One of the main issues of the deterrence is rationality and logic of the enemies that have long existed as a theory and strategy, but in the contemporary international system it has taken a new dimension. In deterrence, the rationale of enemies is assumed, so if enemies are not rational, deterrence will not be possible. Indeed, if the enemies are not logical, none of the deterrent strategies will work. Therefore, the main question of the present research is that how will different perceptions of international actors of logic and rationality affect deterrence strategy?In this article, in the framework of constructivism, it is argued that in complex containment, on the one hand, to the extent that the common knowledge and similar structural features are more symmetrical among the actors, the relations are also more linear and the probability of optimal deterrence is increased. On the other hand, whatever components of the social structure of deterrence have less symmetry and more actors involved, the likelihood of a deterioration of the system into a malicious system and falling into the trap of deterrence and security challenge is further increased.

Punitive damage is a kind of Supra-compensatory damage which is awarded in favor of Plaintiff in Civil actions for punishing the defendant and deterring him from taking action like that in future. The main feature of punitive verdict is deterrence and punishment and in this regard two economic theories exist (optimal deterrence and gain elimination theories). However punitive aspect of this damage is a reason that to be considered as an identity with criminal nature and not to be applied in private actions. Lack of predictability of this damage and sometimes large and backbreaking sentences which make it more complicated, made the United States courts to come up with several strategies for limiting the punitive damages.

Nowadays surface runoff pollution as a crisis of human societies, has forced most countries to seek legal solutions to solve this phenomenon, the most important of which is the establishment of civil liability in this area. Although, according to economic analysis, compensation can not have much effect on optimal deterrence, nevertheless, its effect on reducing water pollution can not be denied.This study, after a comprehensive review of available sources and then analyzing the findings, has concluded that the mere existence of pollution causes harm, so it is sufficient to determine the causality relationship between the pollution and its actor in order to establish civil liability; In addition, the government can be held liable for damages, both in terms of supervision and ownership, and by providing a broad interpretation of the concept of "beneficiary", it can be said that NGOs are considered "beneficiaries" in making such claims and assuming victory in litigation, compensation can be used for sustainable development.Finally, according to the model of sustainable development in the economy, the production of goods is not only a subordinate of labor and capital, but must also be considered in the production process, materials and environmental goods such as water. Therefore, from the perspective of environmental economics, water pollution is considered as a cost of production or consumption, and the higher this cost, the optimal production and economic growth will not be a subordinate of sustainable development.

Can monist theories that address tort law's philosophical foundations, such as corrective and distributive justice or optimal deterrence, manage the enormous diversity of circumstances that tort law now handles? The answer appears to be no. In the normative phase, monist theories seek to assure us that all laws must be designed to achieve a certain goal, while in the descriptive phase; they seek to demonstrate that all components of tort law are grounded on a single logic. This poses substantial obstacles for these theories, to the point that it appears we cannot accept monist theories philosophically or practically, suggesting that resorting to plural theories is the final option given the variety of circumstances that tort law must deal with today. In this study, we examined and analyzed four pluralistic theories in the realm of the philosophical foundations of tort law after assessing their explanations and premises. Each of these ideas has some beneficial traits that contributed to their success as a plural theory, but they also have some severe defects that render them insufficient when used as a coherent and effective theory. While embracing the plural approach, the authors of this essay suggest that present pluralistic approaches to the philosophical underpinnings of tort law have numerous severe shortcomings. A cohesive, effective plural theory could yet be created, in our opinion. Finally, we sketched out the outlines of such a theory and will go into further depth in another essay that will be published to our legal community in the near future.

According to the competition law of Iran, antitrust violations should be punished by optimal sanctions. Nevertheless, there are a lot of missing elements for optimizing enforcement of law. This article considers the meaning of the optimal enforcement as a theory and outlines the basics. The reasoning behind the theory is based on the logic of deterrence and economic incentives of violation. This viewpoint emphasizes on the optimal oriented mechanisms and incentives to commit violations. the optimal enforcement serves the theory of deterrence and distinguishes non legal sanctions. The findings of the article, with comparative study confirm the benefits and necessity of optimal enforcement theory in competition law. optimizing the law of enforcement improves the efficiency of law and is compatible with the economic basics of competition law. As a result, it is safe to say contrary to the current approach, this theory should be approved in the law of Iran.

Today, the rapid growth of dependence of human life on the cyberspace has raised the attention of the enemies of every society to the threats in this space. Several cyberattacks that have taken place in countries such as Estonia, Georgia and the Islamic Republic of Iran in the past, warn that the future of cyberspace will not be free of threats and attacks. Deterrence has always been a very important issue for all countries. In this practical and developmental research, we present Strategical Deterrence model in cyberspace. The game theory will help us model and analyze the deterrent model and descriptive and mathematical          inferences will be used to analyze the model. Finally, in this paper, a strategical model for deterrence in cyberspace will be presented in four stages: the current, optimal, gap analysis and warning stages based on the signaling game with incomplete information. Finally after describing each components of the model and their relationship with each other, it has been shown that the amount of equilibrium can indicate the status of the players in the three situation of conflict, balance and mutual weakness, and only in two situation of balance and mutual weakness, the deterrence will exist.

One of the common difficulties in the field of environmental torts is the proof of causation between the tortious conduct of the tortfeasor and the damage suffered by the victim. This problem, according to the principles of economic analysis of tort law, results in denial of tort claims which itself, encourages the tortfeasor to externalize costs of his hazardous activities, dilutes his incentives to reduce environmental risks in an optimal way, and finally, disturbs the deterrent function of tort law. On the contrary, in recent decades, it is widely accepted that the preventive principle plays a crucial role in sustainable development. The importance of preventive approach in environmental policies requires the tort law –as one of the means of such policies –to serve the aim of deterrence as well as compensation. With these points in mind, this paper first clarifies the three main situations in which the proof of causation is problematic. It then tries to analyze possible solutions of those situations, using an economic perspective and to propose the most compatible solution with deterrence and efficiency, namely using the proportional liability in specific categories of environmental accidents.

“Punitive damages” is a concept versus “compensatory damages” which are not awarded in order to compensate the plaintiff unlike compensatory damages, but they are a reaction to the intentional behavior in the event of malice that the defendant of a civil liability lawsuit has been acted. These kinds of damages have been recently absorbed the attention of analysts and courts especially in Common Law system because of the two major reasons: high costs of proceedings and the incompetency intentions observed in some fields of civil liability. Thus, they benefited from the necessity of defendant to pay a price that has not purely the compensatory characteristic.
In this study efforts have been made to explain the objectives, applications and justifications that have been presented for the punitive damages. Punitive damage consists of two widespread social purposes that the law-makers are more interested in the goal of punishment and the economic analysts are more interested in Economic Analysis of Law in order to execute its deterrence. But the aim of deterrence is to prevent the commitment of intentional harms or those of harms that defendant is able to escape liability against them.
In the aim of deterrence, we intend to impose liability to the defendant due to his previous performance, he and other people who are in the same condition in order to stop them from committing a harmful incidence. Therefore the goal of punishment is resulted from the intention of people to punish the blameworthy people. Thus, we assume that the goal of punishment finally results from the enjoyment or satisfaction that people gain from seeing the perpetrators being punished.
Methodologically, in this article beside the law perspective, the perspective of Economic Analysis of Law has been additionally used. In the Economic Analysis, the economic tools are used in evaluating this damage. That’s why aims which are in consideration of authors in this specific model of liability in the Economic Analysis of Law are explained. In the approach of Economic Analysis of Law, the law rules are tools to reach the important social goals; in other words, based on the economic perspective, the law sanctions are tantamount to prices and when these tools are incomplete in establishing our aims, they could be modified. As a result, since the people respond to the prices, they will respond to the sanctions too and to the stronger sanctions with less commitment of related activities as well.
Theoretically, in the punitive damages which are a type of extra-compensatory damages due to the higher price of compensation from the perpetrators, the cost of action for activists in that field goes up and brings about a stronger preventive force in contrast to the compensatory damages so that he should exercise caution more than a person in normal environment. Thus, if the punitive damages are mandated excessively, it will cause a problem so-called over deterrence.
For Professor Cooter, the punitive damage should involve the goal of deterrence and this goal is recognized according to three policies that the punitive damages consist of. Three policy conclusions follow from this analysis: punitive damages should be restricted to intentional faults; a criterion for identifying intentional fault is that it is gross or repeated; and punitive damages should be computed to offset the injurer’s illicit pleasure from noncompliance or exceptional cost of compliance. In this respect, the players receive behavioral incentives from the civil liability. It is connotatively assumed that if a tort perpetrator brings about harms for which he will be liable, he will be liable too. Therefore, he will face all the negative externalities caused. However, there are many conditions that the probability of making the perpetrators liable is under 100%. In other words, those perpetrators should be known liable may try to escape the trial. Under these conditions, the use of punitive damages is useful.
In general, it should be noted about the internal law condition that the Iranian writers in the case of civil liability mostly pay attention to the traditional aims of this mechanism and in facing the punitive damages know its punishment and trial aspects so that they feel it is inappropriate for their restorative system. The deterrence aspect of punitive damages in the writings of foreign-authors possesses stronger aspect and the Economic Analysts have mentioned logical justifications which generally have been designed to internalize all the harmful effects of individual’s behavior. In sum, based on the punishment perspective, punitive damages are not justifiable in our internal law because they have restorative essence but from the deterrence perspective, all theories such as escaping liability, encouraging market transactions and removing the illicit benefits are somehow trying to internalize the damages that the individual has brought in to the society and the harmed person and is very close to the restorative essence. If the deterrence perspective and justifications are accepted in Iranian Law, no reason will be existed for accepting the punitive damages due to having non-restorative nature and the principle of full compensation because we will utilize the punitive damages for compensating all the damages that the perpetrator brought in to the society. This is exactly the aim that the Economic Analyses of Law expect from the civil liability, so as to be expressed in these types of analyses, the aim of the civil liability system is internalizing the external effects caused by the perpetrator. In other words, the punitive damages finally possess the compensatory essence because of the deterrence perspective.

The study of Iranians’ tort related writings explicates that most of the top jurists believe that there is a maxim called “the principle of full compensation”. Provided that the other two requirements of liability (causation and harmful act) exist, this principle states that all damages, regardless of their type, should be compensated without any need for a specific law prescribing the liability to compensate that kind of damage. Case law is in doubt on how to react to this principle and has since taken two different approaches. Contrary to popular belief, however, our search in the philosophical foundations (and also in the main goals of tort law) shows that there is no theory that stays adamant about compensating all kinds of damages in any circumstances. From only one theory we can infer such a principle, but because of some major defects in this conclusion, it has been widely criticized by tort law philosophers.It seems that the belief in such a principle (of full compensation) is not acceptable neither practically nor theoretically; it is unfeasible in practicality and reduces the power of tort law in organizing and arranging different kinds of social activities, and it is theoretically unsubstantiated. In this article, I propound this idea that invoking this principle should be avoided by our jurists, and as well as our courts.

Due to its significant applications in security building, deterrence system has always been an issue of consideration. One of the important issues in deterrence systems is the mechanisms that these systems are built upon. In accordance with the changes in structures and patterns of international order, deterrence has also evolved. One of these changes, is the networked base effect of non- state actors on deterrence. This evolution has not been considered in recent theories of deterrence. So, the main concern of article is on the way on which non- state actors affect the formation and patterns of deterrence. It is concluded that in the context of asymmetric patterned of order, non-state networks effect on deterrence-based policies by benefiting from heterarchical order structures and converting power to threat. They can finally form the panarchy of deterrence in international relations. By updating the fifth wave of deterrence theory and complying It with the principles of complex- chaotic theory and networked order, this article could provide theoretical bases for elucidation of non- state networked deterrence. The concepts of resilient- networked deterrence and panarchy of deterrence are newly used in this article and can be a proper ground for further research in the field of security and deterrence. At the end, the resort of Iran and Pakistan to non- state networked deterrence has been analyzed to realize the theoretical founding arguments of the article. An abductive method of research that is based on close interaction between theory and practice is used in this work.