mohammad sarbakhshi

‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī is one of the founders of the branches of philosophy in the realm of Islamic thought. Philosophy of ethics is one such branch that he has discussed in his book "The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism", Tafsīr al-Mīzān, and in his other treatises, under the title of "subjective considerations" (i’tibāriyāt). ‘Allāmah’s perspective in the field of ethical judgments seems non-realistic. However, careful examination of different aspects of his thought reveals that he is a realist. Despite considering ethical obligations and the moral goodness and evil as subjective, he interprets them based on reality. For this reason, he should be considered among the realists. According to ‘Allāmah, the goodness and evil are considered based on ethical obligations and the ethical obligations are considered based on the real necessity between action and the goal. The goal of ethics is felicity, and the motive to achieve felicity is not subject to taste, agreement, command, or prohibition. Therefore, its desirability is real, and since achieving the goal is not possible without performing an action, a person has to inevitably consider the necessity between oneself and the actions essential for the goal, which is termed as ethical obligation. In this way, the subjective consideration of the ethical obligations is based on the real desirability of the ethical goal, and the real necessity between action and that goal. The basis of the subjective consideration of goodness and evil to be real, is also explained in this manner.

The existence of nature and the occurrence of causality in its elements are accepted facts in various branches of knowledge. Except for a few skeptics or idealists, no one denies it, but the independence of nature from the non-physical elements and the exclusivity of causality within its constituents have their proponents. One corresponding claim is the physical causal closure. This principle asserts that physical phenomena arise from physical causes and the non-physical element either does not exist, or if it does, it does not intervene or have an explanatory role. Therefore, there is no need to consider the role of non-physical factors in explaining physical events. Muslim philosophers also believe that physical events are caused by the specific nature of objects, and nature itself is the "direct agent." Such a view is susceptible to being assumed same as the principle of physical causal closure. Philosophical investigations show that this perspective is not the same as the principle of causal closure because philosophers reject the exclusivity of causality in physical causes by accepting non-physical causes, soul and their involvement in physical events. Therefore, the confinement of the investigation methodology of nature to sense and experience is denied. ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī also holds this view. Therefore, he cannot be considered in agreement with proponents of the causal closure. This matter is examined through analytical and rational methods by referring to existing texts on these perspectives.

Every moral school must show its rationality in four elements: logical, epistemological, semantic and ontological. Below each of these elements are questions that need to be answered in order to form a complete moral theory. The most important question concerns the ontological element, Its meaning is the determination whether the value and moral obligation are real or unreal. And there is a fundamental approach to this: realism and moral unrealism. Realists have used various things as the basis for proving realism, the most recent of which is the reliance on the love of nature. Our effort is to show that the above question can be answered on the basis of perfection. Perfection means either human or divine perfection. Relying on human perfection, a secular approach to moral values can be adopted and at the same time the rationality of moral values can be explained, but by relying on divine perfection, the most logical and reasonable justification for moral values is provided and the highest moral value makes sense.

Generally, epistemology is considered as second degree knowledge, in which the value of knowledge is discussed. On the other hand, in philosophy, the existential characteristics of knowledge, such as separate from matter and its nature, are discussed. But as some contemporary philosophers have mentioned, many epistemological discussions are ontological. Even the discussion of the value of knowledge cannot be without considering its reality. Also, without relying on metaphysical principles, such as the principle of the realization of reality, its having ranks, the principle of causality and its branches, it is not possible to advance epistemological discussions. Therefore, we believe that epistemology is also a first degree knowledge and is a part of ontology, and it is only with a special validity that it can be considered a second degree knowledge.

Division into concept and Judgement is one of the famous divisions of the acquired knowledge. Among Islamic thinkers, the discussion of this division can be traced back to Farabi's words. After him, other Muslim logicians and philosophers paid attention to this debate and discussed it in their books. The discussion about this has also provoked differences that Mulla Sadra addressed in the treatise of concept and Judgement. In fact, in each of these views, attention has been paid to an aspect of the aspects of Judgement. Some have considered Judgement to be equal to the proposition, some have introduced its truth as an attribution, and some have considered it as a concept that accompanies the attribution. Another point of view that has been presented about the truth of Judgement is related to those who have considered it as understanding the truth of the proposition. With the investigations we have done in the article, we have shown that all these views have problems and each of them has only paid attention to one aspect of the various aspects of Judgement, and this has caused confusion in the definition of Judgement. Mulla Sadra acknowledged more attention to different dimensions of Judgement, so sometimes he called it a belief (a kind of tendency) and sometimes he called it a concept, which is the same as an attribution. It is better to combine these three and consider each of the meanings of "belief", "concept" and " attribution" as referring to one aspect of Judgement. The interpretation of "concept" refers to the epistemic aspect, the interpretation of "belief" refers to the tendentious aspect, and the interpretation of "attribution" refers to the active aspect of Judgement.

Methods of Study: 

The method of discovery in this issue is library method and the method of evaluation is rational analytic.

To put it more clearly and based on the selected point of view, Judgement is a multi-faceted reality, and it can be acknowledged that these definitions are in fact mentioning different dimensions of Judgement, and Judgement is one of the things which has different aspects in harmony with the self, and this is the characteristic that distinguishes it from concept and at the same time makes Judgement a part of the types of knowledge.

Therefore, the Judgement of a truth is three-faceted, which is an epistemic passivity on the one hand, a dispositional passivity on the other hand, and the third face, which observes the active face of the self, is the verb of the self. The first aspect makes us consider Judgement as a type of concept. The second aspect has caused some people to consider it as a kind of acknowledgment and confession that is achieved passively for humans and has a tendency aspect. Sometimes, the expression of faith and belief is used to refer to this aspect, and finally, the third aspect has caused many logicians and philosophers to call Judgement the same as attribution or to call it a concept that accompanies the attribution. In fact, all of these are different aspects of the same truth, and by combining them (epistemic passivity, dispositional passivity, and active aspect), the truth of Judgement is confirmed and its distinction from concept is revealed. The last word is that what has been collected in this article is a library review of the views and their rational and philosophical analysis to lead to the selected theory which is the multifaceted nature of Judgement

Guarantee of performance is one of the important issues raised in the philosophy of ethics; Because unless there is a guarantee for the implementation of ethics, the issuance of moral judgments and requirements will be useless. Therefore, moral schools seek to explain the guarantee of morality in their theories. The present study has investigated the performance guarantee from the perspective of Kant and Shahid Motahhari with a descriptive-analytical approach. What has been gained from the examination of views shows that, according to Kant, practical reason guarantees the implementation of morality; There are drawbacks to this view, so it can not be accepted. Martyr Motahhari, relying on self-knowledge which is based on theology, considers the understanding of self-esteem and dignity as the motivation for the implementation of morality.Studies show that this view is also not comprehensive and can not be a motivation for everyone to do a moral act. It is noteworthy that belief in God is the most important motivation for the implementation of morality, and Islam, according to the different intellectual and spiritual levels of the people, provides a wide range of motivations for people to turn to moral actions based on belief in God and His oneness has

One of the basic questions in the field of ethics is the observance of moral values by God. Virtue, Deontological & Teleological Ethics are three approaches in this regard. Followers of Virtue ethics have sought to justify the observance of values by God by relying on the attributes of divine perfection. Followers of Teleological ethics consider a specific goal as the source of moral value and determine other values and moral requirements based on it, & followers of Deontological ethics, introduce the must as the principal must and infer other moral musts and values from it. This article argues that the Deontological ethics is not only incapable of justifying the observance of moral values by God, but is fundamentally false. On the other hand, virtue and teleological ethics are not fundamentally different from each other. Third, teleological ethics has two different interpretations, only one of which can clarify the observance of moral values by God. By comparing these three approaches in an analytical way, this article examines the proofs of their correctness and validity and tries to provide the necessary explanation for the observance of moral precepts by God with a teleological approach.

In the contemporary Islamic philosophy, the intelligibles (universal concepts) fall under three categories: primary or essential intelligibles, philosophical secondary concepts, and logical secondary concepts. In this study, the term intelligible is the characteristic of mental concepts. A glance at the philosophical references proves that in the past, the term intelligible was sometimes used to describe the very real entities, rather than the concepts, and were merely divided into two primary and secondary ones. Suffering from the primacy of quiddity and some other doubts, the illuminationist philosophers made existence and its attributes fall under secondary intelligibles and thus be regarded as merely mental concepts. Having made the illuminationist's errors correct, later philosophers divided secondary intelligibles into two categories of logic and philosophy and thus they put attributes of existence under philosophical secondary intelligibles. They have also proposed criteria to distinguish those three categories one from another. In his present study of the historical development of the issue, the author has come to the conclusion that putting the concepts as the subject of description, classification of the intelligibles into three categories, and bringing philosophical entities under "secondary intelligibles" are not recommended, and in some cases are incorrect. Like previous references, we ought to consider the very entities as the intelligibles and to classify them into two categories of primary and secondary intelligibles. In this classification, the philosophical entities go under primary intelligibles and they are divided into three: those of quiddity, philosophical ones, and those mentally-constructed.

The purpose of this paper is to study whether religious morality exists or not. To address this issue, the question is stated in four meanings, and then each meaning is dealt with separately: First, is there religious morality? That is, is a part of religion related to morality so it can be called religious morality? Second, is there religious morality that means moral system? Third, are there any moral theories to be attributed to religion by the believers, so that it can be called religious morality? Fourth, is morality dependent on religion and does secular ethics make any sense? This paper studies the above four meanings, which are presented in four separate questions. The answer to the first three questions is positive, and the answer to the last question is negative. The main research method of is philosophical, but, depending on the case, sometimes a narrative method is also used.

The followers of the divine command theory regard ethics as completely dependent on religion and do not regard a meaning and reality for it beyond the divine command and countermand. On the other hand, the followers of secular ethics view ethics as prior and superior to religion, and at least consider moral values as an independent meaning and reality. In the meantime, some theorists of Islamic thought, despite the rejection of the theory of the divine command, believe in religious ethics and deem religion consisting of ethics. The chosen theory is that ethics is the same as religion and religion is the same as ethics, and despite the inaccuracy of divine command theory, there is a reading of religious ethics that is superior to secular ethics in all semantic, ontological, epistemological, and psychological aspects.

Most philosophers understand causation to be applicable to existential things. So, they say that applying it to other things, such as things that do not exist, is simply metaphorical. Also, they say that it is metaphorical to call preparatory causes ‘causes’. This is something that is prevalent amongst lay people but that is philosophically imprecise. Nevertheless, causation is something real that is capable of being applied to all things. So, it is possible to divide it into external causation and analytical causation. Therefore, it is possible to apply it in a real sense to things that exists, those that do not exist as well as conventional matters. There are many views regarding causation. These range from the denial of causation to its application to all things. However, the proper view is for us to say that only limited beings need a cause. Regarding the secret as to why something needs a cause, it is possible to say that if we say causation is limited to things that exist then the reason why something needs a cause is that its existence is limited. However, if we say that causation is a general concept, then we should say that the possibility of meaning is the reason why something needs a cause. The last view is that of the professor Ghulam Ridha Fayyadhi

There are a variety of questions on creation, its purpose and cause. In order to solve the question of the philosophy of creation, it is essential to differentiate the questions and provide appropriate answers to each one. Regarding this issue, four questions can be distinguished from one another: the first question concerns the creator's purpose, and the second question addresses the purpose of creature. The third question deals with the cause of creation, and the fourth is about the wisdom in the creation of the universe. The answer to the first and the second questions is that because of being absolutely perfect, God, the Almighty who is the creator of the universe, has not had any purpose. The goal of creating each creature is to reach the perfection it deserves. The answer to the third question is that love of perfection is the cause of creation, and since creation has occurred in the best possible way, it is wise. The details of these questions and their answers constitute the content of this paper.

There are two logical and philosophical terms for "the copulative being or the inhering existence ". This term was first introduced in logic for the relationship among propositions. In logic, the inhering existence has an in- something-else existence and is contrast to the existence in -itself. Philosophically, the copulative being has an existence for –something- else and is opposite the independent and for-itself existence. According to Sadr al-Muta’allehin, the copulative being has two terms in the philosopher's words: a literal meaning referred to as the relation of the propositions, and the other meaning as the existence for –something-else. By forging a new term for the copulative being and proving the existence of a caused inhering being, Sadr al-Muta’allehin considers it as lacking an existence independent of its cause. In his view, the caused is not referable and no decree is carried on it without negligence. From the caused inhering existence, he concludes the particular unity of being. Using the descriptive method, this paper seeks to present and study the arguments of Sadr al-Muta’allehin for proving the copulative being. It should be said that although the caused existence can be proved, it does not require particular unity.

The relationship between free choice and the philosophical principle of "causal" predestination is an issue that has long been the subject of controversy among Islamic scholars including philosophers, theologians and fundamentalists. The renowned Islamic scholars do not consider free choice inconsistent with this rational and necessary law, but most theologians argue that it is against free choice. Therefore, they regard the law of "causal predestination" as invalid. Some of fundamentalists believe in the differentiation of this law, and hold that this law applies only to natural and material causes, not to free-willed actions. Considering the fact that the subject of this paper is an issue that must be studied in the works of philosophers, thinkers and experts in this field, the paper uses library sources for data collection; it has a descriptive –analytical research method and is fundamental in terms of purpose. While explaining and proving the philosophical law of "causal predestination”, this paper analyzes the opponents’ views and their arguments, and tries to resolve the apparent incompatibility between free choice and the rational law of "causal concomitance" or "causal predestination". Reflecting on this rational principle and law and its analysis, it becomes clear that famous scholars are right about the point that no effect has the possibility of violating its complete cause and, with the existence of complete cause, the realization of the effect is definite and certain. There are no exceptions to this rational law, even in the case of free-willed actions. Moreover, its acceptance never requires predestination; conversely, if we do not accept this law in the case of free-willed actions, the agent’s free choice will be under question, because violation from free choice will be necessary, and this is inconsistent with the causality of the free agent’s will in the occurrence of the action.

Ethical sentences are being expressed in two compositional and declarative forms. In the compositional sentences, an ethical behavior, trait, or goal is considered as the focus of order and prohibition. In the declarative ones, the same affairs turn into the subject and they will be judged by a valuable or necessary concept. The concepts such as good, bad, correct, incorrect, ought to and ought not are containers of ethical propositions which are called “ethical concepts”. In addition, the concepts of perfection and desirability are embedded in the concept of ethical value; therefore, unlike the unrealistic-oriented viewpoints, because of objectivity of perfection, the ethical values are objective affairs. According to the concepts of duty and responsibility and their relation with value, one can consider all voluntary affairs of ethical actions, traits, and goals as ethical valuation. This is because of involvement of free will in ethical duties and with the relation between values and ethical duties, every voluntary affair will become the subject of judgment.

Philosophy in its strict sense is an intellectual discipline concerned with discovering the reality about existent qua existent and its rules. In these discussions the nature and reality of things and the idea of their existence and non-existence are discussed and the certain, discursive, abstractive, general and necessary property of the rule is among the characteristics of philosophical discussions. Proving the subject matter of every discipline, explaining the conceptional principles and proving their judgmental principles are among the main functions of philosophy. For this reason, each one of the added philosophies can constitute a branch of the philosophy in the science which is adjacent to added philosophy.

The philosophy of the creation of the world and the evils in it has been the special concern of philosophers and theologians. Resting on the key elements of the concept of divine grace i.e. science, causality, will and satisfaction, Ibn Sina tries to present a clear picture of the cause of creation and the order of goodness in the world. It seems that his statements cannot illustrate all the ambiguous aspects of this issue or provide a convincing answer to all the existing problems. Based on Ibn Sina's words and the ideas inferred from transcendental theosophy, the present paper seeks to explore the above issue and answer the related questions.

The perception opponents of philosophy hold about its reality is not the same as what philosophers themselves mean by it. Some of them consider the reality of philosophy as playing with concepts, explaining them, and, in its ideal level, presenting demonstrations. Even some have questioned the demonstrative nature of philosophy. However, paying careful attention to the definitions of philosophers themselves and their assertions indicates that philosophy from their perspective has a very comprehensive reality covering all fields of knowledge and practice. This perception is at least the dominant one among Islamic philosophers. Lack of careful consideration of the real meaning of philosophy has given rise to raising numerous objections to it. These objections have a clearer manifestation in the words of particularly those who claim piety and suppose philosophy in conflict with religion. The present article is an attempt to show that philosophy is not only a demonstrative discipline, but practice is a part of its reality. A real philosopher is one who in addition to his mastering the domain of knowledge has reached perfection in terms of practicing ethical commandments.

Beauty as one of the man's oldest and most established natural desires and art as the practical manifestation of this desire in man's life are two most important categories which have deep relationship with religion, ethics, and many other domains of man's life. Hence, there is an overwhelming necessity of doing fundamental and applied research on the issue, especially with a domestic and religious look, due to increasingly extensive impact of art on modern man's personal and social life. The present paper, which is dedicated to the study of Ayatollah Misbah's views on religious art and committed artist, first mentions his views on art and beauty, their relationships, relationship between them and values, and relativism in art. Then, it seeks to investigate those factors which strengthen "Islamic and religious art. It goes on to deal with symbolism and expressive factors in these arts and finally explores the features of committed artist and makes an assessment of the priorities in the field of art in the religious educational system.

In the domain of epistemology, being true and corresponding to reality are considered as the criteria for epistemological value. Despite alternative views, there is a consensus among Muslim philosophers on this. Scrutinizing this issue, one recognizes that this criterion is only applicable to knowledge by representation (al-‘ilm al-husuli). This runs counter to the fact that knowledge has a general meaning in the tradition of Islamic epistemology, and includes knowledge by presence (al-‘ilm al-huduri) too. Hence, the question arises as to whether knowledge by presence has any epistemological value; and if yes, how this criterion is applicable to this type of knowledge. The author tries to suggest a new interpretation of epistemological value, so that it incorporates knowledge by presence. According to this new meaning, being truly representational is a general criterion, and being self-representational is a specific criterion for epistemological value. Knowledge by presence is epistemologically valuable because it is self-representational. On this footing, the author discusses new requisites for epistemological value.

One of the important issues with which this paper is concerned is exploring the exact meaning of secularism and ethics and then finding the relationship between secularism and different aspects of human life. Secularism does not merely mean dualty of religious and political authority and every domain related to the man's choice will be under the influence of secularism. Therefore, secular ethics has a general meaning which includes politics, economy, culture, art, education, etc. The other question with which this paper is concerned is the relationship between religious ethics and secular ethics. The features of each of these two have been dealt with and fully explained to clarify the nature of this relationship.

There are different approaches to criticize religious ethics. One of these approaches is to explain the damages of religion to morals, which seeks to reject the religious ethics and prove the secular ethics instead. Such issues as moral instability, the discriminatory character of religious ethics, the stability of religions moral laws, and the alienation are discussed in this regard. Expounding and analyzing the most important issues which are considered as the damages of religion to morals, the present paper defends religious ethics and proves its position in different moral schools. Although some of the aforementioned issues are considered as the advantages of religious ethics, critics claim that they are damages to morals.

It is well-known that according to philosophers, sense perception is an acquired one. From among great philosophers, however, Shaykh Ishraq opposes this idea. Also, some contemporary philosophers have tried to show that sense perception is some sort of knowledge by presence. The author believes that sense perception is a knowledge by presence; in this article, however, its being by presence has been interpreted in a way slightly different from the way other researchers interpret it. In the beginning, man's knowledge of his own body has been discussed, and the author has tried to show that just in the same way that the soul is known for us through knowledge by presence; and then, he shows that the material beings also may have knowledge and be subject of knowledge by presence. When these two premises are proved, that the sense perception is by presence (in the sense discussed in this article) may be explained.

The problem of “knowledge by presence” is a multidimensional issue, one of which concerns its historical background and searching for the ideas of the preceding philosophers in this regard. The main questions that this article wants to answer are: is this issue a new idea in Islamic philosophy or does it have a history, and if it has a history, what is the role of the preceding philosophers in this regard?The author in this article has pursued this objective through reviewing and analyzing main works of some of the prominent Muslim philosophers. Evidently, his interpretation of them rests on the new findings in the Islamic philosophy. The conclusion is: Muslim philosophers, from the outset, have distinguished knowledge by presence from representational knowledge on the basis of their distinctive features, though under different rubrics. Another finding is that philosophers, at least in some instances, have equated “ta’aqqul” (reasoning) with knowledge by presence.

Different approaches have been taken to prove secularism among which are those of sociological, psychological and political. Even some have tried to base it upon religious teachings and some other, criticizing aforementioned approaches, have also sought to base it on philosophy. Adel Zaher, an outstanding deputy of the last approach, has known ethics independent of religion, the religion based on reason and the reason prior to narration. For him, these can be counted among the reasons for secularism. In this paper the first, namely the independence of ethics from religion, has been studied. The nature of secularism, its relation to religion, various secular tendencies and its historical development have been described in first part of the paper. In the second, it has been shown that how this independency has led to secularism and then the claim has been studied in the fields of definitions, logical justification of the statements and their discovery. Meanwhile, the possibility or necessity of practical statements in general and ethical ones in particular has been studied. Furthermore, Adel Zaher and Hume’s view on which ought to cannot be inducted from is has been argued against and so has been the theory of Divine command given to prove dependency of ethics on religion and finally the correct view has been introduced.