جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه "agency theory" در نشریات گروه "مدیریت"

Without an effective monitoring system, organizations cannot successfully accomplish their missions and properly allocate their resources. Millions of health insurance transactions are conducted every month. These transactions should be examined from both a "real" and "scientific" perspective. Investigating this volume of transactions, detecting errors and misconduct, and preventing misconduct requires intelligent monitoring. A model that enables intelligent monitoring for health insurance holistically and taking into account the main beneficiaries has not yet been presented. This research focuses on developing a model for smart monitoring in basic health insurance.

A detailed action design research (ADR) methodology consisting of two diagnostic and four design cycles within the Iranian Health Insurance Organization was applied in this research. This model proposes four separate ADR cycles for the diagnosis, design, implementation, and evolution of the artifact development solution, and in each cycle it goes through the activities of problem formulation, artifact creation, evaluation, reflection, and learning. The required control patterns for the organization's interaction in a business network were identified using agency theory. The concepts and problems of supervision in health insurance were categorized in the first cycle of diagnosis and conceptualization of the problem using systematic mapping. In the second cycle, 24 interviews were conducted using the snowball method to identify the current situation of the organization as well as the issues and problems. Finally, a system model that provides smart monitoring in health insurance was presented based on the components of smart monitoring.

The proposed model for smart surveillance in health insurance includes five levels. First, the data resource layer includes internal and external organizational systems that provide the data resources required for surveillance. Second, the data storage layer includes the data warehouse where data is extracted, transformed and loaded from various sources. Thirdly, the data presentation, analysis and knowledge capture layer provides monitoring reports, analysis tools and data mining techniques for knowledge extraction. Text mining methods extract knowledge from the texts available in the company's knowledge portal. The fourth layer, the knowledge storage layer, involves loading the extracted knowledge into the knowledge repository. Finally, the knowledge utilization and presentation layer provides a system for searching, displaying and using knowledge that is linked to the knowledge portal and the company's transaction systems.

This research provides a framework of process and outcome criteria for basic health insurance, control, and monitoring based on the organization theory and the monitoring process. By adding the knowledge warehouse and data warehouse, the current research model enables the coverage of all types of knowledge and includes various monitoring criteria. The advantage of the presented model is that by combining the concepts of data warehouse, knowledge extraction, knowledge warehouse and knowledge portal, it creates a framework for better decision making in all organizations. For health insurance companies in particular, the model presented provides a framework of outcome criteria and a process based on health insurance beneficiaries that can form the basis for the work of the monitoring department.

The present study aims to conduct future research of the role of the determinants of managers' fraud, focusing on the diamond model of fraud. To measure the types of fraud and indicators related to the diamond model of fraud from the Likert scale questionnaire which contains three parts (demography, types of fraud, and elements of the fraud diamond model) and 74 declarative sentences were used. Furthermore, SmartPLS Software and the structural equation modeling technique with the partial least squares approach were used to test the hypotheses. The opportunity side is considered as an influential component on different types of fraud. Moreover, the 'capability' side has an effect on managers' fraud through social engineering, misuse of resources (assets), and earning management with opportunistic purposes, and 'rationalization' is the side that influences on the components of non-application of methods in accounting standards by managers and misuse of resources. Additionally, 'pressure' (motivation) is the side that affects the component of fraud management through social engineering. the sides of the fraud diamond model are only efficient when wich is a matter of separation of management and ownership and no effective processes for the supervision of managers.Originality / Value: In the current research, it was noted that the reason for the occurrence of four types of fraud indicators in Iran What was it based on. The added value of this research is that in most of the articles conducted by the researchers, attention was paid to the fraud triangle model.

Provision and presentation of quality information is a prerequisite for decision making by stakeholders of business units. One of the features of this information is having the ability to compare with other peer companies, as one of the quality features of this information. Social responsibility can affect the qualitative characteristics of financial reporting. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between corporate social responsibility and the ability to compare financial statements as one of the most important features of financial reporting. To achieve the purpose of the study, the composite data of 114 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange in the period 2010-2020 were analyzed using multivariate linear regression. Findings showed that there is a positive and significant relationship between corporate social responsibility and the ability to compare financial statements. Based on these findings, it can be said that social responsibility obliges company managers to adhere to their ethical commitments and provide accurate and quality information to their stakeholders. To do this, they use quality and similar standards and procedures that help reduce information asymmetries at the company level, employees, stakeholders, peer companies and even the capital market.

The purpose of this study was to design a model of servant organization based on the knowledge of academic experts using fuzzy DEMATEL technique. To do this, after identifying the six main components of the servant organization from the literature of research (motivation for service, service-oriented approach, service oriented actions, environmental demanding, serving leadership and service environment), and their inclusion in a five-point Likert scale closed questionnaire,we identified 10 experts and distributed questionnaires among them. Their views on the importance of these components in the servant organization are to be taken into account. Before analyzing the collected data, we made sure of content validity and reliability of the questionnaire. Subsequently, a questionnaire adapted to DEMATEL technique was developed to discover the causal relationships among the components. The results of the fuzzy DEMATEL analysis showed that the most effective and fundamental component of the servant organization is the motivation for service. In addition to this component, service oriented actions and environmental demands were also identified in the model as the cause and the rest of the effect.

In recent decades, corporate governance has attracted the attention of many researchers. Most corporate governance studies have focused on internal control mechanisms, while the research has ignored the role of external corporate governance controls in preventing manager's beneficial activities and maintaining stakeholder rights. This paper based on Philosophical foundations of symbolic and Qualitative approach seeks to design Corporate Governance Strategic Control Model in Iranian firms.
Introduction Unfortunately, in Iran, corporate governance does not play the role of sovereignty correctly in the country. The presence of non-obligated on board members, The selection of board members by directors, the integration of the role of directors with the board of directors, the creation of unofficial relationships among board members with directors, increasing costs ­representing and promoting the rate of corruption in recent years and lack of transparency and accountability; all are examples ­of the lack of effective corporate governance in Iran. Seeing corporate governance in the country reveals that the system of corporate governance that aims to avoid the cost of managing directors and executive agencies and protect the rights of its shareholders was developed gone astray, causing costs in the representatives of Companies. The main question here is that if members of the board of directors and corporate governance systems created in order to avoid the cost of representation and the role of strategic leadership, they would create the cost of representing and eliminating the rights of stakeholders and shareholders, what should we do? And how should this cost of the agent be controlled? The lack of external control mechanism regulating corporate governance and lack of previous studies ­is the third missing ring in this area. In fact, in this case, instead of merely seeking to identify mechanisms ­of corporate governance introduced, discovering the clusters and create new concepts with existing context, The meanings of which are made consistent with the operation of its content and the items are discovered and reviewed ­and this look and approach, tailored to the current situation is complex and turbulent. If we want to understand complex problems and growing corporate governance, we may need new methods. This article will provide strategic control model of corporate governance as a key structure in the navigation system forms the new direction for research and studies in this field. In fact, this research aims to design innovative concepts and models based on qualitative data that have emerged from the views of the participants in the study, is trying to use this way to extend the boundaries of knowledge in this sphere. But success is from Him, all from Him and to Him we shall return.
research questions are as follows:(A) What is strategic control theory corporate governance?
(B) What are the constituent elements of corporate governance model of strategic control?
(C) What is the statement of the legal and strategic hypotheses obtained?
Materials and Methods This study is by purpose, are foundations and orientation exploratory qualitative study. The strategy used is a classic grounded theory. All interviews were semi-structured the ruling elites and experts of the company have been collected.
Discussion and Results Theoretical coding explains how to communicate with each other. Usually in the time of the sorting and integrated code, graph theory, the initial encryption is formed. Open coding and key coding is done to categorize and classify the unencrypted data, but at this point and through coding theory, categories communicate with them and the trajectory of the story and explain the theoretical expression will be the final version of the control strategy to clarify corporate governance.
Conclusion As we observed in this study, the concept of strategic control concept of corporate governance is complex and multifaceted. This study seeks to answer the original question, namely inefficiency and corruption in corporate governance in the companies of Iran. By examining the current situation reveals that one of the main problems in the field is translation without thinking and research regulations of corporate governance, as in this study to examine the need for the regulation of corporate governance for companies of Iran according to the context the company would be established. In this study, we try to make this a serious gap to be answered through semi-structured interviews with the philosophy of subjective interpretation of symbolic and active participation of researchers in the research process, concepts Strategic control corporate governance structure and main category and the sub main category. As was discussed in coding theory, corporate governance requires serious and systematic control of the media. Media in the country should feel the responsibility to guard and protect the rights of beneficiaries if stronger than ever. The legal system is another powerful tool in the strategic management of corporate governance. Deficient rules of the country have many original Commercial Code. National legislators and policymakers should seriously re-engineer the Commercial Code and the rules of the Stock Exchange of the country in their agenda.
In today's complex conditions and in the absence of uncertainty now that is high, no longer, the tools and techniques of the old control to manage the payment of corporate governance can be used. In such circumstances, it is necessary to use complex tools specific to the rulers of our company. In such circumstances, the use of techniques, sensitivity analysis, outlining the future for multiple tolerant, caring strategies is needed to prevent strategic deficiencies. While not everything is under our control, self-control and internal control can be a substitute for the exterior and the exterior. The meaning of discourse, the prospect of competition among agents, the founder of corporate governance and control environment useful tools in complex and turbulent conditions can be. While not everything is under our control, self-control and internal control can be a substitute for the problems. The meaning of discourse, the prospect of competition among agents, the founder of corporate governance and control environment are considered as useful tools in complex and turbulent conditions.
Paying attention to corporate governance and all stakeholders to mechanisms of innovative and use them to gain control is necessary. We need to campaign with the culture of questioning, critical thinking and problem-solving thinking all stakeholders in the company and strengthen them. As it was mentioned in the discussions, the control measures will avoid errors and acts of the self-interested agent. Increasing and improving the quality of ratings in the country can be used as a control agent on corporate governance to be effective. In this regard, it is suggested that the rating of the effectiveness of corporate governance designed and developed every year for all companies listed on the Stock Exchange by the system based on the realization of the objectives of corporate governance rankings and a public announcement. Naturally, the regulations and the rating system has a vital role in the stock and the stock market will trend rate pricing. In the end, it is suggested that regulation of corporate governance Stock Exchange recently approved revised and re-engineering seriously, and the new Strategic control of corporate governance that is in this article was discussed, along with the criteria for admission and environmental Iran to be added.

The main purpose for this study is to find practical terms in venture capital (VC) contracting which investigates entrepreneurial firm's stage of growth. Information asymmetry and conflict of interest causes lots of challenges between VC and entrepreneur and there have been a lot of studies considered them based on agency theory, and suggested controlling and motivation mechanisms to mitigate agency problems. But the factor helps to choose among these mechanisms is firm's growth, because the firms needs, characteristics and so the problems change with growth.
Using grounded theory approach, we tried to find different mechanisms which VCs usually use. Open and axial coding helped to find relation between concepts and categories and it shows that developing the firm, improving entrepreneur's abilities and risks can change the contracting approach. Also context conditions such as market, government's intervention, legal and cultural condition change the contracting approach as well.

Many companies are dependent on purchasing the required professional services (such as managerial, marketing, accounting, legal, and IT services) from specialist contractors. The contract between such contractors and clients forms an agency relationship, so the agency theory may be used to regulate the relationship between them. However, since the abstract knowledge is the subject of exchange between the client and professional service provider and there is a knowledge asymmetry between these two parties, the application of agency theory as it is used for traditional owner-manager agency relationship is not possible for principal-professional agent relations. In this article, we expand the agency theory to be applicable in such agency relationships. We suggest that a combination of behavior-based and outcome-based contracts be employed in principal-professional agent relationships, if possible. Moreover, we discuss why it is very hard or even impossible to have a direct control over professional service contractor and to measure the outcomes of its services. We finally propose two alternative mechanisms (1-trust and self-control, and 2-indirect control) for reducing opportunistic behaviors and solving some agency problems occurring in principal-professional agent relations.

Today’s، in competitive environment the role of managers of organizations and types of relationships with employees is very important to achieve organizational effectiveness. this study with base on agency and stewardship theories examining the impact of congruence CEO،s an board of directors` agency and stewardship viewpoint Organizational citizenship behavior. In this regards، 108 managerial team and 500 employees were selected as samples in food industry. Questionnaire was used for data gathering. In order to determine the mean of OCB difference in the three groups was employed by ANOVA and t-Tamhane test. The findings showed، agency Congruence in the attitudes of the executives and the DM has had a negative effect on the employees’ OCB، as opposed to stewardship Congruence. Furthermore، our findings revealed that there is no significant difference between the employees’ OCB in the two groups of companies، say agent-agent companies and agent-steward and steward-agent companies (agent executives and steward DM or vice versa). However; stewardship Congruence in the attitudes of the executives and the DM has had a positive effect on the employees’ OCB، as opposed to agency Congruence.