جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "ابن تیمیه" در نشریات گروه "ادیان و عرفان"

Taymiyya's influence on certain excommunicationist (takfīrī) movements is evident, underscoring the necessity of examining and critiquing his foundational principles. Given the special role of transmitted textual (naqli) evidence in Ibn Taymiyya's framework of religious beliefs, this article employs a descriptive-analytical method to address the question: What are Ibn Taymiyya's principles in deriving religious beliefs from textual sources, and what critiques can be made of them? Key areas of focus include the types of sources, the relationship between these sources, their authoritativeness (ḥujjiyya), the validity of apparent meanings (ẓuhūr), the reliability of single-chain (khabar al-wāḥid) and frequently transmitted reports (tawātur). Among Ibn Taymiyya's contested principles are his denial of metaphorical meaning in the Quran and his rejection of esoteric interpretations (taʾwīl) of textual evidence, backed by numerous arguments. These positions have been met with extensive critiques. Additionally, his views on the acceptance of single-chain reports are not without flaws, and he has loosely applied the term mutawātir to certain types of conclusive reports. However, it is incorrect to assume that critiquing Ibn Taymiyya is as straightforward as critiquing other Salafists, just as his critique should not be equated with that of Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab, who attributes his ideas to Ibn Taymiyya. Unlike many Salafists, Ibn Taymiyya is well-versed in the perspectives of his opponents and prepares responses to potential objections—a characteristic that sets him apart from many other Salafists.

The subject of this research is to examine and critique Ibn Taymiyyah's view on the proof of beliefs based on reason. This has been done by identifying his perspective on rational methods in his written works, and this research, using a descriptive-analytical method, seeks to answer the question of how Ibn Taymiyyah's view on the methods of proving rational beliefs was and what criticisms are made of it.He opposes restricting rational reasoning to analogy, similitude, and induction, and has only briefly defined the inductive method, but has discussed the method of analogy and similitude in detail, and denies the function of logical analogy or universal analogy, as he calls it, and on the contrary, accepts the authority of similitude and analogy of the absent to the witnessed, and attempts to make most experts accept the authority of similitude.In the critique, what he calls the method of rational reasoning other than analogy, similitude, and induction, in fact, goes back to one of these three methods, and the denial of the function of analogy is also not valid. Similitude, although it is one of the methods of rational proof, is not a definite proof.

This research focuses on the concept of moral rationality as elaborated by Ibn al-Taymiyya and Mullā Ṣadrā. Given that moral rationalism emphasizes the coherence of action and its consequences, as well as rational principles, we aim to compare and contrast the views of these two scholars in the following ways: A) endorsing the full dependence of morality on religion, Ibn al-Taymiyya’s view is close to the so-called divine command theory (or religious goodness and badness), and in the realm of moral action, he has developed a version of religious deontologism; B) drawing upon the conceptual distinction and co-instantiation of religion and morality, Mullā Ṣadrā espoused the so-called natural law theory (or rational goodness and badness), and in the realm of moral action, he tends towards the virtue theory. However, upon final analysis, Mullā Ṣadrā's approach appears to be more favorable. This is because it recognizes the inherent value and autonomy of moral life, while also acknowledging the experiential dimensions of morality.

This article deals with the phenomenon of contemporary Salafi movements such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban and ISIS. The emergence of this movement and its feedback in the world led to serious questions in the field of ideology or ideologies of these groups. Is behavior and thought related to Islam, books and traditions? This article seeks to explore the causes of this phenomenon by entering the field of history. According to the authors, Salafi ideas, although indebted to the early days of Islam and the views of the companions of hadith, are systematically overshadowed by the ideas of Ibn-e Taymiyyah. The nineteenth-century Salafi movements were an attempt to update these ideas, which was completed only by Muhammed bin Abdulwahhab. But it was Abu Ala Mawdudi who redefined these ideas systematically and scientifically and in accordance with the current realities of society; And the interesting point is that Mawdudi is one of the thinkers who is strongly opposed to religiosity and can be called one of the heralds of the approximation of Islamic Denominations in the contemporary era.

The most important characteristics of intellect in terms of nature and meaning in the view of Salafism are: 1. Intellect is a kind of instinct 2. Contrary to the view of philosophers who consider intellect to be the essence, it is accident 3. The real meaning of intellect, as stated in the Quran, is heart 4. Intellect has multiple natures. Considering reason as an instinct shows the reduction of the dignity of reason as a source of perception in the eyes of Ibn Taymiyyah and his followers. This is despite the fact that, according to the verses and narrations and the opinions of the great intellectuals, reason has supreme dignity and distinguishes humans from other creatures. But in Mullah Sadra's view, intellect, as the highest level of the human soul, is an independent perceptive faculty and an abstract and immaterial essence. Compared to Ibn Taymiyyah's point of view, Mulla Sadra's view on the semantics and ontology of reason is closer to the meaning of reason that has been emphasized in the verses of the Quran and hadiths.
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In recent decades, we have seen wide-ranging Shia-Salafi conflicts, which have provided an opportunity for contemporary Salafism and Wahhabism to create, or at least claim, a unified anti-Shia movement among the Sunnis. This is despite the fact that for a long time, Salafi thought, especially Wahhabi, has been exposed to severe criticism from Sunnis and even some moderate Ahl Hadith (people of hadith), and therefore perhaps the Shiites have made a strategic mistake to turn the conflict between Sunnis and Salafis into a Shia-Salafi conflict. Although before Ibn Taymiyyah, traces of Salafism can be found among Ahl Hadith and Hanbalis, there is no doubt that today's Salafism and Wahhabism are most indebted to and influenced by Ibn Taymiyyah. Since his time, Ibn Taymiyyah has been subjected to serious and severe criticism, the most recent of which was made by Saudi Raed Samhuri. He is one of the contemporary Salafi authors who wrote about the thoughts of Ibn Taymiyyah. In 2010, in the book (Criticism of Salafi Discourse: Ibn Taymiyyah as an Example), he criticized the Salafi discourse by criticizing its leader, Ibn Taymiyyah. What is most evident in his criticisms is the use of the method of contradiction, in a way that introduces the reader to a series of contradictions of Ibn Taymiyyah. This researcher has scientifically analyzed and criticized Ibn Taymiyyah's thoughts and opinions with theological, jurisprudential, interpretive, and lexical methods. The explanation and analysis of Samhuri's refutation of Ibn Taymiyyah's view on excommunicating opponents is the main focus of this article, and it also implicitly criticizes his work.

Taqiyyah is one of the teachings that the Qur'anic, narrative and intellectual evidences indicate its legitimacy. Accordingly, there is no difference in principle between Muslims, but Shiites are better known for their specific historical characteristics. For this reason, the Shiite opposition has used it as an excuse to attack the Shiites. Ibn Taymiyyah Salafi and Nasser Qafari, contemporary Wahhabis, have considered Shiite adherence to this doctrine to be exaggerated. Hypocrisy, incorrect generalization, verbal taqiyyah, harm to non-consistency on incorrect Imamology are among their suspicions about Shiites in this doctrine. In the present study, these doubts were critiqued analytically based on library resources. The research findings show that, contrary to the claims of the two, the Shiites allow taqiyyah only in emergencies, on a case-by-case basis, as long as it is necessary and conditional on not harming others. The evidence for the permission of Taqiyyah indicates its generality and does not only prove Taqiyyah against the infidels. Also, the concept of taqiyyah is different from the so-called hypocrisy, and also the arguments of the two in the conversion of Shiites to taqiyyah are incorrect.

Sufism has been widely criticized by jurists since its inception in the Islamic world. Ibn Jawzi and Ibn Taymiyyah are among the most prominent of these jurists. This article explores the views of Ibn Jawzi and Ibn Taymiyyah in the critique of Sufism through a descriptive-analytical method. Ibn Jawzi divided Sufism into two groups: Early Sufism and Late Sufism. He considered the early Sufis to be devoted to the Sharia and classified them as ascetics, but condemned the asceticism, science-avoiding, love, and hearing of the later Sufis. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, Sufism is divided into two groups: Sufis of religious sciences and Sufis of philosophy. He did not consider the Sufis of religious sciences as heretics, but attributed infidelity to the belief of Sufis of philosophy due to being influenced by philosophers, the superiority of Wilayah (guardianship) over Nubuwwah (prophecy), Fana (annihilation), and Wahdat Wojud (the unity of existence). Finally, Ibn Taymiyyah had a positive view of Sufism compared to Ibn Jawzi..

Ithbat bila Kayf (proving without quality)and Rouhe Ma'na (spirit of meaning) theories are two common theories in the field of semantics of Divine attributes. In this article, Ibn Taymiyya's reading of this theory is investigated. Making distinction between the realm of meaning and realm of quality on one hand and resorting to semantic commonness and avoiding mixing contents and manifestation on the other hand,  he has posed rather comprehensive analysis and removed the obstacles. He considers the knowledge to the meaning of Divine attributes possible but the knowledge to their quality impossible. Semantic commonness of the meaning of the attributes is the origin of clearness of the meaning and impossibility of dominating the essence of God is the origin of unclearness of the quality. Furthermore, accepting the theory of Rouhe Ma'na (spirit of meaning), gives the real meaning back to spirit of meaning. Based on this theory, the words are assigned to the spirit of meanings and features of manifestations are not taken into account in their meanings. That is why, applying them in meaningful and semantic manifestaions is real, just like tangible and apparent manifestations. Investigating these two theories comparatively, it turns out that Ibn Taymiyya's reading of Ithbat bila Kayf (proving without quality) can be returned to the theory of Rouhe Ma'na (spirit of meaning) .

Ibn Taymiya’s unprecedented views in the seventh century have shown a prejudiced figure and stereotypical reading of Islam, causing a surge of oppositions from both Sunnite and Shiite scholars, especially the scholars of the four denominations of Sunnism. This was to the extent that by consensus, he was renounced and sentenced to a long imprisonment. One of his views was an objection to Imam Ali’s battles of Jamal and Seffin. He maintains that those battles were illegitimate and instances of rebellion, and that the opponents – i.e. people of Jamal and Mu’awiya along with his companions – were not rebellious people. The subject of this study is the extent to which these claims conform to religious sources and the dominant view among the Sunnites. The important finding of this study, conducted as a descriptive-analytical one using the Sunnite authentic sources, was the nonconformity of his view with important religious sources and the Sunnite dominant view. It concludes that his view was completely wrong and in opposition to the thoughts of other Sunnites.

Ibn Taymiyya is the greatest Salafi theorist, whose excommunicative (takfīrī) fatwas are still appealed to as pretexts for slaughtering certain groups of Muslims. He regarded the issue of belief and disbelief as a judicial problem, defining disbelief as lack of belief. In a general classification, he divides excommunication into general and specific: in general excommunication, he merely talks about grounds of disbelief and its general attributes, without restricting it to a particular person. However, in specific excommunication, the ruling is directed at a specific individual or group who said or did something that is in contradiction with Islam. In his analysis of this classification, he seeks Quranic evidence for specific excommunication: Quranic verses in which God has characterized certain people as disbelievers. However, Ibn Taymīyya requires certain maxims for the issuance of excommunication. In this paper, we outline and criticize these maxims, showing that he is not committed to his own maxims of attributing belief and disbelief, since he easily excommunicated some Muslims and issued fatwas as to the obligation of killing them.

Ibn Taymīyyah can be characterized as the intellectual father of Salafis. Thus, his views, particularly those about the nature of the human and the problem of the human divine succession (khilāfa) is of great importance. He appeals to the Quran and hadiths to show that the human consists of a spirit and a body, the main part being the spirit as a self-standing, incipient (ḥādith), and created entity. Ibn Tamīyyah, as an exteriorist in epistemology and sensationalist in ontology, attacks philosophers, logicians and mystics, as well as their principles. He has a fully materialist and earthly view of the human. In his work, the human is considered as a full-blown earthly entity who has no power to affect or manipulate this world. Moreover, since he rejects any similarity between divine and human attributes in order to protect Lordship monotheism (al-tawḥīd al-rubūbī), he cannot accept the human succession of God. His view of the human gives rise to other views and fatwas of his. In his view, it is not only impermissible, but polytheistic and at odds with worship monotheism (al-tawḥīd al-‘ibādī), to visit mausoleums and make recourse to righteous people. Deploying the library method with an analytic-descriptive approach, we have in this research drawn upon Ibn Taymīyyah’s writings to answer two questions: what is the human nature and reality in Ibn Taymīyyah’s view? And given his view of the human nature, how does he account for the human succession of God?

Salafiyyah or Salafism is a sect which claims that they follow the primary Muslims and it has roots in the primary centuries after Hijrah. This sect can be divided in two branches. The first branch is “Conservative Salafism” and the second branch is “Reformist Salafism”. This study investigates the emergence of Salafiyyah, its historical changes and its divisions from the beginning till the death of Rashid Ridha, one of the most important thinkers of Salafism. In this research which has been conducted through the descriptive-analytic method, using library resources, it has been concluded that different branches of Salafiyyah have many dissimilarities and it leads to the difference in their approach to behave other Muslims too.

A disputed issue between Muslim and non-Muslim theologians was the reliability and scope of rational understanding in discovering religious doctrines. Among Islamic sects, there has been a spectrum of views in both extremes, and some parties of the debate accused others of exit from Islam. One influential sect with a particular view of the issue is the Wahhabi branch of Salafism. Their theoreticians, such as Ibn Taymiyya, minimize the reliability of the reason in understanding and discovering religious intentions, and in some cases, they totally deny its reliability. And in cases where a judgment of the reason is in conflict or thought to be in conflict with that of the religion, the latter is preferred over the former. In this paper, I deploy an attributive-analytic method, to reply to the question of the view of this group about the reliability of the reason, and the extent of the cogency of their arguments. I conclude that they divide judgments of the reason into explicit conclusive and probabilistic non-explicit judgments, and they deny a major portion of rational judgments and doctrines, especially in the realm of the practical reason, in the domain of religion and super-natural issues. In their view, arguments propounded by theologians, philosophers, sages, and Sufis are from the probabilistic reason, and should thus be rejected.

Men’s Istizlal at night at the time of Ihram (state of pilgrim sanctity) in Hajj (pilgrimage) and Omreh is an issue that its legitimacy or illegitimacy is not clearly obvious from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh). This subject has not been surveyed comprehensively. So it demands a comprehensive study. Disagreements of the Islamic jurists on the concept of men’s Istizlal and on interpreting its meaning, has led to different judicial decisions. The different views go so far that some jurists believe the lack of sunlight at night can be as an evidence of meaninglessness of men’s Istizlal at night. However, based on a robust theory and legitimate evidence, Istizlal can be defined as the covering the head from coldness, rain, and sunlight. Thus, Istizlal from light and heat for Mohrem men (consecrated pilgrims) during the day is just one of evidence of Istizlal for men. Accordingly, if Istizlal from rain and coldness would take place at night, it could be considered Istizlal at night. Seeking to identify the opinions and perspectives held by Islamic jurists and determining the scope of related evidence and explicating the duties of men in Istizlal at night, the present article, using a library-based method, analyzes and describes the statements declared in the jurisprudence of Islamic sects.

After the demise of the Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him), his followers are divided into numerous theological and jurisprudential sects. Among them, Takfiri Salafists are more different than other Islamic Ummah; a movement that claims it is following the past righteous tradition and the most correct readings of religion. One way to evaluate the correctness and incorrectness of the Salafist beliefs is comparing their thoughts with other Islamic sects. So “Standing on Arsh”, Istava Ala al-Arsh, that is one of the attributes of God, was studied to examine and compare Salafists and Maturidiyans of Hanafi sects. Then the present article, using analytical- documentary method, tries to have a comparative study of Salafists with an emphasis on Ibn Taymiyyah’s and Maturidi views regarding ‘Istava ala al-Arsh. The paper comes to this conclusion that Salafist claims in following the Saleh predecessor tradition is not true. Maturidiyans have a Tanzihi(purifying) and interpretative view in “Istava ala al -Arsh “; however, the Salafists, without having a unified view on the subject, believe in indeterminism and anthropomorphism.

One of the important issues in understanding religion is the position of reason in comprehending religious cognitions. In the following investigation, efforts have been put on analyzing of position of reason from the viewpoints of Ibn Taymiyya and Allameh Tabatabaei, somehow that the strength and weak points of two points of view could be clarified. Ibn Taymiyya believes, as well as all knowledges and actions derived from Intellect is called reason, so reason sometimes refers to a power that human, reflects with it, and this perception is a consequence of “First Intellect” ! Acquiring cognitions of religion in the viewpoint of Ibn Taymiyya doesn’t need reason if there are enough evidence from Quran, narrations and human nature. And if there is a conflict between religion and reason, then the priority must be given to religion. And those who make reason superior to religion, according to him, are mistaken. Allameh Tabatabaei also believes that, what it is meant intellect in human, is perceptive soul of him and that is an initiative level those all universal concepts and general rules lead to that! Indeed Allameh refuses both extreme viewpoints, the one that doesn’t give a role to reason for understanding religion and also that view which considers reason self-sufficient in this regard! instead he believes that reason is located between those to above mentioned extremes! Reason is one of the significant sources in religious cognition which never goes wrong! there is no conflict between Intellect and religion, therefore, in contrast to Ibn Taymiyyah, reason in the viewpoint of Allameh Tabatabaei has an especial role in acquiring religious cognition

Through denying and undermining validity of hadithes or distracting the address of Imam Ali’s hadithes and ascribing them to someone else, Ibn Taymiyyah attempts to disparage the opinions of the Shiites about the authority of Imam Ali (AS) in Minhaj as-Sunnah so that he attempts to find Sahabah’s scientific status preferable to Imam Ali, relying on fake and unreal traditions. Therefore, in this paper, it is attempted to reject Ibn Taymiyyah’s claims and statements, given abundant resources and recording historical events in literature among Sunnis. And prove that he is to what extent malice to Imam Ali (AS), and does his best in order to misrepresent the facts that historians and traditionists have made every endeavour to capture and record them.

The notion of reason, its functions and boundaries is one of the significant and influential subjects forming the theories of scholars of religion that is sometimes either exaggerated or undermined. This article surveys different meanings of reason as well as the viewpoints of Ibn Taymyyah, the founder of Salafism, and Sheikh Yusuf Bahrāni, a prominent Shiite scholar, on it, shedding light on their commonalities and differences, despite the fact that both of them belong to Zāhiri School of interpretation. In practice, they both lay little store on reason while admitting its practicability to some extent. Similarly, they both reject the correlation of reason and law, in spite of accepting the theory of rational goodness and badness, and prioritize narration to reason in time of their discord.