شمس الله سراج

Mullahsadra has used the distinct views of previous philosophers for proving physical resurrection. He has considered his point of view in line with religion and surprised by those who know the day of judgment as spiritual, their express opposite opinion with doomsday bodies in the from of example body and have referred to the assembling from the graves and the blow of the soul by the angels. however, the involvement of some basic issues, such as the position of the religion, the inclusion of the differences between the world and the Hereafter, the kind of bonds of the soul with the afterlife bodies, and also the constitutive substance of the eternal bodies, has led to a dualism in his vision. Although he has distinguished the quality of hereafter life from the world, in the explanation the quality of the substance of Hellman's eternal body, he has inevitably likened the hell substance to this world. To compare the quality of the earthly body with the afterlife body, the mullah has used two terms of femininity and objectivity. In fact, he has generalized the soul to mentioned bodies. Although, he has considered his method for describing physical resurrection discursive and in conformance with religion, unlike his first claim, by including theosophical issues, he has given less importance to the mere rational aspects.

One of the most controversial philosophical-kalami issues in the history of Islamic philosophy has always been the analysis of the problem of the origination and pre-eternity of the world. Most Muslim mutikallimūn believe in the temporal origination of the world and consider the pre-universe time to be “imaginary”. As the most supreme philosopher of the Transcendent Philosophy, Mullā Ṣadrā has also discussed imaginary time in different places in his works. He has adopted two different approaches to this theory but does not express his view explicitly. The present study explains Mullā Ṣadrā’s opinions regarding the theory of imaginary time and his two approaches in this respect in order to answer the question of what his ultimate standpoint regarding imaginary time is. In order to accomplish this task, the authors have referred to the scattered discussions in his works and, after studying and explaining the relationships between them and combining them with each other, have provided a description of Mullā Ṣadrā’s ultimate view. Although in some places he tries to justify the theory of imaginary time based on his own principles, given his explicit statements on negating an intermediary between the world of being and Almighty Necessary as well as his demonstration of the existence of time and rejection of the arguments of deniers of time, it can be concluded that his ultimate view here is the negation of imaginary time.

According to Qāḍī Saʿīd Qumī, monotheism means the negation of any cognation between God and the creatures. The purpose of this article is to present the most important implications of this negative interpretation of monotheism in his thought and to show how this interpretation can lead to such implications. According to the apophatic theology of Qāḍī Saʿīd, no positive concept applies to the First Principle and He is not described by any attribute; therefore: 1. The dispute over the primacy of existence or quiddity does not arise in the case of God, because God is neither of the existence realm nor of the quiddity, 2. There is no graded (tashkīkī) relationship between God and His creatures, 3. God even transcends beyond the necessity of existence, and the “Necessary Being” is His name and His creation, so all three modes of contingency, impossibility and necessity are excluded from Him, 4 & 5 & 6. The “argument of possibility and necessity”, the “argument of the Righteous” and other arguments for proving the Necessary Being and His oneness would be no more valid, 7. The criterion for dependence on a cause is neither temporal emergence nor contingency, but combination (though a mentally posited combination), 8. The Essence of God cannot be worshiped, rather, the very “greatest name” (Allah) is worshiped, 9. God’s power means doing an action without requiring the attribute of power and in a state free from the three modes of contingency, impossibility and necessity, 10. God’s knowledge is neither conceptual nor presential.

Denying any resemblances between the creator and creatures, Qazi Saeed Qomi sets his ideas apart from the typical cataphatic theology in Islamic discourse as well as the conventional theology of Shi’ism. This paper aims at investigating the relationship or lack of it between Qazi Saeed Qomi’s apophatic theology and the conventional predominant monotheistic perspectives of main schools of theology (i.e., Ash’arism, Mu’tazila, Shi’ism). Qazi Saeed’s theology is very different from the common rational theology of Ash’arites or Shi’ites, both of which emphasize the congruities between the creator and creatures. Although differentiating the aforementioned ideas appears to be difficult, unlike other theologists, Qazi Saeed does not believe in the theory of substituting the essence for attribute. In spite of the fact that at the first sights, Qazi Qomi’s theology brings a resemblance to rational-narrative-apophatic theological thoughts (e.g., al-Shaykh al-Saduq’s narrative-apophatic theology), our argument is that his ideas are reliant on the theoretical mystical thought (although they are still different in some ways). Qazi Qomi’s theology has been influenced by the theoretical mystical thought in terms of the following issues: believing in personal unity of existence, negating congruities between the essence and its manifestations, negating God’s essence from his attributes and believing in confinement of God’s names and attributes. The most considerable difference between them is that mystic theologists believe in being qua being principle, while Qazi Saeed Qomi fails even to accept this principle.

Identity of soul and active intellect has caused many philosophical problems in transcendental philosophy: Multiplicity In Intellect ، Dependency of active intellect to an Old fashion of science، Lack of enough explanation of unification s moment، Justification of falseness in sense perception ، How this particular senses are given from Abstract intellect ? and so on .Our main thesis is facing with that critical views which come from neglecting of Ontological aspects of Active Intellect . We can not solve these problems by ancient prediction like prevalent prediction or so on but we should use better one namely (HAMLE HAGHIGAT VA RAGHIGHAT)SOME USEFUL prediction and we should use the rule named “basit Alhaghighah …” to get rid of this problems . At the end of this article we offer some vagueness in this subject. We should put these kind of discussion in strong explanations .we need adequate explanatory of active intellect

This paper seeks to discuss the issue of the infallibility of the prophets from the perspective of Ibn Abi Jumhur al-Ahsa'i, one of the great Imami thinkers. Creating harmony between the three theological, philosophical and mystical approaches, Ibn Abi Jumhur al-Ahsa'i (838-912AH), as a person who has an important status in merging different theoretical branches in the shadow of Imami teachings, has proved the infallibility of the prophet based on his collectivist view of epistemic sources. Presenting a commentary on the theory of divine Grace from a theological point of view, taking benefit of the theory of divine Providence with a philosophical approach and finally, paying attention to the status of the caliphatehood of the perfect man and the concept of moderation in Islamic mysticism, he has proved the necessity and the scope of the infallibility of the Prophet. In addition to his emphasis on the apparent position of the prophet and the position of mission, one of the advantages of his view over his predecessors is that he has dealt with the issue of infallibility from the perspective of the inner position of the prophet in the universe and the necessity of his existence (perfect man).

According to Sa’id Qumi’s negative theology, God has no attributes, neither essential nor non-essential, and there is no congruity between Him and His creatures. Therefore, the words attributed to the Creator and creatures are affirmative for creatures, but negative for the Creator. As an example, His existence is synonymous with His not being non-existent. Therefore, we do not have any understanding except the negative one. However, the affirmative understanding of the Creator leads to divesting God of His attributes. This article aims to examine Sa’id Qumi’s solutions and to evaluate whether his solution logically eliminate the issue of divesting God of His attributes. Sa’id Qumi has proposed four solutions: (1) Replacement of positive knowledge with the negative one; (2) Propounding God as attribute Endower, not the endowed; (3) God has essential reality which is not the subject to our perceptual powers; (4) The replacement of negative understanding of titles and attributes with positive understanding of the Creator’s essence. Rational evaluation shows no solution can eliminate the issue of divesting God of His attributes in Sa’id Qumi monotheistic thought.

One of the primitive principles of Mullah Sadra attention to the position of imagination is to prove physical resurrection and with description imagination,he belives in the survival of the afterlife. The basic functions of the imagination is notional of human physical nature in the isthmus.according to viwe Mullah Sadra, the spriritual resurrection will take place in this world. Some believe that mulla sadra has generalization to resurrection and bady creation for resurrection is done by the power of imagination . as a the result of the physical resurrection in Mullah Sadra view is example bady which is not compatible with traditional reasons. Mullah Sadra is surprised by those who know the day of judgment as spiritual, their express opposite opinion with doomsday bodies in the from of example body. And by differentiating between the function of imagination in the isthmus and resurrection have referred to the assembling from the graves and the blow of the soul by the angels. The author of this research isby bringing the rational reasone and referring to some Mullah sadra phrases it has praven that the function of imagination is different in isthmus and resurrection and candnat have an effect on the creation of the body for the resurrection.

In Islamic and Quranic culture, praising and worshipping God is not specific to human beings; rather, the whole world and all creatures of the universe praise God consciously and in their specific languages. Thus, “the Creatures’ praise to God” has always been a controversial topic among researchers of all eras since the Quran descended. However, it takes a different form in the transcendent theosophy. Mulla Sadra, as a philosopher, mystic, and exegetist, dealt with this problem from a philosophical, mystical, and exegetic viewpoint. The present research deals with the terminology of the term “praise” and explains Mulla Sadra’s philosophical viewpoint toward it. Relying on his philosophical principles, Mulla Sadra puts forward three arguments for generality of praising. He expresses that all Creatures have knowledge and perception, and praise God in their own languages.

Epistemologists define knowledge as "justified true belief”. In the history of philosophy, concerning the measure of truth and justification, as the basic elements of the theory of knowledge, there were several theories. This is true concerning Sadraian and Suhrawardian schools. Although both schools take foundationalism about justification and correspondence concerning truth, but there are important differences between them. Sadraians distinguish between right and true on the base of the relation between proposition and the fact, and its priority and posterity. But the Suhrawardians don’t take this difference serious. Also, Suhrawardians consider correspondence merely conformity with the external world, while for Sadraians, correspondence consists in conformity with both internal and external world. On the other hand, these two schools have similarities, such as for both of them illumination and intuition are evident and fundamental knowledge, which can serve as the basis of human knowledge. Thus, they introduce a new version of foundationalism.