ahad faramarz gharamaleki

The ancient Greeks distinguished between two types or two meanings of education by using the metaphor of filling a vessel and lighting a flame. The acceptance of this distinction and the priority of education in the second sense has directed the attention of thinkers to different fields of education (especially the field of practice) and providing appropriate models. This article tries to find and explain the field of practice in philosophy education. For this purpose, after a brief overview of contemporary researchers' re-attention to the practical domain of philosophy, we will examine the factors affecting this flow and its consequences. In the following, "philosophical skills" and "philosophical life" are proposed and analyzed as the implications of the practical field of philosophy. In the first implication, we will study two suggested lists for philosophical skills and try to organize the differences of opinion, and in the second implication, we will explain the idea of philosophy as a way of life and the currents arising from it, such as philosophical counseling and philosophical therapy. At the end, the practical field of philosophy is drawn as a pyramid consisting of philosophical skills at the lower level, bio-philosophical skills at the upper level and other activities related to philosophizing at the middle levels.

Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari has presented significant criticisms against the doctrine of divine simplicity or the identity of essence and attributes. Some philosophers within the analytical philosophy tradition have also voiced similar concerns about this doctrine. According to Ash'ari, the concept of divine simplicity leads to notions that are intuitively unreasonable and meaningless. In his perspective, embracing the doctrine involves personalizing attributes and accepting an external identity between them, both of which he argues are rejected by reason. In this paper, we delve into the metaphysical foundations of Ash'ari's viewpoint, outlining his primary criticisms of the doctrine of simplicity. We aim to demonstrate that, firstly, the nature of the trans-categorical God proposed by Ash'ari is incongruent with his metaphysical foundations, particularly concerning the object-property model. Secondly, we contend that proponents of the doctrine of simplicity present arguments with similar philosophical strength to Ash'ari's criticisms. Thirdly, we argue that his alternative theory falls short of addressing the issue of the relationship between essence and divine attributes, unless through a non-causal grounding theory.

The application of "حرث" to women in verse 223 of Surah Al-Baqarah brings up the issue of objectification of women and instrumentalization of them for the interests of men; Because based on the appearance of " نسائکم حرث لکم…", it is addressed to men that women are your fields. The idea that a woman is a parasite of a man from the view of Islam is incompatible with many evidences in Islam that emphasize the high dignity of women and consider their piety as the only criterion of human superiority between men and women. the question is to examine the point of view of lexicographers and commentators, This research considers the creation of the mentioned doubt to be due to the lack of sufficient knowledge of rhetorical points, the eloquent simile in Qur'an, which can be defended not only by using ancient literary perspectives, but also from the perspective of modern semantics. it is approved and admired in a favorable way. Because from this simile, prominent concepts such as the position and vital role of women in the survival and growth of the human race and the necessity of a man's special attention to her are learned scholarly.

In the Islamic educational system, human degeneration or perfection has a direct correlation with interpersonal communication behavior. Thinkers have always been concerned about regulating these behaviors and identifying their factors. Psychologists consider biological aspects, external events, as well as learning and attitudes as effective factors on human interpersonal communication behavior. Religious teachings also emphasize the explanation and regulation of human behavior. In this research, mental images are searched as the underlying factor in regulating human communication behavior based on religious teachings. This article examines the formation of Self-servitude as an underlying factor in human communication behavior using a descriptive analytical method. By promoting monotheism in ownership and lordship and paying attention to the human's inherent poverty, religious texts institutionalize his absolute need for God. Self-servitude in human's thought comes from the understanding of man's need for God. This presupposition has led to the realization of the attitude of worship in the believer. With the help of the intermediary of attitude, a person's servitude can affect his behavioral principles, including ego, instincts and moral traits.

The basic problem of this research is the analysis of the quiddity of the first propositions (τἀ πρῶτον: to Proton) in Aristotle's philosophy and its purpose is to discover the relation of these propositions with the sextuple self-evident propositions. In Posterior Analytics, Aristotle puts forward the first propositions in response to the problem of epistemic regress. These propositions are known by two characteristics: 1- They are association of knowledge and have its conditions such as completeness and necessity. 2- They have no middle term. In this research, it is revealed that the instance of first propositions in Aristotle's philosophy is more specific than the instance of self-evident propositions; this means that self-evident propositions are more general than these propositions; but on the other hand, the first propositions in Aristotle’s philosophy are more general than "primary premises" in the Islamic philosophy. Among the sextuple self-evident propositions, Aristotle includes two groups of them, i.e. primary premises and natural propositions, under the first propositions. Exclusion of sensory premises and unanimous traditions premises from the first propositions is due to the lack of conditions of knowledge, and the exclusion of empirical and intuitive premises is due to their provability and causality. In Aristotelian philosophy, the cause’s chain of empirical propositions cannot continue indefinitely; but he fails to express the unprovable principles of nature and clarify their meaning. Also, the lack of providing a suitable criterion for distinguishing the first propositions from other propositions seriously challenges his logical-philosophical system regarding the structure of "demonstrative knowledge"

The main issue of this research is to investigate the causal explanation of the action and its purpose is to discover the deductive-nomological model and to criticize it in the philosophy of Sadr al-Mutalahin. According to him, an intentional action is the volitional act of a person, of which he has second-order awareness; therefore, the causal explanation of it requires the discovery of the basics of these two elements. The main cause of creating volitional action is the recognition of its benefits by the imaginative faculty. The reign of the imaginative faculty in the creation of volitional action is moderated by the intervention of practical reason as the source of awareness, so that intentional action is volitional action that passes through the channel of practical reason. the cause of the creation of an intentional action is either the acknowledgment of one of the two rational or imaginative faculty to perform that action without the presence of the opposite confirmation, or the confirmation of one of these two faculty to perform an action and the overcoming of the enthusiasm caused by the contrary confirmation of the other faculty. Therefore, "confirming the usefulness of an action" in the case of "absence of confirmation of the opposite" or "overcoming the enthusiasm caused by the confirmation of the opposite" makes the deductive-nomological model regarding the action, in transcendental wisdom. The normativism, lack of causal explanation when passions conflict, and determinism are the three problems of Sadr al-Mutalahin's theory.

Religious task within the limits of one's ability is mentioned in five Quranic verses and has created many challenges in the history of tafsir and theological sciences and has led Muslim scholars to group. Challenges in “tasks as much as possible" are often in four intellectual and auditory issues, possibility and refusal, occurrence and non-occurrence, and its goodness and ugliness. These challenges are answered in two hadiths of Imam Riḍā (as). Despite the importance of these two hadiths, so far no independent research has been published on the conceptual and propositional analysis and their logical components. The main issue of this research is the process of providing evidence and the source of proof in two hadiths of Razavi by examining the effect of the source of proof in these two hadiths on the Shiite exegesis heritage and comparing it with Sunni interpretations. The difference between the source of proof in Imam Riḍā's (as) statement, which is "justice", and the source of proof with Sunni interpretations, which is "mercy", shows the difference in the concept of "religious task within the limits of one's ability". The content of this hadith has a strategic role in the health and efficiency of legal, educational and moral systems. The fairness of the task in this narrative can be used as an indicator for evaluating professional tasks.

Asking from the truth of Cogito as the basis of knowledge, this paper tries to analyze all possible answers in Descartes’ philosophy. Inductively, four possible answers are open to consideration: either Cogito is true 1) based on argumentation, 2) because it is clear and distinct, 3) because of being innate, or, lastly, 4) because of intuition. All of these explanations either entail accepting some prior knowledge to Cogito or fall in a vicious circle. A proper way to explain Cogito’s truth is a new perspective to the meaning of intuition in Descartes’ philosophy. Through this perspective Cogito is a presential experience. Lack of any gap, separation, and disjunction in this presential experience is the reason for the truth of Cogito because this lack is the lack of error’s cause.

One of the issues that are neglected in the history of the interpretation of the verse “lā yus’al” (Anbīyā’: 23) is not distinguishing between descriptive and normative approaches. To clarify the verse, this article explores the question that “whether the phrase of “lā yus’al ‘ammā yaf'al” (God is not questioned about what He does) is only a recommendation and expression of normative dos and don'ts for "prohibition" of asking about the divine act, or can it contain a descriptive and news message to talk about the real world and prohibiting the question of God’s actions?” The answer depends on two sub-questions: a) What is the basis of the unquestionability of God's actions? To find this basis, we use conceptual, systematic, and propositional analysis. b) With what purpose does the verse express the unquestionability of divine action? We seek the answer by examining the context of “lā yus’al ‘ammā yaf'al” in the semantic context of Surah Anbīyā’. The results show that the question of objection in this phrase is a process that implies different stages of “evaluation,” “blame and protest” and “reprimand and punishment.” Therefore, in the context of a descriptive approach, the verse may include the message that none of God’s servants can (not that they should) ask about God’s actions. Also, this phrase may indicate a directive prohibition of “interrogative question” about the end of divine actions. This prohibition (in the form of news) refers to the limitation of the perceptive realm of servants as questioners and their lack of knowledge of God.

Throughout history, there have been various treatments of philosophy. What we think of philosophy plays an important role both in accepting or rejecting philosophy and in defining the framework of our philosophy. In the history of Islamic philosophy, Ikhwān al-Ṣafā has put forward a different treatment. In this inquiry we analyze this treatment and show that philosophy for them is a three-stage procedure. The first stage is the love of true philosophical sciences and it is exactly this stage that is the ground of philosophy's appellation. This stage provides the power and fuel of the exhausting path of the second stage. The second stage is the knowledge of the realities of beings to the extent of human strength, which encompasses all philosophical sciences of logics and mathematics and physics and divine sciences (including practical wisdom). And the third stage is word and deed in harmony with science, that is, one must have the skill or virtue or art of acting in accordance with science. In order to act in this way, one must also have the instinct to recognize the appropriate action in the relevant situation. With this procedure, unlike other sciences and other matters, we do not seek an output, rather the procedure itself is beauty and desired. Ikhwān al-Ṣafā have reached this treatment by systematic combination.

The present article deals with research issues related to verse 23 of al-Anbiya' Surah and their methodical classification along with answering method for each issue. This research seeks to answer this main question that how the problem-oriented approach can go beyond the problem and the difficulty of the “God who is not questioned” concept, to different problems in three sets of message analysis, message basics and metamessage to achieve the message and at the same time ensure the goodness of these issues. In the "message analysis" section, the research method is the logical analysis of the verse’s content structure in the form of four sub-branches: meaning expression, conceptual analysis, propositional analysis and systemic analysis. In the "analysis of the message basics” section, using the explaining the "causes" of the verse’s messages method, we analyze the imaginary and affirmative bases of the verse’s contents, and in the "Analysis of the Meta-Message" section, we analyze the consequences, accessories, results and objective effects of the verse’s contents. The problem-oriented encounter with “God who is not questioned”, considering the multi-origin nature of the issues hidden in the verse, passes the dangers of incoherent intermingling of the boundaries of disciplines, one-dimensional and referral interpretation, the application of theories to the verse’s content and arbitrary interpretation. It shows the necessity of inter-discipline in verse interpretation and methodical application of context analysis, old and new logic, philosophy and theology.

Kharazmi and Jami are great poets and mystics of the ninth century AH. They are also among the early commentators of Rumi's Masnavi. The interpretive allusions and mystical considerations of these two commentaries have been considered by many post-Rumi scholars. There are works about the states, works and life of these commentators, but there is no research yet on their methods to describe the Ney-nameh (eighteen verses at the beginning of Masnavi). This issue is undertaken in this research through the analytical recognition of the differences and commonalities and the methods of explaining the Ney-name from the perspective of Kharazmi and Jami. Both commentators are found to have made hermeneutic interpretation, and sometimes an eclectic method instead of discovering the theory of the author of Masnavi. They seek to discover, extract, and explain the mysticism of the epistle, which the text has the capacity for, but they have no reason for their explanations. Thus, they have made it difficult for the general audience of Masnavi to understand the concepts and meanings of the letter.

The combination of specific possibility and two common possibilities has been considered as difficult positions in Islamic philosophy. The first aspect is explaining how to construct the concept of special possibility and the second problem is the results of the presented explanations. The first problem is that if a particular possibility is derived from two common possibilities, the possibility theorems are analyzed into two theorems. The second problem is that if a particular possibility is derived from a common possibility, then, in relation to the common possibility, its relation to the subject itself becomes virtual, while the relation of a particular possibility to nature is a real relation. The negativity of the meaning of a particular possibility also causes the application of the possibility in possible positive cases to be challenged. In this paper, through interdisciplinary studies and using the theory of blending, it became clear that in the construction of special possibility, some semantic components of common possibility are transferred to the space of special possibility and some components and accessories are not thrown into the mixed space. On the one hand, the conceptual blending with the integration of the slabs turns them into a single stripping. On the other hand, due to the special function of conceptual blending, the virtualness of the relation in the common possibility is not transferred to the specific possibility, and thus the relation of the special possibility to its subject is real. By creating a positive meaning in the mixed space of a particular possibility, other forms - based on the negativity of the particular possibility - are also eliminated.

The point of this paper is to compare substitution from the perspective of Levinas and the replacement sympathy as two approaches in facing the other. Sympathy, as one of the moral issues, is a way of paying attention and understanding the anxiety, worry, or need of others, which occurs consciously and with the recognition and replacement of the other. The substitution from the perspective of Levinas is also in relation to the “other” and outlines the scope of the subject’s responsibility towards him. In the beginning, Levinas’ subject imperially reduces the other to himself, but in the face of the “other,” he pays attention to the irreducibility and dependence of the consistency of his nature on it. In this way, the infinite responsibility towards the “other” becomes apparent; a responsibility that is formed before any kind of consciousness and self-consciousness and in a more passive space than any passivity, and its scope extends to the substitution of the “other” and expiation of the “other.” In the shadow of this infinite responsibility, substitution is distinguished from sympathetic and empathetic replacement. Sympathy, which has been described as a virtue in many moral systems, is a form of altruism through which an actor, by entering into the worries and sufferings of others, replaces himself in a scene of their pain. This replacement is based on knowing the other and imagining his position and ultimately transforming the other into another me. Accordingly, some have introduced sympathy and benevolence as the basis of morality (see Hume, 2009, 499-500) and by emphasizing the essential role of compassion in human moral life, an argument is made on compassion as a pillar of morality. (Schopenhauer, 1903, 171). Levinas also speaks of substitution in several places in his work, which is defined as a replacement in sympathy in relation to another. In other words, replacement in sympathy is the product of the relation between the actor and the other, and substitution in Levinas is based on subjectivity, which is itself based on the relation between the subject and the “other.” This paper wants to provide a comparative analysis of the subject’s substitution in Levinas with the concept of replacement on sympathy.Of course, although the concept of “other” in Levinas’s thought is different from the other in sympathy, the relationship between ‘replacement’ (taking the place of) and ‘substitution’ in the two can be examined; for although in Levinas’s view the position of the “other” is defined beyond the essence of the subject and in sympathy after the stage of essence, substitution in Levinas can be proposed in terms of rank later than the stage of essence.‘Substituting the other’ in Levinas, unlike “replacing the other” in sympathy, while excluding cognition, changes from another level of understanding the other to the position of expiation of the other, and such a change is justified by the explanation of subjectivity.No independent research has been done on the relationship between the replacement in sympathy and substitution with the “other” in Levinas, and no analysis has been provided in this regard. This paper, in order to analyze the relation of replacement as one of the principles of sympathy and substitution proposed in Levinas, first defines sympathy and examines the other’s place in it, and then in order to achieve the concept of substitution in Levinas’s thought, examines concepts such as subject, saying, said and responsibility from his point of view.

Applying Qur'anic moral concepts is one of the important needs of the society, and responding to it due to these concepts' multi-generational scope, often requires the use of interdisciplinary approaches and methods. In this regard, we have tried to analyze "generosity" (karam) applications in Semitic languages through historical semantics and anthropological achievements approaches. Also, through the semantic study of the Qur'an structure and through the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, we will present a more accurate understanding of this word’s various applications. These data can be categorized into two groups of concepts and examples and then analyzed through logical analysis approach. The result of this research will be to achieve the three components of "generosity combined with dignity inherent in a communication behavior". The "communication and relationship" component reveals the necessity of investigating "dignity" as a communication behavior. It also reveals the knowledge of the communication's main elements characteristics; sender, receiver, and the message. Examining the analysis of the Qur'anic application of the word "generosity" indicates an excellent pattern in this regard, which is based on the connection of "Lord" in the form of Lordship with the highest frequency on the one hand and divine messengers on the other hand. This pattern can be studied in other types of communication behavior and lead to satisfaction and then improve human relations with the Creator, with oneself, with others and with the environment. Based on the Qur'anic model, what characteristics the communication parties (the communicator and the receiver) should have, and what are the achievements of this model for other types of communication behavior, are the questions that this research seeks to answer through a descriptive-analytical study with the aim of applying the Qur'anic concept of dignity.

In Aristotle and Fārābī's philosophy, knowledge begins with sense perceptions. This approach to the acquisition of knowledge faces two challenges posed by Sufism, “illusion” and the “the conflicting interpretations of sense perceptions”. Aristotle tries to answer these two questions by dividing sense perceptions into “specific” and “common” ones and proposing the concept of “balanced conditions”, and the duality of “appearance” and “perception”. Fārābī has not taken a position on the second challenge, but he draws a different approach to the first challenge by dividing the certainty into “complete certainty” and “incomplete certainty”. In his view, certainty arising from “sense perceptions” is an incomplete one, and by adhering to the three conditions, one can adhere to the certainties of sense intuition. It seems that neither of the two solutions of these two thinkers is complete in solving the problem; but Aristotle's solution to the problem of “illusion” is more defensible than Fārābī’s.

In Aristotle's philosophy, knowledge begins with the senses, and sensory perceptions bring knowledge to man through the activity of the "nous" faculty. Unlike Plato, Aristotle denies any innate knowledge; but on the other hand, he clearly states that sensory perceptions do not belong to knowledge and one cannot acquire knowledge to the senses. This creates a paradox in Aristotle's philosophy. If sensory perceptions do not belong to knowledge, how does knowledge arise from "what does not belong to knowledge" and because of the lack of which component of "knowledge", these perceptions do not belong to "knowledge"? According to the authors, the solution to this paradox goes back to the definition of "knowledge" and the possible role of sensory perceptions in the emergence of knowledge in Aristotle. Aristotle does not consider knowledge to be merely "justified true belief" but narrows the scope of "knowledge" to other conditions such as necessity and causality. Therefore, although belief in sensations is a true belief, but these perceptions do not belong to "knowledge" due to the lack of the condition of generality and causality.

Muhammad Ibn Zakariya al-Razi, the famous physician and philosopher of the Islamic world, has been considered by many researchers in different aspects. His theory of perfection of the soul, however, is not much appreciated in recent scholarship. Without learning philosophy, he believes the soul cannot be perfected and released from the body after death. This proposition begs the question: What will be the fate of the soul after death if it is not sufficiently perfected? Reincarnation, responds al-Razi. His view on reason and reincarnation sets forth a dilemma in his philosophy. The conception of reincarnation implies two propositions: (1) only human beings are rational, and (2) the transmigrated soul eventually returns to the human body, so that it once again tries to achieve perfection. These propositions raise two questions: Why is the soul rational in the human body and irrational in animals? If rationality is an accident for the souls, how does it survive death? This paper aims to provide a flawless solution for this dilemma through a critical analysis method. Before this, previous attempts for achieving such a solution must be investigated. Therese-Anne Druart has suggested that, for al-Razi, animals have reason to some extent. Therefore, the soul is rational, whether it is a human soul or that of animals. Contrarily, Peter Adamson argues that al-Razi has regarded animals as deprived of reason, although they can think. Providing six arguments, Adamson argues that al-Razi does not believe in reincarnation. This way, there will be no reincarnation in al-Razi's philosophy to lead him to the dilemma. We propose that neither of the above solutions can solve the dilemma of reincarnation because al-Razi believes in both reincarnation and depriving animals completely of reason. He does not regard rationality as a condition for the survival of the soul after death. Al-Razi has been influenced by Plato and also mostly by Galen and is opposed to Aristotle's view on the soul. So, his conception of the soul should be conceived in a Platonic sense, not an Aristotelian one. Accordingly, the soul is an eternal self-mover entity and rationality is not the criterion for the survival of the soul. Besides, al-Razi indicates that a human being's reason is due to the particular temperance and structure of his body, especially the brain. Consequently, the soul does not need rationality to survive death. Moreover, the nature of the soul is not necessarily rational. Although the view of reincarnation faces many problems, as many Muslim philosophers have criticized it, this investigation can pave the way for further research on the nature of the soul from al-Razi’s viewpoint.

The answer to the question of "what is the meaning of life?", which is asked many times by all human beings during their lives, would play a fundamental role in their life styles. It requires a good understanding of human nature and their lives to properly answer to this fundamental question. Sadr-ol-Mote'allehin considers a human as a composition (unitive union) of both soul and a physical body. He adopts the life within three meanings, i.e., general, specific, and more specific. The fundamental distinction between humans and other creatures lies within the "more specific" life which is based on the human characteristics such as intellect and will. The soul is continuing its life during the completion motion within the three states of this, the intermediate (isthmus), and the other world. The death results in a discontinuation of relation between the soul and the body but does not lead to a destruction of the soul itself. Therefore, the soul will be transferred to another world and will continue its life. Concludingly, any theory given about the "meaning of life" that does not consider the reality about the human nature will be incomplete and incomprehensive, and would not satisfy the human thirst for knowledge.

Social and professional behaviors are driven by extrinsic as well as intrinsic factors including executive rules and regulations enacted by extrinsic agents through coercion, police force and penalties. Despite their effectiveness, these mechanisms undermine the fact that ethics is an intrinsic human quality. The present study seeks strategies to apply extrinsic coercion as an incentive to direct ethics as an intrinsic value. Ethical behaviors driven by intrinsic motivations are more permanent and less costly. Legal force can either strengthen or weaken intrinsic requirements. Extrinsic conditions such as considering the interests, attitudes and preferences of others, involving people in the regulation and execution of law, justification of law, avoiding excessive punishment or rewards, and indirect support of ethics by establishing the appropriate social context can help boost intrinsic requirements in individuals. Ethics will not be practically established unless we harness individuals’ ‘willingness to act’ as an essential determinant for ethical behavior. This requires adoption of a more psychological approach to ethics. If this aspect of ethical behavior is considered in regulations and executive processes, extrinsic forces can strengthen intrinsic requirements and spread ethics.

The purpose of this study is to examine the ethical aspects and consequences of the feasible duty. The first hypothesis of the study is that the feasible duty also includes ethical recommendations and commands. The second hypothesis is the role of the feasible duty as a strategic principle to prevent harm in moral and educational systems. The third hypothesis is the assessing and psychological role of this principle in the efficiency and effectiveness of ethical and educational systems and the ethical evaluation of the professional systems and legal systems. The research is based on the position of Shiite scholars on the challenges of the unfeasible duty. There are two interpretations of the feasibility: feasibility in the sense of strength and feasibility in the sense of less than tolerability. The research hypotheses are examined via the logical-critical analytic method in light of these two interpretations and by the assumption of non-authorization of the unfeasible duty and the exclusion of any unfeasible duty. The purpose of the present research is to critically apply the principle of the feasible duty to a varied range of applied ethics.

The purpose of this paper is to present a methodological exploration of the process of analyzing educational concepts in philosophy of education with an Islamic approach based on the theory of conventional perceptions of M.H. Tabatabaie. The findings show firstly that educational concepts have these characteristics: 1. Conventional and normative, and therefore the impossibility of connecting them to facts and the truth 2. Not having a productive relationship with the obvious and theoretical theorems. 3. The possibility of change. 4- The possibility of the psychological connection of these types of concepts with the set of facts and needs of human existence. Therefore, it is necessary for educators to integrate these realities and existential needs in the process of analyzing educational concepts. Secondly, the most important criteria for accreditation of such concepts are: 1- Validity of values and supporting propositions, 2- Efficiency (in meeting the needs of human beings), and 3- Compatibility with other social values

Concept of being, by most of MullaSadra’s predecessors, considered simply to be as a derivative and secondary intelligible, to which could not be ascribed any concrete objects or properties, as the referents. The specific problem that we want to address is that if one accepts fundamentality of existence, then how the concept of existence would relate to being (wujūd) itself. In fact, there is an affinity between primacy of being and the way in which concept of being signify things in real world, namely the criterion of subsuming it under first or second intelligible classes. We will argue that rendering the concept of being as a secondary intelligible is inconsistent with MullaSadra’s account of being, based on two different definitions presented traditionally for first and secondary intentions, and the concept, in the sense which characterized by MullaSadra should be subsumed as first intelligible. By exploring the elements of fundamentality of being, one admits that Primacy of being results in the fact that concept of being belongs to first intelligible class.

Mulla Sadra in presenting his theory about Allah's knowledge of objects has innovative achievement in which he has utilized Quranic application of word KHAZAIN. Because of that, it becomes more important to have a comparative study of KHAZAIN by the use of Quranic conceptualization. The main issue in this article is how much Mulla sadra has paid attention to structural-analytic semantics component? While Mulla sadra utilizes Quranic application of KHAZAIN, he has presented philosophical explaining of both properties and conceptual components. Because Sadra attends Quranic conceptualization significantly (e.g. 'being in Precreation',' preservative', ' boundlessness' and etc. ), we can understand that he has done more than a sheer philosophical interpretation in encountering with this word. we can call this approach: ' exegetical philosophy'.

Among the many meanings of the root of the "worm", the meaning of "forgiveness" is seen only in the southern marginal languages, and other meanings of this root, respect, credibility, and honor are only mentioned in Arabic. But how can these meanings be analyzed in the last stages of the process of semanticization of "worms" in the culture of the age of decline, socially and culturally? And whether the process of semanticization of the worm persists in the Qur'an, and what are the main meanings of the "worm" before and after the decline, how are they related to each other, in terms of causes, motivation and function?
According to a humanist study of the phenomenon of forgiveness, the concept of worm in the Saudi space before the descent of two ways can be analyzed: 1) based on motives and 2) through the functions of forgiveness. Because the owners of power, in view of changing the economic discourse of the paranormal region, were motivated to gain credibility, respect and prestige, and to regain the acquired power of forgiveness-zeal. Forgiveness led to the creation of the notion of dignity among the people, and was communicated between dignity and forgiveness and the consolidation of power. Owners of power have enjoyed a remarkable acceptance through the creation of their idolatry and forgiveness to the minds of peoples. On the contrary, since the origin of the worm in the Qur'anic worldview is God, not humans, it should be on the axis of divine reverence