حجت الاسلام محمد سربخشی

‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī is one of the founders of the branches of philosophy in the realm of Islamic thought. Philosophy of ethics is one such branch that he has discussed in his book "The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism", Tafsīr al-Mīzān, and in his other treatises, under the title of "subjective considerations" (i’tibāriyāt). ‘Allāmah’s perspective in the field of ethical judgments seems non-realistic. However, careful examination of different aspects of his thought reveals that he is a realist. Despite considering ethical obligations and the moral goodness and evil as subjective, he interprets them based on reality. For this reason, he should be considered among the realists. According to ‘Allāmah, the goodness and evil are considered based on ethical obligations and the ethical obligations are considered based on the real necessity between action and the goal. The goal of ethics is felicity, and the motive to achieve felicity is not subject to taste, agreement, command, or prohibition. Therefore, its desirability is real, and since achieving the goal is not possible without performing an action, a person has to inevitably consider the necessity between oneself and the actions essential for the goal, which is termed as ethical obligation. In this way, the subjective consideration of the ethical obligations is based on the real desirability of the ethical goal, and the real necessity between action and that goal. The basis of the subjective consideration of goodness and evil to be real, is also explained in this manner.

The existence of nature and the occurrence of causality in its elements are accepted facts in various branches of knowledge. Except for a few skeptics or idealists, no one denies it, but the independence of nature from the non-physical elements and the exclusivity of causality within its constituents have their proponents. One corresponding claim is the physical causal closure. This principle asserts that physical phenomena arise from physical causes and the non-physical element either does not exist, or if it does, it does not intervene or have an explanatory role. Therefore, there is no need to consider the role of non-physical factors in explaining physical events. Muslim philosophers also believe that physical events are caused by the specific nature of objects, and nature itself is the "direct agent." Such a view is susceptible to being assumed same as the principle of physical causal closure. Philosophical investigations show that this perspective is not the same as the principle of causal closure because philosophers reject the exclusivity of causality in physical causes by accepting non-physical causes, soul and their involvement in physical events. Therefore, the confinement of the investigation methodology of nature to sense and experience is denied. ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī also holds this view. Therefore, he cannot be considered in agreement with proponents of the causal closure. This matter is examined through analytical and rational methods by referring to existing texts on these perspectives.

The state of being, occurrence, essential possibility and the possibility of need are among the criteria that have been proposed to justify the need of some things. Each of these criteria has been criticized and denied by others. Some contemporary thinkers have also criticized and rejected the last point of view, the poverty possibility, and have introduced the possibility of meaning as the only correct criterion of need for cause. In this article, according to the two meanings of the criteria (cause and reason), the above views have been examined and shown that all of them are facing challenges. By dividing cause into analytical and external, semantic possibility has been introduced as the criterion of need for the cause in analytical causation and the cause itself as the criterion of need for the cause in external causation. Also, by dividing causality into agent, final, material and formal, complete and incomplete, direct and indirect, longitudinal and transversal, real and as ground, the criterion of need for each of them has been determined separately.

The personal unity of existence is the claim of mysticism and transcendental philosophy. In this claim, the existential multiplicity of the universe is denied and all except Allah (God) are accepted as manifestations and appearances of His Majesty Haqq (Truth). The mystics have an intuitive approach in claiming the personal unity of existence and invite the deniers to follow mystical and spiritual method. In theoretical mysticism, rational reasons are given to prove the personal unity of existence. In transcendental philosophy, after a certain doubt, Sadrul Motaalehin has become inclined towards the personal unity of existence and tried to prove it. In the philosophical approach, reasons are given to prove personal unity, the most important of which is the fact that the effect is the relation itself. This argument has two introductions a) the effect in relation to the creator cause is the relator existence. b) It is not possible to derive a nominal concept from the relator existence. The concept of existent is a nominal concept, and all except Allah (God), due to being a relator, they do not have the ability to abstract the nominal concept. Therefore, only Almighty God has the ability to be applied the title of existence, and this means personal unity of existence. The first premise of this argument is the case of agreement among the most philosophers of transcendental philosophy, and even some followers of transcendental philosophy, who deny the existence of personal unity, accept the first premise; But the second premise is false and this argument cannot prove the personal unity of existence.

Generally, epistemology is considered as second degree knowledge, in which the value of knowledge is discussed. On the other hand, in philosophy, the existential characteristics of knowledge, such as separate from matter and its nature, are discussed. But as some contemporary philosophers have mentioned, many epistemological discussions are ontological. Even the discussion of the value of knowledge cannot be without considering its reality. Also, without relying on metaphysical principles, such as the principle of the realization of reality, its having ranks, the principle of causality and its branches, it is not possible to advance epistemological discussions. Therefore, we believe that epistemology is also a first degree knowledge and is a part of ontology, and it is only with a special validity that it can be considered a second degree knowledge.

Division into concept and Judgement is one of the famous divisions of the acquired knowledge. Among Islamic thinkers, the discussion of this division can be traced back to Farabi's words. After him, other Muslim logicians and philosophers paid attention to this debate and discussed it in their books. The discussion about this has also provoked differences that Mulla Sadra addressed in the treatise of concept and Judgement. In fact, in each of these views, attention has been paid to an aspect of the aspects of Judgement. Some have considered Judgement to be equal to the proposition, some have introduced its truth as an attribution, and some have considered it as a concept that accompanies the attribution. Another point of view that has been presented about the truth of Judgement is related to those who have considered it as understanding the truth of the proposition. With the investigations we have done in the article, we have shown that all these views have problems and each of them has only paid attention to one aspect of the various aspects of Judgement, and this has caused confusion in the definition of Judgement. Mulla Sadra acknowledged more attention to different dimensions of Judgement, so sometimes he called it a belief (a kind of tendency) and sometimes he called it a concept, which is the same as an attribution. It is better to combine these three and consider each of the meanings of "belief", "concept" and " attribution" as referring to one aspect of Judgement. The interpretation of "concept" refers to the epistemic aspect, the interpretation of "belief" refers to the tendentious aspect, and the interpretation of "attribution" refers to the active aspect of Judgement.

Methods of Study: 

The method of discovery in this issue is library method and the method of evaluation is rational analytic.

To put it more clearly and based on the selected point of view, Judgement is a multi-faceted reality, and it can be acknowledged that these definitions are in fact mentioning different dimensions of Judgement, and Judgement is one of the things which has different aspects in harmony with the self, and this is the characteristic that distinguishes it from concept and at the same time makes Judgement a part of the types of knowledge.

Therefore, the Judgement of a truth is three-faceted, which is an epistemic passivity on the one hand, a dispositional passivity on the other hand, and the third face, which observes the active face of the self, is the verb of the self. The first aspect makes us consider Judgement as a type of concept. The second aspect has caused some people to consider it as a kind of acknowledgment and confession that is achieved passively for humans and has a tendency aspect. Sometimes, the expression of faith and belief is used to refer to this aspect, and finally, the third aspect has caused many logicians and philosophers to call Judgement the same as attribution or to call it a concept that accompanies the attribution. In fact, all of these are different aspects of the same truth, and by combining them (epistemic passivity, dispositional passivity, and active aspect), the truth of Judgement is confirmed and its distinction from concept is revealed. The last word is that what has been collected in this article is a library review of the views and their rational and philosophical analysis to lead to the selected theory which is the multifaceted nature of Judgement

Guarantee of performance is one of the important issues raised in the philosophy of ethics; Because unless there is a guarantee for the implementation of ethics, the issuance of moral judgments and requirements will be useless. Therefore, moral schools seek to explain the guarantee of morality in their theories. The present study has investigated the performance guarantee from the perspective of Kant and Shahid Motahhari with a descriptive-analytical approach. What has been gained from the examination of views shows that, according to Kant, practical reason guarantees the implementation of morality; There are drawbacks to this view, so it can not be accepted. Martyr Motahhari, relying on self-knowledge which is based on theology, considers the understanding of self-esteem and dignity as the motivation for the implementation of morality.Studies show that this view is also not comprehensive and can not be a motivation for everyone to do a moral act. It is noteworthy that belief in God is the most important motivation for the implementation of morality, and Islam, according to the different intellectual and spiritual levels of the people, provides a wide range of motivations for people to turn to moral actions based on belief in God and His oneness has

The personal unity of existence is the claim of mysticism and transcendental wisdom. In this claim, the multiplicity of existence of the universe is denied and everything rather than God is accepted as manifestations of God the Almighty. In claiming the personal unity of existence, mystics have an intuitive approach and invite the deniers to the spiritual journey. In theoretical mysticism, rational arguments are put forward to prove the personal unity of existence. In transcendental wisdom, after raising analogism in a specialized sense, Sadr al-Mutallahin has tended to the personal unity of existence and has tried to prove it. In the philosophical approach, reasons are presented to prove personal unity, the most important of which is the copulative nature of the thing caused. This argument has two premises: a. in relation to cause, the thing caused is the essence of the copulative existence b. The copulative existence cannot be interpreted nominally. The existing concept is nominal, and because of being copulative, nothing other than God has the ability to abstract the nominal concept. Therefore, the title of existence can only be applied to the Almighty God, and this means the personal unity of existence. The first premise of this argument is common among most philosophers of transcendental wisdom, and even some followers of transcendental wisdom, who deny the personal unity of existence, accept the first premise; but the second premise is incorrect, and this argument cannot prove the personal unity of existence.

One of the basic questions in the field of ethics is the observance of moral values by God. Virtue, Deontological & Teleological Ethics are three approaches in this regard. Followers of Virtue ethics have sought to justify the observance of values by God by relying on the attributes of divine perfection. Followers of Teleological ethics consider a specific goal as the source of moral value and determine other values and moral requirements based on it, & followers of Deontological ethics, introduce the must as the principal must and infer other moral musts and values from it. This article argues that the Deontological ethics is not only incapable of justifying the observance of moral values by God, but is fundamentally false. On the other hand, virtue and teleological ethics are not fundamentally different from each other. Third, teleological ethics has two different interpretations, only one of which can clarify the observance of moral values by God. By comparing these three approaches in an analytical way, this article examines the proofs of their correctness and validity and tries to provide the necessary explanation for the observance of moral precepts by God with a teleological approach.

In the contemporary Islamic philosophy, the intelligibles (universal concepts) fall under three categories: primary or essential intelligibles, philosophical secondary concepts, and logical secondary concepts. In this study, the term intelligible is the characteristic of mental concepts. A glance at the philosophical references proves that in the past, the term intelligible was sometimes used to describe the very real entities, rather than the concepts, and were merely divided into two primary and secondary ones. Suffering from the primacy of quiddity and some other doubts, the illuminationist philosophers made existence and its attributes fall under secondary intelligibles and thus be regarded as merely mental concepts. Having made the illuminationist's errors correct, later philosophers divided secondary intelligibles into two categories of logic and philosophy and thus they put attributes of existence under philosophical secondary intelligibles. They have also proposed criteria to distinguish those three categories one from another. In his present study of the historical development of the issue, the author has come to the conclusion that putting the concepts as the subject of description, classification of the intelligibles into three categories, and bringing philosophical entities under "secondary intelligibles" are not recommended, and in some cases are incorrect. Like previous references, we ought to consider the very entities as the intelligibles and to classify them into two categories of primary and secondary intelligibles. In this classification, the philosophical entities go under primary intelligibles and they are divided into three: those of quiddity, philosophical ones, and those mentally-constructed.

The followers of the divine command theory regard ethics as completely dependent on religion and do not regard a meaning and reality for it beyond the divine command and countermand. On the other hand, the followers of secular ethics view ethics as prior and superior to religion, and at least consider moral values as an independent meaning and reality. In the meantime, some theorists of Islamic thought, despite the rejection of the theory of the divine command, believe in religious ethics and deem religion consisting of ethics. The chosen theory is that ethics is the same as religion and religion is the same as ethics, and despite the inaccuracy of divine command theory, there is a reading of religious ethics that is superior to secular ethics in all semantic, ontological, epistemological, and psychological aspects.

Most philosophers understand causation to be applicable to existential things. So, they say that applying it to other things, such as things that do not exist, is simply metaphorical. Also, they say that it is metaphorical to call preparatory causes ‘causes’. This is something that is prevalent amongst lay people but that is philosophically imprecise. Nevertheless, causation is something real that is capable of being applied to all things. So, it is possible to divide it into external causation and analytical causation. Therefore, it is possible to apply it in a real sense to things that exists, those that do not exist as well as conventional matters. There are many views regarding causation. These range from the denial of causation to its application to all things. However, the proper view is for us to say that only limited beings need a cause. Regarding the secret as to why something needs a cause, it is possible to say that if we say causation is limited to things that exist then the reason why something needs a cause is that its existence is limited. However, if we say that causation is a general concept, then we should say that the possibility of meaning is the reason why something needs a cause. The last view is that of the professor Ghulam Ridha Fayyadhi

Carnap's imperativism, Ayer’s and Stevenson's emotivism, and Hare's prescriptivism are unrealistic schools that, despite some differences, agrees on denying the reality of moral values based on the positivist approach and analytic philosophy. In fact, these three schools are different aspects of an intellectual approach, which, by insisting on the principle of empirical provability on the one hand, and the analysis of the meaning of words with an empirical approach on the other hand, explain the reality or unreality of different affairs. This, in the realm of ethics, has led them plunge into the abyss of ethical non-realism. Hare is not a positivist but an advocate of analytic philosophy, the empirical approach is manifest in the ethical positions of this philosopher too. Basically, all analytic philosophers share such an approach. The lack of attention to abstract realities including moral values are among the main causes of this mistake as well as most of the mistakes made by the Western philosophers. Explaining and reviewing the three above mentioned schools, this paper shows their flaws and criticisms.

In Islamic philosophy and epistemology, intuitive knowledge is the basis of all knowledge. In a general classification, knowledge is divided into two kinds: intuitive and acquired. Due to the identicalness of the known scientific and objective existence in intuitive knowledge, there is no error in it. Although the scientific and objective existence is not the same in acquired knowledge, it can be argued that a large part of acquired knowledge goes back to intuitive knowledge. The reduction of theoretical knowledge to the self-evident and the return of all self-evident ideas and affirmations to intuitive knowledge make us consider intuitive knowledge as the origin of all knowledge. The universality of the acquired knowledge is consistent with the particularity of their origins (the intuitive knowledge), since signification of multiple references is an intrinsic property of knowledge and results from knowledge of high level perfection. In addition, the correctness of the universality of the indication of acquired knowledge in an intuitive form is understandable. Therefore, the edifice of certain knowledge is built in the thoughts of Islamic philosophers and epistemologists. This method of reconstruction of the edifice of knowledge is called epistemic fundamentalism, whose basic foundation in transcendental philosophy is intuitive knowledge.

There are a variety of questions on creation, its purpose and cause. In order to solve the question of the philosophy of creation, it is essential to differentiate the questions and provide appropriate answers to each one. Regarding this issue, four questions can be distinguished from one another: the first question concerns the creator's purpose, and the second question addresses the purpose of creature. The third question deals with the cause of creation, and the fourth is about the wisdom in the creation of the universe. The answer to the first and the second questions is that because of being absolutely perfect, God, the Almighty who is the creator of the universe, has not had any purpose. The goal of creating each creature is to reach the perfection it deserves. The answer to the third question is that love of perfection is the cause of creation, and since creation has occurred in the best possible way, it is wise. The details of these questions and their answers constitute the content of this paper.

Given knowledge is in fact the presence of the known in itself before the knower, it must be said that every sort of knowledge is in fact presential and thus all branches of the knowledge by acquisition are reduced to knowledge by presence. This becomes further clear after considering the theory of union of the intellect with the intelligible. Thus instead of defining acquired and presential knowledge as knowledge with or without intermediary, we can define knowledge by presence as knowledge that forms the sole criterion for its being known by its knower and knowledge by acquisition as knowledge that in addition to having been the criterion of being known by its knower constitutes something else for its knower. Thus when a knower encounters an object, he learns about it in the beginning without any intermediary and then finds in himself a state similar to that of a mirror through which he acquires knowledge by acquisition. The said state is the result of the knower’s undergoing a substantial movement and his attaining perfection. Given this account, one can reduce basic concepts to knowledge by presence. Primary assents such as the principle of non-contradiction can also be obtained from knowledge by presence. Thus we can, in this way, solve the problem of truth which is the most basic problem in epistemology and find a sure way for gaining true knowledge.

Ethical sentences are being expressed in two compositional and declarative forms. In the compositional sentences, an ethical behavior, trait, or goal is considered as the focus of order and prohibition. In the declarative ones, the same affairs turn into the subject and they will be judged by a valuable or necessary concept. The concepts such as good, bad, correct, incorrect, ought to and ought not are containers of ethical propositions which are called “ethical concepts”. In addition, the concepts of perfection and desirability are embedded in the concept of ethical value; therefore, unlike the unrealistic-oriented viewpoints, because of objectivity of perfection, the ethical values are objective affairs. According to the concepts of duty and responsibility and their relation with value, one can consider all voluntary affairs of ethical actions, traits, and goals as ethical valuation. This is because of involvement of free will in ethical duties and with the relation between values and ethical duties, every voluntary affair will become the subject of judgment.

Philosophy in its strict sense is an intellectual discipline concerned with discovering the reality about existent qua existent and its rules. In these discussions the nature and reality of things and the idea of their existence and non-existence are discussed and the certain, discursive, abstractive, general and necessary property of the rule is among the characteristics of philosophical discussions. Proving the subject matter of every discipline, explaining the conceptional principles and proving their judgmental principles are among the main functions of philosophy. For this reason, each one of the added philosophies can constitute a branch of the philosophy in the science which is adjacent to added philosophy.

Dividing knowledge into "knowledge by presence" and "knowledge by representation" is one of the most important divisions of knowledge in Islamic epistemology. Epistemologists believe that knowledge by presence is an immediate encounter with "the known" itself, and thus, it has an absolute epistemological value, without the possibility of any error penetrating it. On the other hand, many doubts have been put forward in this regard so that infallibility in this type of knowledge may be denied. The present article relies on negating any intermediary in knowledge by presence, and stresses its infallibility to remove the doubts which have been put forward.

The perception opponents of philosophy hold about its reality is not the same as what philosophers themselves mean by it. Some of them consider the reality of philosophy as playing with concepts, explaining them, and, in its ideal level, presenting demonstrations. Even some have questioned the demonstrative nature of philosophy. However, paying careful attention to the definitions of philosophers themselves and their assertions indicates that philosophy from their perspective has a very comprehensive reality covering all fields of knowledge and practice. This perception is at least the dominant one among Islamic philosophers. Lack of careful consideration of the real meaning of philosophy has given rise to raising numerous objections to it. These objections have a clearer manifestation in the words of particularly those who claim piety and suppose philosophy in conflict with religion. The present article is an attempt to show that philosophy is not only a demonstrative discipline, but practice is a part of its reality. A real philosopher is one who in addition to his mastering the domain of knowledge has reached perfection in terms of practicing ethical commandments.

The contrast between philosophical intellect and religious intellect as well as the denial of philosophical intellectuality are among the new discussions dealt with by some authors in the sphere of religious thought. Self-sufficiency of philosophical intellect and its slavery in the hands of philosophical rules of the ancient Greece are among other doubts casted upon philosophy. No proper understanding of the meaning of intellect and intellectuality in Islamic philosophy and insufficient acquaintance with pure thoughts of that philosophy are among the main reasons for such misunderstandings. The present article reviews the meanings of these terms in original texts of Islamic philosophy to answer the abovementioned objections and doubts.

The authors of this article suggest their own definition of knowledge by presence as the kind of knowledge that only reveals itself to the knower, vis-à-vis knowledge by representation that reveals something else too. They believe that this definition is more suitable to the reality of knowledge by presence as an existential entity, because revealing is the most ontologically essential trait of any knowledge, and knowledge by presence is nothing other than being, and presence, of the known for the knower. Knowledge in nothing other than the disclosure of the known for the knower, and disclosure becomes possible by presence and presence by unity or identification. Therefore, whenever there is unity or identification, there will be knowledge by presence too. Different types of unity bring about different kinds of knowledge by presence such as knowledge of the self, of the attributes, of the accidents and affections, of the faculties and existential stages, of the body, etc.