جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "cost stickiness" در نشریات گروه "حسابداری"

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between trade credit and cost stickiness, and to examine whether this relationship is adjusted to the issue of agency.This research has been carried out using annual data of companies accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange during the period of 2013-2022. For testing of research hypotheses, multivariate linear regression has been used based on panel data.The results show that companies that use high levels of trade credit show lower cost stickiness, and this situation is more prevalent and common under examples with high agency (brokerage) issues.The results suggest that trade credit limits the developmental tendencies of managers in companies with acute agency problems, by requiring them to release unused resources at a time of declining sales.

The complexities related to the conflict of interests of managers and owners on one hand and the importance of the effects of the company's performance on other stakeholder groups on the other hand, have recently attracted everyone's attention and finding a suitable model has become a serious concern of many people. . Today, the experts know that the best solution to these problems is to improve the management of companies and their profit management, therefore, according to the above, this research seeks to investigate whether real profit management has an effect on cost stickiness in listed companies. Does it have an effect on the Tehran Stock Exchange? The statistical population of the research is 126 companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange. Also, the time domain includes 5 consecutive years from 1396 to 1400, which was tested using multivariable linear regression. The real profit management (abnormal level of discretionary flow of the company) has a significant effect on the cost stickiness of the company in the Tehran Stock Exchange.

The board of directors plays an important role in corporate governance. The board of directors is created to protect the interests of the shareholders and to separate the management of the company from the ownership. To solve this representation problem, the board of directors play the role of supervisors who are usually busy with supervising the senior executive managers, approving the company's strategy and monitoring the control system. Does the financial expertise of board members have an effect on cost stickiness in companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange? The statistical population of the research is 126 companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange. Also, the time domain includes 5 consecutive years from 1396 to 1400, which was tested using multivariable linear regression. The financial expertise of the board members has a significant effect on the cost stickiness of the company in the Tehran Stock Exchange.

The experimental investigation of the behavior of costs is one of the topics that has recently attracted the attention of many researchers. Since the expenses form an important part of the financial statements of the companies, therefore, proper understanding and awareness of it helps the managers in order to achieve the short-term and strategic goals of the company. The purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of CEO power and free cash flow on cost stickiness. The statistical population of the research companies admitted to Tehran Stock Exchange and the sampling method of systematic elimination and the studied sample includes 140 admitted companies during the years 1397 to 1401. The research method is descriptive-survey and correlational in terms of communication, applied in terms of purpose and post-event in terms of occurrence. Regression method, panel data and fixed effects model were used to process and test the hypotheses. The results obtained from the analysis of the hypotheses showed that the power of the CEO has a positive and significant effect on the stickiness and the free cash flow has a positive and significant effect on the stickiness of the cost.

This research aims to investigate the effect of management style on the stickiness of general, administrative and sales costs at the company level and its impact on shareholder value. The problem is whether the choices and decisions (management style) of CEOs affect the stickiness of administrative and sales costs, and if the management style causes part of the stickiness of costs, is this part of the excess stickiness of costs a consequence of Worth participating? Therefore, in the current research, the excess stickiness of administrative and sales costs compared to the specific stickiness of the company is considered the stickiness caused by the CEO's choices and decisions. Then, its relationship with the company's value is investigated. The direct influence of CEOs on cost adjustment decisions is not easily discernible. Because resource allocation decisions are made at different levels of the company (for example, business unit level). However, the empirical background shows that the hypothesis "the role of manager's style in cost adjustment decisions" is logically provable. Based on this, it is assumed that part of the stickiness of administrative and sales costs at the company level comes from the difference in the specific style of the CEO. In this regard, the first hypothesis is formulated as follows: the fixed effects of the CEO have a significant relationship with the excess stickiness of administrative and sales costs at the company level. Managers seek to increase their personal interests without paying attention to the interests of the shareholders, and the resulting agency costs are directly imposed on the company and shareholders. Therefore, we expect that regardless of the direction of the deviation, the excess stickiness related to the CEO has a negative effect on shareholder value. Of course, adjustment of resources and costs can be caused by supervision and supervision duties. However, it is expected that, on average, the expected effects of the agency model will prevail. Therefore, the second hypothesis of the current research is formulated as follows: the level of excess stickiness of administrative and sales expenses related to the CEO has a negative relationship with shareholder value. 

In the present study, the relationship between the excess adhesion of administrative and sales costs resulting from the decisions of CEOs and shareholder value was investigated. Based on agency theory and neoclassical theory, it was expected that CEOs would be significantly  effective in the level of cost stickiness due to their unique management style. Therefore, research hypotheses were formulated based on the identification of the fixed effects of the CEO on the stickiness of administrative and sales costs and the negative relationship between the stickiness of the surplus related to the CEO and shareholder value, and based on the company's 2016 information from the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2010- 2019; it was tested using multiple regression analysis. 

The results indicate that CEOs play a significant role in the stickiness of general and sales costs, and management style has a positive relationship in the stickiness of costs with shareholder value. 

The results of this research are among the first pieces of evidence showing that managers' selection and decision-making style affect cost stickiness, which can be useful for the company and shareholders. In the current research, in accordance with previous research and our expectations, the effect of CEO selection and decision-making style on cost stickiness was confirmed. However, contrary to previous research, a positive relationship between CEO and company value was obtained. In other words, the manager's decisions regarding cost management are not based on personal motives but on increasing the company's value (based on Q. Tobin's criteria). Since the second research hypothesis is based on agency theory, it can be argued that incentives and other methods of reducing agency problems have reduced the conflict between owners and managers. This is an issue that can be further investigated in future research. However, building a model that controls all economic determinants is challenging. Also, the variable measurement indices may not be complete. Nevertheless, the research findings provide evidence of the effect of management style on cost stickiness. The present research and related research can help develop an experimental model to detect bad or good cost stickiness.

Recent studies have revealed that if both conservatism and cost stickiness exist, not considering cost stickiness in estimating conservatism leads to their overestimation. The present study aims to examine the relationship between cost stickiness and conservatism levels according to the size of the company. This purpose is achieved using the combined data technique and three models of non-operating accruals, Basu model and market value model with a sample consisting of 113 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) over the period 2011 to 2020. The research results indicate that stickiness of costs is related to conservatism in all three models. However,the evidence shows that cost stickiness in the market value model and basu's adjusted model has a negative relationship with conservatism and causes it to decrease. to be The results also showed that by entering the variable size into the research model, in all three models, the stickiness of costs increases, which reduces the conservatism of companies.

The abstract of this research aims to examine the impact of economic uncertainty on cost stickiness with the moderating role of ownership concentration. The target population in this study consists of one hundred companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange over a six-year period. Multivariate correlation and regression were used to test the research hypotheses, and Excel and EVIEWS 10 software were used for data analysis and extracting research results. The results of the study indicate a direct and significant relationship between economic uncertainty and cost stickiness. Furthermore, the test results show that ownership concentration has a negative and significant effect on the relationship between cost stickiness and economic uncertainty. Therefore, it can be stated that an increase in economic uncertainty leads to an increase in cost stickiness. The findings of this study suggest a strong and positive relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty variables and cost stickiness. Additionally, with an increase in economic uncertainty, ownership concentration leads to a decrease in cost stickiness.

The present research investigated the relationship between political uncertainty (presidential elections) and asymmetric cost behavior and the moderating effect of ownership type (state versus private). The sample consisted of 325 Iranian companies (1,990 observations) listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange and the Iran Over the Counter. Data were analyzed using panel data and OLS multiple regression with robust standard errors. The results showed that the asymmetric behavior of selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs is linear during times of political uncertainty (presidential election years), but sticky in non-election years. In other words, costs decrease less than the increase in non-election years. The results also indicated the sticky cost behavior of state-owned firms and the linear (non-sticky) cost behavior of private-owned firms in election years, with state-owned firms exhibiting greater cost stickiness in election years than in non-election years. Additional tests showed that the cost behavior of goods sold is anti-sticky in both election and non-election years, with a greater degree of anti-stickiness in election years. Moreover, in state-owned and private-owned companies, this behavior was non-sticky in both election and non-election years, and state firms exhibited greater anti-stickiness in election years compared to non-election years and private-owned firms. Finally, the behavior of operating costs in both periods was linear and was not significantly different for state-owned and private-owned firms.

Deciding on resource adjustment costs in terms of efficient decisions or opportunistic behaviors of managers, on the other hand, the existence of liquidity in the company to meet the expectations of shareholders, increase the company's value or to promote the personal interests of managers, can be effect cost behavior and consequently dividend behavior.  Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of cost stickiness on dividend stickiness with emphasis on maintaining the cash holdings of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. This research is applied in terms of purpose and correlation and post-event in terms of method. In order to test the research hypotheses, 154 companies were selected in the period 2013-2021 and analyzed using multiple regression models. The results showed that cost stickiness at the operational level has a significant positive effect and at the total cost level and at the industry level has a significant negative effect on dividend stickiness which indicates the ability to control and manage operating costs and the involvement of managerial decisions in adjusting resources using the main operations of production and sales of the company. The interaction effect of cash holdings with cost stickiness at the operational level, total costs and at the industrial level has a negative effect on dividend stickiness

According to efficient decisions (informed decision hypothesis) and opportunistic decisions of managers (agency theory) to maximize the value of the company or personal benefits, the cost behavior and dividend behavior are affected by the adjusting resources and maintaining excess liquidity costs.Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of cost stickiness on dividend stickiness with emphasis on maintaining the surplus liquidity of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. This research is applied in terms of purpose and correlation and post-event in terms of method. In order to test the research hypotheses, 154 companies were selected in the period 2013-2021 and analyzed using multiple regression models. The results showed that cost stickiness at the operational level has a significant positive effect and at the total cost level and at the industry level has a significant negative effect on dividend stickiness which indicates the ability to control and manage operating costs and the involvement of managerial decisions in adjusting resources using the main operations of production and sales of the company. The interaction effect of surplus liquidity with cost stickiness at the operational level, total costs and at the industrial level has a negative effect on dividend stickiness. In other words, cost stickiness at different levels has a different effect on the dividend stickiness, and with the increase in liquidity surplus and greater deviation from optimal level, the effectiveness of dividend stickiness from asymmetric behavior of expenses has increased.

The issue of asymmetric cost behavior has attracted much attention in the management accounting literature. According to the economic theory of sticky costs, resource adjustment costs are one of the main reasons for this asymmetric behavior. Given that suppliers have an impact on the amount of resource adjustment, the purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of trade credit on cost stickiness with respect to the moderating role of product market power and customer concentration. The statistical the population of this study are all companies listed in Tehran Stock Market, in which 102 companies in the period 2014 to 2021 have been selected by systematic elimination method. For data analysis and hypothesis testing, multivariate regression model based on compound data is used. The results showed that trade credit leads to a reduction in cost stickiness. The findings also show that when the market power of the product is weak, the effect of trade credit on cost stickiness increases. In addition, customer concentration does not have a significant effect on the relationship between trade credit and cost stickiness.

In this study, the effect of earnings management constraints based on accruals and the efficiency of intellectual capital on asymmetric cost behavior was investigated. This research is applied in terms of purpose. Also, this research is descriptive in terms of descriptive nature. For this purpose, the financial information of 156 companies was screened during the period 1394 to 1399. Financial information was analyzed using Eviews software. According to the statistical methods performed, the hypotheses were tested at a confidence level of 0.95. The results of the test of research hypotheses showed that the limitations of earnings management based on accruals and the efficiency of intellectual capital affect asymmetric cost behavior. In fact, the findings confirm that the limitations of earnings management based on accruals increase asymmetric cost behavior and increase cost stickiness, and the efficiency of intellectual capital, especially human capital coefficient and structural capital coefficient, increase cost stickiness and asymmetric cost behavior. The findings also showed that the coefficient of physical capital reduces cost stickiness and asymmetric cost behavior.

Despite privatizations in recent decades, the government still owns shares in many companies and is an important component of the country's economy. The purpose of this study is to examine the country's political elections, the structure of government ownership, GDP growth, political relations and the rate of inflation in the country on cost stickiness in Iranian companies. To conduct this research, first, using interviews with experts and the index of lavsh, the variables and factors affecting the stickiness of companies' costs were identified and then the identified variables were measured, and finally a sample of 102 companies from Tehran Stock Exchange companies was selected to be statistically tested on them. The results of the research hypotheses showed that: the country's political elections, government ownership structure, GDP growth, political relations and inflation in the country affect the stickiness of corporate costs Are.

The purpose of the present study is to review the correlation between layoff cost and asymmetric cost behavior or cost stickiness.
The number of workers and legal claim costs for searching layoff costs were chosen as 2 criteria in this research. The sample under study included 108 corporations accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange during 2016-2021.
An increase in the number of workers leads to more labor cost stickiness and if their number declines, labor cost stickiness decreases too. As for legal claims, if a corporation has more legal claims, labor cost stickiness goes up and if it has less legal claims, labor cost stickiness comes down too.
Layoff costs play a main role in moderating cost behavior models.

The Effect of Cost Stickiness on Firm Value by Considering the Resource Adjustment Cost and Agency ProblemAbstract:Cost stickiness is one of the factors affecting the value of the firm, which can be caused by resource adjustment costs or agency problems, and this was the main motivation of this study. The statistical the population of this study are all companies listed in Tehran Stock Market, in which 102 companies in the period 2013 to 2022 have been selected by systematic elimination method. For data analysis and hypothesis testing, multivariate regression model based on compound data is used. The research results showed that cost stickiness has a negative effect on firm value. Also, the findings showed that when the resource adjustment cost is high, the effect of cost stickiness on the value of the firm increases. In addition, agency problems do not affect the relationship between costs and firm value.Keywords: Firm Value, Cost Stickiness, Resource Adjustment Cost, Agency Problem

This research seeks to investigate whether credit trade can decrease cost stickness (as a signal of opportunistic behavior of manager) or not? and whether agency problem, product market competition and customer concentration can moderate the effect of trade credit on cost stickness or not?

Trade credit is measured by two ratios: accounts payable to cost of good sold ratio and accounts payable to sale ratio. Cost stickness is measures by selling, general and administrative expense stickness (SGA) and cost of goods sold stickness(CGS). The statistical population consists of the firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange between 2014 to 2020.

Credit trade affects negatively on cost stickiness and this effect is prevalent in the firms with more agency problems and active in less competitive market.

According to obtained findings, using credit trade leads to decrease the opportunistic behavior of managers and cost stickiness and so, it is a monitoring tool that can be used in evaluating performance and expense efficiency of firms. Additionally, in the firms suffer from more agency problems or active in less competitive market, trade credit decreases cost stickness more because suppliers monitor these firms more than others in order to maintain their interest.

Understanding cost behavior in the case of changes in sales and examining the factors which affects asymmetric cost behavior lead to the greater awareness of managers' motivations and decisions. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between trade credit and corporate cost stickiness as well as the moderating effect of agency problem and customer concentration on the relationship. The sample of this paper includes 161 companies listed on Tehran Stock Exchange in a period of 7 years from 2014 to 2020. Our results show that trade credit as an external governance mechanism has a negative relation with cost stickiness. In addition, the findings show that the agency problem strengthens the relationship between trade credit and corporate cost stickiness, however, customer concentration weakens that relationship. Our study contributes to the cost management literature through identifying one of the potential factors that can reduce cost stickiness in companies.

Trade credit is an important element of short-term financing for companies. By providing trade credit, companies are putting themselves at risk because it is likely that the buyer will not use the resources properly. Also, increasing competition in domestic and global markets has required companies to better identify their cost behaviour. Therefore, in this study, the moderating effect of agency problem on the relationship between trade credit and cost stickiness on the Listed Firms in Tehran Stock Exchange has been investigated. For this purpose, the financial statements of 167 companies in the period 2010 to 2019 have been collected. This research is a quantitative research and the research method is correlational and multiple regression analysis with combined data was used to test the hypotheses. The results show that using all three criteria of trade credit, there is no significant relationship between trade credit and cost stickiness. In addition, the results show that among the indicators of agency problem, the effect of capital expenditures on the relationship between the third criterion of trade credit (ratio of accounts payable to purchases) and cost stickiness is confirmed. However, no evidence was found for the effect of acquisition ratio on the relationship between the first criterion of trade credit (ratio of accounts payable to cost of goods sold) and the second criterion of trade credit (ratio of accounts payable divided by sales) and cost stickiness.

The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of Cost Stickiness on Firms Value Creation with emphasis on moderating role of CEO Power in firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. For this purpose for hypotheses are developed and data on the 108 companies in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 1389 to 1396 were analyzed. This regression model using panel data with fixed effects approach and Random effects approach, reviews and tests. The results showed that the concentration Cost Stickiness has significant negative impact Firms Value Creation. Also the results showed that the concentration CEO Power has significant negative impact Cost Stickiness and significant positive impact Firms Value Creation. Moreover, the results showed that the concentration of CEO Power has significant positive impact the relationship between Cost Stickiness and Firms Value Creation.

Because in times of crisis and economic sanctions, managers see an increase in demand as permanent and a decrease as temporary; If this is reflected in the decision, the stickiness will come at a cost. Therefore, it is expected that at a time when the general state of the economy is growing or in the face of economic sanctions, senior corporate executives will also consider this situation in in-house decisions and the cost stickiness will be affected differently. To take. Therefore, this study examines the impact of political relations and economic sanctions on cost stickiness, emphasizing the role of institution ownership in the Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2013 to 2021 using the information of 150 companies. The hypotheses were tested by multiple regression using generalized least squares (EGLS) method with table data arrangement.The results of the research hypotheses showed that asymmetric behavior (cost stickiness) is present in administrative, public and sales costs, and in companies that have political relations, the stickiness of costs decreases, but in the context of economic sanctions, the stickiness of costs They become more and more sticky. In other words, in crisis situations such as economic sanctions; Having managers with political connections can help export products and supply raw materials, tax breaks, easier access to credit and financing for the company, and keep the company's conditions stable in the short term, all of which can lead to a reduction. Sticky costs. Also, in the conditions of economic sanctions, due to the increase in the cost of products and fluctuations in exchange rates and raw materials, the amount of sales of companies decreases and their costs increase sharply. They adjust income, which leads to cost stickiness as conditions improve. Institution ownership as a corporate governance mechanism also reduces asymmetric behavior in public and administrative spending, and in companies that have political relationships or are subject to sanctions, the existence of institution owners reduces the adhesion of costs. In other words, institution ownership reduces the stickiness of costs by forcing managers to reduce public and administrative costs.