جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « divine will » در نشریات گروه « فلسفه و کلام »

Divine love stands as a pivotal aspect of the intricate relationship between humans and God. Despite its multifaceted presence in theological and mystical traditions, achieving consensus on its nature remains challenging. The inherently personal essence of divine love introduces a level of ambiguity when considering it in the context of an impersonal God, as exemplified by Avicenna's Necessary Existent Deity. Avicenna portrays God as a metaphysical entity characterized by pure transcendence, devoid of personal emotions and passions. In contrast, he positions love as the pinnacle of the human-God connection. This article seeks to elucidate the significance and realization of this love through a semantical lens. While Avicenna provides a comprehensive definition of love as a "propensity for goodness," constructing a cohesive semantic system, the culmination suggests that human love for The Pure Good ultimately sheds any personal attributes. Instead, it transforms into a form of inner metamorphosis, encompassing rational-practical perfection. Hence, articulating divine love in a literal sense seems implausible for The Necessary Existent. Avicenna, in his elimination of dialectics, metaphorically applies divine love to convey a metaphysical rationality and an inner transformative process.

Paul Helm believes that there are good reasons that divine omniscience - which includes the future - with human freedom understood in an incompatibilist sense is logically inconsistent. But this tension should not lead us to a reduced theory of divine foreknowledge, just as it should not negate human freedom and responsibility. Helm has argued that a Christian theist may accept a compatibilist sense of human freedom; first, the Christian doctrine of "God's grace" is compatible only with the compatibilist version of human freedom. Second because God is omniscient, it must be omniscient in a strong sense, and this is the case only if compatibilism is true. We will say that Helm's first argument will lead to the denial of some other accepted doctrines of religions, including Christianity, and his second argument falls into affirming the consequences. But Helm's third reason is that necessarily, if God knows x in advance (which He does), then x will necessarily occur. To avoid problems, he emphasizes that what he means by "necessity" is a historical and not logical necessity. But this argument only works when we accept that God is in time. Therefore, those who consider divine knowledge timeless can claim that all events exist in the divine mind in a necessary way and His knowledge is not necessary because it is in the past. It seems that Helm himself also accepts this problem.

One of the verses that can be examined in the knowledge of theology is verse 116 of Surah Mubaraka Ma'idah. In a part of this verse, God quotes a word from Jesus (pbuh) that he said... Ta'almu ma fi nafsi wa laa a'lammu ma fi nafsik. Translation: You know what is in my soul; And I do not know what is in your soul. Pronounced phrase "Walaa A'alam Ma fi Nafsek" whichh was expressed by God's Prophet Jesus (pbuh) on the Day of Judgment proves that God has a soul, while the soul is only applied to material beings, and also for the soul, a vessel (fi) Is placed. Given. While the soul is not a simple and capable being, Muslim scientists have tried to adapt their scientific findings according to the presuppositions of their theological schools and also with a literary approach. Without referring to the meaning of self, Zamakhshari applied it to the style of Mashakala. He believes that the word "nafsek" was mentioned because of the word "nafsi" in the previous sentence. But writers such as Jurjani, Taftazani and Sialkoti Koch, whose orientation is also theological and philosophical, did not accept the use of soul for God because of the problems and considered its meaning to be essential. This meaning is consistent with the report of lexicographers. They believe that this part of the verse is one of the similar verses. Some theologians, such as Fakhrazi, believe that it is possible to apply the meaning of the self in the verse of essence and the art of the problem. Some philosophers, such as Mullah Sadra, also consider the meaning of the word soul to be essential and believe that the soul is not only applied to bodies, but it can also be applied to God. Jovini did not accept the definition of self for God because of the problem and they consider this definition to be true. His reason for saying this is the repetition of such wording in the Qur'an and hadiths reported from the Prophet (PBUH). The second challenge is related to the capacity in the letter "phi". As mentioned in Khafaji's speech, the problem is in the letter fi. They have tried to solve the challenge in this way. But In many views, the meaning of capacity in the challenged phrase has been ignored. There is a possibility that the importance of applying self to God is the reason for this neglect. Because this application in the Qur'an means confirming the application. Based on this point of view, the interpretation "La Aalm ma fi Nafsak" is not much different from the self-made interpretation "La Aalm Nafsak".

The study method in this writing is rational analysis.

The findings of this research are:Based on the foundations of cognitive linguistics, the view of Zamakhshari's problem is not acceptable. Because the problem is only a verbal literary style in which one word is mentioned in connection with another word in the sentence before it. While language is a reflection of the conceptualization of the mind. In this way, the mind first conceptualizes the external situation and then expresses the appropriate word and phrase based on knowledge. But there Is no conceptualization in the problem. In order to get rid of God's personification, Muslim scholars have chosen the meaning of essence for the word soul. This choice, as mentioned, agrees with the report of lexicographers. But one of the important problems of this choice is its incompatibility with the wisdom of choosing words in the Holy Quran. Three: In the challenged Quranic phrase, two metaphors are intertwined. Separating them is very important and a way for a more correct understanding. The first metaphor is in the word ego, which is a metaphorical part of personality, and the second metaphor is capacity.

The results of this research are as follows: The difference between theologians and metaphor researchers is that in order to reject embodiment, the word can be considered in its original and tangible meaning, but it does not involve the embodiment of God. In other words, the analysis of the challenged phrase is in two ways. Some traditional literary methods try to answer and analyze it. Some have also answered the challenge through conceptual metaphor. Two conceptual metaphors can be generalized to other news attributes

One of the new and famous arguments in denying the existence of God is the Divine hiddenness argument. Based on this argument that was first proposed by John Schellenberg, a contemporary Canadian philosopher, God’s hiddenness is in conflict with his attribute of perfectly loving. Considering this conflict, defenders of the hiddenness argument have denied the existence of God. By adopting a new approach to the issues of being and knowledge, Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi (1154–1191) has presented a different point of view. Suhrawardi calls God the Light of all lights. In his opinion, God’s essence is nothing but his light, and light is that which is manifest (Ẓāhir). Therefore, it is necessary that God’s essence be also manifest. Of course, Suhrawardi also has paid attention to the issue of divine hiddenness and its relationship with the human soul. In Suhrawardi's view, divine hiddenness is due to man's lack of attention to the origin of the universe (i.e. the Light of all lights) and his neglect of his own existential (luminous) aspect. Nevertheless, in Schellenberg's view, God itself is the cause of divine hiddenness, and man has less responsibility. While comparing the viewpoints of Suhrawardi and Schellenberg on divine hiddenness, this article, using a descriptive-analytical method, tries to explain how God’s essence can be hidden while it is manifest, but this hiddenness should not return to his essence.

The problem of evil has always been a challenge against theism and there has been a lot of disputation about it. What can be considered as a newer challenge to theism is the very problem of divine hiddenness. There are multiple similarities between the two arguments which have caused some thinkers to reduce one to another and to count only one of them as original. It is possible that one of the very concepts of evil or hiddenness be reduced to another one, or one of the arguments that is grounded on them, or the reduction occurs in both phases. Regarding the vastitude of the domain of each problem, what we solely aim at is inspecting the reasons of ones who hold that divine hiddenness is nothing but one articulation of the problem of evil and it is not necessary to be regarded as independent. These reasons range from a sort of resemblance of their logical structure, methodology, conclusion, or responses in order to show that either the problem of divine hiddenness is not independent at all or if it is, it makes a much less severe case against theism in comparison to the problem of evil so it’s not worthy of any concern. What will be eventually concluded is that despite having plentiful available similarities, this kind of reduction is not justified and each problem, regardless of their ability to prove what they claim, is independently precious, inspection-worthy, and original.

Since society is among the contingent entities, its existence is dependent on Necessary Existence. God, as the agent and creator of the contingent world, grants the existence of society through human wills and actions, in such a way that the existence of society cannot be reconciled with its non-existence. The divine traditions that we can know through the revealed and rational structures are the basis of our existence and all other realities. Just as realism is the precondition of our existence and all scientific and rational theories, divine traditions also -with the same extent and with the same breadth- provide the basis for our individual and social lives. Accordingly, society is a collection of divine traditions and its emergence requires collective action. Divine traditions, as the constitutive principles, play a causal role in the existence and survival of society. This paper, using a descriptive-analytical method, also deals with some consequences of this understanding of society, the most important of which are: the centrality of human primordial nature in perceiving divine traditions and formation of society, reverse predication in predicating tradition upon society, the necessity of immateriality of society, rejecting relativism, and preserving human volition and responsibility.

This article reports the first part of extensive research on the ‎nature of God's agency. The two main questions of this research are:‎‎(1) Is God a moral agent?‎‎(2) If so, is divine morality the same as human morality or does it differ from human morality, either wholly or ‎partially?‎Regarding the first question, the author examines three rival theories: ‎‎"God as an autocratic‎ agent", "God as a pragmatic agent" and "God as ‎a moral agent". In this research, the idea of God as a moral agent will ‎be argued for, and the other two conceptions of the nature of divine ‎agency will be argued against. Regarding the second question, the ‎author defends the theory that divine morality and human morality ‎have no difference in terms of their “normative content”, although ‎they have considerable differences in other respects.‎The first part of this research, presented in this article, after stating ‎the preliminaries, deals with the theory of “God as an autocratic ‎agent” and critically examines some of the arguments made or that ‎could be made in favor of this conception of the nature of God. The ‎second and third parts of this research, which will be published as ‎separate articles in forthcoming issues of this journal, will elaborate ‎on the other two conceptions of the nature of divine agency.

The widespread development and increasing capabilities of artificial intelligence have led some scientists to believe in the dominance of artificial intelligence over human intelligence and intellect. However, considering the verses of the Quran (Al-A'laa: 1-2) and (Al-An'am: 102) and many other verses that identify God as the sole creator of the universe, as well as God's infinite knowledge (Al-Baqarah: 29) (Al-An'am: 101) of which human knowledge is a mere reflection, and the verses of human dignity: verses that speak of God blowing His spirit into man (Al-Hijr: 29 and Sad: 72) and appointing man as His vicegerent on earth and creating the creatures of the earth for man (Al-Baqarah: 30, Sad: 26, Fatir: 39, Al-An'am: 165, Yunus: 14, Yunus: 73, Al-A'raf: 69, Al-A'raf: 84, Al-Naml: 62), and philosophical arguments that view the universe as a reflection of God's will to be and a cause that is the very essence of dependence on its absolute cause, and considering the verses that identify man as the greatest creation and the most perfect of them (Al-Sajdah: 7) and (At-Tin: 4) to the extent that he is introduced as God's vicegerent on earth (Al-Baqarah: 30), human achievements are the result of human action and man is their efficient cause and the effect of the Most High as the absolute cause, an effect that derives all its power from the sole creator of the universe. Therefore, artificial intelligence, which is a product of man and human achievement, cannot be superior to human intelligence, which is a creation of the Lord of the Worlds. The research method is qualitative and comparative, and the results indicate the invalidity of the superiority of artificial intelligence over human intellect.

The Imami commentators and theologians have relied on verses from the Holy Quran to prove the doctrine of Bada`. From his point of view, some of the verses indicate the possibility of bada's occurrence, some others condemn the opponents of bada', and the third category indicates the occurrence of bada' in previous nations. Among these, the verses of the third category have the most argumentative value. Among the verses of the third category, which have been disputed by both supporters and opponents, are verses 142 of A`raaf and 51 of Baqarah, which are known as the verses of Miqat of the Prophet Moses. The problem of the present research is to investigate the implication or lack of implication of Miqat's verses on Bada' and its purpose is to investigate the extent and manner of the implication of these verses on the proof of Bada'. For this purpose, the opinions of supporters and opponents of Bada'i interpretation of these verses have been studied in a descriptive-analytical way. The analysis of bada`i and non-bada`i interpretations and the confirmation of the latter based on the reasons and evidence mentioned in the research are among its findings.

In the past, there has been a deep discussion among philosophers and theologians regarding the different aspects of the Divine will. This paper aims to first provide a detailed report and evaluation of Allameh Tabataba'i's theories, and then, in comparison with the ideas of eminent thinkers of transcendental theosophy, a new formulation of this interpretation will be presented based on the reductionist approach, how much they consider the attribute of the Divine will to be essential or action. According to the research method of each of the philosophers, Allameh Tabataba'i, considers God’s will to be debatable in the form of Divine actions and considers it difficult to carry it on the Essence in such a way that it is considered an independent concept, we will consider in the framework of anti-reductionism. We consider On the other hand, Imam Khomeini, who considers the Divine will to be one of the attributes of Essence and considers it to be constant in all levels of existence and one of the attributes of perfection, a minimalist reductionist, and Mulla Sadra, who refers the essential Will to other Essential attributes such as knowledge, love, or pleasure, we formulate maximal reductionist.

Miracles, considered the most prominent and universally recognized method for identifying prophets, pose a significant challenge for ordinary, non-infallible individuals. While theologians emphasize the ‘incontestability’ of miracles, the limitations of human knowledge regarding the future cast doubt on the ability to definitively ascertain whether a miracle will remain uncontested in the future. This uncertainty raises questions about the possibility of attaining absolute certainty regarding the miraculous nature of a prophet’s extraordinary acts. This article addresses this challenge through a critical-analytical approach. The key findings of this study suggest that while a miracle must be evident and clear to establish its authenticity, ordinary individuals can assess the miraculous nature of a prophet’s claims by examining the prophet’s background, evaluating the claims themselves against reason and innate understanding, and considering divine wisdom.

The term Divine Suqʿ plays a crucial role in forming the entire structure of mystical ontology, and a precise understanding of its position and characteristics is the basis for comprehending other levels of existence. Mulla Sadra was a pioneer in applying this term in his works, and since then, other commentators have followed him, making it one of the well-known terms in Islamic mysticism. Using two approaches developed by Toshihiko Izutsu, this article aims to analyze the meaning of this term in the school of Ibn Arabi. The first approach is to find the synonyms and equivalents of Divine Suqʿ, and the second is to use the combination of words that have a semantic relation to Divine Suqʿ. Divine knowledge, ʿamā, and Divine Names are among the synonyms of Divine Suqʿ; and the words clement soul, ʿamā, primary determination, and oneness are among the concepts whose combination creates a semantic network of Divine Suqʿ. Another finding of this article is to define the evolution of Ibn Arabi’s thoughts in the intellectual atmosphere of other Islamic scholars.

In the view of cognitive linguists, Metaphor is called conceptual metaphor and its most important cognitive function, understanding abstract concepts through concrete concepts and can turn on the linguistic nature of religious texts which is very abstract and far from sensory experience based on objective concepts. the concept of divine mercy as one the abstract concepts in sahifa sajjadieh used in various metaphorical forms and reveals for reader its linguistic analysis, literary beauties and the view of imam Sajjad in connection with it. The present research was investigated ontological metaphors of concept of divine mercy in sahifa sajjadieh on this basis and with a descriptive-analytical method and in the light of the principles of Jackel's cognitive metaphor and reached that imam has used many fields of phenomenal or material metaphor (with the highest frequency: 50 percent),container metaphor, and recognition metaphor in order to explain the concept of mercy and has made his intended concepts understandable for reader in the form of sensations. Analysis of examined cases in sahifa sajjadieh is in harmony with of the principles of Jackel's cognitive metaphor (the ubiquity hypothesis, domain hypothesis, model hypothesis, uni directionality hypothesis, necessity hypothesis, creativity hypothesis, focusing hypothesis) and approves them .

The theory of emanation based on "creating from being" has conflicts with the divine impermeability based on "creating not from being" in terms of its implications. This requires the accurate attention of scholars in the field of Islamization of human sciences. The article has analyzed the ontological-theological implications of the theory of emanation and criticized it based on an interpretive approach to divine impermeability. Impermeability approach negates any "birth" and "emanation" from God and introduces him with the expressions, "He neither begets nor is born" and "Nor is there to Him any equivalent". While based on the theory of emanation, begetting is accepted in God's Essence and His will is considered as an essential attribute, in the interpretive approach to divine impermeability, God's will is an attribute of action. In the intended meaning of "impermeability", God starts creation based on will and its accompaniment, that is, "Be! and it is" (the agent by will); while in the theory of emanation, the issuance of the creation is necessary from the essence of the Real, and any possibility of not issuing is ruled out, and therefore, God's will and power are limited. In the theory of emanation and its other frequently used equivalent "effusion", there is cognation between the cause and the effect; but according to divine impermeability, there is no need for cognation between the creator and the creature, and it is possible for God to create diverse and multiple beings by creating and making them without the need for an intermediary.

The necessity of a prophet's presence in the leadership of Medina and the intricate relationship between prophecy and politics have long captivated scholars in Islamic philosophy. Avicenna, recognizing this connection, linked the prophet to the active intellect as a singular entity independent of the self. He established this relationship in developing a theoretical framework for the leadership of the citizens of Medina. Consequently, Avicenna's exploration of the nexus between politics and prophecy, grounded in religious sources and Avicennan philosophy, stands as a noteworthy achievement in political philosophy. This study endeavors to answer a pivotal question: On what basis did Avicenna validate the connection between prophecy and politics, and which theoretical framework did he rely on to deem the prophet fit for leadership in Medina? Employing a descriptive-analytical case study, this paper delves into a specific facet of Avicenna's political views. Applying Wilhelm Dilthey’s methodological hermeneutics in an interpretive approach, it concludes that the prophet's connection to the active intellect, serving as a link between the perceptible and rational worlds, justifies his political and religious leadership in Medina. Avicenna posited that, with strong intellectual, imaginative, and creative powers—the sources of miraculous acts—the prophet becomes indispensable for guiding Medina toward salvation in both the worldly and the hereafter. The prophet's leadership reaches its pinnacle by aligning his imaginative power and intellective soul (acquired intellect) with the active intellect, along with the realization of the revelation phenomenon, ultimately leading the people to happiness. According to Avicenna, the prophet's intellectual power is inclined to receive the light of the active intellect, attaining a level akin to the holy intellect. This connection prompts people to recognize its absence within themselves, compelling them to adhere to the laws of Sharia. Avicenna thus demonstrated that for citizens to attain salvation, the prophet's leadership is imperative due to his profound connection to the active intellect.

The appeal to Divine Wisdom, either as a direct axiom or a framework for other principles, has been widely prevalent in Mûtâkâllimūn’s arguments. In the present paper, after presenting some cases of this trend and through logical analysis, the Mû’tâzilite Âbd al-Jâbbār’s arguments based on Divine Wisdom are scrutinized and criticized in particular. As a hypothesis, the authors believe that the Mû’tâzilite Âbd al-Jâbbār’s appeal to this divine attribute is, at least partly, inaccurate and thus, his arguments are logically inconclusive. Seemingly, this divine attribute is often used in a posterior method, and this method has been applied merely to rationalize the religious dogmas and the revelatory statements discursively. In addition, elaboration on this particular topic requires a comprehensive inner knowledge about all details of the universe and the ultimate purpose of the creation. Many other cases which, based on this very principle, must have been done or created, and yet are left unrealized, can be taken as serious counter-examples for this theological framework. It should be noted that the main theme of this paper doesn’t concern the objective reality per se, for based on decisive rational arguments and the explicit religious teachings, all Divine actions are carried out in the ultimate wisdom for the ultimate good; rather, this paper aims at questioning the possibility of a comprehensive understanding of such wisdom and the human intellect’s capacity - with all its limitations and failures - for discerning its cases.

"Divine Hiddenness Argument" is one of the arguments against the existence of God, which has attracted the attention of some religious philosophers in the contemporary era. The introducers of this argument, by referring to some important attributes of the God of monotheistic religions, and the requirements and consequences of accepting these attributes in human life, especially His complete and absolute love for His creatures, try to convince that the real world is devoid of the existence of God, or at least make the possibility of His non-existence appear weaker than the possibility of His existence.
John L. Schellenberg, the Canadian philosopher, has tried to present this matter in the form of various logical arguments in his works, and in his opinion, has tried to make it appear as complete proof against the existence of God. On the other hand, a range of theistic thinkers and philosophers have tried to criticize this argument and show its inadequacy in proving the non-existence of God. This argument is based on the concept and assent principles, whose discussion and analysis will be helpful in the correct understanding of the argument, and the continuation of its criticism.
Although in the works that criticized Schellenberg's “Divine Hiddenness Argument”, useful information about the principles and presuppositions of Schellenberg's argument has been stated, and we have also taken advantage of this information, none of them have discussed this argument from the perspective of assent principles and they have not examined and corrected. In this paper, we are going to investigate Schellenberg's “Divine Hiddenness Argument”.
Principles are the contents and materials on which the problems of science are based, and they can be divided into two parts: concepts and assents. Assent principles refer to propositions that come as an introduction to the arguments and analogies used in a science, and to prove the problems and rules of that science. These propositions are also of two categories: some of them are self-evident, and therefore, do not need proof; while some others are theoretical and need proof, and of course this is done in another science other than assent principles.
The type of assent principles are confirmation and they are propositional and indicate the assent of existence, the truth and reality of propositions, and the issues and subjects of science; in other words, assent principles are issues and reasons that lead to the acceptance of the existence predicables of science problems. In this research, by examining Schellenberg's works, we have tried to extract the assent principles of his interpretations of the “Divine Hiddenness Argument”.

According to the search of valid and indexed scientific documents in scientific sites, so far eight scientific-research articles and two books have been written about the “Divine Hiddenness Argument”. In all of them, the authors have either taken steps in the direction of presenting the “Divine Hiddenness Argument”, or they have mentioned the presuppositions of Schellenberg's argument, but as we will indicate in our research, the assent principles of this argument have not been mentioned by those authors; it is why referring to these principles is considered as the originality of this research, although some researchers have indirectly referred to these principles in their works.

This paper using a descriptive-analytical method, refers to the assent principles of Schellenberg's argument and analyzes them. In the analysis, data is collected from Western and Islamic sources, and rational and descriptive-analytical analysis is used (If necessary).

By examining Schellenberg's works, one can find four assent principles for his argument: 1. the involuntary nature of the belief formation process in humans; 2. God's finality, His incomparability, unsurpassable, and inaccessibility; 3. Ultimism theory; 4. Human free will. The explanation of these matters, along with considerations based on them, will be presented in this research.

In the works of Ibn Sina, expressions related to the discussion of will are phrased in a way that allows for two interpretations. Some researchers believe that Ibn Sina considers the attribute of will to be verbally common between the Necessary Being (God) and humanity. In contrast, others argue that he views this attribute as semantically common. Examination of Ibn Sina's works indicates that his expressions, in cases such as the following, have laid the groundwork for the interpretation of verbal commonality: (1) the absence of conceptual conflict in divine attributes, especially knowledge and will; (2) the distinction of will in the Necessary Being and humanity. On the other hand, his expressions regarding the division of will and the comparison of will in humans and the Necessary Being provide the basis for interpreting semantic commonality. It seems plausible to consider Ibn Sina's theory as semantic commonality and, relying on his expressions about will and divine attributes, present an interpretation of evidence supporting verbal commonality. Examining Ibn Sina's works allows us to define will as "a quality in the agent of the world that causes the issuance of an action from him." In this case, the will between God and humans will be semantically common. Within such a definition, the distinction between the will of God and the will of humans will be merely an extensional difference.

One of the most important principles in theology, laying the foundation for many rules and issues in this field, is the principle of "rational goodness and badness." Acceptance of this principle significantly influences our perspective on the world, theology, and other crucial theological matters. Muslim theologians have two perspectives on this principle. The Adlīyah (including Mu'tazilites and Imamis) accept it, believing that the goodness and badness of actions are intrinsic, and human reason and nature comprehend them without considering anything else. On the other hand, the Ash'aris deny its rational nature, asserting that the divine law specifies the goodness and badness. In this paper, we aim to analyze and explore this principle from the perspective of the narratives of the Imāms (peace be upon them) using an analytical-descriptive and library-based approach. We seek to clarify whether the principle itself or its substance is mentioned in the narratives. According to the findings of this research, the Imāms have addressed this issue, and the narratives sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly indicate the rational goodness and badness. This article will elaborate on the explanation of these narratives.