, he does not acknowledge the perception of any part of the essence that is within the reach of the mystic, because the Divine essence is purely simple and indivisible. From his viewpoint, what can be perceived is the manifested essence, not the essence as it is in itself. The absolute Divine identity is the absolute unseen, and no one has a direct (unmediated) connection with it. This viewpoint is subject to critiques, which are discussed in this study.