According to the primacy of existence and that quiddity is mentally constructed, the reality of what is there in the world is of existence, rather than of quiddity. Philosophers before Mulla Sadra were used to argue that quiddity was of objective reality, but after him it left its place to existence reducing itself to the mentally constructed concepts. Different interpretations of the concepts “Asalat”  (primacy) and “I’tibariyyat” (mentally constructed) have a decisive role in our approaches to the objective things. Shahid Mutahari’s interpretation has a real significance for the issue. He argues that it is existence that makes the outside world and comprises the objective things. Contrariwise, quiddity is a mentally constructed concept as an answer to the question “what is it in its essence?” whose location is merely in the mind having no concrete reality in the outside world. That is to say, existence comprises the real outside world but quiddity makes the mental world. It seems from among all those interpretations that Mutahari’s is correct. Here the author has come to examine this interpretation through description analysis and explanation.

The Illumination philosophy is an undeniably celebrated name in the minds of the cultivated in philosophy and mysticism. Nonetheless, they have not dealt with this school of philosophy duly. The reason for such negligence might be due to Mulla Sadra’s account of the Illumination philosophy; he has introduced Suhrawardi as one advocate of the primacy of quiddity theory. Such an ascription goes to the fact that Mulla Sadra equated Suhrawardi’s theory of existence as a mentally-constructed concept with logically secondary concept. This is while a closer look into several contexts of the issue in Suhrawardi’s philosophy proves that his meaning of existence as a mentally-constructed concept is different from logically secondary concept and thus he does not believe in the primacy of quiddity. Rather, his meaning of mentally-constructed concept is that it is philosophically secondary concept. Accordingly, as he considers existence a mentally-constructed and philosophically secondary concept, he regards quiddity mentally-constructed, too.  As a result, the ascription of primacy of quiddity to Suhrawardi is a great mistake made in his philosophy. In their essay and through both internal and external contexts, the authors have tried to demonstrate that by mentally-construction, Suhrawardi means philosophically secondary concepts. Thus the ascription of primacy of quiddity to him is wrong.

Primary intelligibles, philosophers hold, are general concepts whose referents exist in the external world. On the contrary, secondary intelligibles or mentally constructed concepts do not have referents in the outside world. People like Suhrawardi who believe in the real primacy of quiddity consider existence as a secondary concept because they hold that existence is merely constructed by the mind and thus is not real. On the other hand, after Mulla Sadra who vindicated the real primacy of existence, his followers were to consider existence and its attributes as primary concepts, because according to them it is existence that really exist by itself in the external world, rather than the quiddity. Nevertheless, they still believe that existence and its attributes are secondary intelligibles. A few solutions have been proposed to dispel that contradiction. Ayatullah Fayyazi holds that the correct view is that existence as an infinitive is a secondary intelligible and mentally constructed, but as a verbal noun is a primary one and real. Other views are: 1-the general concept of existence qua its generality is not real; 2- the fake concept of existence -viewing the fact that the reality of existence does not come into the mind- is regarded as a secondary intelligible; 3- the secondary philosophical intelligible is interpreted as a concept lacking any independent referent, or as concept secondarily understood, or as a concept made through comparison. All those solutions are invalid .

Immanuel Kant's ideas and true understanding of them is possible only in the subjectivist context of his critical philosophy. In examining his view of existence therefore one must consider the foundations of his thought like distinction of the noumenal from the phenomenal world and inaccessibility of the former to human reason.Kant reduced existence from external and real domain to mental category in the domain of mind and denied the predicative existence acknowledging only copula existence. He thus regarded existence not as a dimension of reality but only as a mentally constructed matter. in the domain of mind therefore unlike other concepts the concept of existence when attributed does not add anything new to the content of the subject but only acts as a copula (a connective role) in compound propositions and posits the subject itself in simple propositions.

Principality of Existence and the mentally positedness of quiddity is the issue constituting the foundation of many philosophical problems. This principle, as existing today in philosophical fields, has not been nourished in illumination school. Nevertheless, with respect to the principle of “non-addition of existence over quiddity in external world” in his works, and the arguments he has provided to prove this principle under the rubric of proofs on mentally positedness of existence, Suhrawardi is accused of accepting the notion of principality of essence. However, the discourse of the principality of existence in Mullā Ṣadrā’s works is clearly stated with respect to the proofs he has provided to prove this principle, and also due to his criticizing the arguments of those believing in mentally positedness of existence. In this article, it is tried to examine Suhrawardi’s proofs on mentally positedness of existence and Mullā Ṣadrā’s critiques on it.

The doctrine of asalat al-wujud (Principiality of Existence) is perhaps the most important basis of Mulla Sadra's philosophy. Mulla Sadra is mostly considered as the first founder of this doctrine. The doctrine of "principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity" has been interpreted in three ways" 1- quiddity is "existential limit" of existence; 2- quiddity is "mental limit" of existence"; and 3- quiddity is "the same as existence". The two first interpretations are caused by confusion between subject and object and confusion between epistemology and ontology. The best interpretation of the doctrine of "principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity" is the third interpretation according to which quiddity is "the same as existence". The author of the present article seeks to show that concerning "existence" and "quiddity" Aristotle is of an opinion which is the same as the third interpretation- "principiality of existence and mentallypositedness of quiddity". Having distinguished "existence" from "quiddity" in the mind, Aristotle claims for "sameness of existence and quiddity" in the external; world; and this is the same as Mulla Sadra's idea of "principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity".

When we come to speak about current issues of life, we realize that our speech is littered with many things the philosophical reality of which demands precise examination unprecedented. These issues have occupied our life altogether such as, address, home, place of work, money, organization, bank account, seminary school, university, president, inflation, social traditions and institutes, and law. Such issues are not like concrete or physical realities bearing existential characteristics; rather, they are called mentally constructed entities by the intellectuals. Generally speaking, the most difficult philosophical inquiry about those issues is their ontological analysis; i.e. can we consider them as the concrete entities in the outside world? Where is the residence of such issues? Is it inside or outside the mind? Were it the former, is it the mind of the agent or that of those who have accepted them? What does mentality mean when we say that something is mentally constructed? What is the relation between such things and other mental, natural, or physical things? Having followed up their study in the framework of philosophical analysis and according to the principles of Mulla Sadra’s metaphysics, the authors have arrived at the conclusion that mentally constructed entities are realities dependent on valid agents; they exist through the causa subsistendi, though. In this regard, there is no external plurality between mental act of construction and entities mentally constructed. The reality of mental constructions is no more than a shadowy existence to the mental act of construction

What is understood from the very possibility of knowledge and cognitive realism is the perceptions whose essences reveal the objects known. However, by introspection we may find some mental ideas whose essences fail to reveal anything. In their article, the authors mainly try to propose an ontological explanation of how mentally-constructed perceptions and ideas reveal something in the framework of the criterion of there-being [in contrast to the criterion of demonstration] of knowledge. Having reviewed the issues and suggestions related to the nature of mental ideas and their examination such as the theory of apparition, capability of revealing, and the explanation of the essence of revealing, the authors have tried to propose one single framework for the process of revealing of true and mentally-constructed perceptions and ideas. Their answer is that mentally-constructed ideas do not stand in line with true perceptions, but come after them in a hierarchical order. By virtual widening the scope of the referents of true perceptions, we may encounter semi-entities that partially resemble the objects of true perceptions. In this proposal, both “mental-construction” and “partial resemblance” play their role in the process of none-essential revealing; however, there is no partial resemblance between a “mental image” and the “so-called object known”. Rather, there is partial resemblance between “real referent” and “so-called referent”. A mental image reveals by essence the true object to be revealed, but in comparison to the so-called object known its revealing is none-essential.

The analysis of how multiple divine names and attributes issued from One Simple Essence and how they are compatible, for the first time, have been precisely explained in transcendent theosophy. However, is the celebrated interpretation of Mulla Sadra’s word his final view that multiple concepts have been abstracted from One Essence and whether those divine names are real?
The examination of foundations of transcendent theosophy helps draw the conclusion that we cannot embrace the abstraction of multiple concepts from Divine Essence once we have already acknowledged that He is truly One and His Essence is thoroughly simple; nor can we consider divine names separately as real entities once we have already acknowledged that the Essence and attributes are identical and that He encompasses all perfections and the doctrine that equates Allah with all what there is. The solution to this contradiction is the theory of “analytic multiplicity of divine names and attributes”, according to which those perfections -construed as attributes- are obtained from the “analysis of existence” and are thus applicable to existence, because existence and existent are inclusive to One Essence Who encompasses all infinite perfections of existence.
Contrary to the abstraction theory in terms of which both the abstracted and the origin of abstraction are genuine, in this approach the abstracted is mentally-constructed but the origin of abstraction is genuine and real. The logic working at the tie between the Essence and attributes is to negate identity (sameness) once negating alterity (otherness).

Suhrawardi explicitly confirmed the “mentally-positedness of existence” in his most important works. He had correctly concluded the “external occurrence of existence to quiddity” from the works of Farabi and Ibn Sina and, while criticizing some of Ibn Sina’s words, had adduced several arguments for his own view. However, some contemporary scholars, when analyzing his standpoints, have ignored his background regarding the mentally-positedness of existence and introduced him as the first person who advocated this view. In the present paper, after a brief account of Farabi’s and Ibn Sina’s arguments concerning the relationship between existence and quiddity in possible things, the authors have analyzed Suhrawardi’s critical approach to this issue and then referred to three different sources for his belief in the mentally-positedness of existence. His hidden sources in this regard consist of some of the words of Bahmanyar and Omar Khayyam which he has quoted without citing the names of these two scholars in order to support his own arguments for the mentally-positedness of existence. His obvious source is a text written by Ibn Sahlan Sawi in al-Mashari’ wa’l-mutarihat. Since the philosophy section of Hakim Sawi’s book is not available, one cannot correctly judge the quality and quantity of the influence of above-mentioned thinkers on Suhrawardi. Nevertheless, available evidence demonstrates the certainty of his frequent adaptations of Bahmanyar’s works on the rejection of the “external objectivity of existence”.