دکتر مصطفی عابدی

In the history of political thought, the concept of security and protection of the political structure and its stability has been as important as the establishment of the political government. This concept has also been taken into consideration in Farabi's political thought, and in various works such as al-Siyaseh al-Madaniyya, the opinions of the people of Madinah al-Fazlah, etc., after explaining the logic of the development of the ideal politics, Farabi has tried to consider how to maintain Medina and its security. had. The main problem of this article is to study security as the most fundamental political component in Farabi's political thought and analyze the logic he uses in the stability and protection of utopia based on Farabi's philosophical system. According to him, since the establishment of the utopia is dependent on the concept of happiness, morality and virtue, the method of protection, stability and continuity of the utopia policy is also possible depending on the aforementioned three concepts. In order to explain the relations of political security, he places the philosopher-shah as the authority of security, and instead of deriving the logic of security from a dominant power, he relates it to the structure of the universe through the intellect of the philosopher, and the logic of establishment and continuity. It explains political-security from within the existential and rational structure of the objective world that it obtains from the active intellect.

The fundamental problem that has always been paid attention to in the history of thought is that 1- What is the relationship between subject and object? 2- How can we pass from subject to object and know the internal structure of the objective world? The answer to this epistemological problem in the modern period caused extensive changes in the system of thought, and out of it came rationalism, empiricism, and idealism. To explain the mentioned ratio, some like the materialists put the principle as a material object and consider everything, especially the knowledge system, to be explainable based on it. On the other hand, subjective idealism puts the subject first instead of emphasizing the object and bases the explanation of the empirical world on the concept in Kant and rational intuition in Fichte. In both of them, the knowledge system was based on a hard ground that made knowledge as a whole possible by transcending the knowledge system itself. But Hegel took on a completely different role in the Phenomenology of Spirit. 1. by considering the concept as fundamental in the knowledge system, 2. giving it an ontological aspect due to its connection with the object-in-itself, 3. making it fluid from the stage of abstract substance to the stage of the actual subject, he introduced the concept as the absolute with its movement from the potential stage to the actual stage, it determines the subject and the object and harmonizes existence and thought as a system and a dialectical whole. With this work, Hegel was able to rule out elitism in the system of science, and by knowing the concept and its connection with the absolute as fundamental, he reconciled the absolute knowledge with the conventional view and revealed it to everyone. In this article, the author tries to present a concrete interpretation of the system of knowledge in Hegel's thought by focusing on the "concept" according to the preface of the phenomenology of the soul. For this purpose, the author deals with the position of the concept and the explanation of its structure in the phenomenology of the soul under the following nine titles: the position of the concept in the phenomenology of the soul; prior concepts and the beginning of the phenomenology of the soul from essence as nothing; Hegel's critical stance towards instrumentalization of consciousness; the concept and passing from the phenomenal field to the realm of the object in itself; the concept in motion, the ontological foundation of the world; Hegel and the two-way reflection of thought and existence; experience and its extension to the object itself; Hegel's criticism of elitism in the knowledge system through the negation of rational intuition; Hegel's system of knowledge is the only way for subjective idealism to escape from skepticism.

In short, Hegel is trying to define existence and knowledge as a system through a concrete understanding of the concept and its historical and existential development and make thought and existence compatible with each other. In order to turn the knowledge system into something concrete, Hegel changes the foundation of science from fixed transcendental matters to a mediated and negative concept by negating prior concepts and intellectual intuition. In this view, instead of starting from prior and fixed things, which is the condition of knowledge of the concept of the world, science starts from a concept that is considered empty and abstract in the first stage. In this way, knowledge does not start from a definite and actual matter, but from a concept whose only determination is the power and ability to become absolute. According to Hegel, it is this concept that, through its inner negation, dismantles each particle of its former world after another particle and silently matures in a new form. With this statement, Hegel negates any first fixed point that is outside the movement of the concept and conceptual knowledge is based on it, and in this way, everything is determined and known within the concept in motion. This is where Hegel finds the ability to eliminate any dark spots in the history of consciousness and by clarifying the absolute for everyone, destroys the foundation of elitism that Fichte and Schelling's rational intuitions emphasized. Also, by ontologicalizing the concept and relating it to the object-in-itself, Hegel escapes from the skepticism that plagues mental idealism to escape from skepticism.

As Hegel claims in the phenomenology of the soul, subjectivity as the fate of the history of consciousness aims to show how the soul tries to establish a dialectical relationship between the objective and the subjective by becoming aware of itself and reconciling consciousness with self-awareness and to reconcile the two in the subjectivity found in absolute idealism. The main problem of this article is to show how and with what conceptual possibilities Hegel can overcome the one-sidedness of objective realism and subjective idealism by means of the subjectivity in the phenomenology of the soul. To answer this question, the author tries to explain the subjectivity in the book Phenomenology of the Spirit through the conceptual possibilities of consciousness, self-awareness, human society and political situation, and how to actualize the abstract absolute existing at the beginning of the history of consciousness through the mentioned concepts. show for this reason, it is explained that by bringing the absolute closer to the human community and creating an ontological dialectic between God and human "us", Hegel integrates the absolute into the political situation, and by integrating God into the political state, to reveal the absolute both to himself and to human "us" in philosophical knowledge and in this way establish a dialectical union between the realm of the subject and the realm of the object. In this article, the author has used the descriptive-analytical method to explain his position.

There is no mention of Machiavelli in Fichte's works until 1806. In 1806, Fichte spoke about Machiavelli for the first time in the article "About Machiavelli", then in the book "Addresses to the German Nation" written in 1808, he finds Machiavelli important again and tries to Inspired by Machiavelli, who introduced the concept of the nation in political philosophy, to create a logic to explain the German nation, for this purpose, by receiving the similarity between the state of faith and the Italian two centuries ago, he speaks of a nation that in the states Has spread its local small. In his view, the concept of the German nation is a common situation and condition that is scattered throughout the entire geography of Germany and as a common reality, gathers all German people and intellectuals under one general reality. In his speeches, he is looking for a way to reduce the cultural and political influence of France over Germany. Fichte states that if Germany wants to be saved from political and cultural backwardness, the way is to develop and reveal the inner power of the German nation instead of relying on external power.Although Fichte did not mention Machiavelli in the period of Jena when he wrote his two important books, namely, the doctrine of knowledge and the foundation of natural right, it is apparently in this period that Fichte, like Machiavelli, used effective truth in explaining relations in explaining politics. He finds it important to be political and with this explanation he goes to the establishment of his political system. He does not mention Machiavelli in the foundation of natural right where he explains his philosophy of right and politics, but Fichte seems to have been influenced by Machiavelli in his theoretical politics. In this way, although in Fichte's works, we encounter Machiavelli in the Berlin period, that is, the time when nothing was left of Germany but multiple weak governments, but in the Jena period, he also in political philosophy, in a way, in the land that Machiavelli in Shahriar creates and explains his political philosophy.The main problem of this article is to show how Fichte's political philosophy in the Jena period cannot be properly understood without considering Machiavelli's political thought and situation. Although Fichte considered the moral world to be the end of political relations, in many ways he adheres to the logic that Machiavelli creates in politics. Influenced by Machiavelli, he interprets political relations based on effective truth, and considering national unity, the rule of law and public interests as fundamental, he explains rights and politics through recognition. By explaining law and politics, Fichte brings politics, which in Machiavelli was considered the center of human relations, into the realm of consciousness and objectivity, and in this way, the logic of Machiavelli's politics is implemented in the realm of philosophy and opinion. bringsThe author has written this article with a descriptive and analytical method, and the author's goal in writing this article is to present a picture of Fichte's subjective idealism, based on which to show how Fichte's philosophical ontology interacts with the issues that Machiavelli was involved with in his political thought, and ontology Philosophically, he fertilizes himself in the shadow of the possibilities created in Machiavelli's political thought, and in this way, Fichte's subjective idealism can be explained in the political situation and national unity of Germany.ConclusionFrom what has been said, Machiavelli was able to activate the intellectual errors of classical political thought through the effective truth plan in the political system, and by destroying the old political foundations, he built his politics on its ruins. , presented a logic for politics that after him many thinkers of political philosophy, including Fichte, were influenced by it. Although Fichte was an idealist in the ethical system and also in politics he considered the ethical system as an end for the political system, but in many ways he thinks in politics based on the logic that Machiavelli founded the political system on. For this reason, the explanation of Fichte's political philosophy cannot be understood without considering the territory that Fichte opens in theoretical politics.

The relationship between legal-political law and moral law is one of the most important issues in the history of human thought. The ratio of these two concepts is also very important in German Idealism from Kant to Fichte and Hegel. Examining Fichte’s point of view is very important since he is placed between two important philosophers, Kant and Hegel. In this article, the writer analyzes the relationship of ethics by using the descriptive-analytical method and relying on two important works, The Doctrine of Ethics and The Foundation of Natural Right, to examine the relation between right and politics in Fichte’s thought. To explain this issue, the author first explains Fichte’s reasons for not inferring morality from legal law and reveals the difference between moral society and legal society. Also, by assigning external coercion to the realm of law and excluding it from the realm of morality, the author reveals how the political state is limited to the sphere of law in Fichte’s thought. Finally, by stating that Fichte considered the idea of morality as the foundation of the world of knowledge, he thinks that the world of ethics has an ontological value and considers the whole world of consciousness to be explicable in the end of the world of ethics.

The concept of freedom in Kant's view is a general concept that comprises three critiques and many of his treatises and writings. He introduced freedom as the foundation of morality and considers it the fundamental characteristic of the subject. In his view, freedom exists with two negative and positive meanings. From among these two meanings, Kant has chosen the second meaning and made it the basis of his thought. This type of freedom cannot be realized in an individual way and man finds the opportunity for appearance in light of socialization. Also, Kant has referred the realization of freedom to history and considers it a historical destiny. The present article has been written with the aim of describing the concept of freedom in Kant's thought and pointing out some of its shortcomings with an analytical-critical method. By analyzing the concept of freedom in Kant's thought, the authors have come to the conclusion that there are some important issues in the analysis of the concept of freedom that Kant did not pay attention to in his analysis of the concept of freedom; including various meanings of freedom, historical, cultural and linguistic aspects of rationality, and the commitment of the concept of freedom to satisfaction and happiness.

In terms of strategic foundations, the theory of government in the political philosophy of Kant and Fichte have much in common. For this reason, it is not only possible to examine these two political theories in one article, but it also helps to make a more accurate comparison and thus a better understanding of the two philosophers in terms of distinctions. The author believes that the objections of their political theories are to a large extent compatible with each other. Because the government, based on their political philosophy, unlike other areas of thought, has been conceived and written in the field of experience and objectivity. In such circumstances, both philosophers place their abstract foundations as a test of the gravitational field of objectivity or experience, and the question is whether they can establish a union between thought and action and write political thought in the style of their epistemology and ethics. In other words, can they establish transcendental or moral and legal freedom in the realm of external objectivity or the state where political philosophy is to be formed?

In this article, the author believes that in Sadra's philosophy, the authority of the external world loses its epistemological dignity on accidental stage and merely plays the role of a trigger for the intelligent to compose the intellectual that is of his own origin - that is, intellectual by itself- from the external object, and through it, be aware of the world. The field of knowledge is placed in the possession of the rational by itself, which is the reality of knowledge, and the external world is known by using the determinations that the intelligent in the receptacle of the mind, and the compatibility of the object and the mind, and the incarnation of the form and its role on the soul are questioned. The author try to provide an idealistic interpretation of Mulla Sadra's thought by taking help from Kantian epistemology - in which the mind plays a central role in the development of knowledge. If, in Sadra's thought, the intelligent is epistemically prior to the external world and the external world is known only through the determination of the intellect, then state of direct correspondence between the object and the mind and the reference of the external object to the soul will be ruled out. Mulla Sadra's approach to the world overturns the traditional epistemological vector of the Islamic world; because the vector moves from the intellectual to reality with Sadra, not the other way around. Originality is for the intelligent, and object only borrows its epistemological dignity from it.

By discovering effective reality and then establishing a relationship between effective reality and concepts such as human relations, the nation, and the salvation of the homeland, Machiavelli succeeds in devising a new interpretation of morality, virtue, and its relation to the reality of life. By placing human relations and the public interest in the exploration of moral law, he paved the way for Hegel’s conception of concrete morality and ethnic religion. It is according to Machiavelli’s idea that Hegel came up with the basic idea of ​​the phenomenology of the soul, which is to establish the dialectical relationship between heaven and earth. Accordingly, the contradiction between morality and human nature and desire is eliminated, and by cultivating morality from the roots of desire, human desire and nature introduce morality in general in the name of an understandable ethnic and customary spirit. Also, given the possibility that Machiavelli’s effective reality gives him, Hegel succeeds in establishing a relation between idealism and realism and explains the extraction of idealism from within realism. In this regard, the authors try to establish a relation between the logic of Prince Machiavelli and the evolution of the phenomenological logic of the soul by presenting a new interpretation of the modern Prince Machiavelli and showing the great philosophical possibilities that this work offers to philosophers after him, especially Hegel.

In a sense, freedom is one of the most important concepts in the history of philosophy, which plays a fundamental role in the thought of philosophers, but like many other concepts, it needs to be redefined in order to survive in new conditions. Based on this, this article aims to compare Kant's and Heidegger's viewpoints and take some serious criticisms into consideration in order to take a preliminary step towards redefining the concept of freedom. Kant considers freedom to be a metaphenomenal matter and a fundamental characteristic of the subject. And he introduces it as the foundation of ethics. He chooses the positive meaning of freedom that emerges in the shadow of human socialization and makes it the basis of his thought. But it must be said that firstly, it is true that moral laws are issued by us, but acting on them is optional. Secondly, a person is more a social product than the result of the pure form of the moral law and the rule of refusal of the society of contrarians. On the contrary, Heidegger believes Dasein is the essence of transcending itself and existential transcendence, and this is the basis of freedom. Therefore, the (external) existence of Dasein is essentially the essence of freedom. But first of all, Heidegger's method in describing the way of human existence is neutral towards the way of life. Second, Heidegger's view on freedom does not help to live freely, nor does it show a solution for it. Thirdly, this view shows another role and society in living freely ignores and relies only on the individual Dasein. Fourthly, freedom has no relationship with satisfaction and happiness. Therefore, freedom does not mean getting rid of causal-disabled determinism, but it means making it naked.

Before Machiavelli, in order to explain the transition from subject to object, he justified concepts that played a pivotal role in the transition from subject to object, or vice versa, which were essentially theological-metaphysical concepts, but Machiavelli in his political thought defined There is a new relation, and it must be achieved, that Hegel was later able to use in his ontology in a complex interpretation - and a critique of the views of the likes of Kant and Fichte, who are and should have dealt with the separation of territory. Influenced by Machiavelli, instead of inferring, hegel's ontological and transcendent affairs should be sought in the midst of the effective facts of this world, and thus he was able to criticize the precedence of subject over object, as philosophically explained by Kant, and the dialectical relation. Study between the two from a normative point of view. The author tries to present a new interpretation of the problem and must explain in Machiavelli's thought the logic of Hegel's transition from subject to object and how to replace normative logic with transcendent logic in this regard.

Consciousness, which is one of the central issues of German idealism, has received various interpretations among German philosophers. Assuming the thing-in-itself, Kant presented consciousness in pieces and presented it in the form of three critiques. After him, Reinholt and Schultze, by criticizing the thing-in-itself, provided the ground for a new interpretation of consciousness by Fichte. Fichte with approval Schultze's critique of the thing-in-itself, rightly gathered consciousness into the unity of the absolute subject. He then gave a revolutionary interpretation of how consciousness develops by creating a dialectical relationship between consciousness, self-consciousness, and intersubjectivity. In this article, we try to explain Fichte's interpretation of consciousness according to the relationship that he establishes between consciousness, self-consciousness and intersubjectivity, and to present the calendar of consciousness and self-consciousness in the political situation. He first argues that consciousness logically requires an order in which self-consciousness provides its development and He then considers the order in consciousness as dependent on the creation of a relationship that occurs in the process of recognition between subjects.

There tend to be key concepts in the thought of any philosopher which represents their intellectual system and serves as a ground for the existence and understanding of other concepts and thoughts of his. The concept of death is such a key concept in Plato’s thought. In his philosophy, there is a profound relation among the concepts of philosophy, catharsis, and death. It seems that understanding them and explaining the relation among them might pave the path for a better understanding of his views. By adopting a descriptive-analytic method, we aim to show the connection among “philosophy,” “catharsis,” and “philosopher’s death.” The stages of this research are in accordance with Plato’s writings so as to open a door to an understanding of many concepts in his philosophy. We conclude that in his view, philosophy, the philosopher’s death, and catharsis are all grounded in the same foundation. It is true that philosophy is a particular kind of discourse between two persons, death is the separation of the soul from the body, and catharsis is the purification of the soul from bodily attachments, but all these three cases involve a common concept of the soul’s separation from flowing things and its turning toward the real and eternal being. Thus, not only do they have the same function in terms of their instances and none of them is possible without the other, there is also an implicit correspondence in their concepts as well.

The problem of substance has been a key and central problem in philosophy such that a philosopher’s position on this problem plays a crucial role in the whole of his or her philosophy. Moreover, the comparison among different views is one of the best ways to analyze and understand different philosophical approaches, which is why this paper employs a descriptive and analytic method to provide an analytic consideration of the views of two major philosophers in the history of philosophy—Aristotle and Mullā Ṣadra—about the concept of substance in comparative way. We conclude that both Aristotle and Mullā Ṣadrā seek to find the reality and origin of individuation and objecthood of things, seeing substance as what really exists and other things as existing in virtue of these substances, while Aristotle sees the “form” as the primary substance, holding that other candidates for serving as substance are merely secondary substances, and Mullā Ṣadrā draws on his primacy of existence (iṣālat al-wujūd) to introduce existence as a single and graded substance of which all entities are determinations.

In this research, we are trying to explain how Niccolò Machiavelli Basically criticizes the foundations of classical political thought, and in breaking off those foundations, paves the way for a new vision of politics as well as the establishment of political science. In this essay, Aristotle's political philosophy is presented as the representative of the logic of classical political thinking and we interpret this thought on the basis of the three strategic terms of nature, luck and virtue, as well as the complex relationship between them and their relation to politics in Aristotle's perspective and we will show that politics follows the naturalist-ethical view of Aristotle. We also discuss simultaneously how Machiavelli works with three terms that set against the terms of Aristotle (Which include power, virtue , and the homeland) invalidate the foundations of Aristotle's political thought and, consequently, classical political thought. And opens the way for the creation of a new political thought that forms outside the field of gravity of nature power, of fortune power. Where man is only relying on his will and virtue and without the need for a force of nature and fortune, It changes the logic of political relations to its own advantage.

To realize human autonomy, Descartes establishes the dialectical relation between consciousness and freedom through the three essential elements of understanding, will, and divine power. Through the free will of negative, as methodic doubt and the destruction of all presuppositions, the basis of consciousness is referred to the human being and releases it from external authority. By building a knowledge based on the innate concepts that come from within and without mediation consciously re-establishes knowledge. In this way, human beings not only gain autonomy of understanding but also freedom through the effort of a systematic and restrictive understanding. Because with the entry of the limiting of understanding in the area of the will, freedom is no longer meant to be nonchalance and lawlessness. But freedom within the limits of certain judgments of understanding and its legislation and divine power are enclosed. Through this process, it is promoted to positive freedom. Descartes, by declaring that the natural imaginations are verifiably confirmed by divine confirmation, relied on God to guarantee the knowledge of the understanding and in this way, he describes freedom as God's guarantee. Therefore, in Descartes' philosophy, the realization of positive freedom under dialectical conditions form on the basis of the complex relationship between will, intelligence, and divine power, and all of the elements that constitute a whole will only have meaning with each other.

According to the place of light in the philosophy of illumination, this question arises that: Why Suhrawardi has used light instead of the divine being on one hand, and the longitude and latitude as homeland on the other hand?This article tries to prove the illuminate cosmopolitanism from Suhrawardi’s viewpoint. Suhrawardi’s cosmopolitan is investigated via the ontology of light and as a result, the meaning of homeland is explored from philosophy of illumination perspective. Since he has chosen light instead of being in ontological issues on one hand, and used the words associated with homeland including west and east on the other hand; his ontology is related to homeland and as a consequence, to cosmopolitanism. Accordingly, in his opinion, not only homeland is identical to existence but also it as the existence and the realm of homeland is expanded to all over the existence. In Suhrawardi’s cosmopolitan, since the humans belong to an ultimate reality, there is no difference among them and they are dignified in the same level. Hence, accidental differences including color, language, homeland and etc. do not offer specific right to a specific group and no group is superior to other.